La invasión de Bélgica o la campaña belga [2] (10-28 de mayo de 1940), a menudo referida en Bélgica como la Campaña de los 18 Días (en francés : Campagne des 18 jours , en holandés : Achttiendaagse Veldtocht ), formó parte de la gran batalla de Francia , una campaña ofensiva de Alemania durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial . Tuvo lugar durante 18 días en mayo de 1940 y terminó con la ocupación alemana de Bélgica tras la rendición del ejército belga .
Batalla de Bélgica | |||||||||
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Parte de la invasión alemana de Francia y los Países Bajos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial | |||||||||
Soldados belgas bajo la guardia alemana tras la caída de Fort Eben-Emael el 11 de mayo de 1940. | |||||||||
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Beligerantes | |||||||||
Bélgica Francia Reino Unido Países Bajos [a] | Alemania | ||||||||
Comandantes y líderes | |||||||||
Leopoldo III ( prisionero de guerra ) Hubert Pierlot Maurice Gamelin Maxime Weygand Lord Gort | Gerd von Rundstedt Fedor von Bock | ||||||||
Fuerza | |||||||||
144 divisiones [b] 13.974 cañones [c] 3.384 tanques [d] 2.249 aviones [e] | 141 divisiones [1] 7.378 cañones [1] 2.445 tanques [1] 5.446 aviones (4.020 en funcionamiento) [1] | ||||||||
Bajas y perdidas | |||||||||
222,443+ bajas (200,000 capturadas ) [f] ~ 900 aviones [g] | Incierto (ver bajas alemanas ) [h] |
El 10 de mayo de 1940, Alemania invadió Luxemburgo , los Países Bajos y Bélgica bajo el plan operativo Fall Gelb (Caso Amarillo). Los ejércitos aliados intentaron detener al ejército alemán en Bélgica , creyendo que era el principal avance alemán. Después de que los franceses habían enviado completamente al mejor de los ejércitos aliados a Bélgica entre el 10 y el 12 de mayo, los alemanes promulgaron la segunda fase de su operación, una ruptura o corte de hoz, a través de las Ardenas , y avanzaron hacia el Canal de la Mancha . El ejército alemán ( Heer ) llegó al Canal después de cinco días, rodeando a los ejércitos aliados. Los alemanes redujeron gradualmente el bolsillo de las fuerzas aliadas, obligándolos a regresar al mar. El ejército belga se rindió el 28 de mayo de 1940, poniendo fin a la batalla. [3]
La Batalla de Bélgica incluyó la primera batalla de tanques de la guerra, la Batalla de Hannut . [4] Fue la batalla de tanques más grande de la historia en ese momento, pero luego fue superada por las batallas de la Campaña del Norte de África y el Frente Oriental . La batalla también incluyó la Batalla de Fort Eben-Emael , la primera operación aérea estratégica con paracaidistas jamás intentada.
La historia oficial alemana afirmaba que en los 18 días de encarnizados combates, el ejército belga fue duros oponentes y habló de la "extraordinaria valentía" de sus soldados. [5] El colapso belga obligó a la retirada aliada de Europa continental. Posteriormente, la Royal Navy británica evacuó los puertos belgas durante la Operación Dynamo , lo que permitió a la Fuerza Expedicionaria Británica (BEF), junto con muchos soldados belgas y franceses, escapar de la captura y continuar las operaciones militares. Francia alcanzó su propio armisticio con Alemania en junio de 1940. Bélgica fue ocupada por los alemanes hasta el otoño de 1944, cuando fue liberada por los aliados occidentales.
Planes previos a la batalla
Las tensas alianzas de Bélgica
La estrategia belga para la defensa contra la agresión alemana enfrentó problemas tanto políticos como militares. En términos de estrategia militar , los belgas no estaban dispuestos a apostarlo todo por una defensa lineal de la frontera belga-alemana, en una extensión de la Línea Maginot . Tal movimiento dejaría a los belgas vulnerables a un asalto alemán en su retaguardia, a través de un ataque a los Países Bajos . Tal estrategia también dependería de los franceses para moverse rápidamente a Bélgica y apoyar a la guarnición allí. [6]
Políticamente, los belgas no confiaban en los franceses. El mariscal Philippe Pétain había sugerido un ataque francés en el área del Ruhr de Alemania utilizando a Bélgica como trampolín en octubre de 1930 y nuevamente en enero de 1933. Bélgica temía verse envuelta en una guerra independientemente, y trató de evitar esa eventualidad. Los belgas también temían verse arrastrados a una guerra como resultado del pacto franco-soviético de mayo de 1935 . El acuerdo franco-belga estipulaba que Bélgica debía movilizarse si los alemanes lo hacían, pero lo que no estaba claro era si Bélgica tendría que movilizarse en caso de una invasión alemana de Polonia. [6]
Los belgas preferían una alianza con el Reino Unido . Los británicos habían entrado en la Primera Guerra Mundial en respuesta a la violación alemana de la neutralidad belga. Los puertos del Canal belga habían ofrecido valiosas bases a la Armada Imperial Alemana , y tal ataque ofrecería a la Kriegsmarine alemana y las bases de la Luftwaffe para participar en operaciones ofensivas estratégicas contra el Reino Unido en el próximo conflicto. Pero el gobierno británico prestó poca atención a las preocupaciones de los belgas. La falta de este compromiso aseguró la retirada belga de la Alianza Occidental , el día antes de la remilitarización de Renania . [6] [7] La falta de oposición a la remilitarización sirvió para convencer a los belgas de que Francia y Gran Bretaña no estaban dispuestos a luchar por sus propios intereses estratégicos, y mucho menos por los de Bélgica. El Estado Mayor belga estaba decidido a luchar por sus propios intereses, solo si era necesario. [6]
Lugar belga en la estrategia aliada
Los franceses se enfurecieron con la declaración abierta de neutralidad del rey Leopoldo III en octubre de 1936. El ejército francés vio socavadas sus suposiciones estratégicas; ya no podía esperar una cooperación más estrecha con los belgas en la defensa de las fronteras orientales de estos últimos, lo que permitiría detener un ataque alemán mucho más adelante de la frontera francesa. [8] Los franceses dependían de cuánta cooperación pudieran obtener de los belgas. Tal situación privó a los franceses de cualquier defensa preparada en Bélgica para prevenir un ataque, una situación que los franceses habían querido evitar, ya que significaba involucrar a las Divisiones Panzer alemanas en una batalla móvil. [9] Los franceses consideraron invadir Bélgica inmediatamente en respuesta a un ataque alemán al país. [10] Los belgas, reconociendo el peligro planteado por los alemanes, secretamente pusieron a disposición del agregado militar francés en Bruselas sus propias políticas de defensa, información sobre el movimiento de tropas, comunicaciones, disposiciones de defensa fijas, inteligencia y acuerdos de reconocimiento aéreo . [11]
El plan aliado para ayudar a Bélgica fue el Plan Dyle ; la flor y nata de las fuerzas aliadas, que incluían las divisiones blindadas francesas , avanzaría hasta el río Dyle en respuesta a una invasión alemana. La elección de una línea aliada establecida consistió en reforzar a los belgas en el este del país, en la línea del canal Mosa - Albert , y mantener el estuario del Escalda , uniendo así las defensas francesas en el sur con las fuerzas belgas que protegen Gante y Amberes. , parecía ser la estrategia defensiva más sólida. [12] La debilidad del plan fue que, políticamente al menos, abandonó la mayor parte del este de Bélgica a los alemanes. Militarmente, pondría la retaguardia aliada en ángulo recto con las defensas fronterizas francesas; mientras que para los británicos, sus comunicaciones ubicadas en los puertos del Canal, serían paralelas a su frente. A pesar del riesgo de enviar fuerzas al centro de Bélgica y un avance a las líneas Scheldt o Dyle, que serían vulnerables a un movimiento de flanqueo, Maurice Gamelin , el comandante francés, aprobó el plan y siguió siendo la estrategia aliada al estallar la guerra. [12]
Los británicos, sin ejército en el campo y detrás en el rearme, no estaban en posición de desafiar la estrategia francesa, que había asumido el papel prominente de la Alianza Occidental. Teniendo poca capacidad para oponerse a los franceses, la estrategia británica para la acción militar llegó en forma de bombardeo estratégico de la industria del Ruhr. [13]
Estrategia militar belga
Tras la retirada oficial belga de la Alianza Occidental, los belgas se negaron a participar en reuniones oficiales de personal con el personal militar francés o británico por temor a comprometer su neutralidad. Los belgas no consideraban que una invasión alemana fuera inevitable y estaban decididos a que, si se producía una invasión, sería efectivamente resistida por nuevas fortificaciones como Eben Emael . [14] Los belgas habían tomado medidas para reconstruir sus defensas a lo largo de la frontera con el estado alemán tras el ascenso al poder de Adolf Hitler en enero de 1933. El gobierno belga había observado con creciente alarma la retirada alemana de la Liga de Naciones , su repudio del Tratado de Versalles y su violación de los Tratados de Locarno . [15] El gobierno aumentó los gastos para modernizar las fortificaciones en Namur y Lieja . Se establecieron nuevas líneas de defensa a lo largo del canal Maastricht –Bois-le-Duc, uniendo el Mosa, el Escalda y el canal Albert. [15] La protección de la frontera oriental, basada principalmente en la destrucción de una serie de carreteras, se confió a nuevas formaciones (unidades de ciclistas fronterizos y los recién formados Chasseurs Ardennais ). [16] En 1935, las defensas belgas se habían completado. [16] Aun así, se consideró que las defensas ya no eran adecuadas. Se necesitaba una reserva móvil significativa para proteger las zonas de retaguardia y, como resultado, se consideró que la protección contra un asalto repentino de las fuerzas alemanas no era suficiente. [16] También se necesitaban importantes reservas de mano de obra, pero el público rechazó un proyecto de ley para la prestación de un servicio militar más prolongado y entrenamiento para el ejército sobre la base de que aumentaría los compromisos militares de Bélgica, así como la solicitud de los Aliados de participar en conflictos lejos de casa. [17]
El rey Leopoldo III pronunció un discurso el 14 de octubre de 1936 frente al Consejo de Ministros, en un intento de persuadir al pueblo (y a su Gobierno) de que era necesario reforzar las defensas. [17] Esbozó tres puntos militares principales para el aumento del rearme de Bélgica:
a) El rearme alemán, tras la completa remilitarización de Italia y Rusia (la Unión Soviética), hizo que la mayoría de los demás estados, incluso aquellos que eran deliberadamente pacifistas, como Suiza y los Países Bajos, tomaran precauciones excepcionales.
