La ley corporativa de los Estados Unidos regula el gobierno , las finanzas y el poder de las corporaciones en la ley estadounidense . Cada estado y territorio tiene su propio código corporativo básico, mientras que la ley federal crea estándares mínimos para el comercio de acciones de empresas y derechos de gobierno, que se encuentran principalmente en la Ley de Valores de 1933 y la Ley de Valores y Bolsa de 1934 , modificada por leyes como la Sarbanes –La Ley Oxley de 2002 y la Ley de Reforma y Protección al Consumidor de Dodd – Frank Wall Street . La Constitución de los Estados Unidos fue interpretada por elCorte Suprema de los EE. UU. Para permitir que las corporaciones se constituyan en el estado de su elección, independientemente de dónde se encuentren sus oficinas centrales. Durante el siglo XX, la mayoría de las grandes corporaciones se incorporaron bajo la Ley General de Corporaciones de Delaware , que ofrecía impuestos corporativos más bajos, menos derechos de los accionistas contra los directores y desarrolló una profesión legal y judicial especializada. Nevada ha hecho lo mismo. Veinticuatro estados siguen la Ley de Corporaciones Empresariales Modelo , [1] mientras que Nueva York y California son importantes debido a su tamaño.
Historia
En la Declaración de Independencia , las corporaciones habían sido ilegales sin autorización explícita en una Carta Real o una Ley del Parlamento del Reino Unido. Desde la primera caída del mercado de valores del mundo (la burbuja de los mares del Sur de 1720), las corporaciones se percibieron como peligrosas. Esto se debía a que, como escribió el economista Adam Smith en La riqueza de las naciones (1776), los directores administraban "el dinero de otras personas" y este conflicto de intereses significaba que los directores eran propensos a la " negligencia y la profusión ". Se pensaba que las corporaciones solo eran legítimas en industrias específicas (como los seguros o la banca ) que no podían administrarse de manera eficiente a través de asociaciones. [2] Después de la ratificación de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos en 1788, las corporaciones seguían desconfiando y estaban vinculadas al debate sobre el ejercicio interestatal del poder soberano. El Primer Banco de los Estados Unidos fue constituido en 1791 por el Congreso de los Estados Unidos para recaudar dinero para el gobierno y crear una moneda común (junto con un impuesto especial federal y la Casa de la Moneda de los Estados Unidos ). Tenía inversores privados (que no eran propiedad del gobierno), pero se enfrentó a la oposición de los políticos del sur que temían que el poder federal se apoderara del poder estatal. Entonces, el estatuto del First Bank fue escrito para expirar en 20 años. Los gobiernos estatales también podían incorporar corporaciones a través de una legislación especial. En 1811, Nueva York se convirtió en el primer estado en tener un procedimiento de registro público simple para iniciar corporaciones (sin permiso específico de la legislatura) para negocios de manufactura. [3] También permitía a los inversores tener una responsabilidad limitada , de modo que si la empresa quebraba, los inversores perderían su inversión, pero no las deudas adicionales que se hubieran acumulado con los acreedores. Un caso anterior de la Corte Suprema , Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), [4] fue tan lejos como para decir que una vez que se estableció una corporación, una legislatura estatal (en este caso, New Hampshire) no podía enmendarla. Los estados reaccionaron rápidamente reservándose el derecho de regular las transacciones futuras de las corporaciones. [5] En términos generales, las empresas fueron tratadas como " personas jurídicas " con personalidad jurídica separada de sus accionistas, directores o empleados. Las corporaciones estaban sujetas a derechos y deberes legales: podían celebrar contratos, poseer propiedades o comisionar agravios , [6] pero no había ningún requisito necesario para tratar a una corporación tan favorablemente como a una persona real.
A finales del siglo XIX, más y más estados permitieron la libre incorporación de empresas con un simple procedimiento de registro; [8] Delaware promulgó su Ley General de Corporaciones en 1899. Muchas corporaciones serían pequeñas y democráticamente organizadas, con una sola persona, un voto, sin importar la cantidad que tuviera el inversionista, y los directores serían elegidos frecuentemente. Sin embargo, la tendencia dominante condujo a inmensos grupos corporativos donde la regla estándar era una acción, un voto . A finales del siglo XIX, los sistemas de " confianza " (donde la propiedad formal tenía que utilizarse en beneficio de otra persona) se utilizaron para concentrar el control en manos de unas pocas personas o de una sola persona. En respuesta, la Ley Sherman Antimonopolio de 1890 se creó para disolver los grandes conglomerados empresariales, y la Ley Clayton de 1914 otorgó al gobierno poder para detener fusiones y adquisiciones que pudieran dañar el interés público. Al final de la Primera Guerra Mundial , se percibió cada vez más que la gente corriente tenía poca voz en comparación con la "oligarquía financiera" de los banqueros y magnates industriales. [9] En particular, los empleados carecían de voz en comparación con los accionistas, pero los planes para una " democracia industrial " de posguerra (dar a los empleados votos para invertir su trabajo) no se generalizaron. [10] Durante la década de 1920, el poder se concentró en menos manos cuando las corporaciones emitieron acciones con múltiples derechos de voto, mientras que otras acciones se vendieron sin ningún voto. Esta práctica se detuvo en 1926 debido a la presión pública y la negativa de la Bolsa de Valores de Nueva York a cotizar acciones sin derecho a voto. [11] Fue posible vender acciones sin derecho a voto en el auge económico de la década de 1920, porque cada vez más gente común buscaba en el mercado de valores para ahorrar el nuevo dinero que ganaban, pero la ley no garantizaba buena información ni condiciones justas. . Los nuevos accionistas no tenían poder para negociar con los grandes emisores corporativos, pero aún necesitaban un lugar para ahorrar. Antes del desplome de Wall Street de 1929, se vendían acciones de empresas con negocios falsos, ya que las cuentas y los informes comerciales no estaban disponibles para el público inversionista.
- AA Berle y GC Means , The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) Libro I, capítulo IV, 64
El desplome de Wall Street vio el colapso total de los valores del mercado de valores, ya que los accionistas se dieron cuenta de que las corporaciones se habían vuelto sobrevaloradas. Vendieron acciones en masa , lo que significa que a muchas empresas les resultó difícil obtener financiación. El resultado fue que miles de empresas se vieron obligadas a cerrar y despidieron trabajadores. Debido a que los trabajadores tenían menos dinero para gastar, las empresas recibieron menos ingresos, lo que provocó más cierres y despidos. Esta espiral descendente inició la Gran Depresión . Berle y Means argumentaron que la falta de regulación fue la causa principal en su libro fundacional en 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property . Dijeron que los directores se habían vuelto demasiado irresponsables y que los mercados carecían de reglas básicas de transparencia. En última instancia, los intereses de los accionistas tenían que ser iguales o "subordinados a una serie de reclamaciones de la mano de obra, de los clientes y mecenas, de la comunidad". [12] Esto condujo directamente a las reformas del New Deal de la Ley de Valores de 1933 y la Ley de Bolsa y Valores de 1934 . Una nueva Comisión de Bolsa y Valores fue autorizada para exigir a las corporaciones que revelen toda la información material sobre sus negocios al público inversionista. Debido a que muchos accionistas estaban físicamente lejos de la sede corporativa donde se llevarían a cabo las reuniones, se establecieron nuevos derechos para permitir que las personas emitieran votos a través de poderes, en la opinión de que esta y otras medidas harían que los directores fueran más responsables. Dadas estas reformas, aún persistía una gran controversia sobre los deberes que las corporaciones también les debían a los empleados, otras partes interesadas y el resto de la sociedad. [13] Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial , surgió un consenso general de que los directores no estaban obligados únicamente a perseguir el " valor para el accionista ", sino que podían ejercer su discreción por el bien de todas las partes interesadas, por ejemplo, aumentando los salarios en lugar de los dividendos o proporcionando servicios para el bien de la comunidad en lugar de perseguir únicamente beneficios, si ello redundaba en interés de la empresa en su conjunto. [14] Sin embargo, diferentes estados tenían diferentes leyes corporativas. Para aumentar los ingresos por impuestos corporativos , los estados individuales tenían un incentivo para bajar sus estándares en una " carrera hacia el fondo " para atraer corporaciones a establecer sus oficinas centrales en el estado, particularmente donde los directores controlaban la decisión de incorporarse. La " competencia de las empresas chárter ", en la década de 1960, había llevado a Delaware a convertirse en el hogar de la mayoría de las corporaciones estadounidenses más grandes. Esto significó que la jurisprudencia de la Cancillería y la Corte Suprema de Delaware se volvió cada vez más influyente. Durante la década de 1980, un gran auge de fusiones y adquisiciones redujo la responsabilidad de los directores. Para defenderse de una adquisición, los tribunales permitieron que las juntas instituyeran " píldoras venenosas " o " planes de derechos de los accionistas ", lo que permitía a los directores vetar cualquier oferta, y probablemente obtener un pago por permitir que ocurriera una adquisición. Cada vez más, los ahorros para la jubilación de las personas se invierten en el mercado de valores, a través de fondos de pensiones , seguros de vida y fondos mutuos . Esto resultó en un gran crecimiento en la industria de gestión de activos , que tendió a tomar el control de los derechos de voto. Tanto la participación del sector financiero en los ingresos como el salario de los directores ejecutivos comenzaron a aumentar mucho más allá de los salarios reales del resto de la fuerza laboral. El escándalo de Enron de 2001 provocó algunas reformas en la Ley Sarbanes-Oxley (sobre la separación de los auditores del trabajo de consultoría). La crisis financiera de 2007-2008 de 2007 provocó cambios menores en la Ley Dodd-Frank (sobre regulación blanda de la remuneración, junto con los mercados de derivados ). Sin embargo, la forma básica del derecho corporativo en los Estados Unidos ha permanecido igual desde la década de 1980.
Corporaciones y derecho civil
Las sociedades anónimas se clasifican invariablemente como " personas jurídicas " en todos los sistemas jurídicos modernos, lo que significa que, al igual que las personas físicas , pueden adquirir derechos y deberes. Una corporación puede estar constituida en cualquiera de los 50 estados (o el Distrito de Columbia) y puede ser autorizada para hacer negocios en cada jurisdicción en la que opera, excepto cuando una corporación demanda o es demandada por un contrato, el tribunal, independientemente de de donde se encuentra la oficina central de la corporación, o donde ocurrió la transacción, se utilizará la ley de la jurisdicción donde la corporación fue autorizada (a menos que el contrato indique lo contrario). Entonces, por ejemplo, considere una corporación que establece un concierto en Hawai, donde su sede está en Minnesota, y está autorizada en Colorado, si es demandada por sus acciones relacionadas con el concierto, si fue demandada en Hawai (donde el concierto), o Minnesota (donde se encuentra su sede), el tribunal de ese estado seguirá utilizando la ley de Colorado para determinar cómo se llevarán a cabo sus tratos corporativos.
