| Charles Sanders Peirce | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nació | 10 de septiembre de 1839 Cambridge, Massachusetts , Estados Unidos |
| Fallecido | 19 de abril de 1914 (74 años) Milford, Pensilvania , Estados Unidos |
| alma mater | Universidad Harvard |
| Carrera científica | |
| Campos | |
| Instituciones | Universidad Johns Hopkins |
Carrera de filosofía | |
| Era | Filosofía moderna tardía |
| Región | Filosofía occidental |
| Colegio | Pragmatismo Pragmaticismo |
| Estudiantes notables | |
| Intereses principales | |
Influenciado
| |
| Firma | |
| Postura religiosa | Episcopal (no convencional) [8] |
| Charles Sanders Peirce |
|---|
| General |
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| Filosófico |
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| Biográfico |
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Charles Sanders Peirce ( / p ɜːr s / [10] [11] PURSS ; 10 de septiembre de 1839 - 19 de abril de 1914) fue un filósofo , lógico , matemático y científico estadounidense que a veces se conoce como "el padre del pragmatismo ". [12]
Educado como químico y empleado como científico durante treinta años, Peirce se consideraba a sí mismo, ante todo, un lógico . Hizo importantes contribuciones a la lógica, un tema que, para él, abarcaba gran parte de lo que ahora se llama epistemología y filosofía de la ciencia . Para él, la lógica es la rama formal de la semiótica , de la que es fundador, que presagiaba el debate entre los positivistas lógicos y los defensores de la filosofía del lenguaje que dominaba la filosofía occidental del siglo XX. Además, definió el concepto de razonamiento abductivo , así como inducción matemática rigurosamente formulada yrazonamiento deductivo . Ya en 1886, vio que las operaciones lógicas podían llevarse a cabo mediante circuitos de conmutación eléctricos . La misma idea se utilizó décadas más tarde para producir computadoras digitales. [13]
En 1934, el filósofo Paul Weiss llamó a Peirce "el más original y versátil de los filósofos estadounidenses y el mayor lógico de Estados Unidos". [14] El diccionario biográfico de Webster dijo en 1943 que Peirce era "ahora considerado como el pensador más original y el más grande lógico de su tiempo". [15]
Vida [ editar ]
Peirce nació en el número 3 de Phillips Place en Cambridge, Massachusetts . Era hijo de Sarah Hunt Mills y Benjamin Peirce , él mismo era profesor de astronomía y matemáticas en la Universidad de Harvard y quizás el primer matemático investigador serio en Estados Unidos. [ Cita requerida ] A los 12 años, Charles leer la copia de su hermano mayor de Richard Whately 's Elementos de lógica , entonces el texto en idioma Inglés que lleva sobre el tema. Así comenzó su fascinación de toda la vida por la lógica y el razonamiento. [dieciséis]Luego obtuvo una licenciatura y una maestría en artes (1862) de Harvard. En 1863, la Lawrence Scientific School le otorgó una licenciatura en ciencias, el primer título de química summa cum laude de Harvard . [17] Por lo demás, su expediente académico no fue distinguido. [18] En Harvard, comenzó amistades de por vida con Francis Ellingwood Abbot , Chauncey Wright y William James . [19] Uno de sus instructores de Harvard, Charles William Eliot, se formó una opinión desfavorable de Peirce. Esto resultó fatídico, porque Eliot, mientras era presidente de Harvard (1869-1909, un período que abarcaba casi toda la vida laboral de Peirce), vetó repetidamente el empleo de Peirce en la universidad. [20]
Peirce sufrió desde su adolescencia en adelante de una condición nerviosa entonces conocida como "neuralgia facial", que hoy sería diagnosticada como neuralgia del trigémino . Su biógrafo, Joseph Brent, dice que cuando estaba en medio de su dolor "estaba, al principio, casi estupefacto, y luego distante, frío, deprimido, extremadamente desconfiado, impaciente por el más mínimo cruce y sujeto a violentos arrebatos de mal genio". . [21] Sus consecuencias pueden haber llevado al aislamiento social de su vida posterior.
Empleo temprano [ editar ]
Entre 1859 y 1891, Peirce fue empleado intermitentemente en diversas capacidades científicas por el United States Coast Survey y su sucesor, el United States Coast and Geodetic Survey , [22] donde disfrutó de la protección de su padre altamente influyente hasta la muerte de este último en 1880. [ 23] Ese empleo eximió a Peirce de tener que participar en la Guerra Civil Estadounidense ; hubiera sido muy incómodo para él hacerlo, ya que el Brahmin Peirces de Boston simpatizaba con la Confederación . [24] En el Survey, trabajó principalmente en geodesia y gravimetría , refinando el uso depéndulos para determinar pequeñas variaciones locales en la Tierra 's gravedad . [22] Fue elegido miembro residente de la Academia Estadounidense de Artes y Ciencias en enero de 1867. [25] El Survey lo envió a Europa cinco veces, [26] primero en 1871 como parte de un grupo enviado para observar un eclipse solar. . Allí, buscó a Augustus De Morgan , William Stanley Jevons y William Kingdon Clifford , [27]Matemáticos y lógicos británicos cuya forma de pensar se parecía a la suya. De 1869 a 1872, trabajó como asistente en el observatorio astronómico de Harvard, realizando un trabajo importante para determinar el brillo de las estrellas y la forma de la Vía Láctea . [28] El 20 de abril de 1877 fue elegido miembro de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias . [29] También en 1877, propuso medir el medidor como tantas longitudes de onda de luz de cierta frecuencia , [30] el tipo de definición empleada desde 1960 hasta 1983 .
Durante la década de 1880, la indiferencia de Peirce por los detalles burocráticos aumentó mientras que la calidad y la puntualidad de su trabajo de Survey disminuyeron. Peirce tardó años en redactar informes que debería haber completado en meses. [ según quién? ] Mientras tanto, escribió entradas, en última instancia miles, durante 1883-1909 sobre filosofía, lógica, ciencia y otros temas para la enciclopédica Century Dictionary . [31] En 1885, una investigación de la Comisión Allison exoneró a Peirce, pero condujo al despido del superintendente Julius Hilgard y varios otros empleados de Coast Survey por malversación de fondos públicos. [32] En 1891, Peirce renunció al Coast Survey en SuperintendentSolicitud de Thomas Corwin Mendenhall . [33]
Universidad Johns Hopkins [ editar ]
En 1879, Peirce fue nombrado profesor de lógica en la Universidad Johns Hopkins , que tenía departamentos sólidos en áreas que le interesaban, como filosofía ( Royce y Dewey completaron sus doctorados en Hopkins), psicología (impartida por G. Stanley Hall y estudió por Joseph Jastrow , quien fue coautor de un estudio empírico histórico con Peirce), y matemáticas (enseñado por J. J. Sylvester , quien llegó a admirar el trabajo de Peirce sobre matemáticas y lógica). Sus estudios de lógica por miembros de la Universidad Johns Hopkins (1883) contenían obras de él y de Allan Marquand , Christine Ladd , Benjamin Ives Gilmany Oscar Howard Mitchell , varios de los cuales eran sus estudiantes de posgrado. [7] El puesto no titular de Peirce en Hopkins fue el único cargo académico que ocupó.
Brent documenta algo que Peirce nunca sospechó, a saber, que sus esfuerzos por obtener empleo académico, becas y respetabilidad científica se vieron frustrados repetidamente por la oposición encubierta de un importante científico canadiense-estadounidense de la época, Simon Newcomb . [34] Los esfuerzos de Peirce también pueden haber sido obstaculizados por lo que Brent caracteriza como "su personalidad difícil". [35] En contraste, Keith Devlin cree que el trabajo de Peirce fue demasiado adelantado a su tiempo para ser apreciado por el establecimiento académico de la época y que esto jugó un papel importante en su incapacidad para obtener un puesto permanente. [36]
La vida personal de Peirce indudablemente funcionó en contra de su éxito profesional. Después de que su primera esposa, Harriet Melusina Fay ("Zina"), lo abandonara en 1875, [37] Peirce, aún legalmente casado, se involucró con Juliette , cuyo apellido, dado de diversas formas como Froissy y Pourtalai, [38] y nacionalidad (hablaba francés) [39] sigue siendo incierto. [40] Cuando su divorcio de Zina se hizo definitivo en 1883, se casó con Juliette. [41] Ese año, Newcomb señaló a un administrador de Johns Hopkins que Peirce, mientras era empleado de Hopkins, había vivido y viajado con una mujer con la que no estaba casado; el escándalo que siguió condujo a su despido en enero de 1884. [42]A lo largo de los años, Peirce buscó empleo académico en varias universidades sin éxito. [43] No tuvo hijos de ninguno de los dos matrimonios. [44]
Pobreza [ editar ]
En 1887, Peirce gastó parte de la herencia de sus padres para comprar 2.000 acres (8 km 2 ) de tierra rural cerca de Milford, Pensilvania , que nunca rindió beneficios económicos. [45] Allí hizo remodelar una granja de 1854 según su diseño. [46] Los Peirce llamaron a la propiedad " Arisbe ". Allí vivieron con pocas interrupciones por el resto de sus vidas, [47] Charles escribiendo prolíficamente, gran parte de él inédito hasta el día de hoy (ver Obras ). Vivir más allá de sus posibilidades pronto les provocó graves dificultades financieras y legales. [48]Pasó gran parte de sus últimas dos décadas sin poder pagar la calefacción en invierno y subsistiendo con pan viejo donado por el panadero local. Incapaz de permitirse comprar material de oficina nuevo, escribió en el reverso de los manuscritos antiguos. Una orden judicial pendiente por asalto y deudas impagas lo llevó a ser un fugitivo en la ciudad de Nueva York por un tiempo. [49] Varias personas, incluido su hermano James Mills Peirce [50] y sus vecinos, parientes de Gifford Pinchot , liquidaron sus deudas y pagaron los impuestos sobre la propiedad y la hipoteca. [51]
Peirce hizo algunas consultorías científicas y de ingeniería y escribió mucho por un salario escaso, principalmente entradas de diccionarios enciclopédicos y reseñas para The Nation (con cuyo editor, Wendell Phillips Garrison , se hizo amigo). Hizo traducciones para la Institución Smithsonian , a instancias de su director Samuel Langley . Peirce también hizo cálculos matemáticos sustanciales para la investigación de Langley sobre vuelos propulsados. Con la esperanza de ganar dinero, Peirce intentó inventar. [52] Comenzó pero no completó varios libros. [53] En 1888, el presidente Grover Cleveland lo nombró miembro de la Comisión de Ensayo . [54]
A partir de 1890, tuvo un amigo y admirador en el juez Francis C. Russell de Chicago, [55] que presentó a Peirce al editor Paul Carus y al propietario Edward C. Hegeler de la pionera revista de filosofía estadounidense The Monist , que finalmente publicó al menos 14 artículos de Peirce. [56] Escribió muchos textos en el Diccionario de filosofía y psicología de James Mark Baldwin (1901-1905); la mitad de las que se le atribuyen parecen haber sido escritas en realidad por Christine Ladd-Franklin bajo su supervisión. [57] Se postuló en 1902 a la recién formada Carnegie Institution.para una beca para escribir un libro sistemático que describa el trabajo de su vida. La aplicación estaba condenada al fracaso; su némesis, Newcomb, sirvió en el comité ejecutivo de la Carnegie Institution, y su presidente había sido presidente de Johns Hopkins en el momento de la destitución de Peirce. [58]
El que más hizo para ayudar a Peirce en estos tiempos desesperados fue su viejo amigo William James , que dedicó su Will to Believe (1897) a Peirce y consiguió que se le pagara a Peirce por dar dos series de conferencias en o cerca de Harvard (1898). y 1903). [59] Lo más importante, cada año desde 1907 hasta la muerte de James en 1910, James escribió a sus amigos de la intelectualidad de Boston para solicitar ayuda financiera para Peirce; el fondo continuó incluso después de la muerte de James. Peirce correspondió al designar al hijo mayor de James como su heredero en caso de que Juliette falleciera antes que él. [60] Se ha creído que esta fue también la razón por la que Peirce usó "Santiago" ("St. James" en inglés) como segundo nombre, pero apareció impreso ya en 1890 como Charles Santiago Peirce.(VerCharles Santiago Sanders Peirce para discusión y referencias).