b) Ha habido un cambio tan grande en los métodos de guerra como resultado del progreso técnico, particularmente en la aviación y la mecanización, que las operaciones iniciales del conflicto armado podrían ahora ser de tal fuerza, velocidad y magnitud que resulten particularmente alarmantes para países pequeños como Bélgica.
c) Nuestras ansiedades se han incrementado por la reocupación relámpago de Renania y el hecho de que las bases para el inicio de una posible invasión alemana se han trasladado cerca de nuestra frontera. [18]
El 24 de abril de 1937, los franceses y británicos emitieron una declaración pública de que la seguridad de Bélgica era primordial para los aliados occidentales y que defenderían sus fronteras en consecuencia contra cualquier tipo de agresión, ya fuera dirigida únicamente a Bélgica o como medio de obteniendo bases desde las cuales librar la guerra contra "otros estados". Los británicos y franceses, en esas circunstancias, liberaron a Bélgica de sus obligaciones en Locarno de prestarse asistencia mutua en caso de agresión alemana contra Polonia, mientras que los británicos y franceses mantuvieron sus obligaciones militares con Bélgica. [19]
Militarmente, los belgas consideraban que la Wehrmacht era más fuerte que los aliados, en particular el ejército británico, y participar en propuestas a los aliados daría como resultado que Bélgica se convirtiera en un campo de batalla sin aliados adecuados. [20] Los belgas y los franceses permanecieron confundidos acerca de lo que se esperaba el uno del otro si o cuando comenzaran las hostilidades. Los belgas estaban decididos a mantener las fortificaciones fronterizas a lo largo del canal Albert y el Mosa, sin retirarse, hasta que llegara el ejército francés para apoyarlos. Gamelin no estaba interesado en llevar su plan Dyle tan lejos. Le preocupaba que los belgas fueran expulsados de sus defensas y se retiraran a Amberes, como en 1914. De hecho, las divisiones belgas que protegían la frontera debían retirarse y retirarse hacia el sur para unirse con las fuerzas francesas. Esta información no se le dio a Gamelin. [21] En lo que respecta a los belgas, el Plan Dyle tenía ventajas. En lugar del limitado avance aliado al Escalda, o encontrarse con los alemanes en la frontera franco-belga, el traslado al río Dyle reduciría el frente aliado en el centro de Bélgica en 70 kilómetros (43 millas), liberando más fuerzas para su uso como reserva estratégica. Se consideró que salvaría más territorio belga, en particular las regiones industriales del este. También tenía la ventaja de absorber formaciones del ejército holandés y belga (incluidas unas 20 divisiones belgas). Gamelin debía justificar el Plan Dyle después de la derrota utilizando estos argumentos. [22]
El 10 de enero de 1940, en un episodio conocido como el incidente de Mechelen , un comandante del ejército alemán Hellmuth Reinberger se estrelló en un Messerschmitt Bf 108 cerca de Mechelen-aan-de-Maas . [23] Reinberger estaba llevando a cabo los primeros planes para la invasión alemana de Europa occidental que, como Gamelin había esperado, implicaba una repetición del Plan Schlieffen de 1914 y un avance alemán a través de Bélgica (que fue ampliado por la Wehrmacht para incluir a los Países Bajos) y en Francia. [24]
Los belgas sospecharon de una artimaña, pero los planes se tomaron en serio. La inteligencia belga y el agregado militar en Colonia sugirieron correctamente que los alemanes no comenzarían la invasión con este plan. Sugirió que los alemanes intentarían un ataque a través de las Ardenas belgas y avanzarían a Calais con el objetivo de rodear a los ejércitos aliados en Bélgica. Los belgas habían predicho correctamente que los alemanes intentarían un Kesselschlacht (literalmente "batalla de caldero", que significa cerco), para destruir a sus enemigos. Los belgas habían predicho el plan alemán exacto ofrecido por Erich von Manstein . [25]
El Alto Mando belga advirtió a los franceses y británicos de sus preocupaciones. Temían que el plan Dyle pusiera en peligro no solo la posición estratégica belga, sino también todo el ala izquierda del frente aliado. El rey Leopoldo y el general Raoul Van Overstraeten, ayudante de campo del rey , advirtieron a Gamelin y al mando del ejército francés de sus preocupaciones el 8 de marzo y el 14 de abril. Fueron ignorados. [26]
Planes belgas para operaciones defensivas
El plan belga, en caso de agresión alemana [cursiva en el original] preveía:
(a) Una posición dilatoria a lo largo del canal Albert de Amberes a Lieja y el Mosa de Lieja a Namur, que debía mantenerse el tiempo suficiente para permitir que las tropas francesas y británicas ocuparan la línea Amberes-Namur- Givet . Se anticipó que las fuerzas de las Potencias garantes entrarían en acción el tercer día de una invasión.
b) Retirada a la posición de Amberes-Namur.
(c) El ejército belga debía mantener el sector, excluyendo Lovaina , pero incluida Amberes, como parte de la principal posición defensiva aliada. [27]
En un acuerdo con los ejércitos británico y francés, el 7.º ejército francés bajo el mando de Henri Giraud debía avanzar hacia Bélgica, pasando el estuario del Escalda en Zelanda si era posible, hasta Breda , en los Países Bajos. La Fuerza Expedicionaria Británica del Ejército Británico o BEF, comandada por el General John Vereker, Lord Gort , ocuparía la posición central en la brecha Bruselas-Gante apoyando al Ejército belga que mantenía las principales posiciones defensivas a unos 20 kilómetros (12 millas) al este de Bruselas. La principal posición defensiva que rodeaba Amberes estaría protegida por los belgas, a apenas 10 kilómetros de la ciudad. El 7º ejército francés debía llegar a Zelanda o Breda, justo dentro de la frontera holandesa. Los franceses estarían entonces en condiciones de proteger el flanco izquierdo de las fuerzas del ejército belga que protegen Amberes y amenazar el flanco norte alemán. [27]
Más al este, se construyeron posiciones dilatorias en las zonas tácticas inmediatas a lo largo del Canal Albert, que se unía a las defensas del Mosa al oeste de Maastricht. La línea se desvió hacia el sur y continuó hasta Lieja. La brecha de Maastricht-Lieja estaba fuertemente protegida. Fort Eben-Emael custodiaba el flanco norte de la ciudad, el territorio de los tanques situado en las profundidades estratégicas de las fuerzas belgas que ocupaban la ciudad y el eje de avance hacia el oeste del país. Otras líneas de defensa corrían hacia el suroeste, cubriendo el eje Lieja-Namur. El ejército belga también tuvo el beneficio adicional del 1er ejército francés , avanzando hacia Gembloux y Hannut , en el flanco sur del BEF y cubriendo el sector de Sambre . Esto cubrió la brecha en las defensas belgas entre las principales posiciones belgas en la línea Dyle con Namur al sur. Más al sur aún, el 9º ejército francés avanzó hasta el eje Givet-Dinant en el río Mosa. El 2º ejército francés fue responsable de los últimos 100 kilómetros (62 millas) de frente, cubriendo Sedan, el bajo Mosa, la frontera belga-luxemburguesa y el flanco norte de la línea Maginot. [27]
Planes operativos alemanes
El plan de ataque alemán requería que el Grupo de Ejércitos B avanzara y atrajera al Primer Grupo de Ejércitos Aliados hacia el centro de Bélgica, mientras que el Grupo de Ejércitos A conducía el asalto sorpresa a través de las Ardenas. Bélgica actuaría como un frente secundario en lo que respecta a la importancia. El Grupo de Ejércitos B recibió solo un número limitado de unidades blindadas y móviles, mientras que la gran mayoría del Grupo de Ejércitos comprendía divisiones de infantería. [28] Después de que se alcanzó el Canal de la Mancha , todas las unidades de la división Panzer y la mayor parte de la infantería motorizada fueron retiradas del Grupo de Ejércitos B y entregadas al Grupo de Ejércitos A, para fortalecer las líneas de comunicación alemanas y evitar una fuga aliada. [29]
Tal plan aún fracasaría si no se pudiera tomar rápidamente suficiente terreno en Bélgica para presionar a los aliados contra dos frentes. Evitar que esto sucediera fueron las defensas de Fort Eben-Emael y el Canal Albert. Los tres puentes sobre el canal fueron la clave para permitir al Grupo de Ejércitos B un alto ritmo operativo. Los puentes de Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven y Kanne en Bélgica, y Maastricht en la frontera holandesa fueron el objetivo. [30] La imposibilidad de capturar los puentes dejaría al 6º Ejército alemán de Reichenau , el ejército más meridional del Grupo B, atrapado en el enclave del canal Maastricht-Albert y sometido al fuego de Eben-Emael. El fuerte tuvo que ser capturado o destruido. [30]
Adolf Hitler convocó al teniente general Kurt Student de la 7. División Flieger (7ª División Aérea) para discutir el asalto. [30] Primero se sugirió que las fuerzas aerotransportadas hicieran un lanzamiento en paracaídas convencional para apoderarse y destruir los cañones de los fuertes antes de que se acercaran las unidades terrestres. Tal sugerencia fue rechazada porque los transportes Junkers Ju 52 eran demasiado lentos y probablemente serían vulnerables a los cañones antiaéreos holandeses y belgas. [30] Otros factores para su rechazo fueron las condiciones climáticas, que podrían alejar a los paracaidistas del fuerte y dispersarlos demasiado. Una caída de siete segundos desde un Ju 52 a una altura operativa mínima provocó una dispersión de más de 300 metros solamente. [30]
Hitler había notado una falla potencial en las defensas. [30] Los techos eran planos y desprotegidos; exigió saber si un planeador , como el DFS 230 , podría aterrizar sobre ellos. El estudiante respondió que se podía hacer, pero solo con 12 aviones y durante el día; esto entregaría entre 80 y 90 paracaidistas sobre el objetivo. [30] Hitler luego reveló el arma táctica que haría funcionar esta operación estratégica, introduciendo el Hohlladungwaffe (carga hueca), un arma explosiva de 50 kilogramos (110 libras) que destruiría los emplazamientos de armas belgas. Fue esta unidad táctica la que encabezaría la primera operación aérea estratégica de la historia. [31]