Todas las grandes corporaciones públicas también se caracterizan por tener responsabilidad limitada y tener una gestión centralizada. [17] Cuando un grupo de personas atraviesa los procedimientos para constituirse, adquirirán derechos para hacer contratos , poseer propiedades , demandar, y también serán responsables de agravios u otros agravios, y serán demandados. El gobierno federal no crea sociedades (excepto los bancos nacionales, las cajas de ahorro federales y las uniones de crédito federales), aunque las regula. Cada uno de los 50 estados más DC tiene su propia ley de sociedades. La mayoría de las grandes corporaciones históricamente han optado por constituirse en Delaware, a pesar de que operan a nivel nacional, y pueden tener poco o ningún negocio en Delaware. El grado en que las corporaciones deben tener los mismos derechos que las personas reales es controvertido, particularmente cuando se trata de los derechos fundamentales que se encuentran en la Declaración de Derechos de los Estados Unidos . De acuerdo con la ley, una corporación actúa a través de personas reales que forman su junta directiva, y luego a través de los funcionarios y empleados que son nombrados en su nombre. En algunos casos, los accionistas pueden tomar decisiones en nombre de la corporación, aunque en empresas más grandes tienden a ser pasivos. De lo contrario, la mayoría de las corporaciones adoptan una responsabilidad limitada para que, en general, los accionistas no puedan ser demandados por las deudas comerciales de una corporación. Si una corporación quiebra y no puede pagar las deudas con los acreedores comerciales a su vencimiento, entonces, en algunas circunstancias, los tribunales estatales permiten que se traspase el llamado "velo de incorporación", y así responsabilizar a las personas que están detrás de la corporación. . Esto suele ser poco común y en casi todos los casos implica la falta de pago de los impuestos del fondo fiduciario o una mala conducta intencional, que esencialmente equivale a fraude.
Concurso de constitución y chárter
Aunque cada estado tendrá ligeras diferencias en sus requisitos, el proceso de formación de una nueva corporación suele ser rápido. [18] Una corporación no es el único tipo de organización empresarial que se puede elegir. Es posible que las personas deseen registrar una sociedad o una sociedad de responsabilidad limitada , según el estado fiscal preciso y la forma organizativa que se busque. [19] Sin embargo, la mayoría de las veces, las personas eligen corporaciones que tienen responsabilidad limitada para aquellos que se convierten en accionistas: si la corporación quiebra, la regla predeterminada es que los accionistas solo perderán el dinero que pagaron por sus acciones, incluso si tienen deudas comerciales los acreedores siguen sin pagar. Una oficina estatal, quizás llamada "División de Corporaciones" o simplemente "Secretaria de Estado", [20] requerirá que las personas que deseen incorporarse presenten " artículos de incorporación " (a veces llamados "estatutos") y paguen una tarifa. Los artículos de incorporación generalmente registran el nombre de la corporación, si hay algún límite a sus poderes, propósitos o duración, identifique si todas las acciones tendrán los mismos derechos. Con esta información presentada ante el estado, una nueva corporación entrará en existencia y estará sujeta a los derechos y deberes legales que las personas involucradas creen en su nombre. Los incorporadores también tendrán que adoptar " estatutos " que identifiquen muchos más detalles, como el número de directores, la disposición de la junta, los requisitos para las reuniones corporativas, los deberes de los funcionarios titulares, etc. El certificado de constitución habrá identificado si los directores o los accionistas, o ambos, tienen la competencia para adoptar y modificar estas reglas. Todo esto se logra típicamente a través de la primera reunión de la corporación.
Una de las cosas más importantes que determinan los artículos de incorporación es el estado de incorporación. Los diferentes estados pueden tener diferentes niveles de impuestos corporativos o de franquicias , diferentes calidades de derechos de accionistas y partes interesadas, deberes de directores más o menos estrictos , etc. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema sostuvo en Paul v Virginia que, en principio, los estados deberían permitir que las corporaciones constituidas en un estado diferente hicieran negocios libremente. [21] Esto parecía seguir siendo cierto incluso si otro estado (por ejemplo, Delaware) requería protecciones internas significativamente peores para los accionistas, empleados y acreedores que el estado en el que operaba la corporación (por ejemplo, Nueva York). Hasta ahora, la regulación federal ha afectado más cuestiones relacionadas con los mercados de valores que el equilibrio de poder y deberes entre directores, accionistas, empleados y otras partes interesadas. La Corte Suprema también ha reconocido que las leyes de un estado regirán los " asuntos internos " de una corporación, para evitar conflictos entre las leyes estatales. [22] Entonces, en la presente ley, independientemente de dónde opere una corporación en los 50 estados, las reglas del estado de incorporación (sujeto a la ley federal) regirán su operación. [23] A principios del siglo XX, algunos estados, inicialmente Nueva Jersey, reconocieron que el estado podía reducir su tasa impositiva para atraer más incorporaciones y, por lo tanto, reforzar la recaudación de impuestos. [24] Rápidamente, Delaware emergió como un estado preferido de incorporación. [25] En el caso de 1933 Louis K. Liggett Co v Lee , [26] Brandeis J. representó la opinión de que la "carrera resultante no fue de diligencia, sino de laxitud", particularmente en términos de tasas de impuestos corporativos, y reglas que podrían proteger a las partes interesadas corporativas menos poderosas. Durante el siglo XX, se pensó cada vez más que el problema de una " carrera a la baja " justificaba la regulación federal de las corporaciones. La opinión contrastante fue que la competencia regulatoria entre estados podría ser beneficiosa, en el supuesto de que los accionistas optarían por invertir su dinero en corporaciones que estuvieran bien gobernadas. Por lo tanto, los mercados eficientes "fijarían el precio" de las regulaciones corporativas del estado. De esta manera se argumentó que era una "carrera hacia la cima". [27] Un punto de vista intermedio en la literatura académica, [28] sugirió que la competencia regulatoria podría de hecho ser positiva o negativa, y podría usarse en beneficio de diferentes grupos, dependiendo de qué partes interesadas ejercerían más influencia en la decisión sobre qué estado para incorporar en. [29] en la mayoría de las leyes estatales, los directores tienen el poder exclusivo de permitir una votación sobre la modificación de la escritura de constitución, y los accionistas deben aprobar las propuestas de los directores por mayoría, a menos que un umbral más alto se encuentra en los artículos.
Personalidad corporativa
En principio, una empresa debidamente constituida adquiere " personalidad jurídica " que es independiente de las personas que invierten su capital y su trabajo en la corporación. Al igual que el derecho consuetudinario lo había hecho para las corporaciones municipales y eclesiásticas durante siglos, [30] el Tribunal Supremo sostuvo en Bank of the United States v Deveaux [31] que, en principio, las corporaciones tenían capacidad jurídica . En su centro, las empresas que son "personas jurídicas" significan que pueden celebrar contratos y otras obligaciones, poseer propiedades, demandar para hacer valer sus derechos y ser demandadas por incumplimiento del deber. Sin embargo, más allá del núcleo de los derechos y deberes del derecho privado, ha surgido continuamente la pregunta sobre hasta qué punto las corporaciones y las personas reales deben ser tratadas por igual. El significado de "persona", cuando se usa en un estatuto o en la Declaración de Derechos de los Estados Unidos, generalmente se cree que gira en torno a la construcción del estatuto, de modo que en diferentes contextos la legislatura o los padres fundadores podrían haber tenido diferentes intenciones por "persona". Por ejemplo, en un caso de 1869 llamado Paul v Virginia , la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos sostuvo que la palabra "ciudadano" en la cláusula de privilegios e inmunidades de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos (artículo IV, sección 2) no incluía a las corporaciones. [32] Esto significaba que la Commonwealth of Virginia tenía derecho a exigir que una corporación de seguros contra incendios de Nueva York , dirigida por Samuel Paul, adquiriera una licencia para vender pólizas dentro de Virginia, a pesar de que existían diferentes reglas para las corporaciones incorporadas dentro del estado. [33] En contraste, en el condado de Santa Clara contra Southern Pacific Railroad Co , [34] una mayoría de la Corte Suprema insinuó que una corporación podría ser considerada como una "persona" bajo la cláusula de igual protección de la Decimocuarta Enmienda . La Southern Pacific Railroad Company había afirmado que no debería estar sujeta a un trato fiscal diferenciado, en comparación con las personas físicas, establecido por la Junta Estatal de Igualación que actúa en virtud de la Constitución de California . Sin embargo, en el caso de que Harlan J sostuviera que la empresa no podía ser tasada por impuestos por un punto técnico: el condado estatal había incluido demasiadas propiedades en sus cálculos. Por lo tanto, no se abordó de lleno el trato diferenciado entre personas físicas y sociedades.
Sin embargo, a finales del siglo XX, la cuestión de si una corporación contaba como "persona" para todos o algunos propósitos adquirió importancia política. Inicialmente, en Buckley v Valeo [36], una ligera mayoría de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos había sostenido que las personas físicas tenían derecho a gastar cantidades ilimitadas de su propio dinero en sus campañas políticas. Sobre un fuerte disenso, la mayoría sostuvo que partes de la Ley de Campaña Electoral Federal de 1974 eran inconstitucionales ya que gastar dinero era, en opinión de la mayoría, una manifestación del derecho a la libertad de expresión bajo la Primera Enmienda . Esto no afectó a las corporaciones, aunque el problema surgió en Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce . [37] Una Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos constituida de manera diferente sostuvo, con tres disidentes, que la Ley de Financiamiento de Campañas de Michigan podría, de manera compatible con la Primera Enmienda, prohibir el gasto político de las corporaciones. Sin embargo, en 2010, la Corte Suprema tenía una mayoría diferente. En una decisión de cinco a cuatro, Citizens United contra la Comisión Electoral Federal [35] sostuvo que las corporaciones eran personas que debían estar protegidas de la misma manera que las personas naturales bajo la Primera Enmienda, por lo que tenían derecho a gastar cantidades ilimitadas de dinero en donaciones. a campañas políticas. Esto derogó la Ley de Reforma de Campañas Bipartidistas de 2002, de modo que un grupo de presión pro-empresarial pudiera publicar un anuncio en contra de Hillary Clinton (" Hillary: The Movie "). Posteriormente, la misma mayoría de la Corte Suprema decidió en 2014, en Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc [38] que las corporaciones también eran personas para la protección de la religión bajo la Ley de Restauración de la Libertad Religiosa . Específicamente, esto significaba que una corporación tenía que tener derecho a optar por no cumplir con las disposiciones de la Ley de Protección al Paciente y Cuidado de Salud Asequible de 2010, que podría requerir brindar atención médica a los empleados a los que la junta directiva de la corporación podría tener objeciones religiosas. No abordó específicamente una reclamación alternativa bajo la Primera Enmienda . Los cuatro jueces disidentes enfatizaron su opinión de que los casos anteriores "no respaldan la noción de que el libre ejercicio [de los derechos religiosos] pertenece a las corporaciones con fines de lucro". [39] En consecuencia, la cuestión de la personalidad corporativa ha adquirido un carácter cada vez más político. Debido a que las corporaciones son típicamente capaces de dominar un poder económico mayor que las personas individuales, y las acciones de una corporación pueden estar indebidamente influenciadas por los directores y los principales accionistas , surge el problema de la corrupción de la política democrática. [40]
Gestión y agentes delegados
Aunque una corporación puede considerarse una persona jurídica separada, físicamente no puede actuar por sí misma. Por lo tanto, existen necesariamente reglas de los estatutos corporativos y la ley de agencia que atribuyen los actos de personas reales a la corporación, para hacer contratos, tratar con la propiedad, comisionar agravios, etc. En primer lugar, la junta directiva normalmente será nombrada en la primera reunión corporativa por quienquiera que los estatutos identifiquen como con derecho a elegirlos. Por lo general, a la junta se le otorga el poder colectivo para dirigir, administrar y representar a la corporación. Este poder (y sus límites) generalmente se delega a los directores por la ley del estado o los artículos de incorporación. [41] En segundo lugar, las leyes corporativas establecen con frecuencia funciones para determinados "funcionarios" de la corporación, generalmente en la alta dirección, dentro o fuera de la junta. La legislación laboral estadounidense considera que los directores y funcionarios tienen contratos de trabajo , aunque no para todos los fines. [42] Si la ley estatal o los estatutos de la corporación guardan silencio, los términos de estos contratos definirán con más detalle el papel de los directores y funcionarios. En tercer lugar, los directores y funcionarios de la corporación generalmente tendrán la autoridad para delegar tareas y contratar empleados para los trabajos que deben realizarse. Nuevamente, los términos de los contratos de trabajo darán forma a los términos expresos en los que los empleados actúan en nombre de la corporación.