Peirce murió en la indigencia en Milford, Pensilvania , veinte años antes que su viuda. Juliette Peirce guardó la urna con las cenizas de Peirce en Arisbe. En 1934, el gobernador de Pensilvania, Gifford Pinchot, organizó el entierro de Juliette en el cementerio de Milford. La urna con las cenizas de Peirce fue enterrada con Juliette. [61]
Esclavitud, guerra civil estadounidense y racismo [ editar ]
Peirce creció en un hogar donde la supremacía blanca se daba por sentada y la esclavitud sureña se consideraba natural. [62]
Hasta el estallido de la Guerra Civil, su padre se describía a sí mismo como un secesionista , pero después del estallido de la guerra, esto se detuvo y se convirtió en un partidario de la Unión , proporcionando donaciones a la Comisión Sanitaria , la principal organización benéfica de la guerra del Norte. Ningún miembro de la familia Peirce se ofreció como voluntario o se alistó. Peirce compartía los puntos de vista de su padre y le gustaba utilizar el siguiente silogismo para ilustrar la falta de fiabilidad de las formas tradicionales de lógica: [63]
Todos los hombres son iguales en sus derechos políticos.
Los negros son hombres.
Por lo tanto, los negros tienen los mismos derechos políticos que los blancos.
Recepción [ editar ]
Bertrand Russell (1959) escribió "Sin lugar a dudas [...] fue una de las mentes más originales de finales del siglo XIX y, sin duda, el pensador estadounidense más grande de todos los tiempos". [64] El Principia Mathematica de Russell y Whitehead , publicado de 1910 a 1913, no menciona a Peirce (el trabajo de Peirce no fue ampliamente conocido hasta más tarde). [65] AN Whitehead , mientras leía algunos de los manuscritos inéditos de Peirce poco después de llegar a Harvard en 1924, se sorprendió de cómo Peirce había anticipado su propio pensamiento sobre el "proceso". (Sobre Peirce y la metafísica de procesos , véase Lowe 1964 [28] ). Karl Popper veía a Peirce como "uno de los más grandes filósofos de todos los tiempos". [66] Sin embargo, los logros de Peirce no fueron reconocidos de inmediato. Sus imponentes contemporáneos William James y Josiah Royce [67] lo admiraban y Cassius Jackson Keyser , de Columbia y CK Ogden , escribía sobre Peirce con respeto pero sin efecto inmediato.
El primer erudito en darle a Peirce su considerada atención profesional fue Morris Raphael Cohen , alumno de Royce , editor de una antología de los escritos de Peirce titulada Chance, Love, and Logic (1923), y autor de la primera bibliografía de los escritos dispersos de Peirce. [68] John Dewey estudió con Peirce en Johns Hopkins. [7] Desde 1916 en adelante, los escritos de Dewey mencionan repetidamente a Peirce con deferencia. Su Lógica de 1938 : la teoría de la investigación está muy influenciada por Peirce. [69] La publicación de los primeros seis volúmenes de Collected Papers.(1931-1935), el evento más importante hasta la fecha en los estudios de Peirce y uno que Cohen hizo posible al recaudar los fondos necesarios, [70] no provocó una avalancha de estudios secundarios. Los editores de esos volúmenes, Charles Hartshorne y Paul Weiss , no se convirtieron en especialistas de Peirce. Los primeros hitos de la literatura secundaria incluyen las monografías de Buchler (1939), Feibleman (1946) y Goudge (1950), la tesis de doctorado de 1941 de Arthur W. Burks (que luego editó los volúmenes 7 y 8) y los estudios editado por Wiener y Young (1952). La Sociedad Charles S. Peirce se fundó en 1946. Sus transacciones, un trimestral académico especializado en el pragmatismo de Peirce y la filosofía estadounidense ha aparecido desde 1965. [71] (Ver Phillips 2014, 62 para una discusión de Peirce y Dewey en relación con el transaccionalismo ).
En 1949, mientras realizaba un trabajo de archivo no relacionado, la historiadora de las matemáticas Carolyn Eisele (1902-2000) encontró por casualidad una carta autógrafa de Peirce. Así comenzaron sus cuarenta años de investigación sobre Peirce, "el matemático y científico", que culminaron en Eisele (1976, 1979, 1985). A partir de 1960, el filósofo e historiador de las ideas Max Fisch (1900-1995) emergió como una autoridad en Peirce (Fisch, 1986). [72] Incluye muchos de sus artículos relevantes en una encuesta (Fisch 1986: 422-48) sobre el impacto del pensamiento de Peirce hasta 1983.
Peirce ha ganado un seguimiento internacional, marcada por los centros de investigación universitarios dedicados a estudios de Peirce y el pragmatismo en Brasil ( CENEP / CIEP ), Finlandia ( HPRC y Commens ), Alemania ( grupo de Wirth , Hoffman y el grupo de Otte , y el grupo Härle de Deuser y de [73 ] ), Francia ( L'IRSCE ), España ( GEP ) e Italia ( CSP). Sus escritos se han traducido a varios idiomas, incluidos alemán, francés, finlandés, español y sueco. Desde 1950, ha habido destacados estudiosos de Peirce franceses, italianos, españoles, británicos y brasileños. Durante muchos años, el departamento de filosofía norteamericano más dedicado a Peirce fue la Universidad de Toronto , gracias en parte al liderazgo de Thomas Goudge y David Savan. En los últimos años, los académicos estadounidenses de Peirce se han agrupado en la Universidad de Indiana, la Universidad Purdue de Indianápolis , sede del Proyecto Peirce Edition (PEP), y la Universidad Estatal de Pensilvania .
Actualmente, investigadores que están totalmente fuera del ámbito de la filosofía académica están mostrando un interés considerable en las ideas de Peirce. El interés proviene de la industria, los negocios, la tecnología, las organizaciones de inteligencia y el ejército; y ha dado lugar a la existencia de un número sustancial de agencias, institutos, empresas y laboratorios en los que se están llevando a cabo enérgicamente investigaciones en curso y desarrollo de los conceptos de Peircean.
- Robert Burch, 2001, actualizado en 2010 [22]
En los últimos años, la tricotomía de signos de Peirce es explotada por un número creciente de profesionales para tareas de marketing y diseño.
John Deely escribe que Peirce fue el último de los "modernos" y "el primero de los posmodernos". Elogia la doctrina de los signos de Peirce como contribución a los albores de la época posmoderna . Deely comenta además que "Peirce se encuentra ... en una posición análoga a la que ocupaba Agustín como último de los Padres occidentales y primero de los medievales". [74]
Obras [ editar ]
La reputación de Peirce se basa en gran medida en artículos académicos publicados en revistas científicas y académicas estadounidenses como Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences , Journal of Speculative Philosophy , The Monist , Popular Science Monthly , American Journal of Mathematics , Memoirs of the National Academy de Ciencias , La Nación , entre otros. Consulte los artículos de Peirce, publicados durante su vida, para obtener una lista extensa con enlaces a ellos en línea. El único libro completo (ni extracto ni panfleto) que Peirce escribió y vio publicado durante su vida [75]fue Photometric Researches (1878), una monografía de 181 páginas sobre las aplicaciones de los métodos espectrográficos a la astronomía. Mientras estuvo en Johns Hopkins, editó Studies in Logic (1883), que contiene capítulos de él y sus estudiantes graduados . Además de las conferencias durante sus años (1879-1884) como profesor de lógica en Johns Hopkins, dio al menos nueve series de conferencias, muchas de las cuales ya están publicadas; ver Conferencias de Peirce .
Después de la muerte de Peirce, la Universidad de Harvard obtuvo de la viuda de Peirce los artículos encontrados en su estudio, pero no los microfilmó hasta 1964. Solo después de que Richard Robin (1967) [76] catalogó este Nachlass quedó claro que Peirce había dejado aproximadamente 1.650 manuscritos sin publicar. , con un total de más de 100.000 páginas, [77] en su mayoría aún inéditas, excepto en microfilm . Sobre las vicisitudes de los artículos de Peirce, véase Houser (1989). [78] Según se informa, los documentos siguen en condiciones insatisfactorias. [79]
La primera antología publicada de los artículos de Peirce fue Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays , editado por Morris Raphael Cohen , 1923, todavía en impresión. Otras antologías de un volumen se publicaron en 1940, 1957, 1958, 1972, 1994 y 2009, la mayoría todavía impresa. Las principales ediciones póstumas [80] de las obras de Peirce en su largo camino hacia la luz, a menudo en varios volúmenes y algunas todavía impresas, han incluido:
1931–1958: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP), 8 volúmenes, incluye muchas obras publicadas, junto con una selección de obras inéditas y un puñado de su correspondencia. Esta edición estándar de larga data extraída del trabajo de Peirce desde la década de 1860 hasta 1913 sigue siendo el estudio más completo de su prolífica producción de 1893 a 1913. Está organizada temáticamente, pero los textos (incluidas las series de conferencias) a menudo se dividen en volúmenes, mientras que los textos de varias etapas en el desarrollo de Peirce a menudo se combinan, lo que requiere visitas frecuentes a las notas de los editores. [81] Editado (1-6) por Charles Hartshorne y Paul Weiss y (7-8) por Arthur Burks , en forma impresa y en línea.
1975-1987: Charles Sanders Peirce: Contribuciones a The Nation , 4 volúmenes, incluye más de 300 reseñas y artículos de Peirce publicados entre 1869 y 1908 en The Nation . Editado por Kenneth Laine Ketner y James Edward Cook, en línea.
1976: The New Elements of Mathematics de Charles S. Peirce , 4 volúmenes en 5, incluía muchos manuscritos de Peirce inéditos sobre temas matemáticos, junto con importantes artículos matemáticos publicados por Peirce. Editado por Carolyn Eisele, nuevamente impreso.
1977: Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between CS Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby (2ª edición, 2001), incluyó toda la correspondencia de Peirce (1903-1912) con Victoria, Lady Welby . La otra correspondencia publicada de Peirce se limita en gran medida a las 14 cartas incluidas en el volumen 8 de los Documentos recopilados y a los 20 artículos anteriores a 1890 incluidos hasta ahora en los Escritos . Editado por Charles S. Hardwick con James Cook, agotado.
1982-ahora: Escritos de Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition (W), Volúmenes 1–6 y 8, de un proyectado 30. La cobertura limitada, y la edición y organización defectuosas, de los Documentos recopilados llevaron a Max Fisch y otros a la década de 1970 para fundar el Proyecto Peirce Edition (PEP), cuya misión es preparar una edición cronológica crítica más completa. Hasta la fecha sólo han aparecido siete volúmenes, pero cubren el período de 1859 a 1892, cuando Peirce realizó gran parte de su obra más conocida. Escritos de Charles S. Peirce , 8 se publicó en noviembre de 2010; y el trabajo continúa en Escritos de Charles S. Peirce , 7, 9 y 11. En forma impresa y en línea.
1985: Perspectivas históricas sobre la lógica de la ciencia de Peirce: una historia de la ciencia , 2 volúmenes. Auspitz ha dicho: [82] "El grado de inmersión de Peirce en la ciencia de su época es evidente en sus reseñas en The Nation [...] y en sus artículos, solicitudes de subvenciones y prospectos de editores en la historia y la práctica de ciencia ", refiriéndose últimamente a Perspectivas históricas . Editado por Carolyn Eisele, nuevamente impreso.
1992: El razonamiento y la lógica de las cosas recopila en un solo lugar la serie de conferencias de Peirce de 1898 invitadas por William James. Editado por Kenneth Laine Ketner, con comentarios de Hilary Putnam , en forma impresa.
1992-1998: The Essential Peirce (EP), 2 volúmenes, es una muestra reciente importante de los escritos filosóficos de Peirce. Editado (1) por Nathan Hauser y Christian Kloesel y (2) por los editores del Proyecto Peirce Edition , en forma impresa.
1997: Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking recopila las "Lectures on Pragmatism" de Harvard de 1903 de Peirce en una edición de estudio, que incluye borradores, de los manuscritos de las conferencias de Peirce, que habían sido previamente publicados en forma abreviada; las conferencias ahora también aparecen en The Essential Peirce , 2. Editado por Patricia Ann Turisi, en forma impresa.
2010: Filosofía de las Matemáticas: Escritos seleccionados recopila importantes escritos de Peirce sobre el tema, muchos de los cuales no se han publicado anteriormente. Editado por Matthew E. Moore, en forma impresa.