Fuerzas involucradas
Fuerzas belgas
El ejército belga podía reunir 22 divisiones, [32] que contenían 1338 piezas de artillería pero solo 10 tanques AMC 35 . Sin embargo, los vehículos de combate belgas incluían 200 cazacarros T-13 . Estos tenían un excelente cañón antitanque de 47 mm y una ametralladora coaxial FN30 en una torreta. Los belgas también poseían 42 T-15 . Fueron descritos oficialmente como vehículos blindados, pero en realidad eran tanques con seguimiento completo con una ametralladora de torreta de 13,2 mm . El cañón antitanque belga estándar era el FRC de 47 mm , remolcado por camiones o por tractores Utilitie B blindados con orugas completas. Un informe afirma que una bala de un cañón de 47 mm atravesó un Sd kfz 231 y penetró el blindaje del Panzer IV detrás de él. Estos cañones belgas eran mejores que los cañones de 25 mm y 37 mm de los franceses y los alemanes, respectivamente. [33]
Los belgas comenzaron la movilización el 25 de agosto de 1939 y en mayo de 1940 montaron un ejército de campaña de 18 divisiones de infantería, dos divisiones de Chasseurs Ardennais parcialmente motorizadas y dos divisiones de caballería motorizadas, una fuerza total de unos 600.000 hombres. [34] Las reservas belgas pueden haber podido desplegar 900.000 hombres. [35] El ejército carecía de armaduras y cañones antiaéreos. [34] [36]
Después de completar la movilización del ejército belga, podría reunir cinco cuerpos regulares y dos cuerpos de ejército de reserva que constan de 12 divisiones de infantería regulares, dos divisiones de Chasseurs Ardennais , seis divisiones de infantería de reserva, una brigada de guardias fronterizos ciclistas, un cuerpo de caballería de dos divisiones y una brigada de caballería motorizada. [37] El Ejército contenía dos regimientos de artillería antiaérea y cuatro de artillería, y un número indeterminado de personal de fortaleza, ingenieros y fuerzas de señales. [37]
El Cuerpo Naval Belga ( Corps de Marine ) resucitó en 1939. La mayor parte de la flota mercante belga, unos 100 barcos, evadió la captura de los alemanes. Según los términos de un acuerdo entre Bélgica y la Marina Real, estos barcos y sus 3.350 tripulantes fueron puestos bajo control británico durante la duración de las hostilidades. [38] El Cuartel General del Almirantazgo belga estaba en Ostende bajo el mando del mayor Henry Decarpentrie. La Primera División Naval tenía su base en Ostende, mientras que las Divisiones Segunda y Tercera tenían su base en Zeebrugge y Amberes. [39]
La Aéronautique Militaire Belge (Fuerza Aérea Belga - AéMI) apenas había comenzado a modernizar su tecnología aeronáutica. La AéMI había ordenado cazas Brewster Buffalo , Fiat CR.42 y Hawker Hurricane , entrenadores Koolhoven FK56 , bombarderos ligeros Fairey Battle y Caproni Ca.312 y aviones de reconocimiento Caproni Ca.335, pero solo los Fiats, Hurricanes y Battles. había sido entregado. La escasez de tipos modernos significaba que las versiones de un solo asiento del bombardero ligero Fairey Fox se usaban como cazas. [40] El AéMI poseía 250 aviones de combate. Al menos 90 eran cazas, 12 bombarderos y 12 aviones de reconocimiento. Solo 50 eran de un nivel razonablemente moderno. [41] Cuando se incluyen las aeronaves de enlace y transporte de todos los servicios, la dotación total fue de 377; sin embargo, sólo 118 de ellos estaban en servicio el 10 de mayo de 1940. De este número, alrededor de 78 eran cazas y 40 bombarderos. [42]
El AéMI estaba al mando de Paul Hiernaux, que había recibido su licencia de piloto justo antes del estallido de la Primera Guerra Mundial y había ascendido al puesto de Comandante en Jefe en 1938. [40] Hiernaux organizó el servicio en tres Regimientos de Estado. Aéronautique (regimientos aéreos): el 1er con 60 aviones, el 2ème con 53 aviones y el 3ème con 79 aviones. [43]
Fuerzas francesas
Los belgas recibieron un apoyo sustancial del ejército francés . El 1er Ejército francés incluía el Cuerpo de Caballería del general René Prioux. El Cuerpo recibió la 2da División Mecanizada Ligera (2 e División Légère Mécanique, o 2 e DLM) y la 3ra División Mecanizada Ligera (3 e DLM), que se asignaron para defender la brecha de Gembloux . Las fuerzas blindadas consistían en 176 de los formidables SOMUA S35 y 239 tanques ligeros Hotchkiss H35 . Ambos tipos, en armadura y potencia de fuego, eran superiores a la mayoría de los tipos alemanes. [44] El 3 e DLM contenía 90 S35 y unos 140 H35 solo. [44]
El 7. ° ejército francés fue asignado para proteger la parte más septentrional del frente aliado. Contenía la 1ª División Mecanizada Ligera (1 re DLM), la 25ª División de Infantería Motorizada (25 e Division d'Infanterie Motorisée, o 25 e DIM) y la 9ª División de Infantería Motorizada (9 e DIM). Esta fuerza avanzaría a Breda en los Países Bajos. [45]
El tercer ejército francés en entrar en acción en suelo belga fue el noveno . Era más débil que los ejércitos 7 y 1. Al 9º Ejército se le asignaron divisiones de infantería, con la excepción de la 5ª División de Infantería Motorizada (5 e DIM). Su misión era proteger el flanco sur de los ejércitos aliados, al sur del río Sambre y justo al norte de Sedan . Más al sur, en Francia, estaba el 2º ejército francés, que protegía la frontera franco-belga entre Sedan y Montmédy . Los dos ejércitos franceses más débiles protegían así el área de la principal ofensiva alemana. [46]
Fuerzas británicas
Los británicos contribuyeron con la fuerza más débil a Bélgica. El BEF, bajo el mando del general Lord Gort VC, constaba de sólo 152.000 hombres en dos cuerpos de dos divisiones cada uno. Se esperaba desplegar dos ejércitos de dos Cuerpos cada uno, pero esta escala de movilización nunca tuvo lugar. El I Cuerpo fue comandado por Lt-Gen. John Dill , más tarde teniente general. Michael Barker , quien a su vez fue reemplazado por el general de división Harold Alexander . Teniente General. Alan Brooke comandó el II Cuerpo . Más tarde el III Cuerpo al mando del Lt-Gen. Ronald Adam fue agregado al orden de batalla británico . Otros 9.392 efectivos de la Royal Air Force (RAF) de la RAF Advanced Air Striking Force bajo el mando del Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair estaban destinados a apoyar las operaciones en Bélgica. En mayo de 1940, la BEF había crecido a 394.165 hombres, de los cuales más de 150.000 formaban parte de las organizaciones logísticas de la retaguardia y tenían escaso entrenamiento militar. [47] El 10 de mayo de 1940, el BEF comprendía sólo 10 divisiones (no todas con toda su fuerza), 1.280 piezas de artillería y 310 tanques. [48]
Fuerzas alemanas
El Grupo de Ejércitos B estaba al mando de Fedor von Bock . Se le asignaron 26 divisiones de infantería y tres Panzer para la invasión de los Países Bajos y Bélgica. [49] De las tres Divisiones Panzer, la 3ª y 4ª iban a operar en Bélgica bajo el mando del XVI Cuerpo del 6º Ejército . La 9ª División Panzer se incorporó al 18º Ejército que, después de la Batalla de los Países Bajos , apoyaría el avance hacia Bélgica junto con el 18º Ejército y cubriría su flanco norte. [49]
La fuerza de blindaje en el Grupo de Ejércitos B ascendió a 808 tanques, de los cuales 282 eran Panzer Is , 288 Panzer II , 123 Panzer III y 66 Panzer IV ; [50] 49 tanques de mando también estaban operativos. [50] Los regimientos blindados de la 3.ª División Panzer consistían en 117 Panzer Is, 128 Panzer II, 42 Panzer III, 26 Panzer IV y 27 tanques de mando. [50] La 4ª División Panzer tenía 136 Panzer Is, 105 Panzer II, 40 Panzer III, 24 Panzer IV y 10 tanques de mando. [50] El 9º Panzer, programado inicialmente para operaciones en los Países Bajos, era la división más débil con solo 30 Panzer Is, 54 Panzer II, 123, 66 Panzer III y 49 Panzer IV. [50] Los elementos extraídos de la 7ª División Aérea y la 22ª División de Aterrizaje Aéreo , que iban a participar en el ataque a Fort Eben-Emael, se llamaron Sturmabteilung Koch (Destacamento de Asalto Koch); el nombre del oficial al mando del grupo, Hauptmann Walter Koch . [51] La fuerza se reunió en noviembre de 1939. Estaba compuesta principalmente por paracaidistas del 1er Regimiento de Paracaidistas e ingenieros de la 7ª División Aérea, así como un pequeño grupo de pilotos de la Luftwaffe . [52] La Luftwaffe asignó 1.815 aviones de combate, 487 aviones de transporte y 50 planeadores para el asalto a los Países Bajos. [53]
The initial air strikes over Belgian air space were to be conducted by IV. Fliegerkorps under General der Flieger Generaloberst Alfred Keller. Keller's force consisted of Lehrgeschwader 1 (Stab. I., II., III., IV.), Kampfgeschwader 30 (Stab. I., II., III.) and Kampfgeschwader 27 (III.).[54] On 10 May Keller had 363 aircraft (224 serviceable) augmented by Generalmajor Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII. Fliegerkorps with 550 (420 serviceable) aircraft. They in turn were supported by Oberst Kurt-Bertram von Döring's Jagdfliegerführer 2, with 462 fighters (313 serviceable).[55]
Keller's IV. Fliegerkorps headquarters would operate from Düsseldorf, LG 1. Kampfgeschwader 30 which was based at Oldenburg and its III. Gruppe were based at Marx. Support for Döring and Von Richthofen came from present-day North Rhine-Westphalia and bases in Grevenbroich, Mönchengladbach, Dortmund and Essen.[54]
Batalla
Luftwaffe operations: 10 May
During the evening of 9 May, the Belgian Military attaché in Berlin intimated that the Germans intended to attack the following day. Offensive movement of enemy forces were detected on the border. At 00:10 on 10 May 1940, at General Headquarters an unspecified squadron in Brussels gave the alarm.[56] A full state of alert was instigated at 01:30 am.[57] Belgian forces took up their deployment positions.[56] The Allied armies had enacted their Dyle plan on the morning of 10 May, and were approaching the Belgian rear. King Leopold had gone to his Headquarters near Briedgen, Antwerp.[58]