Hacia el mundo exterior, los actos de los directores, funcionarios y otros empleados serán vinculantes para la corporación en función de la ley de agencia y los principios de responsabilidad indirecta (o responat superior ). Solía ser que el derecho consuetudinario reconocía restricciones sobre la capacidad total de la corporación. Si un director o empleado actuara más allá de los propósitos o poderes de la corporación ( ultra vires ), cualquier contrato sería ex ante nulo e inaplicable. Esta regla fue abandonada a principios del siglo XX, [44] y hoy en día las corporaciones generalmente tienen capacidad y propósitos ilimitados. [45] Sin embargo, no todas las acciones de los agentes corporativos son vinculantes. Por ejemplo, en South Sacramento Drayage Co v Campbell Soup Co [46] se sostuvo que un gerente de tráfico que trabajaba para Campbell Soup Company no tenía (como era de esperar) autoridad para celebrar un contrato exclusivo de 15 años para el transporte de tomates dentro del estado. . Se aplican los principios estándar de agencia comercial (" autoridad aparente "). Si una persona razonable no cree que un empleado (dado su puesto y función) tiene autoridad para celebrar un contrato, la corporación no puede quedar obligada. [47] Sin embargo, las corporaciones siempre pueden conferir expresamente mayor autoridad a los funcionarios y empleados, por lo que estarán obligadas si los contratos otorgan una autoridad real expresa o implícita . Sin embargo, el tratamiento de la responsabilidad por contratos y otras obligaciones basadas en el consentimiento difiere de los agravios y otros agravios. En este caso, se considera que el objetivo de la ley de asegurar la internalización de " externalidades " o " riesgos empresariales " arroja un alcance más amplio de responsabilidad.
Uno de los principios básicos del derecho corporativo moderno es que las personas que invierten en una corporación tienen responsabilidad limitada . Por ejemplo, como regla general, los accionistas solo pueden perder el dinero que invirtieron en sus acciones. En la práctica, la responsabilidad limitada opera solo como una regla predeterminada para los acreedores que pueden ajustar su riesgo. [48] Los bancos que prestan dinero a corporaciones suelen contratar a los directores o accionistas de una corporación para obtener garantías personales , o para tomar garantías reales sobre sus activos personales, o sobre los activos de una corporación, para asegurar que sus deudas se paguen en su totalidad. Esto significa que la mayor parte del tiempo, los accionistas son responsables más allá de sus inversiones iniciales. De manera similar, los acreedores comerciales , como los proveedores de materias primas, pueden utilizar una cláusula de retención de título u otro dispositivo con el efecto equivalente a las garantías reales, que se pagarán antes que otros acreedores en quiebra. [49] Sin embargo, si los acreedores no tienen garantía, o por alguna razón las garantías y la seguridad no son suficientes, los acreedores no pueden (a menos que haya excepciones) demandar a los accionistas por deudas pendientes. Hablando metafóricamente, su responsabilidad está limitada detrás del "velo corporativo". Sin embargo, el mismo análisis ha sido rechazado por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos en Davis v Alexander , [50] donde una compañía subsidiaria de ferrocarriles causó daños al ganado que estaba siendo transportado. Como dijo Brandeis J , cuando una "empresa realmente controla a otra y opera ambas como un sistema único, la empresa dominante será responsable de las lesiones debidas a la negligencia de la filial".
Hay una serie de excepciones, que difieren según la ley de cada estado, al principio de responsabilidad limitada. Primero, como mínimo, como se reconoce en el derecho internacional público , [52] los tribunales "traspasarán el velo corporativo" si se utiliza a una corporación para evadir obligaciones de manera deshonesta. La organización defectuosa, como no presentar debidamente los artículos de incorporación a un funcionario estatal, es otro motivo universalmente reconocido. [53] Sin embargo, existe una diversidad considerable en la ley estatal y controversia sobre cuánto más debe llegar la ley. En Kinney Shoe Corp v Polan [54], la Corte Federal de Apelaciones del Cuarto Circuito sostuvo que también perforaría el velo si (1) la corporación no hubiera sido adecuadamente capitalizada para cumplir con sus obligaciones futuras (2) si no hubiera formalidades corporativas (por ejemplo, reuniones y minutos), o (3) la corporación se utilizó deliberadamente para beneficiar a una corporación asociada. Sin embargo, una opinión posterior del mismo tribunal enfatizó que la perforación no podía realizarse simplemente para evitar una noción abstracta de "injusticia" o "injusticia". [55] Otro recurso equitativo, aunque técnicamente diferente, es que, según la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos en Taylor v Standard Gas Co [56], los iniciados corporativos (por ejemplo, directores o accionistas importantes) que también son acreedores de una empresa están subordinados a otros acreedores cuando la empresa quiebra si la empresa no está adecuadamente capitalizada para las operaciones que estaba llevando a cabo.
Las víctimas de agravios se diferencian de los acreedores comerciales porque no tienen la capacidad de negociar en torno a la responsabilidad limitada y, por lo tanto, se consideran de manera diferente en la mayoría de las leyes estatales. La teoría desarrollada a mediados del siglo XX de que más allá de la corporación en sí, era más apropiado que la ley reconociera la "empresa" económica, que generalmente compone grupos de corporaciones , donde la matriz se beneficia de las actividades de una subsidiaria y es capaz de de ejercer una influencia decisiva. [57] Se desarrolló un concepto de " responsabilidad empresarial " en campos como la legislación fiscal, las prácticas contables y la legislación antimonopolio, que se fue incorporando gradualmente a la jurisprudencia de los tribunales. Casos más antiguos habían sugerido que no existía un derecho especial a perforar el velo en favor de las víctimas de agravios, incluso cuando los peatones habían sido atropellados por un tranvía propiedad de una empresa subsidiaria en quiebra [58] o por taxis propiedad de subcapitalizados corporaciones subsidiarias. [59] Una autoridad más moderna sugirió un enfoque diferente. En un caso relacionado con uno de los peores derrames de petróleo de la historia, causado por Amoco Cadiz, que era propiedad a través de subsidiarias de Amoco Corporation , el tribunal de Illinois que conoció el caso declaró que la empresa matriz era responsable por el hecho de la estructura de su grupo. [60] Por lo tanto, los tribunales "suelen aplicar normas más estrictas para perforar el velo corporativo en un caso de contrato que en los casos de agravio" porque los demandantes de agravio no aceptan voluntariamente la responsabilidad limitada. [61] En virtud de la Ley de Responsabilidad, Compensación y Respuesta Ambiental Integral de 1980 , el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos en Estados Unidos contra Bestfoods [62] dictaminó que si una empresa matriz "participaba activamente y ejercía control sobre las operaciones de" una subsidiaria instalaciones, "puede ser considerado directamente responsable". Esto deja la cuestión de la naturaleza del derecho consuetudinario, en ausencia de un estatuto específico, o cuando una ley estatal prohíbe perforar el velo, excepto por motivos muy limitados. [63] Una posibilidad es que las víctimas de agravios no sean compensadas, incluso cuando la empresa matriz sea solvente y tenga seguro. Una segunda posibilidad es que se imponga a todos los accionistas un régimen de responsabilidad de compromiso, como la responsabilidad prorrateada en lugar de la responsabilidad conjunta y solidaria, independientemente de su tamaño. [64] Una tercera posibilidad, y una que no interfiere con los fundamentos del derecho corporativo, es que las corporaciones matrices y los principales accionistas puedan tener un deber directo de cuidado extracontractual hacia la persona lesionada en la medida en que puedan ejercer control. Esta ruta significa que la empresa corporativa no obtendría un subsidio a expensas de la salud y el medio ambiente de otras personas, y que no hay necesidad de traspasar el velo.
Gobierno corporativo
Corporate governance, though used in many senses, is primarily concerned with the balance of power among the main actors in a corporation: directors, shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders.[65] A combination of a state's corporation law, case law developed by the courts, and a corporation's own articles of incorporation and bylaws determine how power is shared. In general, the rules of a corporation's constitution can be written in whatever way its incorporators choose, or however it is subsequently amended, so long as they comply with the minimum compulsory standards of the law. Different laws seek to protect the corporate stakeholders to different degrees. Among the most important are the voting rights they exercise against the board of directors, either to elect or remove them from office. There is also the right to sue for breaches of duty, and rights of information, typically used to buy, sell and associate, or disassociate on the market.[66] The federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, requires minimum standards on the process of voting, particularly in a "proxy contest" where competing groups attempt to persuade shareholders to delegate them their "proxy" vote. Shareholders also often have rights to amend the corporate constitution, call meetings, make business proposals, and have a voice on major decisions, although these can be significantly constrained by the board. Employees of US corporations have often had a voice in corporate management, either indirectly, or sometimes directly, though unlike in many major economies, express "codetermination" laws that allow participation in management have so far been rare.
Corporate constitutions
In principle, a corporation's constitution can be designed in any way so long as it complies with the compulsory rules set down by the state or federal legislature. Most state laws, and the federal government, give a broad freedom to corporations to design the relative rights of directors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders in the articles of incorporation and the by-laws. These are written down during incorporation, and can usually be amended afterwards according to the state law's procedures, which sometimes place obstacles to amendment by a simple majority of shareholders.[67] In the early 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward[4] the US Supreme Court held by a majority that there was a presumption that once a corporate charter was made, the corporation's constitution was subject to "no other control on the part of the Crown than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter itself."[68] On the facts, this meant that because Dartmouth College's charter could not be amended by the New Hampshire legislature, though subsequent state corporation laws subsequently included provisions saying that this could be done. Today there is a general presumption that whatever balance of powers, rights and duties are set down in the constitution remain binding like a contract would.[69] Most corporation statutes start with a presumption (in contrast to old ultra vires rules) that corporations may pursue any purpose that is lawful,[70] whether that is running a profitable business, delivering services to the community, or any other objects that people involved in a corporation may choose. By default, the common law had historically suggested that all decisions are to be taken by a majority of the incorporators,[71] and that by default the board could be removed by a majority of shareholders for a reason they themselves determined.[72] However these default rules will take subject to the constitution that incorporators themselves define, which in turn take subject to state law and federal regulation.