Matemáticas [ editar ]
El trabajo más importante de Peirce en matemáticas puras fue en áreas lógicas y fundamentales. También trabajó en álgebra lineal , matrices , diversas geometrías, topología y enumeración de números , números de campana , gráficos , el problema de los cuatro colores y la naturaleza de la continuidad.
Trabajó en matemáticas aplicadas en economía, ingeniería y proyecciones de mapas (como la proyección quincuncial de Peirce ), y fue especialmente activo en probabilidad y estadística. [83]
- Descubrimientos
Peirce hizo una serie de descubrimientos sorprendentes en lógica formal y matemáticas fundamentales, casi todos los cuales llegaron a ser apreciados solo mucho después de su muerte:
En 1860 [84] sugirió una aritmética cardinal para números infinitos, años antes de cualquier trabajo de Georg Cantor (quien completó su disertación en 1867 ) y sin acceso al Paradoxien des Unendlichen de 1851 (póstumo) de Bernard Bolzano .
símbolo de "(ni) ... ni ...", también llamada daga de Quine
En 1880-1881 [85] mostró cómo el álgebra de Boole se podía hacer mediante una operación binaria única suficiente repetida ( NOR lógica ), anticipando a Henry M. Sheffer por 33 años. (Ver también las leyes de De Morgan ).
En 1881 [86] expuso la axiomatización de la aritmética de números naturales , unos años antes que Richard Dedekind y Giuseppe Peano . En el mismo artículo, Peirce dio, años antes que Dedekind, la primera definición puramente cardinal de un conjunto finito en el sentido ahora conocido como " Dedekind-finito ", e implicaba con el mismo trazo una importante definición formal de un conjunto infinito (Dedekind-infinito ), como un conjunto que se puede poner en una correspondencia uno a uno con uno de sus subconjuntos adecuados .
En 1885 [87] distinguió entre cuantificación de primer y segundo orden. [88] [89] En el mismo artículo expuso lo que se puede leer como la primera teoría de conjuntos axiomática (primitiva) , anticipando a Zermelo en unas dos décadas (Brady 2000, [90] págs. 132–33).
En 1886, vio que los cálculos booleanos se podían realizar a través de interruptores eléctricos, [13] anticipándose a Claude Shannon en más de 50 años.
A finales de la década de 1890 [91] estaba ideando gráficos existenciales , una notación diagramática para el cálculo de predicados . Basados en ellos están los gráficos conceptuales de John F. Sowa y el razonamiento esquemático de Sun-Joo Shin .
- Los nuevos elementos de las matemáticas
Peirce escribió borradores para un libro de texto introductorio, con el título provisional Los nuevos elementos de las matemáticas , que presentaba las matemáticas desde un punto de vista original. Esos borradores y muchos otros de sus manuscritos matemáticos inéditos finalmente aparecieron [83] en The New Elements of Mathematics de Charles S. Peirce (1976), editado por la matemática Carolyn Eisele .
- Naturaleza de las matemáticas
Peirce estuvo de acuerdo con Auguste Comte en considerar las matemáticas como más básicas que la filosofía y las ciencias especiales (de la naturaleza y la mente). Peirce clasificó las matemáticas en tres subáreas: (1) matemáticas de la lógica, (2) series discretas y (3) pseudo-continuos (como él los llamó, incluidos los números reales ) y continuos. Influenciado por su padre Benjamin , Peirce argumentó que las matemáticas estudian objetos puramente hipotéticos y no es solo la ciencia de la cantidad, sino que es más ampliamente la ciencia que saca las conclusiones necesarias; que las matemáticas ayudan a la lógica, no al revés; y esa lógica en sí misma es parte de la filosofía y es la ciencia acerca de sacar conclusiones necesarias y no. [92]
Matemáticas de la lógica [ editar ]
- "Sobre una mejora en el cálculo lógico de Boole" (1867)
- "Descripción de una notación para la lógica de los parientes" (1870)
- "Sobre el álgebra de la lógica" (1880)
- "Un álgebra booleana con una constante" (1880 MS)
- "Sobre la lógica del número" (1881)
- "Nota B: La lógica de los familiares" (1883)
- "Sobre el álgebra de la lógica: una contribución a la filosofía de la notación" (1884/1885)
- "La lógica de los familiares" (1897)
- "Las matemáticas más simples" (1902 MS)
- "Prolegómenos a una apología del pragmaticismo" (1906, sobre gráficos existenciales)
A partir de su primer artículo sobre la "Lógica de los parientes" (1870) , Peirce amplió la teoría de las relaciones que Augustus De Morgan acababa de despertar de su sueño de Cenicienta. Gran parte de las matemáticas de las relaciones que ahora se dan por sentadas fueron "tomadas prestadas" de Peirce, no siempre con todo el crédito; sobre eso y sobre cómo el joven Bertrand Russell , especialmente sus Principles of Mathematics y Principia Mathematica , no le hicieron justicia a Peirce, ver Anellis (1995). [65] En 1918, el lógico C. I. Lewisescribió: "Las contribuciones de CS Peirce a la lógica simbólica son más numerosas y variadas que las de cualquier otro escritor, al menos en el siglo XIX". [93] A partir de 1940, Alfred Tarski y sus estudiantes redescubrieron aspectos de la visión más amplia de Peirce de la lógica relacional, desarrollando la perspectiva del álgebra de relaciones .
La lógica relacional ganó aplicaciones. En matemáticas, influyó en el análisis abstracto de EH Moore y la teoría de celosía de Garrett Birkhoff . En informática, el modelo relacional para bases de datos se desarrolló con ideas de Peirce en el trabajo de Edgar F. Codd , quien era un estudiante de doctorado [94] de Arthur W. Burks , un académico de Peirce. En economía, la lógica relacional fue utilizada por Frank P. Ramsey , John von Neumann y Paul Samuelson para estudiar las preferencias y la utilidad y por Kenneth J. Arrow enElección social y valores individuales , siguiendo la asociación de Arrow con Tarski en City College of New York .
Sobre Peirce y sus contemporáneos Ernst Schröder y Gottlob Frege , Hilary Putnam (1982) [88] documentó que el trabajo de Frege sobre la lógica de los cuantificadores tuvo poca influencia en sus contemporáneos, aunque fue publicado cuatro años antes que el trabajo de Peirce y su alumno Oscar. Howard Mitchell . Putnam descubrió que los matemáticos y los lógicos aprendieron acerca de la lógica de los cuantificadores a través del trabajo independiente de Peirce y Mitchell, particularmente a través de "Sobre el álgebra de la lógica: una contribución a la filosofía de la notación" de Peirce [87] (1885), publicado en la premier Revista matemática estadounidense del día, y citado por Peano.y Schröder, entre otros, que ignoró a Frege. También adoptaron y modificaron las notaciones de Peirce, variantes tipográficas de las que se utilizan ahora. Peirce aparentemente ignoraba el trabajo de Frege, a pesar de sus logros superpuestos en lógica, filosofía del lenguaje y los fundamentos de las matemáticas .
El trabajo de Peirce sobre lógica formal tenía admiradores además de Ernst Schröder :
- El algebrista filosófico William Kingdon Clifford [95] y el lógico William Ernest Johnson , ambos británicos;
- La escuela polaca de lógica y matemáticas fundamentales, incluido Alfred Tarski ;
- Arthur Prior, who praised and studied Peirce's logical work in a 1964 paper[28] and in Formal Logic (saying on page 4 that Peirce "perhaps had a keener eye for essentials than any other logician before or since").
A philosophy of logic, grounded in his categories and semiotic, can be extracted from Peirce's writings and, along with Peirce's logical work more generally, is exposited and defended in Hilary Putnam (1982);[88] the Introduction in Nathan Houser et al. (1997);[96] and Randall Dipert's chapter in Cheryl Misak (2004).[97]
Continua[edit]
Continuity and synechism are central in Peirce's philosophy: "I did not at first suppose that it was, as I gradually came to find it, the master-Key of philosophy".[98]
From a mathematical point of view, he embraced infinitesimals and worked long on the mathematics of continua. He long held that the real numbers constitute a pseudo-continuum;[99] that a true continuum is the real subject matter of analysis situs (topology); and that a true continuum of instants exceeds—and within any lapse of time has room for—any Aleph number (any infinite multitude as he called it) of instants.[100]
In 1908 Peirce wrote that he found that a true continuum might have or lack such room. Jérôme Havenel (2008): "It is on 26 May 1908, that Peirce finally gave up his idea that in every continuum there is room for whatever collection of any multitude. From now on, there are different kinds of continua, which have different properties."[101]
Probability and statistics[edit]
Peirce held that science achieves statistical probabilities, not certainties, and that spontaneity (absolute chance) is real (see Tychism on his view). Most of his statistical writings promote the frequency interpretation of probability (objective ratios of cases), and many of his writings express skepticism about (and criticize the use of) probability when such models are not based on objective randomization.[102] Though Peirce was largely a frequentist, his possible world semantics introduced the "propensity" theory of probability before Karl Popper.[103][104] Peirce (sometimes with Joseph Jastrow) investigated the probability judgments of experimental subjects, "perhaps the very first" elicitation and estimation of subjective probabilities in experimental psychology and (what came to be called) Bayesian statistics.[2]
Peirce was one of the founders of statistics. He formulated modern statistics in "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" (1877–1878) and "A Theory of Probable Inference" (1883). With a repeated measures design, Charles Sanders Peirce and Joseph Jastrow introduced blinded, controlled randomized experiments in 1884[105] (Hacking 1990:205)[1] (before Ronald A. Fisher).[2] He invented optimal design for experiments on gravity, in which he "corrected the means". He used correlation and smoothing. Peirce extended the work on outliers by Benjamin Peirce, his father.[2] He introduced terms "confidence" and "likelihood" (before Jerzy Neyman and Fisher). (See Stephen Stigler's historical books and Ian Hacking 1990.[1])
Philosophy[edit]
It is not sufficiently recognized that Peirce's career was that of a scientist, not a philosopher; and that during his lifetime he was known and valued chiefly as a scientist, only secondarily as a logician, and scarcely at all as a philosopher. Even his work in philosophy and logic will not be understood until this fact becomes a standing premise of Peircean studies.
— Max Fisch 1964, p. 486.[28]
Peirce was a working scientist for 30 years, and arguably was a professional philosopher only during the five years he lectured at Johns Hopkins. He learned philosophy mainly by reading, each day, a few pages of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in the original German, while a Harvard undergraduate. His writings bear on a wide array of disciplines, including mathematics, logic, philosophy, statistics, astronomy,[28] metrology,[3] geodesy, experimental psychology,[4] economics,[5] linguistics,[6] and the history and philosophy of science. This work has enjoyed renewed interest and approval, a revival inspired not only by his anticipations of recent scientific developments but also by his demonstration of how philosophy can be applied effectively to human problems.
Peirce's philosophy includes (see below in related sections) a pervasive three-category system: belief that truth is immutable and is both independent from actual opinion (fallibilism) and discoverable (no radical skepticism), logic as formal semiotic on signs, on arguments, and on inquiry's ways—including philosophical pragmatism (which he founded), critical common-sensism, and scientific method—and, in metaphysics: Scholastic realism, e.g. John Duns Scotus, belief in God, freedom, and at least an attenuated immortality, objective idealism, and belief in the reality of continuity and of absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and creative love. In his work, fallibilism and pragmatism may seem to work somewhat like skepticism and positivism, respectively, in others' work. However, for Peirce, fallibilism is balanced by an anti-skepticism and is a basis for belief in the reality of absolute chance and of continuity,[106] and pragmatism commits one to anti-nominalist belief in the reality of the general (CP 5.453–57).
For Peirce, First Philosophy, which he also called cenoscopy, is less basic than mathematics and more basic than the special sciences (of nature and mind). It studies positive phenomena in general, phenomena available to any person at any waking moment, and does not settle questions by resorting to special experiences.[107] He divided such philosophy into (1) phenomenology (which he also called phaneroscopy or categorics), (2) normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, and logic), and (3) metaphysics; his views on them are discussed in order below.