The Luftwaffe was to spearhead the aerial battle in the low countries. Its first task was the elimination of the Belgian air contingent. Despite an overwhelming numerical superiority of 1,375 aircraft, 957 of which were serviceable, the air campaign in Belgium had limited success overall on the first day.[55] At roughly 04:00, the first air raids were conducted against airfields and communication centres.[56] It still had a tremendous impact on the AéMI, which had only 179 aircraft on 10 May.[59]
Much of the success achieved was down to Richthofen's subordinates, particularly Kampfgeschwader 77 and its commander Oberst Dr. Johann-Volkmar Fisser whose attachment to VIII. Fliegerkorps, was noted by Generalmajor Wilhelm Speidel. He commented it "...was the result of the well-known tendency of the commanding general to conduct his own private war".[59] Fisser's KG 77 destroyed the AéMI main bases, with help from KG 54.[59] Fighters from Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27) eliminated two Belgian squadrons at Neerhespen, and during the afternoon, I./St.G 2 destroyed nine of the 15 Fiat CR.42 fighters at Brustem.[59] At Schaffen-Diest, three Hawker Hurricanes of Escadrille 2/I/2 were destroyed and another six damaged when a wave of He 111s caught them as they were about to take off. A further two were lost in destroyed hangars. At Nivelles airfield, 13 CR42s were destroyed.[60] The only other success was KG 27s destruction of eight aircraft at Belesle.[59]
In aerial combat the battles were also one-sided. Two He 111s, two Do 17s and three Messerschmitt Bf 109s were shot down by Gloster Gladiators and Hurricanes. In return, eight Belgian Gladiators, five Fairey Foxs and one CR42 were shot down by JG 1, 21 and 27. No. 18 Squadron RAF sent two Bristol Blenheims on operations over the Belgian front, but lost both to Bf 109s. By the end of 10 May, the official German figures indicate claims for 30 Belgian aircraft destroyed on the ground, and 14 (plus the two RAF bombers) in the air for 10 losses.[61] The victory claims are likely an undercount. A total of 83 Belgian machines–mostly trainers and "squadron hacks", were destroyed.[59] The AéMI flew only 146 sorties in the first six days.[62] Between 16 May and 28 May, the AéMI flew just 77 operations.[62] It spent most of its time retreating and fuel withdrawing in the face of Luftwaffe attacks.[62]
10–11 May: The border Battles
The German planners had recognised the need to eliminate Fort Eben-Emael if their army was to break into the interior of Belgium. It decided to deploy airborne forces (Fallschirmjäger) to land inside the fortress perimeter using gliders. Using special explosives (and flamethrowers) to disable the defences, the Fallschirmjäger then entered the fortress. In the ensuing battle, German infantry overcame the defenders of the I Belgian Corps' 7th Infantry Division in 24 hours.[63] The main Belgian defence line had been breached and German infantry of the 18th Army had passed through it rapidly. Moreover, German soldiers had established bridgeheads across the Albert Canal before the British were able to reach it some 48 hours later. The Chasseurs Ardennais further south, on the orders of their commander, withdrew behind the Meuse, destroying some bridges in their wake.[64] The German airborne forces were assisted by Junkers Ju 87 Stukas of III./Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) and I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 (StG 77) helped suppress the defences. Henschel Hs 123s of II.(S)./Lehrgeschwader 2 (LG 2) which assisted in the capture of the bridges at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt in the immediate area.[65]
Further successful German airborne offensive operations were carried out in Luxembourg which seized five crossings and communication routes leading into central Belgium. The offensive, carried out by 125 volunteers of the 34th Infantry Division under the command of Wenner Hedderich, achieved their missions by flying to their objectives using Fieseler Fi 156 Störche. The cost was the loss of five aircraft and 30 dead.[66] With the fort breached, the Belgian 4th and 7th Infantry Divisions were confronted by the prospect of fighting an enemy on relatively sound terrain (for armour operations). The 7th Division, with its 2nd and 18th Grenadier Regiments and 2nd Carabineers, struggled to hold their positions and contain the German infantry on the west bank.[58] The Belgian tactical units engaged in several counterattacks. At one point, at Briedgen, they succeeded in retaking the bridge and blowing it up.[58] At the other points, Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt, the Germans had had time to establish strong bridgeheads and repulsed the attacks.[58]
A little known third airborne operation, Operation Niwi, was also conducted on 10 May in southern Belgium. The objectives of this operation was to land two companies of the 3rd battalion Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment by Fi 156 aircraft at Nives and Witry in the south of the country, in order to clear a path for the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions which were advancing through the Belgian–Luxembourg Ardennes. The original plan called for the use of Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft, but the short landing capability of the Fi 156 (27 metres) saw 200 of these aircraft used in the assault. The operational mission was to:
1. Cut signal communications and message links on the Neufchâteau–Bastogne and Neufchâteau–Martelange roads. [Neufchâteau being the largest southernmost city in Belgium]
2. Prevent the approach of reserves from the Neufchâteau area
3. Facilitate the capture of pillboxes and the advance by exerting pressure against the line of pillboxes along the border from the rear.[67]
The German infantry were engaged by several Belgian patrols equipped with T-15 armoured cars. Several Belgian counterattacks were repulsed, among them an attack by the 1st Light Chasseurs Ardennais Division. Unsupported, the Germans faced a counterattack later in the evening by elements of the French 5th Cavalry Division, dispatched by General Charles Huntziger from the French 2nd Army, which had a significant tank strength. The Germans were forced to retreat. The French, however, failed to pursue the fleeing German units, stopping at a dummy barrier.[68] By the next morning, the 2nd Panzer Division had reached the area, and the mission had largely been accomplished. From the German perspective, the operation hindered rather than helped Heinz Guderian's Panzer Corps.[68] The regiment had blocked the roads and, against the odds, prevented French reinforcements reaching the Belgian–Franco-Luxembourg border, but it also destroyed Belgian telephone communications.[68] This inadvertently prevented the Belgian field command recalling the units along the border. The 1st Belgian Light Infantry did not receive the signal to retreat and engaged in a severe fire-fight with the German armour, slowing down their advance.[68]
The failure of the Franco–Belgian forces to hold the Ardennes gap was fatal. The Belgians had withdrawn laterally upon the initial invasion and had demolished and blocked routes of advance, which held up the French 2nd Army units moving north toward Namur and Huy. Devoid of any centre of resistance, the German assault engineers had cleared the obstacles unchallenged. The delay that the Belgian Ardennes Light Infantry, considered to be an elite formation, could have inflicted upon the advancing German armour was proved by the fight for Bodange, where the 1st Panzer Division was held up for a total of eight hours. This battle was a result of a breakdown in communications and ran contrary to the operational intentions of the Belgian Army.[69]
Meanwhile, in the central Belgian sector, having failed to restore their front by means of ground attack, the Belgians attempted to bomb the bridges and positions that the Germans had captured intact and were holding on 11 May. Belgian Fairey Battles of 5/III/3 escorted by six Gloster Gladiators attacked the Albert Canal bridges. Bf 109s from I./Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1) and I./JG 27 intercepted and JG 1 shot down four Gladiators and both units destroyed six Battles and heavily damaged the remaining three. Eight CR.42s were evacuated from Brustem to Grimbergen near Brussels but seven Gladiators and the last remaining Hurricanes from 2/I/2 Escadrille were destroyed at Beauvechain Air Base and Le Culot by He 111s and I./JG 27 respectively.[58][70] The RAF contributed to the effort to attack the bridges. The British dispatched Bristol Blenheims from 110 and 21 Squadron—the first squadron lost two, one to I./JG 27. 21 Squadron suffered damage to most of the bombers because of intense ground-fire. The French Armée de l'air dispatched LeO 451s from GBI/12 and GBII/12 escorted by 18 Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 of GCIII/3 and GCII/6. The operation failed and one bomber was lost while four M.S.406s fell to I.JG 1. The French claimed five. Meanwhile, 114 Squadron lost six Blenheims destroyed when Dornier Do 17s of Kampfgeschwader 2 bombed their airfield at Vraux. Another Battle of No. 150 Squadron RAF was lost in another raid.[71]