Although it is possible to structure corporations differently, the two basic organs in a corporate constitution will invariably be the general meeting of its members (usually shareholders) and the board of directors.[73] Boards of directors themselves have been subject in modern regulation to a growing number of requirements regarding their composition, particularly in federal law for public corporations. Particularly after the Enron scandal, companies listed on the major stock exchanges (the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, and AMEX) were required to adopt minimum standards on the number of independent directors, and their functions. These rules are enforced through the threat of delisting by the exchange, while the Securities and Exchange Commission works to ensure ultimate oversight. For example, the NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.01 requires that listed companies have a majority of "independent" directors.[74] "Independence" is in turn defined by Rule 303A.02 as an absence of material business relationship with the corporation, not having worked for the last three years for the corporation as an employee, not receiving over $120,000 in pay, or generally having family members who are.[75] The idea here is that "independent" directors will exercise superior oversight of the executive board members, and thus decrease the likelihood of abuse of power. Specifically, the nominations committee (which makes future board appointments), compensation committee (which sets director pay), and audit committee (which appoints the auditors), are required to be composed of independent directors, as defined by the Rules.[76] Similar requirements for boards have proliferated across many countries,[77] and so exchange rules allow foreign corporations that are listed on an American exchange to follow their home jurisdiction's rules, but to disclose and explain how their practices differ (if at all) to the market.[78] The difficulty, however, is that oversight of executive directors by independent directors still leaves the possibility of personal relationships that develop into a conflict of interest. This raises the importance of the rights that can be exercised against the board as a whole.
While the board of directors is generally conferred the power to manage the day-to-day affairs of a corporation, either by the statute, or by the articles of incorporation, this is always subject to limits, including the rights that shareholders have. For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a) says the "business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."[79] However, directors themselves are ultimately accountable to the general meeting through the vote. Invariably, shareholders hold the voting rights,[80] though the extent to which these are useful can be conditioned by the constitution. The DGCL §141(k) gives an option to corporations to have a unitary board that can be removed by a majority of members "without cause" (i.e. a reason determined by the general meeting and not by a court), which reflects the old default common law position.[81] However, Delaware corporations may also opt for a classified board of directors (e.g. where only a third of directors come up for election each year) where directors can only be removed "with cause" scrutinized by the courts.[82] More corporations have classified boards after initial public offerings than a few years after going public, because institutional investors typically seek to change the corporation's rules to make directors more accountable.[83] In principle, shareholders in Delaware corporations can make appointments to the board through a majority vote,[84] and can also act to expand the size of the board and elect new directors with a majority.[85] However, directors themselves will often control which candidates can be nominated to be appointed to the board. Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, §971 empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to write a new SEC Rule 14a-11 that would allow shareholders to propose nominations for board candidates. The Act required the SEC to evaluate the economic effects of any rules it wrote, however when it did, the Business Roundtable challenged this in court. In Business Roundtable v SEC,[86] Ginsburg J in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals went as far to say that the SEC had "acted arbitrarily and capriciously" in its rule making. After this, the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to challenge the decision, and abandoned drafting new rules. This means that in many corporations, directors continue to have a monopoly on nominating future directors.
Apart from elections of directors, shareholders' entitlements to vote have been significantly protected by federal regulation, either through stock exchanges or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Beginning in 1927, the New York Stock Exchange maintained a "one share, one vote" policy, which was backed by the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1940.[88] This was thought to be necessary to halt corporations issuing non-voting shares, except to banks and other influential corporate insiders.[89] However, in 1986, under competitive pressure from NASDAQ and AMEX, the NYSE sought to abandon the rule, and the SEC quickly drafted a new Rule 19c-4, requiring the one share, one vote principle. In Business Roundtable v SEC[90] the DC Circuit Court of Appeals struck the rule down, though the exchanges and the SEC subsequently made an agreement to regulate shareholder voting rights "proportionately". Today, many corporations have unequal shareholder voting rights, up to a limit of ten votes per share.[91] Stronger rights exist regarding shareholders ability to delegate their votes to nominees, or doing "proxy voting" under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Its provisions were introduced to combat the accumulation of power by directors or management friendly voting trusts after the Wall Street Crash. Under SEC Rule 14a-1, proxy votes cannot be solicited except under its rules. Generally, one person soliciting others' proxy votes requires disclosure, although SEC Rule 14a-2 was amended in 1992 to allow shareholders to be exempt from filing requirements when simply communicating with one another,[92] and therefore to take collective action against a board of directors more easily. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits any false or misleading statements being made in soliciting proxies. This all matters in a proxy contest, or whenever shareholders wish to change the board or another element of corporate policy. Generally speaking, and especially under Delaware law, this remains difficult. Shareholders often have no rights to call meetings unless the constitution allows,[93] and in any case the conduct of meetings is often controlled by directors under a corporation's by-laws. However, under SEC Rule 14a-8, shareholders have a right to put forward proposals, but on a limited number of topics (and not director elections).[94]
On a number of issues that are seen as very significant, or where directors have incurable conflicts of interest, many states and federal legislation give shareholders specific rights to veto or approve business decisions. Generally state laws give the right for shareholders to vote on decision by the corporation to sell off "all or substantially all assets" of the corporation.[96] However fewer states give rights to shareholder to veto political contributions made by the board, unless this is in the articles of incorporation.[97] One of the most contentious issues is the right for shareholders to have a "say on pay" of directors. As executive pay has grown beyond inflation, while average worker wages remained stagnant, this was seen important enough to regulate in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 §951. This provision, however, simply introduced a non-binding vote for shareholders, though better rights can always be introduced in the articles of incorporation. While some institutional shareholders, particularly pension funds, have been active in using shareholder rights, asset managers regulated by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 have tended to be mute in opposing corporate boards, as they are often themselves disconnected from the people whose money they are voting upon.
Investor rights
Most state corporate laws require shareholders have governance rights against boards of directors, but fewer states guarantee governance rights to the real investors of capital. Currently investment managers control most voting rights in the economy using "other people's money".[98] Investment management firms, such as Vanguard, Fidelity, Morgan Stanley or BlackRock, are often delegated the task of trading fund assets from three main types of institutional investors: pension funds, life insurance companies, and mutual funds.[99] These are usually substitutes to save for retirement. Pensions are most important kind, but can be organized through different legal forms. Investment managers, who are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, are then often delegated the task of investment management. Over time, investment managers have also vote on corporate shares, assisted by a "proxy advice" firm such as ISS or Glass Lewis. Under ERISA 1974 §1102(a),[100] a plan must merely have named fiduciaries who have "authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan", selected by "an employer or employee organization" or both jointly. Usually these fiduciaries or trustees, will delegate management to a professional firm, particularly because under §1105(d), if they do so, they will not be liable for an investment manager's breaches of duty.[101] These investment managers buy a range of assets (e.g. government bonds, corporate bonds, commodities, real estate or derivatives) but particularly corporate stocks which have voting rights.
The largest form of retirement fund has become the 401(k) defined contribution scheme. This is often an individual account that an employer sets up, named after the Internal Revenue Code §401(k), which allows employers and employees to defer tax on money that is saved in the fund until an employee retires.[102] The individual invariably loses any voice over how shareholder voting rights that their money buys will be exercised.[103] Investment management firms, that are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and ERISA 1974, will almost always take shareholder voting rights. By contrast, larger and collective pension funds, many still defined benefit schemes such as CalPERS or TIAA, organize to take voting in house, or to instruct their investment managers. Two main types of pension fund to do this are labor union organized Taft-Hartley plans,[104] and state public pension plans. A major example of a mixture is TIAA, established on the initiative of Andrew Carnegie in 1918, which requires participants to have voting rights for the plan trustees.[105] Under the amended National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §302(c)(5)(B) a union organized plan has to be jointly managed by representatives of employers and employees.[106] Many local pension funds are not consolidated and have had critical funding notices from the U.S. Department of Labor.[107] But more funds with beneficiary representation ensure that corporate voting rights are cast according to the preferences of their members. State public pensions are often larger, and have greater bargaining power to use on their members' behalf. State pension schemes usually disclose the way trustees are selected. In 2005, on average more than a third of trustees were elected by employees or beneficiaries.[108] For example, the California Government Code §20090 requires that its public employee pension fund, CalPERS has 13 members on its board, 6 elected by employees and beneficiaries. However, only pension funds of sufficient size have acted to replace investment manager voting. No federal law requires voting rights for employees in pension funds, despite several proposals.[109] For example, the Joint Trusteeship Bill of 1989, sponsored by Peter Visclosky in the US House of Representatives, would have required all single employer pension plans to have trustees appointed equally by employers and employee representatives.[110] There is also currently no legislation to stop investment managers voting with other people's money, in the way that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §78f(b)(10) bans broker-dealers voting on significant issues without instructions.[111]
Employee rights
—Louis Brandeis, Testimony to Commission on Industrial Relations (1916) vol 8, 7659–7660
While investment managers tend to exercise most voting rights in corporations, bought with pension, life insurance and mutual fund money, employees also exercise voice through collective bargaining rules in labor law.[112] Increasingly, corporate law has converged with labor law.[113] The United States is in a minority of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries that, as yet, has no law requiring employee voting rights in corporations, either in the general meeting or for representatives on the board of directors.[114] On the other hand, the United States has the oldest voluntary codetermination statute for private corporations, in Massachusetts since 1919 passed under the Republican governor Calvin Coolidge, enabling manufacturing companies to have employee representatives on the board of directors, if corporate stockholders agreed.[115] Also in 1919 both Procter & Gamble and the General Ice Delivery Company of Detroit had employee representation on boards.[116] In the early 20th century, labor law theory split between those who advocated collective bargaining backed by strike action, those who advocated a greater role for binding arbitration,[117] and proponents codetermination as "industrial democracy".[118] Today, these methods are seen as complements, not alternatives. A majority of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have laws requiring direct participation rights.[119] In 1994, the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations: Final Report examined law reform to improve collective labor relations, and suggested minor amendments to encourage worker involvement.[120] Congressional division prevented federal reform, but labor unions and state legislatures have experimented.