Theory of categories[edit]
On May 14, 1867, the 27-year-old Peirce presented a paper entitled "On a New List of Categories" to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which published it the following year. The paper outlined a theory of predication, involving three universal categories that Peirce developed in response to reading Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and G. W. F. Hegel, categories that Peirce applied throughout his work for the rest of his life.[22] Peirce scholars generally regard the "New List" as foundational or breaking the ground for Peirce's "architectonic", his blueprint for a pragmatic philosophy. In the categories one will discern, concentrated, the pattern that one finds formed by the three grades of clearness in "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878 paper foundational to pragmatism), and in numerous other trichotomies in his work.
"On a New List of Categories" is cast as a Kantian deduction; it is short but dense and difficult to summarize. The following table is compiled from that and later works.[108] In 1893, Peirce restated most of it for a less advanced audience.[109]
| Name | Typical characterizaton | As universe of experience | As quantity | Technical definition | Valence, "adicity" |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firstness[111] | Quality of feeling | Ideas, chance, possibility | Vagueness, "some" | Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a quality)[112] | Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[113] which has the quality) |
| Secondness[114] | Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation | Brute facts, actuality | Singularity, discreteness, "this" | Reference to a correlate (by its relate) | Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate) |
| Thirdness[115] | Representation, mediation | Habits, laws, necessity | Generality, continuity, "all" | Reference to an interpretant* | Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant*) |
*Note: An interpretant is an interpretation (human or otherwise) in the sense of the product of an interpretive process.
Aesthetics and ethics[edit]
Peirce did not write extensively in aesthetics and ethics,[116] but came by 1902 to hold that aesthetics, ethics, and logic, in that order, comprise the normative sciences.[117] He characterized aesthetics as the study of the good (grasped as the admirable), and thus of the ends governing all conduct and thought.[118]
Philosophy: logic, or semiotic[edit]
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Logic as philosophical[edit]
Peirce regarded logic per se as a division of philosophy, as a normative science based on esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,[119] and as "the art of devising methods of research".[120] More generally, as inference, "logic is rooted in the social principle", since inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.[121] Peirce called (with no sense of deprecation) "mathematics of logic" much of the kind of thing which, in current research and applications, is called simply "logic". He was productive in both (philosophical) logic and logic's mathematics, which were connected deeply in his work and thought.
Peirce argued that logic is formal semiotic: the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that are artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. Peirce held that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs",[122] along with their representational and inferential relations. He argued that, since all thought takes time, all thought is in signs[123] and sign processes ("semiosis") such as the inquiry process. He divided logic into: (1) speculative grammar, or stechiology, on how signs can be meaningful and, in relation to that, what kinds of signs there are, how they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others; (2) logical critic, or logic proper, on the modes of inference; and (3) speculative or universal rhetoric, or methodeutic,[124] the philosophical theory of inquiry, including pragmatism.
Presuppositions of logic[edit]
In his "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic] (1899), Peirce states that the first, and "in one sense, the sole", rule of reason is that, to learn, one needs to desire to learn and desire it without resting satisfied with that which one is inclined to think.[119] So, the first rule is, to wonder. Peirce proceeds to a critical theme in research practices and the shaping of theories:
- ...there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:
Peirce adds, that method and economy are best in research but no outright sin inheres in trying any theory in the sense that the investigation via its trial adoption can proceed unimpeded and undiscouraged, and that "the one unpardonable offence" is a philosophical barricade against truth's advance, an offense to which "metaphysicians in all ages have shown themselves the most addicted". Peirce in many writings holds that logic precedes metaphysics (ontological, religious, and physical).
Peirce goes on to list four common barriers to inquiry: (1) Assertion of absolute certainty; (2) maintaining that something is absolutely unknowable; (3) maintaining that something is absolutely inexplicable because absolutely basic or ultimate; (4) holding that perfect exactitude is possible, especially such as to quite preclude unusual and anomalous phenomena. To refuse absolute theoretical certainty is the heart of fallibilism, which Peirce unfolds into refusals to set up any of the listed barriers. Peirce elsewhere argues (1897) that logic's presupposition of fallibilism leads at length to the view that chance and continuity are very real (tychism and synechism).[106]
The First Rule of Logic pertains to the mind's presuppositions in undertaking reason and logic; presuppositions, for instance, that truth and the real do not depend on yours or my opinion of them but do depend on representational relation and consist in the destined end in investigation taken far enough (see below). He describes such ideas as, collectively, hopes which, in particular cases, one is unable seriously to doubt.[125]
Four incapacities[edit]
- Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man (1868)
- Some Consequences of Four Incapacities (1868)
- Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic:
Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869)
In three articles in 1868–1869,[123][126][127] Peirce rejected mere verbal or hyperbolic doubt and first or ultimate principles, and argued that we have (as he numbered them[126]):
- No power of Introspection. All knowledge of the internal world comes by hypothetical reasoning from known external facts.
- No power of Intuition (cognition without logical determination by previous cognitions). No cognitive stage is absolutely first in a process. All mental action has the form of inference.
- No power of thinking without signs. A cognition must be interpreted in a subsequent cognition in order to be a cognition at all.
- No conception of the absolutely incognizable.
(The above sense of the term "intuition" is almost Kant's, said Peirce. It differs from the current looser sense that encompasses instinctive or anyway half-conscious inference.)
Peirce argued that those incapacities imply the reality of the general and of the continuous, the validity of the modes of reasoning,[127] and the falsity of philosophical Cartesianism (see below).
Peirce rejected the conception (usually ascribed to Kant) of the unknowable thing-in-itself[126] and later said that to "dismiss make-believes" is a prerequisite for pragmatism.[128]
Logic as formal semiotic[edit]
Peirce sought, through his wide-ranging studies through the decades, formal philosophical ways to articulate thought's processes, and also to explain the workings of science. These inextricably entangled questions of a dynamics of inquiry rooted in nature and nurture led him to develop his semiotic with very broadened conceptions of signs and inference, and, as its culmination, a theory of inquiry for the task of saying 'how science works' and devising research methods. This would be logic by the medieval definition taught for centuries: art of arts, science of sciences, having the way to the principles of all methods.[120] Influences radiate from points on parallel lines of inquiry in Aristotle's work, in such loci as: the basic terminology of psychology in On the Soul; the founding description of sign relations in On Interpretation; and the differentiation of inference into three modes that are commonly translated into English as abduction, deduction, and induction, in the Prior Analytics, as well as inference by analogy (called paradeigma by Aristotle), which Peirce regarded as involving the other three modes.
Peirce began writing on semiotic in the 1860s, around the time when he devised his system of three categories. He called it both semiotic and semeiotic. Both are current in singular and plural. He based it on the conception of a triadic sign relation, and defined semiosis as "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs".[129] As to signs in thought, Peirce emphasized the reverse: "To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs."[123]
Peirce held that all thought is in signs, issuing in and from interpretation, where sign is the word for the broadest variety of conceivable semblances, diagrams, metaphors, symptoms, signals, designations, symbols, texts, even mental concepts and ideas, all as determinations of a mind or quasi-mind, that which at least functions like a mind, as in the work of crystals or bees[130]—the focus is on sign action in general rather than on psychology, linguistics, or social studies (fields which he also pursued).
Inquiry is a kind of inference process, a manner of thinking and semiosis. Global divisions of ways for phenomena to stand as signs, and the subsumption of inquiry and thinking within inference as a sign process, enable the study of inquiry on semiotics' three levels:
- Conditions for meaningfulness. Study of significatory elements and combinations, their grammar.
- Validity, conditions for true representation. Critique of arguments in their various separate modes.
- Conditions for determining interpretations. Methodology of inquiry in its mutually interacting modes.
Peirce uses examples often from common experience, but defines and discusses such things as assertion and interpretation in terms of philosophical logic. In a formal vein, Peirce said:
On the Definition of Logic. Logic is formal semiotic. A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. This definition no more involves any reference to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place within which a particle lies during a lapse of time. It is from this definition that I deduce the principles of logic by mathematical reasoning, and by mathematical reasoning that, I aver, will support criticism of Weierstrassian severity, and that is perfectly evident. The word "formal" in the definition is also defined.[131]
Signs[edit]
- A list of noted writings by Peirce on signs and sign relations is at Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce § References and further reading.
Sign relation[edit]
Peirce's theory of signs is known to be one of the most complex semiotic theories due to its generalistic claim. Anything is a sign—not absolutely as itself, but instead in some relation or other. The sign relation is the key. It defines three roles encompassing (1) the sign, (2) the sign's subject matter, called its object, and (3) the sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of effect called its interpretant (a further sign, for example a translation). It is an irreducible triadic relation, according to Peirce. The roles are distinct even when the things that fill those roles are not. The roles are but three; a sign of an object leads to one or more interpretants, and, as signs, they lead to further interpretants.
Extension × intension = information. Two traditional approaches to sign relation, necessary though insufficient, are the way of extension (a sign's objects, also called breadth, denotation, or application) and the way of intension (the objects' characteristics, qualities, attributes referenced by the sign, also called depth, comprehension, significance, or connotation). Peirce adds a third, the way of information, including change of information, to integrate the other two approaches into a unified whole.[132] For example, because of the equation above, if a term's total amount of information stays the same, then the more that the term 'intends' or signifies about objects, the fewer are the objects to which the term 'extends' or applies.
Determination. A sign depends on its object in such a way as to represent its object—the object enables and, in a sense, determines the sign. A physically causal sense of this stands out when a sign consists in an indicative reaction. The interpretant depends likewise on both the sign and the object—an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant. But this determination is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an interpretant does not merely represent something which represented an object; instead an interpretant represents something as a sign representing the object. The object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one's collateral experience[133] with the object, in which the object is found or from which it is recalled, as when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an absent object. Peirce used the word "determine" not in a strictly deterministic sense, but in a sense of "specializes", bestimmt,[134] involving variable amount, like an influence.[135] Peirce came to define representation and interpretation in terms of (triadic) determination.[136] The object determines the sign to determine another sign—the interpretant—to be related to the object as the sign is related to the object, hence the interpretant, fulfilling its function as sign of the object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is logically structured to perpetuate itself, and is definitive of sign, object, and interpretant in general.[135]
Semiotic elements[edit]
Peirce held there are exactly three basic elements in semiosis (sign action):
- A sign (or representamen)[137] represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial—a cloud might be a sign of rain for instance, or ruins the sign of ancient civilization.[138] As Peirce sometimes put it (he defined sign at least 76 times[135]), the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. A sign represents its object in some respect, which respect is the sign's ground.[112]
- An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant. It can be anything thinkable, a quality, an occurrence, a rule, etc., even fictional, such as Prince Hamlet.[139] All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.[139] For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but ultimately not only about Pluto. An object either (i) is immediate to a sign and is the object as represented in the sign or (ii) is a dynamic object, the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded "as on bedrock".[140]
- An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is a sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of idea or effect, an interpretation, human or otherwise. An interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as a sign of the same object. An interpretant either (i) is immediate to a sign and is a kind of quality or possibility such as a word's usual meaning, or (ii) is a dynamic interpretant, such as a state of agitation, or (iii) is a final or normal interpretant, a sum of the lessons which a sufficiently considered sign would have as effects on practice, and with which an actual interpretant may at most coincide.
Some of the understanding needed by the mind depends on familiarity with the object. To know what a given sign denotes, the mind needs some experience of that sign's object, experience outside of, and collateral to, that sign or sign system. In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.[133]
Classes of signs[edit]
Among Peirce's many sign typologies, three stand out, interlocked. The first typology depends on the sign itself, the second on how the sign stands for its denoted object, and the third on how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant. Also, each of the three typologies is a three-way division, a trichotomy, via Peirce's three phenomenological categories: (1) quality of feeling, (2) reaction, resistance, and (3) representation, mediation.[141]
I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign (also called tone, token, type, and also called potisign, actisign, famisign):[142] This typology classifies every sign according to the sign's own phenomenological category—the qualisign is a quality, a possibility, a "First"; the sinsign is a reaction or resistance, a singular object, an actual event or fact, a "Second"; and the legisign is a habit, a rule, a representational relation, a "Third".
II. Icon, index, symbol: This typology, the best known one, classifies every sign according to the category of the sign's way of denoting its object—the icon (also called semblance or likeness) by a quality of its own, the index by factual connection to its object, and the symbol by a habit or rule for its interpretant.