The German counter-air operations were spearheaded by Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) under the command of Hans-Hugo Witt, which was responsible for 82 of the German claims in aerial combat between 11 and 13 May.[72] Despite the apparent success of the German fighter units, the air battle was not one-sided.[72] On the morning of 11 May ten Ju 87s of StG 2 were shot down attacking Belgian forces in the Namur–Dinant gap, despite the presence of two Jagdgeschwader—27 and 51.[72] Nevertheless, the Germans reported a weakening in Allied air resistance in northern Belgium by 13 May.[72]
During the night of 11 May, the British 3rd Infantry Division under the command of General Bernard Law Montgomery, reached its position on the Dyle river at Leuven. As it did so the Belgian 10th Infantry Division, occupying the position, mistook them for German parachutists and fired on them. The Belgians refused to yield but Montgomery claimed to have got his way by placing himself under the command of the Belgian forces, knowing that when the Germans came within artillery range the Belgians would withdraw.[45]
Alan Brooke, commander of the British II Corps sought to put the matter of cooperation right with King Leopold. The King discussed the matter with Brooke, who felt a compromise could be reached. Van Overstraeten, the King's military aide, stepped in and said that the 10th Belgian Infantry Division could not be moved. Instead, the British should move further south and remain completely clear of Brussels. Brooke told the King that the 10th Belgian Division was on the wrong side of the Gamelin line and was exposed. Leopold deferred to his advisor and chief of staff. Brooke found Overstaeten to be ignorant of the situation and the dispositions of the BEF. Given that the left flank of the BEF rested on its Belgian ally, the British were now unsure about Belgian military capabilities.[45] The Allies had more serious grounds for complaint about the Belgian anti-tank defences along the Dyle line, that covered the Namur–Perwez gap which was not protected by any natural obstacles.[45][73] Only a few days before the attack, General Headquarters had discovered the Belgians had sited their anti-tank defences (de Cointet defences) several miles east of the Dyle between Namur–Perwez.[45]
After holding onto the Albert Canal's west bank for nearly 36 hours, the 4th and 7th Belgian infantry divisions withdrew. The capture of Eben-Emael allowed the Germans to force through the Panzers of the 6th Army. The situation for the Belgian divisions was either to withdraw or be encircled. The Germans had advanced beyond Tongeren and were now in a position to sweep south to Namur, which would threaten to envelop the entire Albert Canal and Liège positions. Under the circumstances, both divisions withdrew.[74] On the evening of 11 May, the Belgian Command withdrew its forces behind the Namur–Antwerp line. The following day, the French 1st Army arrived at Gembloux, between Wavre and Namur, to cover the "Gembloux gap". It was a flat area, devoid of prepared or entrenched positions.[74]
The French 7th Army, on the northern flank of the Belgian line, protected the Bruges–Ghent–Ostend axis and, covering the Channel ports, had advanced into Belgium and into the Netherlands with speed. It reached Breda in the Netherlands, on 11 May. But German parachute forces had seized the Moerdijk bridge on the Hollands Diep river, south of Rotterdam, making it impossible for the French to link up with the Dutch Army. The Dutch Army withdrew north to Rotterdam and Amsterdam.[75] The French 7th Army turned east and met the 9th Panzer Division about 20 kilometres (12 mi) east of Breda at Tilburg. The battle resulted in the French retiring, in the face of Luftwaffe air assaults, to Antwerp. It would later help in the defence of the city.[76] The Luftwaffe had given priority to attacking the French 7th Army's spearhead into the Netherlands as it threatened the Moerdijk bridgehead. Kampfgeschwader 40 and 54 supported by Ju 87s from VIII. Fliegerkorps helped drive them back.[77] Fears of Allied reinforcements reaching Antwerp forced the Luftwaffe to cover the Scheldt estuary. KG 30 bombed and sank two Dutch gunboats and three Dutch destroyers, as well as badly damaging two Royal Navy destroyers. But overall the bombing had a limited effect.[77]
12–14 May: Battles of the central Belgian plain
During the night of 11/12 May, the Belgians were fully engaged in withdrawing to the Dyle line, covered by a network of demolitions and rearguards astride Tongeren. During the morning of 12 May, King Leopold III, General van Overstraeten, Édouard Daladier, General Alphonse Georges (commander of the First Allied army Group, comprising the BEF, French 1st, 2nd, 7th and 9th Armies), General Gaston Billotte (coordinator of the Allied Armies) and General Henry Royds Pownall, Gort's chief of staff, met for a military conference near Mons. It was agreed the Belgian Army would man the Antwerp–Leuven line, while its allies took up the responsibility of defending the extreme north and south of the country.[78]
The Belgian III Corps, and its 1st Chasseurs Ardennais, 2nd Infantry and 3rd Infantry Divisions had withdrawn from the Liège fortifications to avoid being encircled. One regiment, the Liège Fortress Regiment, stayed behind to disrupt German communications. Further to the south, the Namur fortress, manned by VI Corps' 5th Infantry Division and the 2nd Chasseurs Ardennais with the 12th French Infantry Division, fought delaying actions and participated in a lot of demolition work while guarding the position.[79] As far as the Belgians were concerned, it had accomplished the only independent mission assigned to it: to hold the Liège–Albert Canal line long enough for the Allied units to reach friendly forces occupying the Namur–Antwerp–Givet line. For the remainder of the campaign, the Belgians would execute their operations in accordance with the overall Allied plan.[79]
Belgian soldiers fought rearguard actions while other Belgian units already on the Dyle line worked tirelessly to organise better defensive positions in the Leuven–Antwerp gap. The 2nd Regiment of Guides and the 2nd Carabineers Cyclists of the 2nd Belgian Cavalry Division covered the retreat of the 4th and 7th Belgian divisions and were particularly distinguished at the Battle of Tirlemont and the Battle of Halen.[80][81]
In support of Belgian forces in the area, the RAF and French flew air defence operations in the Tirlemont and Louvain area. The RAF Advanced Air Striking Force committed 3, 504, 79, 57, 59, 85, 87, 605, and 242 squadrons to battle. A series of air battles were fought with JG 1, 2, 26, 27 and 3. Messerschmitt Bf 110s from Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), and bomber units LG 1, 2 and KG 27 were also involved.[82] Over Belgium and France, the day was disastrous for the British: 27 Hurricanes were shot down.[83] In light of the withdrawal to the main defensive line, which was now being supported by the British and French Armies, King Leopold issued the following proclamation to improve morale after the defeats at the Albert Canal:
Soldiers
The Belgian Army, brutally assailed by an unparalleled surprise attack, grappling with forces that are better equipped and have the advantage of a formidable air force, has for three days carried out difficult operations, the success of which is of the utmost importance to the general conduct of the battle and to the result of war.
These operations require from all of us – officers and men – exceptional efforts, sustained day and night, despite a moral tension tested to its limits by the sight of the devastation wrought by a pitiless invader. However severe the trial may be, you will come through it gallantly.
Our position improves with every hour; our ranks are closing up. In the critical days that are ahead of us, you will summon up all your energies, you will make every sacrifice, to stem the invasion.
Just as they did in 1914 on the Yser, so now the French and British troops are counting on you: the safety and honour of the country are in your hands.Leopold.[80]
To the Allies, the Belgian failure to hold onto its eastern frontiers (they were thought to be capable of holding out for two weeks), was a disappointment. The Allied Chiefs of Staff had sought to avoid an encounter mobile battle without any strong fixed defences to fall back on and hoped Belgian resistance would last long enough for a defensive line to be established.[84] Nevertheless, a brief lull fell on the Dyle front on 11 May which enabled the Allied armies to get into position by the time the first major assault was launched the following day. Allied cavalry had moved into position and infantry and artillery were reaching the front more slowly, by rail. Although unaware of it, the First Allied army Group and the Belgian Army outnumbered and outgunned Walther von Reichenau's German 6th Army.[85]
On the morning of 12 May, in response to Belgian pressure and necessity, the Royal Air Force and the Armée de l'Air undertook several air attacks on the German-held Maastricht and Meuse bridges to prevent German forces flowing into Belgium. 74 sorties had been flown by the Allies since 10 May. On 12 May, eleven out of eighteen French Breguet 693 bombers were shot down. The RAF Advanced Air Striking Force, which included the largest Allied bomber force, was reduced to 72 aircraft out of 135 by 12 May. For the next 24 hours, missions were postponed as the German anti-aircraft and fighter defences were too strong.[86]
The results of the bombing is difficult to determine. The German XIX Corps war diary's situation summary at 20:00 on 14 May noted:
The completion of the military bridge at Donchery had not yet been carried out owing to heavy flanking artillery fire and long bombing attacks on the bridging point ... Throughout the day all three divisions have had to endure constant air attack — especially at the crossing and bridging points. Our fighter cover is inadequate. Requests [for increased fighter protection] are still unsuccessful.