Corporations are chartered under state law, the larger mostly in Delaware, but leave investors free to organize voting rights and board representation as they choose.[121] Because of unequal bargaining power, but also historic caution of labor unions,[122] shareholders monopolize voting rights in American corporations. From the 1970s employees and unions sought representation on company boards. This could happen through collective agreements, as it historically occurred in Germany or other countries, or through employees demanding further representation through employee stock ownership plans, but they aimed for voice independent from capital risks that could not be diversified. Corporations included where workers attempted to secure board represented included United Airlines, the General Tire and Rubber Company, and the Providence and Worcester Railroad.[123] However, in 1974 the Securities and Exchange Commission, run by appointees of Richard Nixon, rejected that employees who held shares in AT&T were entitled to make proposals to include employee representatives on the board of directors.[124] This position was eventually reversed expressly by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 §971, which subject to rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission entitles shareholders to put forward nominations for the board.[125] Instead of pursuing board seats through shareholder resolutions, for example, the United Auto Workers successfully sought board representation by collective agreement at Chrysler in 1980,[126] and the United Steel Workers secured board representation in five corporations in 1993.[127] However, it was clear that employee stock ownership plans were open to abuse, particularly after Enron collapsed in 2003. Workers had been enticed to invest an average of 62.5 per cent of their retirement savings from 401(k) plans in Enron stock, against basic principles of prudent, diversified investment, and had no board representation. This meant, employees lost a majority of pension savings.[128] For this reason, employees and unions have sought representation simply for investment of labor, without taking on undiversifiable capital risk. Empirical research suggests by 1999 there were at least 35 major employee representation plans with worker directors, though often linked to corporate stock.[129]
Deberes de los directores
While corporate constitutions typically set out the balance of power between directors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders, additional duties are owed by members of the board to the corporation as a whole. First, rules can restrain or empower the directors in whose favor they exercise their discretion. While older corporate law judgments suggested directors had to promote "shareholder value", most modern state laws empower directors to exercise their own "business judgment" in the way they balance the claims of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. Second, all state laws follow the historical pattern of fiduciary duties to require that directors avoid conflicts of interest between their own pursuit of profit, and the interests of the corporation. The exact standard, however, may be more or less strict. Third, many states require some kind of basic duty of care in performance of a director's tasks, just as minimum standards of care apply in any contract for services. However, Delaware has increasingly abandoned substantive objective duties, as it reinterpreted the content of the duty of care, allows liability waivers.
Stakeholder interests
Most corporate laws empower directors, as part of their management functions, to determine which strategies will promote a corporation's success in the interests of all stakeholders. Directors will periodically decide whether and how much of a corporation's revenue should be shared among directors' own pay, the pay for employees (e.g. whether to increase or not next financial year), the dividends or other returns to shareholders, whether to lower or raise prices for consumers, whether to retain and reinvest earnings in the business, or whether to make charitable and other donations. Most states have enacted "constituency statutes",[131] which state expressly that directors are empowered to balance the interests of all stakeholders in the way that their conscience, or good faith decisions would dictate. This discretion typically applies when making a decision about the distribution of corporate resources among different groups, or in whether to defend against a takeover bid. For example, in Shlensky v Wrigley[130] the president of the Chicago Cubs baseball team was sued by stockholders for allegedly failing to pursue the objective of shareholder profit maximization. The president had decided the corporation would not install flood lights over the baseball ground that would have allowed games could take place at night, because he wished to ensure baseball games were accessible for families, before children's bed time. The Illinois court held that this decision was sound because even though it could have made more money, the director was entitled to regard the interests of the community as more important. Following a similar logic in AP Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow a New Jersey court held that the directors were entitled to make a charitable donation to Princeton University on the basis because there was "no suggestion that it was made indiscriminately or to a pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of personal rather than corporate ends."[132] So long as the directors could not be said to have conflicting interests, their actions would be sustained.
Delaware's law has also followed the same general logic, even though it has no specific constituency or stakeholder statute.[134] The standard is, however, contested largely among business circles which favor a view that directors should act in the sole interests of shareholder value. Judicial support for this aim is typically found in a case from Michigan in 1919, called Dodge v Ford Motor Company.[135] Here, the Ford Motor Company president Henry Ford had publicly announced that he wished not merely to maximize shareholder returns but to raise employee wages, decrease the price of cars for consumers, because he wished, as he put it, "to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number". A group of shareholders sued, and the Michigan Supreme Court said in an obiter dictum that a "business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end." However, in the case itself a damages claim against Ford did not succeed, and since then Michigan law has been changed.[136] The US Supreme Court has also made it clear in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc that shareholder value is not a default or overriding aim of corporate law,[137] unless a corporation's rules expressly opt to define such an objective. In practice, many corporations do operate for the benefit of shareholders, but this is less because of duties, and more because shareholders typically exercise a monopoly on the control rights over electing the board. This assumes, however, that directors do not merely use their office to further their own personal goals over the interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders.
Conflicts of interest
Since the earliest corporations were formed, courts have imposed minimum standards to prevent directors using their office to pursue their own interests over the interests of the corporation. Directors can have no conflict of interest. In trusts law, this core fiduciary duty was formulated after the collapse of the South Sea Company in 1719 in the United Kingdom. Keech v Sandford held that people in fiduciary positions had to avoid any possibility of a conflict of interest, and this rule "should be strictly pursued".[138] It was later held that no inquiry should be made into transactions where the fiduciary was interested in both sides of the deal.[139] These principles of equity were received into the law of the United States, and in a modern formulation Cardozo J said in Meinhard v Salmon that the law required "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive ... at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."[140]
The standards applicable to directors, however, began to depart significantly from traditional principles of equity that required "no possibility" of conflict regarding corporate opportunities, and "no inquiry" into the actual terms of transactions if tainted by self-dealing. In a Delaware decision from 1939, Guth v Loft Inc,[141] it was held that Charles Guth, the president of a drink manufacturer named Loft Inc., had breached his duty to avoid conflicts of interest by purchasing the Pepsi company and its syrup recipe in his own name, rather than offering it to Loft Inc. However, although the duty was breached, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the court will look at the particular circumstances, and will not regard a conflict as existing if the company it lacked finances to take the opportunity, if it is not in the same line of business, or did not have an "interest or reasonable expectancy". More recently, in Broz v Cellular Information Systems Inc,[142] it was held that a non-executive director of CIS Inc, a man named Mr Broz, had not breached his duty when he bought telecommunications licenses for the Michigan area for his own company, RFB Cellular Inc.. CIS Inc had been shedding licenses at the time, and so Broz alleged that he thought there was no need to inquire whether CIS Inc would be interested. CIS Inc was then taken over, and the new owners pushed for the claim to be brought. The Delaware Supreme Court held that because CIS Inc had not been financially capable at the time to buy licenses, and so there was no actual conflict of interest. In order to be sure, or at least avoid litigation, the Delaware General Corporation Law §144 provides that directors cannot be liable, and a transaction cannot be voidable if it was (1) approved by disinterested directors after full disclosure (2) approved by shareholders after disclosure, or (3) approved by a court as fair.[143]
- Miller v Miller, 222 NW.2d 71 (1974)
Corporate officers and directors may pursue business transactions that benefit themselves as long as they can prove the transaction, although self-interested, was nevertheless intrinsically "fair" to the corporation.
- Lieberman v Becker, 38 Del Ch 540, 155 A 2d 596 (Super Ct 1959)
- DGCL §144 contains the rule that the burden for proving unfairness remains on plaintiff after disclosure
- Flieger v Lawrence, 361 A2d 218 (Del 1976) the burden of proof shifts onto the plaintiff to show a transaction was conflicted if approval by disinterested stockholders or directors has been given to a transaction. Also Remillard Brick Co v Remillard-Dandini Co, 109 Cal App2d 405 (1952)
- Oberly v Kirby, 592 A2d 445, 467 (Del 1991)
- Cinerama Inc v Technicolor Inc, 663 A2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995)
- Benihana of Tokyo Inc v Benihana Inc., 906 A2d 114 (Del. 2006)
Duty of care
The duty of care that is owed by all people performing services for others is, in principle, also applicable to directors of corporations. Generally speaking, the duty of care requires an objective standard of diligence and skill when people perform services, which could be expected from a reasonable person in a similar position (e.g. auditors must act "with the care and caution proper to their calling",[146] and builders must perform their work in line with "industry standards"[147]). In a 1742 decision of the English Court of Chancery, The Charitable Corporation v Sutton,[148] the directors of the Charitable Corporation, which gave out small loans to the needy, were held liable for failing to keep procedures in place that would have prevented three officers defrauding the corporation of a vast sum of money. Lord Hardwicke, noting that a director's office was of a "mixed nature", partly "of the nature of a public office" and partly like "agents" employed in "trust", held that the directors were liable. Though they were not to be judged with hindsight, Lord Hardwicke said he could "never determine that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or equity, for an intolerable grievance would follow from such a determination." Many states have similarly maintained an objective baseline duty of care for corporate directors, while acknowledging different levels of care can be expected from directors of small or large corporations, and from directors with executive or non-executive roles on the board.[149] However, in Delaware, as in a number of other states,[150] the existence of a duty of care has become increasingly uncertain.
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court passed one of its most debated judgments, Smith v Van Gorkom.[153] The directors of TransUnion, including Jerome W. Van Gorkom, were sued by the shareholders for failing to adequately research the corporation's value, before approving a sale price of $55 per share to the Marmon Group. The Court held that to be a protected business judgment, "the directors of a corporation [must have] acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Failing to act on an informed basis, if it caused loss, would amount to gross negligence, and here the directors were liable. The decision triggered a panic among corporate boards which believed they would be exposed to massive liability, and insurance firms who feared rising costs of providing directors and officers liability insurance to corporate boards. In response to lobbying, the Delaware General Corporation Law was amended to insert a new §102(b)(7). This allowed corporations to give directors immunity from liability for breach of the duty of care in their charter. However, for those corporations which did not introduce liability waivers, the courts subsequently proceeded to reduce the duty of care outright.[154] In 1996, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation[155] required "an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists", and in 2003 In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation[156] went further. Chancellor Chandler held directors could only be liable for showing "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders" through actions that are "without the bounds of reason".[157] In one of the cases that came out of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the same line of reasoning was deployed in In re Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative Litigation.[151] Chancellor Chandler, confirming his previous opinions in Re Walt Disney and the dicta of Re Caremark, held that the directors of Citigroup could not be liable for failing to have a warning system in place to guard against potential losses from sub-prime mortgage debt. Although there had been several indications of the significant risks, and Citigroup's practices along with its competitors were argued to have contributed to crashing the international economy, Chancellor Chandler held that "plaintiffs would ultimately have to prove bad faith conduct by the director defendants". This suggested that Delaware law had effectively negated any substantive duty of care. This suggested that corporate directors were exempt from duties that any other professional performing services would owe. It remained unclear, with a change in the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court in 2014, whether this position would remain.
Derivative suits
Because directors owe their duties to the corporation and not, as a general rule, to specific shareholders or stakeholders, the right to sue for breaches of directors duty rests by default with the corporation itself. The corporation is necessarily party to the suit.[158] This creates a difficulty because almost always, the right to litigate falls under the general powers of directors to manage the corporation day to day (e.g. Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a)). Often, cases arise (such as in Broz v Cellular Information Systems Inc[142]) where an action is brought against a director because the corporation has been taken over and a new, non-friendly board is in place, or because the board has been replaced after bankruptcy. Otherwise, there is a possibility of a conflict of interest because directors will be reluctant to sue their colleagues, particularly when they develop personal ties. The law has sought to define further cases where groups other than directors can sue for breaches of duty. First, many jurisdictions outside the US allow a specific percentage of shareholders to bring a claim as of right (e.g. 1 per cent).[159] This solution may still entail significant collective action problems where shareholders are dispersed, like the US. Second, some jurisdictions give standing to sue to non-shareholder groups, particularly creditors, whose collective action problems are less.[160] Otherwise, third, the main alternative is that any individual shareholder may "derive" a claim on the corporation's behalf to sue for breach of duty, but such a derivative suit will be subject to permission from the court.