III. Rheme, dicisign, argument (also called sumisign, dicisign, suadisign, also seme, pheme, delome,[142] and regarded as very broadened versions of the traditional term, proposition, argument): This typology classifies every sign according to the category which the interpretant attributes to the sign's way of denoting its object—the rheme, for example a term, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of quality; the dicisign, for example a proposition, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of fact; and the argument is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of habit or law. This is the culminating typology of the three, where the sign is understood as a structural element of inference.
| 1. | 2. | 3. | |||
| I. | Qualisign | or | Sinsign | or | Legisign |
| and | |||||
| II. | Icon | or | Index | or | Symbol |
| and | |||||
| III. | Rheme | or | Dicisign | or | Argument |
Every sign belongs to one class or another within (I) and within (II) and within (III). Thus each of the three typologies is a three-valued parameter for every sign. The three parameters are not independent of each other; many co-classifications are absent, for reasons pertaining to the lack of either habit-taking or singular reaction in a quality, and the lack of habit-taking in a singular reaction. The result is not 27 but instead ten classes of signs fully specified at this level of analysis.
Modes of inference[edit]
Borrowing a brace of concepts from Aristotle, Peirce examined three basic modes of inference—abduction, deduction, and induction—in his "critique of arguments" or "logic proper". Peirce also called abduction "retroduction", "presumption", and, earliest of all, "hypothesis". He characterized it as guessing and as inference to an explanatory hypothesis. He sometimes expounded the modes of inference by transformations of the categorical syllogism Barbara (AAA), for example in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878).[143] He does this by rearranging the rule (Barbara's major premise), the case (Barbara's minor premise), and the result (Barbara's conclusion):
Deduction. Rule: All the beans from this bag are white. | Induction. Case: These beans are [randomly selected] from this bag. | Hypothesis (Abduction). Rule: All the beans from this bag are white. |
Peirce 1883 in "A Theory of Probable Inference" (Studies in Logic) equated hypothetical inference with the induction of characters of objects (as he had done in effect before[126]). Eventually dissatisfied, by 1900 he distinguished them once and for all and also wrote that he now took the syllogistic forms and the doctrine of logical extension and comprehension as being less basic than he had thought. In 1903 he presented the following logical form for abductive inference:[144]
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
- But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
- Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
The logical form does not also cover induction, since induction neither depends on surprise nor proposes a new idea for its conclusion. Induction seeks facts to test a hypothesis; abduction seeks a hypothesis to account for facts. "Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be."[145] Peirce did not remain quite convinced that one logical form covers all abduction.[146] In his methodeutic or theory of inquiry (see below), he portrayed abduction as an economic initiative to further inference and study, and portrayed all three modes as clarified by their coordination in essential roles in inquiry: hypothetical explanation, deductive prediction, inductive testing.
Pragmatism[edit]
- Illustrations of the Logic of Science (1877–1878):
inquiry, pragmatism, statistics, inference
- The Fixation of Belief (1877)
- How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878)
- The Doctrine of Chances (1878)
- The Probability of Induction (1878)
- The Order of Nature (1878)
- Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis (1878)
- The Harvard lectures on pragmatism (1903)
- What Pragmatism Is (1905)
- Issues of Pragmaticism (1905)
- Pragmatism (1907 MS in The Essential Peirce, 2)
Peirce's recipe for pragmatic thinking, which he called pragmatism and, later, pragmaticism, is recapitulated in several versions of the so-called pragmatic maxim. Here is one of his more emphatic reiterations of it:
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.
As a movement, pragmatism began in the early 1870s in discussions among Peirce, William James, and others in the Metaphysical Club. James among others regarded some articles by Peirce such as "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) and especially "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) as foundational to pragmatism.[147] Peirce (CP 5.11–12), like James (Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 1907), saw pragmatism as embodying familiar attitudes, in philosophy and elsewhere, elaborated into a new deliberate method for fruitful thinking about problems. Peirce differed from James and the early John Dewey, in some of their tangential enthusiasms, in being decidedly more rationalistic and realistic, in several senses of those terms, throughout the preponderance of his own philosophical moods.
In 1905 Peirce coined the new name pragmaticism "for the precise purpose of expressing the original definition", saying that "all went happily" with James's and F.C.S. Schiller's variant uses of the old name "pragmatism" and that he coined the new name because of the old name's growing use in "literary journals, where it gets abused". Yet he cited as causes, in a 1906 manuscript, his differences with James and Schiller and, in a 1908 publication, his differences with James as well as literary author Giovanni Papini's declaration of pragmatism's indefinability. Peirce in any case regarded his views that truth is immutable and infinity is real, as being opposed by the other pragmatists, but he remained allied with them on other issues.[148]
Pragmatism begins with the idea that belief is that on which one is prepared to act. Peirce's pragmatism is a method of clarification of conceptions of objects. It equates any conception of an object to a conception of that object's effects to a general extent of the effects' conceivable implications for informed practice. It is a method of sorting out conceptual confusions occasioned, for example, by distinctions that make (sometimes needed) formal yet not practical differences. He formulated both pragmatism and statistical principles as aspects of scientific logic, in his "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series of articles. In the second one, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", Peirce discussed three grades of clearness of conception:
- Clearness of a conception familiar and readily used, even if unanalyzed and undeveloped.
- Clearness of a conception in virtue of clearness of its parts, in virtue of which logicians called an idea "distinct", that is, clarified by analysis of just what makes it applicable. Elsewhere, echoing Kant, Peirce called a likewise distinct definition "nominal" (CP 5.553).
- Clearness in virtue of clearness of conceivable practical implications of the object's conceived effects, such that fosters fruitful reasoning, especially on difficult problems. Here he introduced that which he later called the pragmatic maxim.
By way of example of how to clarify conceptions, he addressed conceptions about truth and the real as questions of the presuppositions of reasoning in general. In clearness's second grade (the "nominal" grade), he defined truth as a sign's correspondence to its object, and the real as the object of such correspondence, such that truth and the real are independent of that which you or I or any actual, definite community of inquirers think. After that needful but confined step, next in clearness's third grade (the pragmatic, practice-oriented grade) he defined truth as that opinion which would be reached, sooner or later but still inevitably, by research taken far enough, such that the real does depend on that ideal final opinion—a dependence to which he appeals in theoretical arguments elsewhere, for instance for the long-run validity of the rule of induction.[149] Peirce argued that even to argue against the independence and discoverability of truth and the real is to presuppose that there is, about that very question under argument, a truth with just such independence and discoverability.
Peirce said that a conception's meaning consists in "all general modes of rational conduct" implied by "acceptance" of the conception—that is, if one were to accept, first of all, the conception as true, then what could one conceive to be consequent general modes of rational conduct by all who accept the conception as true?—the whole of such consequent general modes is the whole meaning. His pragmatism does not equate a conception's meaning, its intellectual purport, with the conceived benefit or cost of the conception itself, like a meme (or, say, propaganda), outside the perspective of its being true, nor, since a conception is general, is its meaning equated with any definite set of actual consequences or upshots corroborating or undermining the conception or its worth. His pragmatism also bears no resemblance to "vulgar" pragmatism, which misleadingly connotes a ruthless and Machiavellian search for mercenary or political advantage. Instead the pragmatic maxim is the heart of his pragmatism as a method of experimentational mental reflection[150] arriving at conceptions in terms of conceivable confirmatory and disconfirmatory circumstances—a method hospitable to the formation of explanatory hypotheses, and conducive to the use and improvement of verification.[151]
Peirce's pragmatism, as method and theory of definitions and conceptual clearness, is part of his theory of inquiry,[152] which he variously called speculative, general, formal or universal rhetoric or simply methodeutic.[124] He applied his pragmatism as a method throughout his work.
Theory of inquiry[edit]
Critical common-sensism[edit]
Critical common-sensism,[153] treated by Peirce as a consequence of his pragmatism, is his combination of Thomas Reid's common-sense philosophy with a fallibilism that recognizes that propositions of our more or less vague common sense now indubitable may later come into question, for example because of transformations of our world through science. It includes efforts to work up in tests genuine doubts for a core group of common indubitables that vary slowly if at all.
Rival methods of inquiry[edit]
In "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), Peirce described inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubt born of surprise, disagreement, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, belief being that on which one is prepared to act. That let Peirce frame scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not mere verbal, quarrelsome, or hyperbolic doubt, which he held to be fruitless. Peirce sketched four methods of settling opinion, ordered from least to most successful:
- The method of tenacity (policy of sticking to initial belief) – which brings comforts and decisiveness but leads to trying to ignore contrary information and others' views as if truth were intrinsically private, not public. The method goes against the social impulse and easily falters since one may well notice when another's opinion seems as good as one's own initial opinion. Its successes can be brilliant but tend to be transitory.
- The method of authority – which overcomes disagreements but sometimes brutally. Its successes can be majestic and long-lasting, but it cannot regulate people thoroughly enough to withstand doubts indefinitely, especially when people learn about other societies present and past.
- The method of the a priori – which promotes conformity less brutally but fosters opinions as something like tastes, arising in conversation and comparisons of perspectives in terms of "what is agreeable to reason". Thereby it depends on fashion in paradigms and goes in circles over time. It is more intellectual and respectable but, like the first two methods, sustains accidental and capricious beliefs, destining some minds to doubt it.
- The method of science – wherein inquiry supposes that the real is discoverable but independent of particular opinion, such that, unlike in the other methods, inquiry can, by its own account, go wrong (fallibilism), not only right, and thus purposely tests itself and criticizes, corrects, and improves itself.
Peirce held that, in practical affairs, slow and stumbling ratiocination is often dangerously inferior to instinct and traditional sentiment, and that the scientific method is best suited to theoretical research,[154] which in turn should not be trammeled by the other methods and practical ends; reason's "first rule"[119] is that, in order to learn, one must desire to learn and, as a corollary, must not block the way of inquiry. Scientific method excels over the others finally by being deliberately designed to arrive—eventually—at the most secure beliefs, upon which the most successful practices can be based. Starting from the idea that people seek not truth per se but instead to subdue irritating, inhibitory doubt, Peirce showed how, through the struggle, some can come to submit to truth for the sake of belief's integrity, seek as truth the guidance of potential conduct correctly to its given goal, and wed themselves to the scientific method.
Scientific method[edit]
Insofar as clarification by pragmatic reflection suits explanatory hypotheses and fosters predictions and testing, pragmatism points beyond the usual duo of foundational alternatives: deduction from self-evident truths, or rationalism; and induction from experiential phenomena, or empiricism.
Based on his critique of three modes of argument and different from either foundationalism or coherentism, Peirce's approach seeks to justify claims by a three-phase dynamic of inquiry:
- Active, abductive genesis of theory, with no prior assurance of truth;
- Deductive application of the contingent theory so as to clarify its practical implications;
- Inductive testing and evaluation of the utility of the provisional theory in anticipation of future experience, in both senses: prediction and control.
Thereby, Peirce devised an approach to inquiry far more solid than the flatter image of inductive generalization simpliciter, which is a mere re-labeling of phenomenological patterns. Peirce's pragmatism was the first time the scientific method was proposed as an epistemology for philosophical questions.
A theory that succeeds better than its rivals in predicting and controlling our world is said to be nearer the truth. This is an operational notion of truth used by scientists.
Peirce extracted the pragmatic model or theory of inquiry from its raw materials in classical logic and refined it in parallel with the early development of symbolic logic to address problems about the nature of scientific reasoning.
Abduction, deduction, and induction make incomplete sense in isolation from one another but comprise a cycle understandable as a whole insofar as they collaborate toward the common end of inquiry. In the pragmatic way of thinking about conceivable practical implications, every thing has a purpose, and, as possible, its purpose should first be denoted. Abduction hypothesizes an explanation for deduction to clarify into implications to be tested so that induction can evaluate the hypothesis, in the struggle to move from troublesome uncertainty to more secure belief. No matter how traditional and needful it is to study the modes of inference in abstraction from one another, the integrity of inquiry strongly limits the effective modularity of its principal components.
Peirce's outline of the scientific method in §III–IV of "A Neglected Argument"[155] is summarized below (except as otherwise noted). There he also reviewed plausibility and inductive precision (issues of critique of arguments).