The Luftwaffe's operations includes a note of "vigorous enemy fighter activity through which our close reconnaissance in particular is severely impeded". Nevertheless, inadequate protection was given to cover RAF bombers against the strength of German opposition over the target area.[87] In all, out of 109 Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheims which had attacked enemy columns and communications in the Sedan area, 45 had been lost.[87] On 15 May, daylight bombing was significantly reduced.[87] Of 23 aircraft employed, four failed to return. Equally, owing to the Allied fighter presence, the German XIX Corps War Diary states, "Corps no longer has at its disposal its own long-range reconnaissance ... [Reconnaissance squadrons] are no longer in a position to carry out vigorous, extensive reconnaissance, as, owing to casualties, more than half of their aircraft are not now available."[87]
The most serious combat to evolve on 12 May 1940 was the beginning of the Battle of Hannut (12–14 May). While the German Army Group A advanced through the Belgian Ardennes, Army Group B's 6th Army launched an offensive operation toward the Gembloux gap. Gembloux occupied a position in the Belgian plain; it was an unfortified, untrenched space in the main Belgian defensive line.[88] The Gap stretched from the southern end of the Dyle line, from Wavre in the north, to Namur in the south, 20 kilometres (12 mi) to 30 kilometres (19 mi). After attacking out of the Maastricht bulge and defeating the Belgian defences at Liege, which compelled the Belgian I Corps to retreat, the German 6th Army's XVI Panzer-Motorized Corps, under the command of General Erich Hoepner and containing the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, launched an offensive in the area where the French mistakenly expected the main German thrust.[89][90]
The Gembloux gap was defended by the French 1st Army, with six elite divisions including the 2nd (2e Division Légère Mécanique, or 2e DLM) and 3rd Light Mechanized Divisions.[88] The Prioux Cavalry Corps, under the command of Rene-Jacques-Adolphe Prioux, was to advance 30 kilometres (19 mi) beyond the line (east) to provide a screen for the move. The French 1st and 2nd Armoured Divisions were to be moved behind the French 1st Army to defend its main lines in depth.[88] The Prioux Cavalry Corps was equal to a German Panzer Corps and was to occupy a screening line on the Tirlemont–Hannut–Huy axis. The operational plan called for the Corps to delay the German advance on Gembloux and Hannut until the main elements of the French 1st Army had reached Gembloux and dug in.[88]
Hoepner's Panzer Corps and Prioux' Cavalry clashed head-on near Hannut, Belgium, on 12 May. Contrary to popular belief, the Germans did not outnumber the French.[91] Frequently, figures of 623 German and 415 French tanks are given.[91] The German 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions numbered 280 and 343 respectively.[91] The 2e DLM and 3e DLM numbered 176 Somuas and 239 Hotchkiss H35s.[91] Added to this force were the considerable number of Renault AMR-ZT-63s in the Cavalry Corps. The R35 was equal or superior to the Panzer I and Panzer IIs in armament terms.[91] This applies all the more to the 90 Panhard 178 armoured cars of the French Army. Its 25mm main gun could penetrate the armour of the Panzer IV. In terms of tanks that were capable of engaging and surviving a tank-vs-tank action, the Germans possessed just 73 Panzer IIIs and 52 Panzer IVs.[91] The French had 176 SOMUA and 239 Hotchkisses.[91] German tank units also contained 486 Panzer I and IIs, which were of dubious combat value given their losses in the Polish Campaign.[44]
The German forces were able to communicate by radio during the battle and they could shift the point of the main effort unexpectedly. The Germans also practiced combined arms tactics, while the French tactical deployment was a rigid and linear leftover from the First World War. French tanks did not possess radios and often the commanders had to dismount to issue orders.[92] Despite the disadvantages experienced by the Germans in armour, they were able to gain the upper hand in the morning battle on 12 May, encircling several French battalions. The combat power of the French 2e DLM managed to defeat the German defences guarding the pockets and freeing the trapped units.[93] Contrary to German reports, the French were victorious on that first day, preventing a Wehrmacht break-through to Gembloux or seizing Hannut.[92] The result of the first day's battle was:
The effect on the German light tanks was catastrophic. Virtually every French weapon from 25mm upward penetrated the 7-13mm of the Panzer I. Although the Panzer II fared somewhat better, especially those that had been up-armoured since the Polish Campaign, their losses were high. Such was the sheer frustration of the crews of these light Panzers in [the] face of heavier armoured French machines that some resorted to desperate expedients. One account speaks of a German Panzer commander attempting to climb on a Hotchkiss H-35 with a hammer, presumably to smash the machine's periscopes, but falling off and being crushed by the tank's tracks. Certainly by day's end, Prioux had reason to claim that his tanks had come off best. The battlefield around Hannut was littered with knocked-out tanks–the bulk of which were German Panzers–with by far and away the bulk of them being Panzer Is and IIs.[94]
The following day, 13 May, the French were undone by their poor tactical deployment. They strung their armour out in a thin line between Hannut and Huy, leaving no defence in depth, which was the point of sending the French armour to the Gembloux gap in the first place. This left Hoepner with a chance to mass against one of the French Light Divisions (the 3e DLM) and achieve a breakthrough in that sector. Moreover, with no reserves behind the front, the French denied themselves the chance of a counterattack. The victory saw the Panzer Corps out-manoeuvre the 2e DLM on its left flank.[92] The Belgian III Corps, retreating from Liege, offered to support the French front held by the 3e DLM. This offer was rejected.[95]
On 12 and 13 May, 2e DLM lost no AFVs, but the 3e DLM lost 30 SOMUAs and 75 Hotchkisses. The French had disabled 160 German tanks.[96] But as the poor linear deployment had allowed the Germans the chance of breaking through in one spot, the entire battlefield had to be abandoned,[96] the Germans repaired nearly three-quarters of their tanks; 49 were destroyed and 111 were repaired. They had 60 men killed and another 80 wounded.[97] In terms of battlefield casualties, the Hannut battle had resulted in the French knocking-out 160 German tanks, losing 105 themselves. Prioux had achieved his tactical mission and withdrew.[98]
Hoepner now pursued the retreating French. Being impatient, he did not wait for his infantry divisions to catch up. Instead, he hoped to continue pushing the French back and not give them time to construct a coherent defence line. German formations pursued the enemy to Gembloux. The Panzer Corps ran into retreating French columns and inflicted heavy losses on them. The pursuit created severe problems for the French artillery. The combat was so closely fought that the danger of friendly fire incidents were very real. Nevertheless, the French, setting up new anti-tank screens and Hoepner, lacking infantry support, caused the Germans to attack positions head-on. During the following Battle of Gembloux the two Panzer Divisions reported heavy losses during 14 May and were forced to slow their pursuit. The German attempts to capture Gembloux were repulsed.[99]
Although suffering numerous tactical reverses, operationally the Germans diverted the Allied First Army Group from the lower Ardennes area. In the process his forces, along with the Luftwaffe depleted Prioux' Cavalry Corps. When news of the German breakthrough at Sedan reached Prioux, he withdrew from Gembloux. With the Gembloux gap breached, the German Panzer Corps, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, were no longer required by Army Group B and were handed over to Army Group A. Army Group B would continue its own offensive to force the collapse of the Meuse front. The Army Group was in a position to advance westward to Mons, outflank the BEF and Belgian Army protecting the Dyle–Brussels sector, or turn south to outflank the French 9th Army. German losses had been heavy at Hannut and Gembloux.[100] The 4th Panzer Division was down to 137 tanks on 16 May, including just four Panzer IVs. The 3rd Panzer Division was down by 20–25 percent of its operational force, while the 4th Panzer Division 45–50 percent of its tanks were not combat ready.[100] Damaged tanks were quickly repaired, but its strength was initially greatly weakened.[100] The French 1st Army had also taken a battering and despite winning several tactical defensive victories it was forced to retreat on 15 May owing to developments elsewhere, leaving its tanks on the battlefield, while the Germans were free to recover theirs.[101]
15–21 May: Counterattacks and retreat to the coast
On the morning of 15 May, German Army Group A broke the defences at Sedan and was now free to drive for the English Channel. The Allies considered a wholesale withdrawal from the Belgian trap. The withdrawal would reflect three stages: the night of 16/17 May to the River Senne, the night of 17/18 May to the river Dendre and the night of 18/19 May to the river Scheldt.[102][103] The Belgians were reluctant to abandon Brussels and Leuven, especially as the Dyle line had withstood German pressure well.[102] The Belgian Army, the BEF and the French 1st Army, in a domino effect, was ordered/forced to retire on 16 May to avoid their southern flanks from being turned by the German armoured forces advancing through the French Ardennes and the German 6th Army advancing through Gembloux. The Belgian Army was holding the German Fourteenth Army on the KW-line, along with the French 7th and British armies. Had it not been for the collapse of the French 2nd Army at Sedan, the Belgians were confident that they could have checked the German advance.[104]
The situation called for the French and British to abandon the Antwerp–Namur line and strong positions in favour of improvised positions behind the Scheldt, without facing any real resistance.[105] In the South, General Deffontaine of the Belgian VII Corps retreated from the Namur and Liège regions,[105] the Liège fortress region put up stiff resistance to the German 6th Army.[106] In the North, the 7th Army was diverted to Antwerp after the surrender of the Dutch on 15 May, but was then diverted to support the French 1st Army.[105] In the centre, the Belgian Army and the BEF suffered little German pressure. On 15 May, the only sector to really be tested was around Leuven, which was held by the British 3rd Division. The BEF was not pursued vigorously to the Scheldt.[102]
After the withdrawal of the French Army from the northern sector, the Belgians were left to guard the fortified city of Antwerp. Four infantry divisions (including the 13th and 17th Reserve Infantry Divisions) engaged the German Eighteenth Army's 208th, 225th and 526th Infantry Divisions.[107] The Belgians successfully defended the northern part of the city, delaying the German infantry forces while starting to withdraw from Antwerp on 16 May. The city fell on 18/19 May after considerable Belgian resistance. On 18 May the Belgians received word that Namur's Fort Marchovelette had fallen; Suarlee fell on 19 May; St. Heribert and Malonne on 21 May; Dave, Maizeret and Andoy on 23 May.[106]
Between 16 and 17 May, the British and French withdrew behind the Willebroek Canal, as the volume of Allied forces in Belgium fell and moved toward the German armoured thrust from the Ardennes. The Belgian I Corps and V Corps also retreated to what the Belgians called the Ghent bridgehead, behind the Dendre and Scheldt. The Belgian Artillery Corps and its infantry support defeated attacks by the Eighteenth Army's infantry and in a communiqué from London, the British recognized the "Belgian Army has contributed largely toward the success of the defensive battle now being fought.[106] Nevertheless, the now-outnumbered Belgians abandoned Brussels and the Government fled to Ostend. The city was occupied by the German Army on 17 May. The very next morning, Hoepner, the German XVI Corps commander, was ordered to release the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions to Army Group A.[108] This left the 9th Panzer Division attached to the Eighteenth Army as the only armoured unit on the Belgian front.