The risk of allowing individual shareholders to bring derivative suits is usually thought to be that it could encourage costly, distracting litigation, or "strike suits"[163] – or simply that litigation (even if the director is guilty of a breach of duty) could be seen as counterproductive by a majority of shareholders or stakeholders who have no conflicts of interest. Accordingly, it is generally thought that oversight by the court is justified to ensure derivative suits match the corporation's interests as a whole because courts may be more independent. However, especially from the 1970s some states, and especially Delaware, began also to require that the board have a role. Most common law jurisdictions have abandoned role for the board in derivative claims,[164] and in most US states before the 1980s, the board's role was no more than a formality.[165] But then, a formal role for the board was reintroduced. In the procedure to bring a derivative suit, the first step is often that the shareholder had to make a "demand" on the board to bring a claim.[166] Although it might appear strange to ask a group of directors who will be sued, or whose colleagues are being sued, for permission, Delaware courts took the view that the decision to litigate ought by default to lie within the legitimate scope of directors' business judgment. For example, in Aronson v Lewis[167] a shareholder of the Meyers Parking System Inc claimed that the board had improperly wasted corporate assets by giving its 75-year-old director, Mr Fink, a large salary and bonus for consultancy work even though the contract did not require performance of any work. Mr Fink had also personally selected all of the directors. Nevertheless, Moore J. held for the Delaware Supreme Court that there was still a requirement to make a demand on the board before a derivative suit could be brought. There was "a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company", even if they owed their jobs to the person being sued. A requirement to make a demand on the board will, however, be excused if it is shown that it would be entirely "futile", primarily because a majority of the board is alleged to have breached its duty. Otherwise it must be shown that all board members are in some very strong sense conflicted, but merely working with the accused directors, and the personal ties this potentially creates, is insufficient for some courts.[168] This indicated a significant and controversial change in Delaware's judicial policy, that prevented claims against boards.
In some cases corporate boards attempted to establish "independent litigation committees" to evaluate whether a shareholder's demand to bring a suit was justified. This strategy was used to pre-empt criticism that the board was conflicted. The directors would appoint the members of the "independent committee", which would then typically deliberate and come to the conclusion that there was no good cause for bringing litigation. In Zapata Corp v Maldonado[169] the Delaware Supreme Court held that if the committee acted in good faith and showed reasonable grounds for its conclusion, and the court could be "satisfied [about] other reasons relating to the process", the committee's decision to not allow a claim could not be overturned. Applying Connecticut law, the Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeals held in Joy v North[170] that the court could substitute its judgment for the decisions of a supposedly independent committee, and the board, on the ground that there was scope for conflicting interests. Then, the substantive merits for bringing the derivative claim would be assessed. Winter J held overall that shareholders would have the burden "to demonstrate that the action is more likely than not to be against the interests of the corporation". This would entail a cost benefit analysis. On the benefit side would be "the likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding of liability", and the costs side would include "attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket expenses", "time spent by corporate personnel", "the impact of distraction of key personnel", and potential lost profits which may result from the publicity of a trial." If it is thought that the costs exceed the benefits, then the shareholders acquire the right to sue on the corporation's behalf. A substantive hearing on the merits about the alleged breach of director's duty may be heard. The tendency in Delaware, however, has remained to allow the board to play a role in restricting litigation, and therefore minimize the chances that it could be held accountable for basic breaches of duty.[171]
- Ivanhoe Partners v Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) a shareholder owning over 50% of shares is a controlling shareholder; but actual control may also be present through other mechanisms
- Citron v Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989) non-controlling shareholders do not owe duties to minority shareholders and may vote their shares for personal gain without concern
- In re Cysive, Inc. Shareholders Litigation 836 A.2d 531 (Del. 2003) Nelson Carbonell owned 35% of Cysive, Inc., a publicly traded company. His associates' holdings and options to buy more stock, however, actually meant he controlled around 40% of the votes. Chancellor held that "without having to attract much, if any, support from public stockholders" Carbonell could control the company. This was especially so since "100% turn-out is unlikely even in a contested election" and "40% block is very potent in view of that reality."
- Kahn v Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) Alcatel held 43% of shares in Lynch. One of its nominees on the board told the others, "you must listen to us. We are 43% owner. You have to do what we tell you." The Delaware Supreme Court held that Alcatel did in fact dominate Lynch.
- Perlman v Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir 1955), certiorari denied, 349 US 952 (1955) held it was foreseeable that a takeover bidder wished to divert a corporate advantage to itself, and so the selling shareholders were required to pay the premium they received to the corporation
- Jones v H.F. Ahmanson & Co. 1 Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464 (1969) holders of 85% of comm shares in a savings and loan association, exchanged shares for shares of a new corporation and began to sell those to the public, meaning that the minority holding 15% had no market for the sale of their shares. Held, breach of fiduciary duty to the minority: "majority shareholders ... have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the corporation to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner."
- New York Business Corporation Law section 1104-a, the holders of 20 per cent of voting shares of a non-public corporation may request that the corporation be wound up on grounds of oppression.
- NY Bus Corp Law §1118 and Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (1980) the minority can sue to be bought out at a fair value, determined by arbitration or a court.
- Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co of New England 367 Mass 578 (1975) majority shareholders cannot authorise a share purchase from one shareholder when the same opportunity is not offered to the minority.
- In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc 64 NY 2d 63 (1984) under a "just and equitable winding up" provision, (equivalent to IA 1986 s 212(1)(g)), it was construed that less drastic remedies were available to the court before winding up, and "oppression" was said to mean 'conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise. A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.'
- Meiselman v Meiselman 309 NC 279 (1983) a shareholder's 'reasonable expectations' are to be determined by looking at the whole history of the participants' relationship. 'That history will include the 'reasonable expectations' created at the inception of the participants' relationship; those 'reasonable expectations' as altered over time; and the 'reasonable expectations' which develop as the participants engage in a course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the corporation.'
Fusiones y adquisiciones
Applicable to Delaware corporations:
- DGCL §203
- Cheff v Mathes 199 A2d 548 (Del 1964)
- Weinberger v UOP Inc, 457 A2d 701, 703–04 (Del 1983) plaintiff must start by alleging the fiduciary stood to gain a material economic benefit. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show the fairness of the transaction. The court considers both the terms, and the process for the bargain, i.e. both a fair price, and fair dealing. However, if the director shows that full disclosure was made to either the disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders, then the burden remains on the plaintiff.
- Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985)
- Hanson Trust PLC v ML SCM Acquisition, Inc, 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir 1986), asset lock up in contested takeover, violation of duty of care
- Unitrin Inc v American General Corp.
- Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
- Moran v Household International Inc, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)
- Lacos Land Co v Arden Group Inc, 517 A 2d 271 (Del Ch 1986)
- Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Network Inc, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)
Finanzas corporativas
- US Securities and Exchange Commission
- Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
- Stock certificate, Unissued stock and Treasury stock
Securities markets
- Securities Act of 1933
- Securities Exchange Act of 1934
- Williams Act
- SEC Rule 10b-5, unlawful to make 'any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading.'
- Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) only those suffering direct loss from the purchase or sale of stock have standing to sue under federal securities law.
- TSC Industries v Northway 426 U.S. 438 (1976) Burger CJ, material means 'a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote'.
- Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) an employee of a printer that figured out upcoming company positions from his work was not liable for securities fraud.
- Basic v Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (1988) every affected investor can sue for personal loss, under a rebuttable presumption of reliance on the information (the 'fraud-on-the-market theory').
- United States v. O'Hagan 521 U.S. 642 (1997)
- Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano 563 U.S. ___ (2011) company reports on products a basis for securities fraud action
- Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) state law securities fraud class action claims were preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
- Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) 5 to 4 decision that related companies were not also liable under SEC Rule 10b-5
Investment businesses
- Investment Advisers Act of 1940
- Investment Company Act of 1940
- Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
Auditing
- Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 §404, listed corporations must document and disclose an enterprise-wide system of internal financial information. §301, CEO and CFO must personally certify integrity of annual financial statements.
- Schedule 13D, within 10 days anyone who acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any class of publicly traded securities in a public company must tell the SEC.
- SEA 1934 §13 or 15(d) requires an annual report
- Form 10-K, the basic information required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission as an annual report
- Form 10-Q, required each quarter
Bankruptcy
- Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code
- Claim in bankruptcy
- Taylor v Standard Gas and Electric Company
- Marrama v Citizens Bank of Massachusetts
Taxation
Teoría
- Nexus of contracts and Concession theory
- WZ Ripley, Wall Street and Main Street (1927)
- AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)
- LLSV and leximetrics
- Shareholder value, stakeholders and codetermination
- Charles A. Beard, "Corporations and Natural Rights," The Virginia Quarterly Review (1936)
Ver también
- UK company law
- Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson
- Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010
- Swiss referendum "against corporate Rip-offs" of 2013
- List of company registers
Notas
- ^ Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power 118 Harvard Law Review 833, 844 (2004)
- ^ cf A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Book V, ch 1, §107
- ^ Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing Purposes of 1811
- ^ a b 17 US 518 (1819)
- ^ cf William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Business Organization and Finance 113–114 (9th edn 2004) cf Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824) the right of Congress to regulate interstate trade under the commerce clause.
- ^ See Louisville C&CR Co v Letson, 2 How. 497, 558, 11 L.Ed. 353 (1844), a corporation is "capable of being treated as a citizen of [the State which created it], as much as a natural person." Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co, 16 How. 314, 329, 14 L.Ed. 953 (1854) "those who use the corporate name, and exercise the faculties conferred by it," should be presumed conclusively to be citizens of the corporation's State of incorporation.
- ^ Joseph Keppler, Puck (January 23, 1889)
- ^ See M Dodd, American Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today in Law: A Century of Progress: 1835–1935 (Reppy 1937) 254 and Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (1973) 166–175
- ^ See L Brandeis, Other People's Money And How the Bankers Use It (1914)
- ^ The Massachusetts governor Calvin Coolidge passed "An Act to enable manufacturing corporations to provide for the representation of their employees on the board of directors" (April 3, 1919) Chap. 0070. This was a measure that allowed corporations to voluntarily give workers votes. It remains in the Massachusetts Laws, General Laws, Part I Administration of the Government, Title XII Corporations, ch 156 Business Corporations, §23
- ^ See William Z. Ripley, Wall Street and Main Street (1927). The practice began again in 1986.
- ^ AA Berle, 'For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note' (1932) 45(8) Harvard Law Review 1365, 1372. See also the Berle-Dodd debate.
- ^ AA Berle, 'Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust' (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049, EM Dodd, 'For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145 and AA Berle, 'For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365
- ^ e.g. AP Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, 39 ALR 2d 1179 (1953) and Shlensky v Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968)
- ^ See corplaw.delaware.gov.
- ^ See L Bebchuk, A Cohen and A Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law? 90 California LR 1775, 1809–1810 (2002)
- ^ c.f. RC Clark, Corporate Law (Aspen 1986) 2, who defines the modern public corporation by four main features: separate legal personality, limited liability, centralized management, and freely transferable shares.
- ^ See generally, WA Klein and JC Coffee, Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles (9th edn Foundation 2004) 137–140
- ^ See also Limited liability limited partnership
- ^ e.g. in Delaware see the Division of Corporations at corp.delaware.gov, in New York see the Division of Corporations at dos.ny.gov/corps, and in California see the "Business Entities" section of the Secretary of State website at sos.ca.gov/business
- ^ 75 US 168 (1869) and see Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth century jurisdictional competition in the granting of corporate privileges (1985) 14(1) Journal of Legal Studies 129
- ^ See Edgar v MITE Corp, 457 US 624 (1982) White J., citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302, Comment b, pp. 307–308 (1971) Also VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v Examen Inc, 871 A2d 1108, 1113 (2005) 'The internal affairs doctrine applies to those matters that pertain to the relationships among or between the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholder.'