1. Abductive (or retroductive) phase. Guessing, inference to explanatory hypotheses for selection of those best worth trying. From abduction, Peirce distinguishes induction as inferring, on the basis of tests, the proportion of truth in the hypothesis. Every inquiry, whether into ideas, brute facts, or norms and laws, arises from surprising observations in one or more of those realms (and for example at any stage of an inquiry already underway). All explanatory content of theories comes from abduction, which guesses a new or outside idea so as to account in a simple, economical way for a surprising or complicated phenomenon. The modicum of success in our guesses far exceeds that of random luck, and seems born of attunement to nature by developed or inherent instincts, especially insofar as best guesses are optimally plausible and simple in the sense of the "facile and natural", as by Galileo's natural light of reason and as distinct from "logical simplicity".[156] Abduction is the most fertile but least secure mode of inference. Its general rationale is inductive: it succeeds often enough and it has no substitute in expediting us toward new truths.[157] In 1903, Peirce called pragmatism "the logic of abduction".[158] Coordinative method leads from abducting a plausible hypothesis to judging it for its testability[159] and for how its trial would economize inquiry itself.[160] The hypothesis, being insecure, needs to have practical implications leading at least to mental tests and, in science, lending themselves to scientific tests. A simple but unlikely guess, if not costly to test for falsity, may belong first in line for testing. A guess is intrinsically worth testing if it has plausibility or reasoned objective probability, while subjective likelihood, though reasoned, can be misleadingly seductive. Guesses can be selected for trial strategically, for their caution (for which Peirce gave as example the game of Twenty Questions), breadth, or incomplexity.[161] One can discover only that which would be revealed through their sufficient experience anyway, and so the point is to expedite it; economy of research demands the leap, so to speak, of abduction and governs its art.[160]
2. Deductive phase. Two stages:
- i. Explication. Not clearly premised, but a deductive analysis of the hypothesis so as to render its parts as clear as possible.
- ii. Demonstration: Deductive Argumentation, Euclidean in procedure. Explicit deduction of consequences of the hypothesis as predictions about evidence to be found. Corollarial or, if needed, Theorematic.
3. Inductive phase. Evaluation of the hypothesis, inferring from observational or experimental tests of its deduced consequences. The long-run validity of the rule of induction is deducible from the principle (presuppositional to reasoning in general) that the real "is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead";[149] in other words, anything excluding such a process would never be real. Induction involving the ongoing accumulation of evidence follows "a method which, sufficiently persisted in", will "diminish the error below any predesignate degree". Three stages:
- i. Classification. Not clearly premised, but an inductive classing of objects of experience under general ideas.
- ii. Probation: direct Inductive Argumentation. Crude or Gradual in procedure. Crude Induction, founded on experience in one mass (CP 2.759), presumes that future experience on a question will not differ utterly from all past experience (CP 2.756). Gradual Induction makes a new estimate of the proportion of truth in the hypothesis after each test, and is Qualitative or Quantitative. Qualitative Gradual Induction depends on estimating the relative evident weights of the various qualities of the subject class under investigation (CP 2.759; see also Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 7.114–20). Quantitative Gradual Induction depends on how often, in a fair sample of instances of S, S is found actually accompanied by P that was predicted for S (CP 2.758). It depends on measurements, or statistics, or counting.
- iii. Sentential Induction. "...which, by Inductive reasonings, appraises the different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgment on the whole result".
Against Cartesianism[edit]
Peirce drew on the methodological implications of the four incapacities—no genuine introspection, no intuition in the sense of non-inferential cognition, no thought but in signs, and no conception of the absolutely incognizable—to attack philosophical Cartesianism, of which he said that:[126]
1. "It teaches that philosophy must begin in universal doubt" – when, instead, we start with preconceptions, "prejudices [...] which it does not occur to us can be questioned", though we may find reason to question them later. "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts."
2. "It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is...in the individual consciousness" – when, instead, in science a theory stays on probation till agreement is reached, then it has no actual doubters left. No lone individual can reasonably hope to fulfill philosophy's multi-generational dream. When "candid and disciplined minds" continue to disagree on a theoretical issue, even the theory's author should feel doubts about it.
3. It trusts to "a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premisses" – when, instead, philosophy should, "like the successful sciences", proceed only from tangible, scrutinizable premisses and trust not to any one argument but instead to "the multitude and variety of its arguments" as forming, not a chain at least as weak as its weakest link, but "a cable whose fibers", soever "slender, are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected".
4. It renders many facts "absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that 'God makes them so' is to be regarded as an explanation"[162] – when, instead, philosophy should avoid being "unidealistic",[163] misbelieving that something real can defy or evade all possible ideas, and supposing, inevitably, "some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate", which explanatory surmise explains nothing and so is inadmissible.
Philosophy: metaphysics[edit]
- The Monist Metaphysical Series (1891–1893)
- The Architecture of Theories (1891)
- The Doctrine of Necessity Examined (1892)
- The Law of Mind (1892)
- Man's Glassy Essence (1892)
- Evolutionary Love (1893)
- Immortality in the Light of Synechism (1893 MS)
Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.
Ontology[edit]
Peirce was a scholastic realist, declaring for the reality of generals as early as 1868.[164] Regarding modalities (possibility, necessity, etc.), he came in later years to regard himself as having wavered earlier as to just how positively real the modalities are. In his 1897 "The Logic of Relatives" he wrote:
I formerly defined the possible as that which in a given state of information (real or feigned) we do not know not to be true. But this definition today seems to me only a twisted phrase which, by means of two negatives, conceals an anacoluthon. We know in advance of experience that certain things are not true, because we see they are impossible.
Peirce retained, as useful for some purposes, the definitions in terms of information states, but insisted that the pragmaticist is committed to a strong modal realism by conceiving of objects in terms of predictive general conditional propositions about how they would behave under certain circumstances.[165]
Psychical or religious metaphysics[edit]
Peirce believed in God, and characterized such belief as founded in an instinct explorable in musing over the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits—and it is a belief in God not as an actual or existent being (in Peirce's sense of those words), but all the same as a real being.[166] In "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908),[155] Peirce sketches, for God's reality, an argument to a hypothesis of God as the Necessary Being, a hypothesis which he describes in terms of how it would tend to develop and become compelling in musement and inquiry by a normal person who is led, by the hypothesis, to consider as being purposed the features of the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits (for example scientific progress), such that the thought of such purposefulness will "stand or fall with the hypothesis"; meanwhile, according to Peirce, the hypothesis, in supposing an "infinitely incomprehensible" being, starts off at odds with its own nature as a purportively true conception, and so, no matter how much the hypothesis grows, it both (A) inevitably regards itself as partly true, partly vague, and as continuing to define itself without limit, and (B) inevitably has God appearing likewise vague but growing, though God as the Necessary Being is not vague or growing; but the hypothesis will hold it to be more false to say the opposite, that God is purposeless. Peirce also argued that the will is free[167] and (see Synechism) that there is at least an attenuated kind of immortality.
Physical metaphysics[edit]
Peirce held the view, which he called objective idealism, that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".[168] Peirce asserted the reality of (1) absolute chance (his tychist view), (2) mechanical necessity (anancist view), and (3) that which he called the law of love (agapist view), echoing his categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. He held that fortuitous variation (which he also called "sporting"), mechanical necessity, and creative love are the three modes of evolution (modes called "tychasm", "anancasm", and "agapasm")[169] of the cosmos and its parts. He found his conception of agapasm embodied in Lamarckian evolution; the overall idea in any case is that of evolution tending toward an end or goal, and it could also be the evolution of a mind or a society; it is the kind of evolution which manifests workings of mind in some general sense. He said that overall he was a synechist, holding with reality of continuity,[170] especially of space, time, and law.[171]
Science of review[edit]
Peirce outlined two fields, "Cenoscopy" and "Science of Review", both of which he called philosophy. Both included philosophy about science. In 1903 he arranged them, from more to less theoretically basic, thus:[107]
- Science of Discovery.
- Mathematics.
- Cenoscopy (philosophy as discussed earlier in this article – categorial, normative, metaphysical), as First Philosophy, concerns positive phenomena in general, does not rely on findings from special sciences, and includes the general study of inquiry and scientific method.
- Idioscopy, or the Special Sciences (of nature and mind).
- Science of Review, as Ultimate Philosophy, arranges "... the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science". His examples included Humboldt's Cosmos, Comte's Philosophie positive, and Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy.
- Practical Science, or the Arts.
Peirce placed, within Science of Review, the work and theory of classifying the sciences (including mathematics and philosophy). His classifications, on which he worked for many years, draw on argument and wide knowledge, and are of interest both as a map for navigating his philosophy and as an accomplished polymath's survey of research in his time.
See also[edit]
- Charles Sanders Peirce's type–token distinction
- Continuous predicate
- Entitative graph
- Howland will forgery trial
- Hypostatic abstraction
- Idea § Charles Sanders Peirce
- Laws of Form
- List of American philosophers
- Logic of information
- Logical machine
- Logical matrix
- Mathematical psychology
- Normal distribution § Naming
- Peirce triangle
- Peircean realism
- Phaneron
- Pragmatics
- Problem of universals § Peirce
- Quantification (science) § History
- Relation algebra
- Truth table
Contemporaries associated with Peirce[edit]
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
- George Herbert Mead
References[edit]
- ^ a b c Hacking, Ian (1990). The Taming of Chance. A Universe of Chance. Cambridge University Press. pp. 200–15.
- ^ a b c d Stigler, Stephen M. (1978). "Mathematical statistics in the early States". Annals of Statistics. 6 (2): 239–65 [248]. doi:10.1214/aos/1176344123. JSTOR 2958876. MR 0483118.
- ^ a b Crease, Robert P. (2009). "Charles Sanders Peirce and the first absolute measurement standard". Physics Today. 62 (12): 39–44. Bibcode:2009PhT....62l..39C. doi:10.1063/1.3273015. Archived from the original on January 12, 2013.
In his brilliant but troubled life, Peirce was a pioneer in both metrology and philosophy.
- ^ a b Cadwallader, Thomas C. (1974). "Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914): The first American experimental psychologist". Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. 10 (3): 291–8. doi:10.1002/1520-6696(197407)10:3<291::AID-JHBS2300100304>3.0.CO;2-N. PMID 11609224.
- ^ a b Wible, James R. (December 2008). "The economic mind of Charles Sanders Peirce". Contemporary Pragmatism. Vol. 5 no. 2. pp. 39–67.
- ^ a b Nöth, Winfried (2000). "Charles Sanders Peirce, Pathfinder in Linguistics".
Nöth, Winfried (2000). "Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce". - ^ a b c d Houser, Nathan (1989), "Introduction", Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 4:xxxviii, find "Eighty-nine".
- ^ Brent, Joseph (1998). Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life (2 ed.). Indiana University Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-0253211613.
Peirce had strong, though unorthodox, religious convictions. Although he was a communicant in the Episcopal church for most of his life, he expressed contempt for the theologies, metaphysics, and practices of established religions.
- ^ Brent, Joseph (1998), Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 2nd edition, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (catalog page); also NetLibrary.
- ^ "Peirce", in the case of C. S. Peirce, always rhymes with the English-language word "terse" and so, in most dialects, is pronounced exactly like the English-language word "purse (help·info)".
- ^ "Note on the Pronunciation of 'Peirce'". Peirce Project Newsletter. 1 (3–4). December 1994.
- ^ Biographies. MacTutor. "Charles Sanders Peirce".
- ^ a b Peirce, C. S. (1886). "Letter, Peirce to A. Marquand". Writings of Charles S. Pierce. pp. 5:541–43. ISBN 978-0253372017. See Burks, Arthur W. (1978). "Charles S. Peirce, The new elements of mathematics" (PDF). Book Review. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society. Eprint. 84 (5): 913–18 [917]. doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1978-14533-9. Also Houser, Nathan. "Introduction". Writings of Charles S. Pierce. 5. p. xliv.
- ^ Weiss, Paul (1934). "Peirce, Charles Sanders". Dictionary of American Biography. Arisbe.
- ^ "Peirce, Benjamin: Charles Sanders". Webster's Biographical Dictionary. Merriam-Webster. Springfield, Massachusetts. 1960 [1943].
- ^ Fisch, Max, "Introduction", Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 1:xvii, find phrase "One episode".
- ^ "Peirce, Charles Sanders" (1898), The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, v. 8, p. 409.
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 54–56
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 363–64
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 19–20, 53, 75, 245
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 40
- ^ a b c d Burch, Robert (2001, 2010), "Charles Sanders Peirce", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 139
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 61–62
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 69
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 368
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 79–81
- ^ a b c d e Moore, Edward C., and Robin, Richard S., eds., (1964), Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, Amherst: U. of Massachusetts Press. On Peirce the astronomer, see Lenzen's chapter.
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 367
- ^ Fisch, Max (1983), "Peirce as Scientist, mathematician, historian, Logician, and Philosopher", Studies in Logic (new edition), see p. x.
- ^ See "Peirce Edition Project (UQÀM) – in short Archived 6 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine" from PEP-UQÀM.
- ^ Houser, Nathan, "Introduction", Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 5:xxviii–xxix, find "Allison".
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 202
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 150–54, 195, 279–80, 289
- ^ Brent 1998, p. xv
- ^ Devlin, Keith (2000). The Math Gene. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0465016198.
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 98–101
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 141
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 148
- ^ Houser, Nathan, "Introduction", Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 6, first paragraph.
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 123, 368
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 150–51, 368
- ^ In 1885 (Brent 1998, p. 369); in 1890 and 1900 (p. 273); in 1891 (pp. 215–16); and in 1892 (pp. 151–52, 222).
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 77
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 191–92, 217, 270, 318, 321, 337.
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 13
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 369–74
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 191
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 246
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 242
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 271
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 249–55
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 371
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 189
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 370
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 205–06
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 374–76
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 279–89
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 261–64, 290–92, 324
- ^ Brent 1998, pp. 306–07, 315–16
- ^ In 2018, plans have been made to erect a memorial monument for Peirce at the site of burial – see: Justin Weinberg, 'A Proper Memorial Monument for Peirce', website Daily Nous, March 14, 2018.
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 34
- ^ Menand, Louis (2001). The Metaphysical Club. London: Flamingo. pp. 161–62. ISBN 978-0007126903.
- ^ Russell, Bertrand (1959), Wisdom of the West, p. 276
- ^ a b Anellis, Irving H. (1995), "Peirce Rustled, Russell Pierced: How Charles Peirce and Bertrand Russell Viewed Each Other's Work in Logic, and an Assessment of Russell's Accuracy and Role in the Historiography of Logic", Modern Logic 5, 270–328. Arisbe Eprint
- ^ Popper, Karl (1972), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, p. 212
- ^ See Royce, Josiah, and Kernan, W. Fergus (1916), "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method v. 13, pp. 701–09. Arisbe Eprint
- ^ Ketner et al. (1986), Comprehensive Bibliography, p. iii
- ^ Hookway, Christopher (2008), "Pragmatism", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Brent 1998, p. 8
- ^ "Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society". Indiana University Press Journals. Retrieved June 17, 2017.
- ^ Fisch, Max (1986), Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel, eds., Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana U. Press.
- ^ Theological Research Group in C.S. Peirce's Philosophy (Hermann Deuser, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen; Wilfred Härle, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany).
- ^ Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy. Quid Sit Postmodernismus?, page 93,
- ^ Burks, Arthur, Introduction, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 7, p. xi.
- ^ Robin, Richard S. (1967), Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Amherst MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- ^ "The manuscript material now (1997) comes to more than a hundred thousand pages. These contain many pages of no philosophical interest, but the number of pages on philosophy certainly number much more than half of that. Also, a significant but unknown number of manuscripts have been lost." – Joseph Ransdell (1997), "Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic", end note 2, 1997 light revision of 1977 version in Semiotica 19:157–78.
- ^ Houser, Nathan, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers", Fourth Congress of the IASS, Perpignan, France, 1989. Signs of Humanity, v. 3, 1992, pp. 1259–68. Eprint
- ^ Memorandum to the President of Charles S. Peirce Society by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, U. of Helsinki, March 29, 2012. Eprint.
- ^ See for example "Collections of Peirce's Writings" at Commens, U. of Helsinki.
- ^ See 1987 review by B. Kuklick (of Peirce by Christopher Hookway), in British Journal for the Philosophy of Sciencev. 38, n. 1, pp. 117–19. First page.
- ^ Auspitz, Josiah Lee (1994), "The Wasp Leaves the Bottle: Charles Sanders Peirce", The American Scholar, v. 63, n. 4, Autumn 1994, 602–18. Arisbe Eprint.
- ^ a b Burks, Arthur W., "Review: Charles S. Peirce, The new elements of mathematics", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society v. 84, n. 5 (1978), pp. 913–18 (PDF).
- ^ Peirce (1860 MS), "Orders of Infinity", News from the Peirce Edition Project, September 2010 (PDF), p. 6, with the manuscript's text. Also see logic historian Irving Anellis's November 11, 2010 comment Archived April 23, 2017, at the Wayback Machine at peirce-l.
- ^ Peirce (MS, winter of 1880–81), "A Boolean Algebra with One Constant", Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 4.12–20, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 4:218–21. Google Preview. See Roberts, Don D. (1973), The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce, p. 131.
- ^ Peirce (1881), "On the Logic of Number", American Journal of Mathematics v. 4, pp. 85–95. Reprinted (CP 3.252–88), (Writings of Charles S. Pierce, 4:299–309). See See Shields, Paul (1997), "Peirce's Axiomatization of Arithmetic", in Houser et al., eds., Studies in the Logic of Charles S. Peirce.
- ^ a b Peirce (1885), "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation", American Journal of Mathematics 7, two parts, first part published 1885, pp. 180–202 (see Houser in linked paragraph in "Introduction" in Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 4). Presented, National Academy of Sciences, Newport, RI, October 14–17, 1884 (see The Essential Peirce, 1, Headnote 16). 1885 is the year usually given for this work. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 3.359–403, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 5:162–90, The Essential Peirce, 1:225–28, in part.
- ^ a b c Putnam, Hilary (1982), "Peirce the Logician", Historia Mathematica 9, 290–301. Reprinted, pp. 252–60 in Putnam (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Harvard. Excerpt with article's last five pages.
- ^ It was in Peirce's 1885 "On the Algebra of Logic". See Byrnes, John (1998), "Peirce's First-Order Logic of 1885", Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society v. 34, n. 4, pp. 949–76.
- ^ Brady, Geraldine (2000), From Peirce to Skolem: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Logic, North-Holland/Elsevier Science BV, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
- ^ See Peirce (1898), Lecture 3, "The Logic of Relatives" (not the 1897 Monist article), Reasoning and the Logic of Things, pp. 146–64 [151]
- ^ Peirce (1898), "The Logic of Mathematics in Relation to Education" in Educational Review v. 15, pp. 209–16 (via Internet Archive). Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 3.553–62. See also his "The Simplest Mathematics" (1902 MS), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 4.227–323.
- ^ Lewis, Clarence Irving (1918), A Survey of Symbolic Logic, see ch. 1, §7 "Peirce", pp. 79–106, see p. 79 (Internet Archive). Note that Lewis's bibliography lists works by Frege, tagged with asterisks as important.
- ^ Avery, John (2003) Information theory and evolution, p. 167; also Mitchell, Melanie, "My Scientific Ancestry Archived October 8, 2014, at the Wayback Machine".
- ^ Beil, Ralph G. and Ketner, Kenneth (2003), "Peirce, Clifford, and Quantum Theory", International Journal of Theoretical Physics v. 42, n. 9, pp. 1957–72.
- ^ Houser, Roberts, and Van Evra, eds. (1997), Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce, Indiana U., Bloomington, IN.
- ^ Misak, ed. (2004), The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, Cambridge U., UK.
- ^ Peirce (1893–1894, MS 949, p. 1)
- ^ Peirce (1903 MS), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6.176: "But I now define a pseudo-continuum as that which modern writers on the theory of functions call a continuum. But this is fully represented by [...] the totality of real values, rational and irrational [...]."
- ^ Peirce (1902 MS) and Ransdell, Joseph, ed. (1998), "Analysis of the Methods of Mathematical Demonstration", Memoir 4, Draft C, MS L75.90–102, see 99–100. (Once there, scroll down).
- ^ See:
- Peirce (1908), "Some Amazing Mazes (Conclusion), Explanation of Curiosity the First", The Monist, v. 18, n. 3, pp. 416–44, see 463-64. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 4.594–642, see 642.
- Havenel, Jérôme (2008), "Peirce's Clarifications on Continuity", Transactions Winter 2008 pp. 68–133, see 119. Abstract.
- ^ Peirce condemned the use of "certain likelihoods" (The Essential Peirce, 2:108–09) even more strongly than he criticized Bayesian methods. Indeed Peirce used a bit of Bayesian inference in criticizing parapsychology (Writings of Charles S. Pierce, 6:76).
- ^ Miller, Richard W. (1975), "Propensity: Popper or Peirce?", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 26, n. 2, pp. 123–32. doi:10.1093/bjps/26.2.123. Eprint.
- ^ Haack, Susan and Kolenda, Konstantin (1977), "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, v. 51, pp. 63–104. JSTOR 4106816
- ^ Peirce CS, Jastrow J. On Small Differences in Sensation. Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 1885; 3:73–83.
- ^ a b Peirce (1897) "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution", Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.141–75 (Eprint), placed by the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, editors directly after "F.R.L." (1899, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.135–40).
- ^ a b Peirce (1903), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.180–202 and (1906) "The Basis of Pragmaticism", The Essential Peirce, 2:372–73, see "Philosophy" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ See in "Firstness", "Secondness", and "Thirdness" in Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Peirce (1893), "The Categories" MS 403. Arisbe Eprint, edited by Joseph Ransdell, with information on the re-write, and interleaved with the 1867 "New List" for comparison.
- ^ "Minute Logic", CP 2.87, c.1902 and A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.329, 1904. See relevant quotes under "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories" in Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (CDPT), Bergman & Paalova, eds., U. of Helsinki.
- ^ See quotes under "Firstness, First [as a category]" in CDPT.
- ^ a b The ground blackness is the pure abstraction of the quality black. Something black is something embodying blackness, pointing us back to the abstraction. The quality black amounts to reference to its own pure abstraction, the ground blackness. The question is not merely of noun (the ground) versus adjective (the quality), but rather of whether we are considering the black(ness) as abstracted away from application to an object, or instead as so applied (for instance to a stove). Yet note that Peirce's distinction here is not that between a property-general and a property-individual (a trope). See "On a New List of Categories" (1867), in the section appearing in CP 1.551. Regarding the ground, cf. the Scholastic conception of a relation's foundation, Google limited preview Deely 1982, p. 61
- ^ A quale in this sense is a such, just as a quality is a suchness. Cf. under "Use of Letters" in §3 of Peirce's "Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives", Memoirs of the American Academy, v. 9, pp. 317–78 (1870), separately reprinted (1870), from which see p. 6 via Google books, also reprinted in CP 3.63:
Now logical terms are of three grand classes. The first embraces those whose logical form involves only the conception of quality, and which therefore represent a thing simply as "a —." These discriminate objects in the most rudimentary way, which does not involve any consciousness of discrimination. They regard an object as it is in itself as such (quale); for example, as horse, tree, or man. These are absolute terms. (Peirce, 1870. But also see "Quale-Consciousness", 1898, in CP 6.222–37.)
- ^ See quotes under "Secondness, Second [as a category]" in CDPT.
- ^ See quotes under "Thirdness, Third [as a category]" in CDPT.
- ^ "Charles S. Peirce on Esthetics and Ethics: A Bibliography Archived 6 April 2003 at the Wayback Machine" (PDF) by Kelly A. Parker in 1999.
- ^ Peirce (1902 MS), Carnegie Application, edited by Joseph Ransdell, Memoir 2, see table.
- ^ See Esthetics at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ a b c Peirce (1899 MS), "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic], Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.135–40, Eprint
- ^ a b Peirce (1882), "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins University Circulars, v. 2, n. 19, pp. 11–12 (via Google), November 1882. Reprinted (The Essential Peirce, 1:210–14; Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 4:378–82; Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 7.59–76). The definition of logic quoted by Peirce is by Peter of Spain.
- ^ Peirce (1878), "The Doctrine of Chances", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604–15 (CP 2.645–68, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 3:276–90, The Essential Peirce, 1:142–154).
... death makes the number of our risks, the number of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely great. ... logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. ... Logic is rooted in the social principle.
- ^ Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.448 footnote, from "The Basis of Pragmaticism" in 1906.
- ^ a b c Peirce, (1868), "Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man", Journal of Speculative Philosophy v. 2, n. 2, pp. 103–14. On thought in signs, see p. 112. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.213–63 (on thought in signs, see 253), Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2:193–211, The Essential Peirce, 2:11–27. Arisbe Eprint.
- ^ a b See rhetoric definitions at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Peirce (1902), The Carnegie Institute Application, Memoir 10, MS L75.361–62, Arisbe Eprint.
- ^ a b c d e Peirce (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", Journal of Speculative Philosophy v. 2, n. 3, pp. 140–57. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.264–317, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2:211–42, The Essential Peirce, 1:28–55. Arisbe Eprint.
- ^ a b Peirce, "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities", Journal of Speculative Philosophy v. II, n. 4, pp. 193–208. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.318–57, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2:242–72 (Peirce Edition Project, Eprint), The Essential Peirce, 1:56–82.
- ^ Peirce (1905), "What Pragmatism Is", The Monist, v. XV, n. 2, pp. 161–81, see 167. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.411–37, see 416. Arisbe Eprint.
- ^ Peirce 1907, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.484. Reprinted, The Essential Peirce, 2:411 in "Pragmatism" (398–433).
- ^ See "Quasi-mind" in Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Peirce, "Carnegie Application", The New Elements of Mathematics v. 4, p. 54.
- ^ Peirce (1867), "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension" (CP 2.391–426), (Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2:70–86).
- ^ a b See pp. 404–09 in "Pragmatism" in The Essential Peirce, 2. Ten quotes on collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here at peirce-l's Lyris archive. Note: Ransdell's quotes from Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8.178–79 are also in The Essential Peirce, 2:493–94, which gives their date as 1909; and his quote from Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8.183 is also in The Essential Peirce, 2:495–96, which gives its date as 1909.
- ^ Peirce, letter to William James, dated 1909, see The Essential Peirce, 2:492.
- ^ a b c See "76 definitions of the sign by C.S.Peirce", collected by Robert Marty (U. of Perpignan, France).
- ^ Peirce, A Letter to Lady Welby (1908), Semiotic and Significs, pp. 80–81:
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood.
- ^ Representamen (/ˌrɛprɪzɛnˈteɪmən/ REP-ri-zen-TAY-mən) was adopted (not coined) by Peirce as his technical term for the sign as covered in his theory, in case a divergence should come to light between his theoretical version and the popular senses of the word "sign". He eventually stopped using "representamen". See The Essential Peirce, 2:272–73 and Semiotic and Significs p. 193, quotes in "Representamen" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Eco, Umberto (1984). Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p. 15. ISBN 978-0253203984.
- ^ a b Peirce (1909), A Letter to William James, The Essential Peirce, 2:492–502. Fictional object, 498. Object as universe of discourse, 492. See "Dynamical Object" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ See "Immediate Object", etc., at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ a b Peirce (1903 MS), "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", under other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 233–72, and reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2, pp. 289–99. Also see image of MS 339 (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand of the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique.
- ^ a b On the varying terminology, look up in Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Popular Science Monthly, v. 13, pp. 470–82, see 472 or the book at Wikisource. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 2.619–44 [623]
- ^ See, under "Abduction" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce, the following quotes:
- On correction of "A Theory of Probable Inference", see quotes from "Minute Logic", Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 2.102, c. 1902, and from the Carnegie Application (L75), 1902, Historical Perspectives on Peirce's Logic of Science v. 2, pp. 1031–32.
- On new logical form for abduction, see quote from Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, 1903, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.188–89.
- ^ "Lectures on Pragmatism", 1903, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.171.
- ^ A Letter to J. H. Kehler (dated 1911), The New Elements of Mathematics v. 3, pp. 203–04, see in "Retroduction" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ James, William (1897), The Will to Believe, see p. 124.
- ^ See Pragmaticism#Pragmaticism's name for discussion and references.
- ^ a b "That the rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead", in Peirce (1878 April), "The Probability of Induction", p. 718 (via Internet Archive ) in Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 705–18. Reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 2.669–93, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 3:290–305, The Essential Peirce, 1:155–69, elsewhere.
- ^ Peirce (1902), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.13 note 1.
- ^ See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.34 Eprint (in "The Spirit of Scholasticism"), where Peirce ascribed the success of modern science less to a novel interest in verification than to the improvement of verification.
- ^ See Joseph Ransdell's comments and his tabular list of titles of Peirce's proposed list of memoirs in 1902 for his Carnegie application, Eprint
- ^ Peirce (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", The Monist, v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481–99. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.438–63. Also important: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.497–525.
- ^ Peirce, "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", Lecture 1 of the 1898 Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1.616–48 in part and Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 105–22, reprinted in The Essential Peirce, 2:27–41.
- ^ a b Peirce (1908), "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", published in large part, Hibbert Journal v. 7, 90–112. Reprinted with an unpublished part, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6.452–85, Selected Writings pp. 358–79, The Essential Peirce, 2:434–50, Peirce on Signs 260–78.
- ^ See also Nubiola, Jaime (2004), "Il Lume Naturale: Abduction and God", Semiotiche I/2, 91–102.
- ^ Peirce (c. 1906), "PAP (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism)" (MS 293), The New Elements of Mathematics v. 4, pp. 319–20, first quote under "Abduction" at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Peirce (1903), "Pragmatism – The Logic of Abduction", Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.195–205, especially 196. Eprint.
- ^ Peirce, Carnegie application, MS L75.279–80: Memoir 27, Draft B.
- ^ a b See MS L75.329–30, from Draft D of Memoir 27 of Peirce's application to the Carnegie Institution:
Consequently, to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later, if we had not troubled ourselves to make the discovery. Consequently, the art of discovery is purely a question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic is concerned, the leading doctrine with reference to the art of discovery. Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be governed by economical considerations.
- ^ Peirce, C. S., "On the Logic of Drawing Ancient History from Documents", The Essential Peirce, 2, see pp. 107–09. On Twenty Questions, see 109:
Thus, twenty skillful hypotheses will ascertain what 200,000 stupid ones might fail to do.
- ^ Peirce believed in God. See section #Philosophy: metaphysics.
- ^ However, Peirce disagreed with Hegelian absolute idealism. See for example Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8.131.
- ^ Peirce (1868), "Nominalism versus Realism", Journal of Speculative Philosophy v. 2, n. 1, pp. 57–61. Reprinted (CP 6.619–24), (Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2:144–53).
- ^ On developments in Peirce's realism, see:
- Peirce (1897), "The Logic of Relatives", The Monist v. VII, n. 2 pp. 161–217, see 206 (via Google). Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 3.456–552.
- Peirce (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", The Monist v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481–99, see 495–496 (via Google). Reprinted (CP 5.438–63, see 453–57).
- Peirce (c. 1905), Letter to Signor Calderoni, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8.205–13, see 208.
- Lane, Robert (2007), "Peirce's Modal Shift: From Set Theory to Pragmaticism", Journal of the History of Philosophy, v. 45, n. 4.
- ^ Peirce in his 1906 "Answers to Questions concerning my Belief in God", Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6.495, Eprint Archived February 23, 2008, at the Wayback Machine, reprinted in part as "The Concept of God" in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, J. Buchler, ed., 1940, pp. 375–78:
I will also take the liberty of substituting "reality" for "existence." This is perhaps overscrupulosity; but I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense of "react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." The word "reality," on the contrary, is used in ordinary parlance in its correct philosophical sense. [....] I define the real as that which holds its characters on such a tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may have thought them to be, or ever will have thought them to be, here using thought to include, imagining, opining, and willing (as long as forcible means are not used); but the real thing's characters will remain absolutely untouched.
- ^ See his "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (1892) and "Reply to the Necessitarians" (1893), to both of which editor Paul Carus responded.
- ^ Peirce (1891), "The Architecture of Theories", The Monist v. 1, pp. 161–76, see p. 170, via Internet Archive. Reprinted (CP 6.7–34) and (The Essential Peirce, 1:285–97, see p. 293).
- ^ See "tychism", "tychasm", "tychasticism", and the rest, at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- ^ Peirce (1893), "Evolutionary Love", The Monist v. 3, pp. 176–200. Reprinted Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6.278–317, The Essential Peirce, 1:352–72. Arisbe Eprint Archived May 20, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ See p. 115 in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (Peirce's 1898 lectures).
External links[edit]
Media from Wikimedia Commons- Quotations from Wikiquote
- Texts from Wikisource
- Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway, Joseph Ransdell, ed. Over 100 online writings by Peirce as of November 24, 2010, with annotations. Hundreds of online papers on Peirce. The peirce-l e-forum. Much else.
- Center for Applied Semiotics (CAS) (1998–2003), Donald Cunningham & Jean Umiker-Sebeok, Indiana U.
- Centro Internacional de Estudos Peirceanos (CIEP) and previously Centro de Estudos Peirceanos (CeneP), Lucia Santaella et al., Pontifical Catholic U. of São Paulo (PUC-SP), Brazil. In Portuguese, some English.
- Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce, Mats Bergman, Sami Paavola, & João Queiroz, formerly Commens at Helsinki U. Includes Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms with Peirce's definitions, often many per term across the decades, and the Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce (old edition still at old website).
- Centro Studi Peirce, Carlo Sini, Rossella Fabbrichesi, et al., U. of Milan, Italy. In Italian and English. Part of Pragma.
- Charles S. Peirce Foundation. Co-sponsoring the 2014 Peirce International Centennial Congress (100th anniversary of Peirce's death).
- Charles S. Peirce Society
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Quarterly journal of Peirce studies since spring 1965. Table of Contents of all issues. - Charles S. Peirce Studies, Brian Kariger, ed.
- Charles Sanders Peirce at the Mathematics Genealogy Project
- Collegium for the Advanced Study of Picture Act and Embodiment: The Peirce Archive. Humboldt U, Berlin, Germany. Cataloguing Peirce's innumerable drawings & graphic materials. More info (Prof. Aud Sissel Hoel).
- Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce, João Queiroz (now at UFJF) & Ricardo Gudwin (at Unicamp), eds., [[Universidade Estadual de Campinas|U. of Campinas]], Brazil, in English. 84 authors listed, 51 papers online & more listed, as of January 31, 2009. Newer edition now at Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce.
- Existential Graphs, Jay Zeman, ed., U. of Florida. Has 4 Peirce texts.
- Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos (GEP) / Peirce Studies Group, Jaime Nubiola, ed., U. of Navarra, Spain. Big study site, Peirce & others in Spanish & English, bibliography, more.
- Helsinki Peirce Research Center (HPRC), Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen et al., U. of Helsinki.
- His Glassy Essence. Autobiographical Peirce. Kenneth Laine Ketner.
- Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, Kenneth Laine Ketner, Clyde Hendrick, et al., Texas Tech U. Peirce's life and works.
- International Research Group on Abductive Inference, Uwe Wirth et al., eds., Goethe U., Frankfurt, Germany. Uses frames. Click on link at bottom of its home page for English. Moved to U. of Gießen, Germany, home page not in English but see Artikel section there.
- L'I.R.S.C.E. (1974–2003) – Institut de Recherche en Sémiotique, Communication et Éducation, Gérard Deledalle, Joëlle Réthoré, U. of Perpignan, France.
- Minute Semeiotic, Vinicius Romanini, U. of São Paulo, Brazil. English, Portuguese.
- Peirce at Signo: Theoretical Semiotics on the Web, Louis Hébert, director, supported by U. of Québec. Theory, application, exercises of Peirce's Semiotics and Esthetics. English, French.
- Peirce Edition Project (PEP), Indiana U.–Purdue U. Indianapolis (IUPUI). André De Tienne, Nathan Houser, et al. Editors of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce (W) and The Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2. Many study aids such as the Robin Catalog of Peirce's manuscripts & letters and:
Biographical introductions to EP 1–2 and W 1–6 & 8
Most of Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 2 readable online.
PEP's branch at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM). Working on Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 7: Peirce's work on the Century Dictionary. Definition of the week. - Peirce's Existential Graphs, Frithjof Dau, Germany
- Peirce Research Group, Department of Philosophy "Piero Martinetti" - University of Milan, Italy.
- Peirce's Theory of Semiosis: Toward a Logic of Mutual Affection, Joseph Esposito. Free online course.
- Pragmatism Cybrary, David Hildebrand & John Shook.
- Research Group on Semiotic Epistemology and Mathematics Education (late 1990s), Institut für Didaktik der Mathematik (Michael Hoffman, Michael Otte, Universität Bielefeld, Germany). See Peirce Project Newsletter v. 3, n. 1, p. 13.
- Semiotics according to Robert Marty, with 76 definitions of the sign by C. S. Peirce.
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