By 19 May, the Germans were hours away from reaching the French Channel coast. Gort had discovered the French had neither plan nor reserves and little hope for stopping the German thrust to the channel. He was concerned that the French 1st Army on its southern flank had been reduced to a disorganized mass of "fag-ends", fearing that German armour might appear on their right flank at Arras or Péronne, striking for the channel ports at Calais or Boulogne or north west into the British flank. Their position in Belgium massively compromised, the BEF considered abandoning Belgium and retreating to Ostend, Bruges or Dunkirk, the latter lying some 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) to 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) inside the French border.[109]
The proposals of a British strategic withdrawal from the continent was rejected by the War Cabinet and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). They dispatched General Ironside to inform Gort of their decision and to order him to conduct an offensive to the south-west "through all opposition" to reach the "main French forces" in the south [the strongest French forces were actually in the north]. The Belgian Army was asked to conform to the plan, or should they choose, the British Royal Navy would evacuate what units they could.[109] The British cabinet decided that even if the "Somme offensive" was carried out successfully, some units may still need to be evacuated, and ordered Admiral Ramsay to assemble a large number of vessels. This was the beginning of Operation Dynamo.[109] Ironside arrived at British General Headquarters at 06:00 am on 20 May, the same day that continental communications between France and Belgium was cut.[110] When Ironside made his proposals known to Gort, Gort replied such an attack was impossible. Seven of his nine divisions were engaged on the Scheldt and even if it was possible to withdraw them, it would create a gap between the Belgians and British which the enemy could exploit and encircle the former. The BEF had been marching and fighting for nine days and was now running short of ammunition.[110] The main effort had to be made by the French to the south.[110]
The Belgian position on any offensive move was made clear by Leopold III. As far as he was concerned, the Belgian Army could not conduct offensive operations as it lacked tanks and aircraft; it existed solely for defence.[111][112] The King also made clear that in the rapidly shrinking area of Belgium still free, there was only enough food for two weeks.[111] Leopold did not expect the BEF to jeopardize its own position in order to keep contact with the Belgian Army, but he warned the British that if it persisted with the southern offensive the Belgians would be overstretched and their army would collapse.[111][112] King Leopold suggested the best recourse was to establish a beach-head covering Dunkirk and the Belgian channel ports.[111] The will of the CIGS won out. Gort committed just two infantry battalions and the only armoured battalion in the BEF to the attack, which despite some initial tactical success, failed to break the German defensive line at the Battle of Arras on 21 May.[113]
In the aftermath of this failure, the Belgians were asked to fall back to the Yser river and protect the Allied left flank and rear areas. The King's aide, General Overstraten said that such a move could not be made and would lead to the Belgian Army disintegrating. Another plan for further offensives was suggested. The French requested the Belgians withdraw to the Leie and the British to the French frontier between Maulde and Halluin, the Belgians were then to extend their front to free further parts of the BEF for the attack. The French 1st Army would relieve two more divisions on the right flank. Leopold was reluctant to undertake such a move because it would abandon all but a small portion of Belgium. The Belgian Army was exhausted and it was an enormous technical task that would take too long to complete.[114]
At this time, the Belgians and the British concluded that the French were beaten and the Allied Armies in the pocket on the Belgian–Franco border would be destroyed if action was not taken. The British, having lost confidence in their Allies, decided to look to the survival of the BEF.[115]
22–28 May: Last defensive battles
The Belgian battle-front on the morning of 22 May extended some 90 kilometres (56 mi) from north to south, beginning with the Cavalry Corps, which checked its advance at Terneuzen. V, II, VI, VII and IV Corps (all Belgian) were drawn up side by side. Two further signal Corps were guarding the coast.[116] These formations were then largely holding the eastern front as the BEF and French forces withdrew to the west to protect Dunkirk, which was vulnerable to German assault on 22 May. The eastern front remained intact, but the Belgians now occupied their last fortified position at Leie.[117] The Belgian I Corps, with only two incomplete divisions, had been heavily engaged in the fighting and their line was wearing thin. On that day, Winston Churchill visited the front and pressed for the French and British Armies to break out from the north-east. He assumed that the Belgian Cavalry Corps could support the offensives' right flank. Churchill dispatched the following message to Gort:
1. That the Belgian Army should withdraw to the line of the Yser and stand there, the sluices being opened.
2. That the British Army and French 1st Army should attack south-west toward Bapaume and Cambrai at the earliest moment, certainly tomorrow, with about eight divisions, and with the Belgian Cavalry Corps on the right of the British.[118]
Such an order ignored the fact that the Belgian Army could not withdraw to the Yser, and there was little chance of any Belgian Cavalry joining in the attack.[118] The plan for the Belgian withdrawal was sound; the Yser river covered Dunkirk to the east and south, while the La Bassée Canal covered it from the west. The ring of the Yser also dramatically shorted the Belgian Army's area of operations. Such a move would have abandoned Passchendaele and Ypres and would have certainly meant the capture of Ostend while further reducing the amount of Belgian territory still free by a few square miles.[119]
On 23 May, the French tried to conduct a series of offensives against the German defensive line on the Ardennes–Calais axis but failed to make any meaningful gains. Meanwhile, on the Belgian front, the Belgians, under pressure, retreated further, and the Germans captured Terneuzen and Ghent that day. The Belgians also had trouble moving the oil, food and ammunition that they had left.[120] The Luftwaffe had air superiority and made everyday life hazardous in logistical terms. Air support could only be called in by "wireless" and the RAF was operating from bases in southern England which made communication more difficult.[120] The French denied the use of the Dunkirk, Bourbourg and Gravelines bases to the Belgians, which had initially been placed at its disposal. The Belgians were forced to use the only harbours left to them, at Nieuwpoort and Ostend.[120]
Churchill and Maxime Weygand, who had taken over command from Gamelin, were still determined to break the German line and extricate their forces to the south. When they communicated their intentions to King Leopold and van Overstraten on 24 May, the latter was stunned.[121] A dangerous gap was starting to open between the British and Belgians between Ypres and Menen, which threatened what remained of the Belgian front.[121] The Belgians could not cover it; such a move would have overstretched them. Without consulting the French or asking permission from his government, Gort immediately and decisively ordered the British 5th and 50th Infantry Divisions to plug the gap and abandon any offensive operations further south.[121][122]
On the afternoon of 24 May, von Bock had thrown four divisions, of Reichenau's 6th Army, against the Belgian IV Corps position at the Kortrijk area of the Leie during the Battle of the Lys (1940). The Germans managed, against fierce resistance, to cross the river at night and force a one-mile penetration along a 13-mile front between Wervik and Kortrijk. The Germans, with superior numbers and in command of the air, had won the bridgehead.[121] Nevertheless, the Belgians had inflicted many casualties and several tactical defeats on the Germans. The 1st, 3rd, 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions, acting as reinforcements, had counterattacked several times and managed to capture 200 German prisoners.[123] Belgian artillery and infantry were then heavily attacked by the Luftwaffe, which forced their defeat. The Belgians blamed the French and British for not providing air cover.[123] The German bridgehead dangerously exposed the eastern flank of the southward stretched BEF's 4th Infantry Division. Montgomery dispatched several units of the 3rd Infantry Division (including the heavy infantry of the 1st and 7th Middlesex battalions and the 99th Battery, 20th Anti-Tank Regiment), as an improvised defence.[124]
A critical point of the "Weygand Plan" and the British government and French Army's argument for a thrust south, was the withdrawal of forces to see the offensive through which had left the Belgian Army over-extended and was instrumental in its collapse. It was forced to cover the areas held by the BEF in order to enable the latter to engage in the offensive.[121] Such a collapse could have resulted in the loss of the Channel ports behind the Allied front, leading to a complete strategic encirclement. The BEF could have done more to counterattack von Bock's left flank to relieve the Belgians as von Bock attacked across the fortified British position at Kortrijk.[125] The Belgian High Command made at least five appeals for the British to attack the vulnerable left flank of the German divisions between the Scheldt and the Leie to avert disaster.[125]
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes transmitted the following message to GHQ:
Van Overstraten is desperately keen for strong British counterattack. Either north or south of Leie could help restore the situation. Belgians expect to be attacked on the Ghent front tomorrow. Germans already have a bridgehead over canal west of Eecloo. There can be no question of the Belgian withdrawal to Yser. One battalion on march NE of Ypres was practically wiped out today in attack by sixty aircraft. Withdrawal over open roads without adequate fighter support very costly. Whole of their supplies are east of Yser. They strongly represent attempt should be made to restore the situation on Leie by British counter-attack for which opportunity may last another few hours only.[126]
No such attack came. The Germans brought fresh reserves to cover the gap (Menen–Ypres). This nearly cut the Belgians off from the British. The 2nd, 6th and 10th Cavalry Divisions frustrated German attempts to exploit the gap in depth but the situation was still critical.[123] On 26 May, Operation Dynamo officially commenced, in which large French and British contingents were to be evacuated to the United Kingdom. By that time, the Royal Navy had already withdrawn 28,000 British non-fighting troops. Boulogne had fallen and Calais was about to, leaving Dunkirk, Ostend and Zeebrugge as the only viable ports which could be used for evacuation. The advance of the 14th German Army would not leave Ostend available for much longer. To the west, the German Army Group A had reached Dunkirk and were 4 miles (6.4 km) from its centre on the morning of 27 May, bringing the port within artillery range.[127]
The situation on 27 May had changed considerably from just 24 hours earlier. The Belgian Army had been forced from the Leie line on 26 May, and Nevele, Vynckt, Tielt and Izegem had fallen on the western and central part of the Leie front. In the east, the Germans had reached the outskirts of Bruges, and captured Ursel. In the west, the Menen–Ypres line had broken at Kortrijk and the Belgians were now using railway trucks to help form anti-tank defences on a line from Ypres–Passchendaele–Roulers. Further to the west the BEF had been forced back, north of Lille just over the French border and was now in danger of allowing a gap to develop between themselves and the Belgian southern flank on the Ypres–Lille axis.[128] The danger in allowing a German advance to Dunkirk would mean the loss of the port which was now too great. The British withdrew to the port on 26 May. In doing so, they left the French 1st Army's north-eastern flank near Lille exposed. As the British moved out, the Germans moved in, encircling the bulk of the French Army. Both Gort and his Chief of Staff, General Henry Pownall, accepted that their withdrawal would mean the destruction of the French 1st Army, and they would be blamed for it.[129]
The fighting of 26–27 May had brought the Belgian Army to the brink of collapse. The Belgians still held the Ypres–Roulers line to the west, and the Bruges–Thelt line to the east. However, on 27 May, the central front collapsed in the Izegem–Thelt sector. There was now nothing to prevent a German thrust to the east to take Ostend and Bruges, or west to take the ports at Nieuwpoort or La Panne, deep in the Allied rear.[128] The Belgians had practically exhausted all available means of resistance. The disintegration of the Belgian Army and its front caused many erroneous accusations by the British.[130] In fact, on numerous occasions, the Belgians had held on after British withdrawals.[130] One example was the taking over of the Scheldt line, where they relieved the British 44th Infantry Division, allowing it to retire through their ranks.[130] Despite this, Gort and to a greater extent Pownall, showed anger at the Belgian King's decision to surrender on 28 May, considering it to undercut the war effort. .[130] When it was inquired if any Belgians were to be evacuated, Pownall was reported to have replied, "We don't care a bugger what happens to the Belgians".[130]
Belgian surrender
The Belgian Army was stretched from Cadzand south to Menen on the river Leie, and west, from Menin, to Bruges without any sort of reserves. With the exception of a few RAF sorties, the air was exclusively under the control of the Luftwaffe, and the Belgians reported attacks against all targets considered an objective, with resulting casualties. No natural obstacles remained between the Belgians and the German Army; retreat was not feasible. The Luftwaffe had destroyed most of the rail networks to Dunkirk, just three roads were left: Bruges–Torhout–Diksmuide, Bruges–Gistel–Nieupoort and Bruges–Ostend–Nieuwpoort. Using such axes of retreat was impossible without losses owing to German air supremacy (as opposed to air superiority). Water supplies were damaged and cut off, gas and electricity supplies were also cut. Canals were drained and used as supply dumps for whatever ammunition and food-stuffs were left. The total remaining area covered just 1,700 km2, and compacted military and civilians alike, of which the latter numbered some 3 million people.[131] Under these circumstances Leopold deemed further resistance useless. On the evening of 27 May, he requested an armistice.[3]
Churchill sent a message to Keyes the same day, and made clear what he thought of the request:
Belgian Embassy here assumes from King's decision to remain that he regards the war as lost and contemplates [a] separate peace. It is in order to dissociate itself from this that the constitutional Belgian Government has reassembled on foreign soil. Even if present Belgian Army has to lay down its arms, there are 200,000 Belgians of military age in France, and greater resources than Belgium had in 1914 which to fight back. By present decision the King is dividing the Nation and delivering it into Hitler's protection. Please convey these considerations to the King, and impress upon him the disastrous consequences to the Allies and to Belgium of his present choice.[132]
The Royal Navy evacuated General Headquarters at Middelkerke and Sint-Andries, east of Bruges, during the night. Leopold III, and his mother Queen Mother Elisabeth, stayed in Belgium to endure five years of self-imposed captivity.[132] In response to the advice of his government to set up a government-in-exile Leopold said, "I have decided to stay. The cause of the Allies is lost."[3] The Belgian surrender came into effect at 04:00 on 28 May. Recriminations abounded with the British and French claiming the Belgians had betrayed the alliance. In Paris, the French Premier Paul Reynaud denounced Leopold's surrender, and the Belgian Premier Hubert Pierlot informed the people that Leopold had taken action against the unanimous advice of the government. As a result, the king was no longer in a position to govern and the Belgian government in exile that was located in Paris (later moved to London following the fall of France) would continue the struggle.[3] The chief complaint was that the Belgians had not given any prior warning that their situation was so serious as to capitulate. Such claims were largely unjust. The Allies had known, and admitted it privately on 25 May through contact with the Belgians, that the latter were on the verge of collapse.[133][134]
Churchill's and the British response was officially restrained. This was due to the strong-willed defence of the Belgian defensive campaign presented to the cabinet by Sir Roger Keyes at 11:30 am 28 May.[135] The French and Belgian ministers had referred to Leopold's actions as treacherous, but they were unaware of the true events: Leopold had not signed an agreement with Hitler in order to form a collaborative government, but an unconditional surrender as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Armed Forces.[136]
Damnificados
The casualty reports include total losses at this point in the campaign. The figures for the Battle of Belgium, 10–28 May 1940, cannot be known with any certainty.
Belgian
Belgian casualties stood at:
- Killed in action: 6,093 and 2,000 Belgian prisoners died in captivity[38]
- Missing: more than 500[38]
- Captured: 200,000[137]
- Wounded: 15,850[137]
- Aircraft: 112 destroyed[59]
French
Numbers for the Battle of Belgium are unknown, but the French suffered the following losses throughout the entire western campaign, 10 May – 22 June:
- Killed in action: 90,000[138]
- Wounded: 200,000[138]
- Prisoners of War: 1,900,000.[138]
- Total French losses in aircraft numbered 264 from 12 to 25 May, and 50 for 26 May to 1 June.[139]
British
Numbers for the Battle of Belgium are unknown, but the British suffered the following losses throughout the entire campaign, 10 May – 22 June:
- 68,111 killed in action, wounded or captured.[140]
- 64,000 vehicles destroyed or abandoned[140]
- 2,472 guns destroyed or abandoned[140]
- RAF losses throughout the entire campaign (10 May – 22 June) amounted to 931 aircraft and 1,526 casualties. Casualties to 28 May are unknown.[140] Total British losses in the air numbered 344 between 12 and 25 May, and 138 between 26 May and 1 June.[139]
German
The consolidated report of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht regarding the operations in the west from 10 May to 4 June (German: Zusammenfassender Bericht des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht über die Operationen im Westen vom 10. Mai bis 4. Juni) reports:[141]
- Killed in action: 10,232 officers and soldiers[141]
- Missing: 8,463 officers and soldiers[141]
- Wounded: 42,523 officers and soldiers[141]
- Losses of the Luftwaffe from 10 May to 3 June: 432 aircraft[141]
- Losses of the Kriegsmarine: none[141]
Ver también
- German invasion of Luxembourg
- Mechelen incident
- List of Belgian military equipment of World War II
- List of French military equipment of World War II
- List of British military equipment of World War II
- List of German military equipment of World War II
Referencias
Notes
- ^ Contributed lightly armed infantry units retreating from Dutch territory. Also committed the Dutch Air Force on few, ineffective and costly missions. Gunsburg 1992, p. 216.
- ^ The Belgian Army consisted of 22 divisions, the French provided 104, the British provided 10, and the Dutch 8 divisions. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army had 1,338 guns, the French 10,700, the British 1,280, and the Dutch 656. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army had 10 tanks, the French 3,063, the British 310 and the Dutch 1 tank. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Air Force consisted of 250 aircraft, the French Air Force 1,368, the British Royal Air Force provided 456 aircraft and the Dutch Air Force 175. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army sustained 6,093 men killed, 15,850 men wounded in action, more than 500 men missing and 200,000 men captured, of which 2,000 died in captivity. Keegan 2005, p. 96; Ellis 1993, p. 255. French and British losses on Belgian territory are unknown. Keegan 2005, p. 96.
- ^ The Belgian Air Force lost 83 planes on the ground on 10 May, 25 lost in aerial combat between 10–15 May, and four lost in the air between 16–28 May. Hooton 2007, pp. 49, 52, 53. French and British losses are not certain, however the French Air Force lost 264 aircraft between 12–25 May and 50 for 26 May – 1 June while the British Royal Air Force lost 344 and 138 aircraft in these respective periods. Hooton 2007, p. 57.
- ^ German air units doubled up and flew missions over the Netherlands and Belgium. Case specific loss totals for Belgium only cannot be certain. Total German losses in the air numbered 469 in 12–25 May, and 126 for 26 May – 1 June, but at least 43 paratroopers were killed and a further 100 wounded. Hooton 2007, p. 57; Dunstan 2005, p. 57.
Citations
- ^ a b c d Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941.
- ^ a b c d Shirer 1990, p. 729.
- ^ Healy 2008, p. 36.
- ^ Keegan 2005, pp. 95–96.
- ^ a b c d Bond 1990, p. 8.
- ^ Ellis 2004, p. 8.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 9.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 21.
- ^ Bond & Taylor 2001, p. 14.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 9–10.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 22.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 22–23.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 24.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 2.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 3.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 4.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 53.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 25.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 28.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 35.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 28–36.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 36.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 46–47.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Holmes 2001, p. 313.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 100–101.
- ^ a b c d e f g Dunstan 2005, p. 34.
- ^ Dunstan 2005, p. 36.
- ^ Bond & Taylor 2001, p. 37.
- ^ Keegan 2005, p. 324.
- ^ a b Keegan 2005, p. 95.
- ^ Fowler 2002, p. 12.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 36.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 32.
- ^ a b c Keegan 2005, p. 96.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Keegan 2005, pp. 95, 324.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Holleman, Rosseels & Welting 2008.
- ^ a b c Healy 2008, p. 37.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 58.
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 322. (map of French dispositions is available in Keegan's book)
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 130.
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 324.
- ^ a b Bond 1975, p. 20.
- ^ a b c d e Healy 2008, p. 32.
- ^ Harclerode 2006, p. 51.
- ^ Tugwell 2006, p. 52.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 47.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, pp. 45–46.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 48.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 33.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 50–51.
- ^ a b c d e Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 35.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hooton 2007, p. 52.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 19.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b c Hooton 2007, p. 53.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 34.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 59.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 18.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 54.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 123.
- ^ a b c d Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 138–139.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 61.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 61–62.
- ^ a b c d Hooton 2007, p. 56.
- ^ Ellis 1993, p. 37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 36.
- ^ Jackson 2003, p. 37.
- ^ Shepperd 1990, p. 38.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 51.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 38.
- ^ Niehorster, Order of Battle, Army.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 116–121.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 135.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 60.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 55.
- ^ a b c d Ellis 1993, pp. 56–57.
- ^ a b c d Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 240.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 239.
- ^ Ellis 1993, pp. 37–38.
- ^ a b c d e f g Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 241.
- ^ a b c Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 242.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, pp. 221–224.
- ^ Healy 2008, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 228.
- ^ a b Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 243.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 237.
- ^ Healy 2008, p. 38.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 243–244.
- ^ a b c Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 246.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 71.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 64.
- ^ Ellis 2004, p. 59.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 30.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 39.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 40.
- ^ Bloock 2003.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 70–71.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 67.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 69.
- ^ a b c d Bond 1990, p. 70.
- ^ a b Ellis 2004, p. 105.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 71–72.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 72.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 73.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 54.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 75.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 76.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 78.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 43.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 84.
- ^ Ellis 1993, p. 172.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 44.
- ^ Ellis 2004, pp. 135–136.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 85.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 86.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 88.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 44–45.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 89.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 92.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 60.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 93.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 94.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 304.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 95.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 96.
- ^ a b Ellis 1993, p. 255.
- ^ a b c Keegan 2005, p. 326.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 57.
- ^ a b c d Holmes 2001, p. 130.
- ^ a b c d e f Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1941, p. 189.
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Otras lecturas
- Blatt, Joel (1998). The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments. Providence: Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-57181-109-7.
- Dear, Ian; Foot, M. R. D. (2001). The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-860446-4.
- Harman, Nicholas (1980). Dunkirk. London: Hodder and Stoughton. ISBN 978-0-340-24299-5.
- Krause, Michael; Cody, P. (2006). Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art. Washington: Center of Military History Publication – Dept. of the Army. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7.
- Powaski, Ronald E. (2003). Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940. John Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-39431-0.
- Taylor, A. J. P.; Mayer, S. L., eds. (1974). A History of World War Two. London: Octopus Books. ISBN 978-0-7064-0399-2.
- Weal, John (1997). Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937–1941. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-636-1.