- ^ Contrast the European Union decisions, including Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (2003) C-167/01 and see Simon Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 231
- ^ See WL Cary, 'Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware' (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal 663, 664, noting how under Woodrow Wilson acting as governor tightened New Jersey law, provoking Delaware to change its regulation.
- ^ See William Ripley, Wall Street and Main Street (1927) 30, 'The little state of Delaware has always been forward in this chartermongering business.'
- ^ 288 US 517 (1933)
- ^ See RK Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation' (1977) 6 J Leg Studies 251
- ^ This is vast. See K Kocaoglu, 'A Comparative Bibliography: Regulatory Competition on Corporate Law' (2008) Georgetown University Law Center Working Paper, on SSRN
- ^ e.g. W Bratton, 'Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular' (1994) 44 U Toronto LJ 401. See also
- ^ e.g. Case of Sutton's Hospital (1612) 77 Eng Rep 960
- ^ 9 US 61 (1809)
- ^ 75 US 168 (1869)
- ^ The larger consequence was that insurance regulation remained state based, as the Court also held that insurance did not generally affect interstate commerce. This latter ruling was, however, overturned by United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 US 533 (1944)
- ^ 118 US 394 (1886)
- ^ a b 558 US 310 (2010)
- ^ 424 US 1 (1976)
- ^ 494 US 652 (1990)
- ^ 573 US ___ (2014)
- ^ per Ginsburg J (dissenting), at page 14 of the dissent 573 US ___ (2014)
- ^ cf Kennedy J (dissenting) Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010)
- ^ e.g. DGCL §141(a), "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." California Corporations Code §300(a) Archived November 13, 2012, at the Wayback Machine. NYBCL §701, "Subject to any provision in the certificate of incorporation authorized by ... [the] certificate of incorporation as to control of directors ... the business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors ... " This is a change from an old dictum in Manson v Curtis, 119 NE 559, 562 (NY 1918) where it was said that a director's powers are "original and undelegated". For support for this position, see Johannes Zahn, Wirtschaftsführertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht 95 (1934) reviewed by Friedrich Kessler (1935) 83 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 393 and Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119(6) Harvard Law Review 1735, 1746, fn 59 (2006)
- ^ See NLRB v Bell Aerospace Co, 416 US 267 (1974) excluding "managerial employees" from the scope of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §2(3) and (11). See further A Cox, DC Bok, RA Gorman and MW Finkin, Labor Law Cases and Materials (14th edn 2006) 92–97
- ^ cf Turberville v Stampe (1697) 91 ER 1072, per Lord Holt CJ
- ^ See RS Stevens, 'A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine' (1927) 36(3) Yale Law Journal 297 and MA Schaeftler, 'Ultra Vires – Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations' (1983–1984) Journal of Corporation Law 81
- ^ Revised MBCA §3.01(a) presumption that a corporation's purpose is to 'engage in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.' Also §3.04, precludes a corporation from asserting ultra vires as a defense from having contracts enforced against it.
- ^ 220 Cal App2d 851, (3d Dist 1963)
- ^ See further, Restatement of the Law of Agency (3rd edn 2006)
- ^ LA Bebchuk and JM Freid, 'The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy' (1996) 105 Yale LJ 857, 881–890
- ^ All such interests need to be registered to take effect under the Uniform Commercial Code art 9
- ^ 269 U.S. 114 (1925)
- ^ [1970] ICJ 1
- ^ See Re Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co, Ltd [1970] ICJ 1
- ^ e.g. MBCA §2.04
- ^ 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991)
- ^ See Perpetual Real Estate Services Inc v Michaelson Properties Inc, 974 F2d 545 (4th Cir 1992)
- ^ 306 US 307 (1939) known as the "Deep Rock doctrine"
- ^ See generally AA Berle, 'The Theory of Enterprise Entity' (1947) 47(3) Columbia Law Review 343
- ^ Berkey v Third Avenue Railway, 244 NY 602 (1927)
- ^ e.g. Walkovszky v Carlton 223 NE2d 6 (NY 1966). Contrast the dissent of Keating J and the Californian decision Minton v Cavaney, 56 Cal2d 576 (1961). Traynor J held the veil would be pierced when shareholders "provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs." This meant the family of a girl who drowned in a swimming pool would be compensated.
- ^ In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 1984 AMC 2123 (ND Ill 1984), McGarr J, at 2191, "As an integrated multinational corporation which is engaged through a system of subsidiaries in the exploration, production, refining, transportation and sale of petroleum products throughout the world, Standard is responsible for the tortious acts of its wholly owned subsidiaries and instrumentalities, AIOC and Transport."
- ^ Perpetual Real Estate Services Inc v Michaelson Properties Inc, 974 F2d 545 (4th Cir 1992) citing WM Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1990) § 41.85 at 71, "courts usually apply more stringent standards to piercing the corporate veil in a contract case than they do in tort cases. This is because the party seeking relief in a contract case is presumed to have voluntarily and knowingly entered into an agreement with a corporate entity, and is expected to suffer the consequences of the limited liability associated with the corporate business form, while this is not the situation in tort cases." c.f. Fletcher v Atex Inc 8 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995)
- ^ 524 US 51 (1998)
- ^ e.g. Texas Business Corporation Act of 1997, art 2.21(2)
- ^ Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, Towards Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts 100(7) Yale Law Journal 1879, 1900–1901 (1991)
- ^ See Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton 2005) 4
- ^ See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 86 (Aspen 1986)
- ^ e.g. DGCL §242(b)(1) requires a resolution by the directors, and then a majority vote of shareholders, and the affected classes of shareholder.
- ^ cf William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Business Organization and Finance 113–114 (9th edn 2004) "The decision evoked much contemporary protest, because to many it seemed to imply that once a corporate charter was granted, the corporation was beyond legislative control. In fact, its significance was more limited than this because, as Justice Story pointed out ... the state could insert a provision in any charter that it granted reserving its right to amend or further condition the charter."
- ^ cf, the English Court of Appeal case, Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34, cited in Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee and Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (8th Edition 2012)
- ^ e.g. DGCL §102(b)
- ^ Attorney General v Davy (1741) 26 ER 531, per Lord Hardwicke LC
- ^ R v Richardson (1758) 97 ER 426, per Lord Mansfield
- ^ cf Manson v Curtis, 223 NY 313, 119 NE 559 (1918) holding that the board of directors could not be effectively abolished so as to allow large shareholders to dominate.
- ^ See also NASDAQ Rule 4350(c)(1)
- ^ See NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.02
- ^ NYSE Rule 303A.04-06. See also NASDAQ Rule 4350(c)(3)-(4) allows one of three directors to lack "independence" if he or she is not an officer or family member of an officer.
- ^ This is generally thought to have begun with the UK Cadbury Report.
- ^ e.g. NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.11
- ^ DGCL §141(a) Also see DGCL §350, shareholder agreements may only affect a board's discretion in close corporations, and Galler v Galler, 32 Ill2d 16 (1964)
- ^ This is not inevitable, as in corporations without shareholders, or those which may choose to give a voice to employees, e.g. Massachusetts Laws, General Laws, Part I Administration of the Government, Title XII Corporations, ch 156 Business Corporations, §23
- ^ Attorney General v Davy (1741) 2 Atk 212 and R v Richardson (1758) 97 ER 426
- ^ The case law on the meaning of "with cause" is conflicting. In New York, see Fox v Cody, 141 Misc 552, 252 NYS 395 (Sup Ct 1930) and Auer v Dressel, 306 NY 427, 118 NE 2d 590, 593 (1954) and in Delaware, see Campbell v Loew's Inc, 36 Del Ch 563, 134 A 2d 852 (Ch 1957) referring back to Auer.
- ^ Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88(5) Texas Law Review 987, 1008 (2010)
- ^ DGCL §211(b)
- ^ DGCL §228
- ^ 647 F3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011)
- ^ See Business Roundtable v SEC, 647 F3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011) and Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F2d 406 (DC Cir 1990)
- ^ See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 George Washington Law Review 687 (1986)
- ^ See William Z. Ripley, Two Changes in the Nature and Conduct of Corporations 11(4) Trade Associations and Business Combinations 143 (1926); or Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 695
- ^ 905 F 2d 406 (DC Cir 1990)
- ^ e.g. NYSE Listed Company Manual §313.00
- ^ See, SEC Release No. 34-31326 (October 16, 1992) changing rules so that (1) preparing and filing proxy statements are not needed if a person is not seeking to obtain voting authority from another person, but owners of over $5m are required. (2) no prior review of preliminary proxy solicitation materials (3) proxies are required to unbundle proposals so there are separate votes on each.
- ^ e.g. DGCL §211(d). See also, SEC 13d-5, dating from times when groups of investors were considered potential cartels, saying any 5% shareholder voting block must register with the Federal financial authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- ^ SEC Rule 14a-8
- ^ Economic Policy Institute, 'More compensation heading to the very top: 1965–2009 Archived November 24, 2011, at the Wayback Machine' (May 16, 2011) Based on data from Wall Street Journal/Mercer, Hay Group 2010.
- ^ DGCL §271, and cf Katz v Bregman, 431 A2d 1274 (1981) includes assets under 50% of the company's value.
- ^ cf the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 ss 366–368 and 378
- ^ See earlier, LD Brandeis, Other People's Money And How the Bankers Use It (1914) an JS Taub, 'Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders' Rights' (2009) 34(3) The Journal of Corporation Law 843, 876
- ^ See AA Berle, Property, Production and Revolution (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1
- ^ ERISA 1974, 29 USC §1102
- ^ 29 USC §1105(d)
- ^ 26 USC §401(k)
- ^ JS Taub, 'Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders' Rights' (2009) 34(3) The Journal of Corporation Law 843, 876
- ^ Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 USC §186(c)(5)(B)
- ^ This followed Carnegie's attendance the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1916 to explain labor unrest. See W Greenough, It's My Retirement Money – Take Good Care of It: The TIAA-CREF Story (Irwin 1990) 11–37, and E McGaughey, Participation in Corporate Governance (2014) ch 6(3)
- ^ 29 USC §302(c)(5)(B)
- ^ See US Department of Labor, Critical, Endangered and WRERA Status Notices' (Retrieved August 11, 2016)
- ^ See D Hess, 'Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices' (2005–2006) 39 UC Davis LR 187, 195. The recommended Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act of 1997 §17(c)(3) suggested funds publicize their governance structures. This was explicitly adopted by a number of states, while others already followed the same best practice.
- ^ e.g., sponsored by Bernie Sanders, Workplace Democracy Act of 1999, HR 1277, Title III, §301. See further R Cook, 'The Case for Joint Trusteeship of Pension Plans' (2002) WorkingUSA 25. Most recently, the Employees' Pension Security Act of 2008 (HR 5754) §101 would have amended ERISA 1974 §403(a) to insert 'The assets of a pension plan which is a single-employer plan shall be held in trust by a joint board of trustees, which shall consist of two or more trustees representing on an equal basis the interests of the employer or employers maintaining the plan and the interests of the participants and their beneficiaries.'
- ^ See HR 2664
- ^ This was inserted by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 §957: Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §6(b)(10), 15 USC §78f(b)(10)
- ^ See generally, A Cox, DC Bok, MW Finkin and RA Gorman, Labor Law: Cases and Materials (2011) part 11 and RL Hogler and GJ Grenier, Employee Participation and Labor Law in the American Workplace (1992)
- ^ See the popular text by the former Dean of Harvard Law School, RC Clark, Corporate Law (1986) 32, 'even if your aim is not to understand all of law's effects on corporate activities but only to grasp the basic legal 'constitution' or make-up of the modern corporation, you must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of labor law.'
- ^ See further worker-participation.eu
- ^ Massachusetts Laws, General Laws, Part I Administration of the Government, Title XII Corporations, ch 156 Business Corporations, §23. This was originally introduced by An Act to enable manufacturing corporations to provide for the representation of their employees on the board of directors (April 3, 1919) Chap. 0070.
- ^ NM Clark, Common Sense in Labor Management (1919) 28–29
- ^ See generally JR Commons and JB Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (1920) and US Congress, Report of the Committee of the Senate Upon the Relations between Labor and Capital (Washington DC 1885) vol II, 806 on Straiton & Storm
- ^ See Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony (1915) vol 1, 92 ff, and LD Brandeis, The Fundamental Cause of Industrial Unrest (1916) vol 8, 7672, C Magruder, 'Labor Copartnership in Industry' (1921) 35 Harvard Law Review 910 and S Webb and B Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (1920) Appendix VIII
- ^ See further, www.worker-participation.eu
- ^ Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations: Final Report (1994)
- ^ n.b. The New Jersey Revised Statute (1957) §14.9-1 to 3 expressly empowered employee representation on boards, but has subsequently been left out of the code. See further JB Bonanno, 'Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, present practice in Europe and applicability to the United States' (1976–1977) 14 Harvard Journal on Legislation 947
- ^ e.g. RA Dahl, 'Power to the Workers?' (November 19, 1970) New York Review of Books 20
- ^ See B Hamer, 'Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors' (1981) 81(3) Columbia Law Review 639, 640 and 'Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma' (1982) 92(1) Yale Law Journal 106
- ^ American Telephone & Telegraph Company, CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter 79,658 (1974) see JW Markham, 'Restrictions on Shared Decision-Making Authority in American Business' (1975) 11 California Western Law Review 217, 245–246
- ^ This was subject to litigation in Business Roundtable v SEC, 647 F3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011) but the SEC eventually produced implementing rules.
- ^ JD Blackburn, 'Worker Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is America Ready for Industrial Democracy?' (1980–1981) 18 Houston Law Review 349
- ^ 'The Unions Step on Board' (October 27, 1993) Financial Times
- ^ PJ Purcell, 'The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans' (March 11, 2002) CRS Report for Congress and JH Langbein, SJ Stabile and BA Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law (4th edn Foundation 2006) 640–641
- ^ See RB McKersie, 'Union-Nominated Directors: A New Voice in Corporate Governance' (April 1, 1999) MIT Working Paper. Further discussion in E Appelbaum and LW Hunter, 'Union Participation in Strategic Decisions of Corporations' (2003) NBER Working Paper 9590
- ^ a b 237 NE 2d 776 (Ill App 1968)
- ^ 28 states in 1991. See C Hansen, 'Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective' (1991) 46(4) The Business Lawyer 1355, Appendix A for a list of laws. The Connecticut General Statute Ann. §33-756 goes further than most in requiring directors take account of stakeholders.
- ^ 39 ALR 2d 1179 (1953)
- ^ See Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Virginia Law and Business Review 163 (2008)
- ^ See Davis v Louisville Gas and Electric Co, 16 Del Ch 157 (1928) 'the directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final. The judgment the directors of the corporation enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith, and was designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they serve.' See also Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985)
- ^ 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919)
- ^ Michigan Business Corporation Act §§251 and 541a(1)(c), and see Churella v Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co, 671 NW2d 125 (2003) distinguishing Dodge.
- ^ 573 U.S. ___ (2014) at page 23, "While it is certainly true that a central objective of for- profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives."
- ^ [1726] EWHC Ch J76
- ^ See Whelpdale v Cookson (1747) 27 ER 856
- ^ 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)
- ^ 5 A2d 503 (Del 1939)
- ^ a b 637 A2d 148 (Del Supr 1996)
- ^ See also the Revised Model Business Corporation Act §8.61 and California Corporation Code §310
- ^ 174 NE 441 (1932)
- ^ At 30 Broad Street, New York City.
- ^ See Ultramares Corporation v Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1932)
- ^ See Terlinde v Neely, 275 SC 395, 271 SE2d 768 (1980)
- ^ (1742) 26 ER 642
- ^ e.g. Barnes v Andrews, 298 F 614 (SDNY 1924) A director of the Liberty Starter Co, now insolvent, was accused of having contributed to the failure by being inattentive on the board. Acknowledging the duty of care, but distinguishing on these facts, Learned Hand J held, "It is easy to say he should have done something, but that will not serve to harness upon him the whole loss, nor is it the equivalent of saying that, had he acted, the company would now flourish. An inattentive director or directors cannot be held liable for a corporate loss if it is shown that proper attentiveness to corporate affairs by all the directors would still not have prevented the loss complained of. In order words, it must be demonstrated that the accused director's slothfulness was a cause of the company's loss. This notion of causation is thus a critical element in any action brought against a poorly performing board of directors and has had a tremendous impact on the course of modern corporate governance."
- ^ e.g. Indiana Code Ann §23-1-35(1)(e)(2) requires willful misconduct or recklessness before any liability. c.f. Model Business Corporation Act §8.30(a) which requires a director act in good faith and what he or she reasonably believes to be in the company's best interests.
- ^ a b 964 A 2d 106 (Del Ch 2009)
- ^ See further, JC Coffee, 'What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis' (2009) 9(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1
- ^ 488 A2d 858 (Sup Ct Del 1985) Before this, the leading case was Graham v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co, 188 A2d 125 (Del Supr 1963)
- ^ See also Cinerama Inc v Technicolor, Inc, 663 A.2d 1156 (1995) directors proved the 'entire fairness' of a merger, selling to MacAndrews & Forbes Group, even though directors failed to conduct an adequate market check to determine if other bidders would have given a higher price. Van Gorkom was distinguished.
- ^ 698 A 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
- ^ 825 A 2d 275 (2003)
- ^ See also, Brehm v Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (2000) Del Supreme Court, "Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule."
- ^ See generally Davenport v Dows, 85 US 626 (1873) and Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531 (1970)
- ^ e.g., the German Aktiengesetz 1965 §148
- ^ e.g. BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 SCR 560
- ^ 824 A.2d 917 (2003)
- ^ The case was subsequently settled. See 'Oracle's Chief in Agreement to Settle Insider Trading Lawsuit' (September 12, 2005) NY Times
- ^ Yehezkel, Ariel; Ackerman, Amanda. "Court Sets Forth Road Map for Defending "Strike Suits"". Transaction Advisors. ISSN 2329-9134.
- ^ See for example, the UK Companies Act 2006 ss 261–263
- ^ See RM Buxbaum, 'Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions' (1980) 68 Californian Law Review 1122
- ^ Delaware Chancery Court Rules, Rule 23.1, requires exhaustion of internal remedies.
- ^ 473 A 2d 805, 812 (Del 1984)
- ^ e.g. in New York, see Barr v Wackman 329 NE.2d 180 (1975) and In re Kaufmann Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1973) cert denied 414 US 857 (1973)
- ^ a b 430 A 2d 779 (Del Sup 1981)
- ^ 692 F.2d 880 (1982)
- ^ c.f. more recently, In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (2003) concerning insider trading, approving a derivative claim on the basis of the director's personal ties.
Referencias
- Textbooks
- V Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations (2nd edn Little, Brown and Co 1886) vol I
- WW Cook, A treatise on the law of corporations having a capital stock (7th edn Little, Brown and Co 1913) vol I
- WO Douglas and CM Shanks, Cases and Materials on the Law of Management of Business Units (Callaghan 1931)
- Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Aspen 1986)
- A Cox, DC Bok, RA Gorman and MW Finkin, Labor Law Cases and Materials (14th edn 2006)
- JH Choper, JC Coffee and R. J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (7th edn Aspen 2009)
- WA Klein and JC Coffee, Business Organization and Finance (11th edn Foundation Press 2010)
- Books
- AA Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, Macmillan 1932)
- William Ripley, Wall Street and Main Street (1927)
- Johannes Zahn, Wirtschaftsführertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht (1934)
- Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton 2005)
- Articles
- Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119(6) Harvard Law Review 1735 (2006)
- LA Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power 118 Harvard Law Review 833 (2004)
- LA Bebchuk, A Cohen and A Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law? 90 California LR 1775 (2002)
- AA Berle, Non-Voting Stock and Bankers Control (1925–1926) 39 Harvard Law Review 673
- AA Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049
- AA Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity (1947) 47(3) Columbia Law Review 343
- AA Berle, The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration (1952) 19(4) University of Chicago Law Review 639
- AA Berle, Control in Corporate Law (1958) 58 Columbia Law Review 1212
- AA Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 433
- AA Berle, Property, Production and Revolution (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1
- AA Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control (1968–1969) 24 Business Lawyer 149
- V Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law 38 BCL Review 595 (1977)
- RM Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions (1980) 68 Californian Law Review 1122
- WL Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal 663
- JC Coffee, What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis (2009) 9(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1
- C Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective (1991) 46(4) The Business Lawyer 1355
- Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, Towards Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100(7) Yale Law Journal 1879 (1991)
- Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88(5) Texas Law Review 987 (2010)
- Friedrich Kessler, Book Review (1935) 83 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 393
- K Kocaoglu, A Comparative Bibliography: Regulatory Competition on Corporate Law (2008) Georgetown University Law Center Working Paper
- MA Schaeftler, Ultra Vires – Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations (1983–1984) Journal of Corporation Law 81
- Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 George Washington Law Review 687 (1986)
- RS Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine (1927) 36(3) Yale Law Journal 297
- Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Virginia Law and Business Review 163 (2008)
- William Z. Ripley, Two Changes in the Nature and Conduct of Corporations, 11(4) Trade Associations and Business Combinations 143 (1926); or Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 695
- RK Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation' (1977) 6 J Leg Studies 251
enlaces externos
- List of States' corporate laws and websites from law.cornell.edu
- US Corporate Law on Wikibooks
- Fordham syllabus 2003
- Based on the MBCA
- Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 10
- Florida Business Corporation Act (FBCA)
- Georgia Business Corporation Code (GBCC)
- Illinois Business Corporation Act (IBCA)
- North Carolina Business Corporation Act (NCBCA)
- South Carolina Business Corporation Act (SCBCA)
- Washington Business Corporation Act (WBCA)
- Wisconsin Business Corporation Law (WBCL)
- Other states with own laws
- California Corporations Code (CCC)
- Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
- Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS)
- New Jersey Business Corporation Act (NJBCA)
- New York Business Corporation Law (NYBCL)
- Ohio General Corporation Law (OGCL)
- Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law (PBCL)
- Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA)