La Guerra Greco-Italiana ( Guerra Italo-Griega , Campaña Italiana en Grecia ; en Grecia: Guerra del 40 ) tuvo lugar entre los reinos de Italia y Grecia del 28 de octubre de 1940 al 23 de abril de 1941. Esta guerra local dio inicio a la Campaña de los Balcanes de La Segunda Guerra Mundial entre las potencias del Eje y los Aliados y finalmente se convirtió en la Batalla de Grecia con participación británica y alemana . El 10 de junio de 1940, Italia declaró la guerra a Francia y al Reino Unido. En septiembre de 1940, los italianos habían invadido Francia., Somalilandia británica y Egipto . A esto siguió una campaña de prensa hostil en Italia contra Grecia, acusada de ser un aliado británico. Varias provocaciones culminaron con el hundimiento del crucero ligero griego Elli por los italianos el 15 de agosto (la fiesta cristiana de la Dormición de la Madre de Dios ). El 28 de octubre, Mussolini emitió un ultimátum a Grecia exigiendo la cesión del territorio griego, que el primer ministro de Grecia , Ioannis Metaxas , rechazó .
Guerra greco-italiana | |||||||
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Parte de la campaña de los Balcanes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial | |||||||
En el sentido de las agujas del reloj: bombarderos italianos sobre territorio griego, soldados italianos durante el invierno en Albania , soldados griegos en Gjirokaster , soldados griegos durante la ofensiva de primavera italiana | |||||||
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Beligerantes | |||||||
Alemania ( desde el 6 de abril de 1941 ) | Grecia Reino Unido (apoyo aéreo y material) | ||||||
Comandantes y líderes | |||||||
Victor Emmanuel III ( Rey de Italia ) Benito Mussolini ( Primer Ministro de Italia ) Sebastiano Visconti Prasca ( C-in-C hasta el 9 de noviembre) Ubaldo Soddu (C-in-C hasta mediados de diciembre) Ugo Cavallero (C-in-C desde mediados de diciembre) | Jorge II (Primer Ministro del 18 de abril al 23) Alexandros Papagos ( C-in-C ) John D'Albiac (Comandante de la RAF en Grecia) | ||||||
Fuerza | |||||||
Octubre: [4] 6 divisiones de 12 regimientos 87.000 soldados 463 aviones 163 tanques ligeros 686 piezas de artillería Noviembre: 10 divisiones de 20 regimientos Diciembre: 17 divisiones de 34 regimientos Enero: 25 divisiones de 50 regimientos 272.463 soldados 7.563 vehículos 32.871 animales Abril: [ 5] 29 divisiones de 58 regimientos 400.000 soldados 9.000 vehículos 50.000 animales [c] | Octubre: [4] [6] [7] [8] 4 divisiones de 12 regimientos 50.000 soldados 300 aviones de los cuales 160 operativos (cazas) 940 piezas de artillería 270 antiaéreos 459.650 rifles 17.032 ametralladoras 315 artillería de mortero 600 vehículos militares Noviembre: 7 divisiones de 21 regimientos Diciembre: 13 divisiones de 39 regimientos Enero: 13 divisiones de 39 regimientos [c] | ||||||
Bajas y perdidas | |||||||
13.755 muertos 50.874 heridos 3.914 desaparecidos 21.153 POW Total de pérdidas en combate: 89.696 12.368 casos de congelación 64 aviones (otros 24 reclamados) 1 submarino 30.000 toneladas largas de transporte Total general: 102.064 | 13.325 muertos 42.485 heridos 1.237 desaparecidos 1.531 Prisioneros de guerra Total de pérdidas en combate: 58.578 ? enfermo c. 25.000 casos de congelación 52 a 77 aeronaves 1 submarino Total general: 83.578+ |
La invasión italiana de Grecia, lanzada desde la Albania controlada por Italia , fue un fiasco: seis divisiones del ejército italiano , mal organizadas e insuficientes para gestionar una invasión a gran escala, encontraron una resistencia inesperadamente tenaz por parte del ejército helénico y tuvieron que enfrentarse a las montañas. y terreno fangoso en la frontera entre Albania y Grecia. A mediados de noviembre, los griegos habían detenido la invasión italiana justo dentro del territorio griego. A medida que el británicas aviones bombarderos y de combate golpeó fuerzas y bases de Italia, los griegos completaron su movilización y contraatacaron con el grueso de su ejército para empujar a los italianos de nuevo en Albania - un avance que culminó con la captura de Klisura Pass en enero de 1941, unas pocas docenas de kilómetros dentro de la frontera con Albania. La derrota de la invasión italiana y la contraofensiva griega de 1940 han sido calificadas por Mark Mazower como el "primer revés del Eje de toda la guerra" , y los griegos "sorprendieron a todos con la tenacidad de su resistencia".
El frente se estabilizó en febrero de 1941, momento en el que los italianos habían reforzado el frente de Albania a 28 divisiones contra las 14 divisiones de los griegos (aunque las divisiones griegas eran más grandes). En marzo, los italianos llevaron a cabo la ofensiva de primavera fallida . En este punto, las pérdidas eran mutuamente costosas, pero los griegos tenían mucha menos capacidad que los italianos para reponer sus pérdidas tanto en hombres como en material, y estaban peligrosamente bajos en municiones y otros suministros. También carecían de la capacidad de rotar a sus hombres y equipo, a diferencia de los italianos. [3] Las solicitudes de ayuda material de los griegos a los británicos solo aliviaron parcialmente la situación, y en abril de 1941 el ejército griego solo poseía 1 mes más de munición de artillería pesada y no pudo equipar y movilizar adecuadamente la mayor parte de sus 200.000– 300.000 reservas fuertes. [9]
Adolf Hitler decidió que el aumento de la intervención británica en el conflicto representaba una amenaza para la retaguardia de Alemania, [d] mientras que la acumulación alemana en los Balcanes se aceleró después de que Bulgaria se uniera al Eje el 1 de marzo de 1941. Las fuerzas terrestres británicas comenzaron a llegar a Grecia al día siguiente. . Esto hizo que Hitler acudiera en ayuda de su aliado del Eje. El 6 de abril, los alemanes invadieron el norte de Grecia (" Operación Marita "). Los griegos habían desplegado a la gran mayoría de sus hombres en un punto muerto mutuamente costoso con los italianos en el frente albanés, dejando a la Línea Metaxas fortificada con solo un tercio de su fuerza autorizada. [10] Las fuerzas griegas y británicas en el norte de Grecia fueron abrumadas y los alemanes avanzaron rápidamente hacia el oeste y el sur. En Albania, el ejército griego hizo una retirada tardía para evitar ser cortado por los alemanes, pero fue seguido lentamente por los italianos. Grecia se rindió a las tropas alemanas el 20 de abril de 1941 y a los italianos el 23 de abril de 1941 ( Armisticio de Salónica ). [e] Grecia fue ocupada posteriormente por tropas búlgaras, alemanas e italianas. El ejército italiano sufrió 102.064 bajas en combate (13.700 muertos y 3.900 desaparecidos) y cincuenta mil enfermos; los griegos sufrieron más de 90.000 bajas en combate (incluidos 14.000 muertos y 5.000 desaparecidos) y un número desconocido de enfermos. [11]
Fondo
Imperialismo italiano
A finales de la década de 1920, el primer ministro italiano Benito Mussolini dijo que la Italia fascista necesitaba Spazio vitale , una salida para su población excedente y que sería en el mejor interés de otros países ayudar en la expansión de la Italia imperial . [12] El régimen quería la hegemonía en la región mediterránea –Danubiana– de los Balcanes y Mussolini imaginaba la conquista "de un imperio que se extendía desde el Estrecho de Gibraltar hasta el Estrecho de Ormuz ". [13]
Había planes para un protectorado sobre el Reino de Albania y para la anexión de Dalmacia y el control económico y militar del Reino de Yugoslavia y el Reino de Grecia . El régimen fascista también buscó establecer protectorados sobre la Primera República de Austria , el Reino de Hungría , el Reino de Rumania y el Reino de Bulgaria , que se encuentran en la periferia de una esfera de influencia europea italiana . [14]
En 1935, Italia inició la Segunda Guerra Italo-Etíope para expandir el imperio; una política exterior italiana más agresiva que "expuso [las] vulnerabilidades" de los británicos y franceses y creó una oportunidad que el régimen fascista necesitaba para realizar sus objetivos imperiales. [15] [16] En 1936 comenzó la Guerra Civil española e Italia hizo una contribución militar tan grande que jugó un papel decisivo en la victoria de las fuerzas rebeldes de Francisco Franco . [17] "Una guerra externa a gran escala" se libró por la sumisión española al Imperio italiano, para poner a Italia en pie de guerra y crear "una cultura guerrera". [18]
En septiembre de 1938, el ejército italiano había hecho planes para invadir Albania , que comenzó el 7 de abril de 1939, y en tres días había ocupado la mayor parte del país. Albania era un territorio que Italia podía adquirir como " espacio vital para aliviar su superpoblación", así como un punto de apoyo para la expansión en los Balcanes. [19] Italia invadió Francia en junio de 1940, seguida de su invasión de Egipto en septiembre. [20] Se elaboró un plan para invadir Yugoslavia, pero se pospuso debido a la oposición de la Alemania nazi y la falta de transporte del ejército italiano. [21]
Relaciones greco-italianas en el período de entreguerras
Italia había capturado las islas del Dodecaneso predominantemente habitadas por griegos en el mar Egeo del Imperio Otomano en la guerra ítalo-turca de 1912. Las había ocupado desde entonces, después de renegar del acuerdo de 1919 entre Venizelos y Tittoni para cederlas a Grecia. [22] Cuando los italianos descubrieron que a Grecia se le había prometido tierras en Anatolia en la Conferencia de Paz de París de 1919 , para ayudar en la derrota del Imperio Otomano durante la Primera Guerra Mundial , la delegación italiana se retiró de la conferencia durante varios meses. Italia ocupó partes de Anatolia que amenazaban la zona de ocupación griega y la ciudad de Esmirna . Las tropas griegas fueron desembarcadas y la guerra greco-turca (1919–22) comenzó con el avance de las tropas griegas hacia Anatolia. Las fuerzas turcas finalmente derrotaron a los griegos y, con la ayuda italiana, recuperaron el territorio perdido, incluida Esmirna. [23] En 1923, Mussolini utilizó el asesinato de un general italiano en la frontera greco-albanesa como pretexto para bombardear y ocupar temporalmente Corfú , la más importante de las Islas Jónicas . [24]
La derrota griega en Anatolia y la firma del Tratado de Lausana (1923) acabaron con la idea expansionista de Megali . A partir de entonces, la política exterior griega tuvo como principal objetivo preservar el statu quo . Los reclamos territoriales sobre el norte de Epiro (sur de Albania), el Dodecaneso gobernado por Italia y el Chipre gobernado por los británicos permanecieron abiertos pero inactivos en vista de la debilidad y el aislamiento del país. La principal amenaza que enfrentó Grecia fue la de Bulgaria , que reclamó los territorios del norte de Grecia. Los años posteriores a 1923 estuvieron marcados por un aislamiento diplomático casi completo y disputas sin resolver con prácticamente todos los países vecinos. [25] La dictadura de Theodoros Pangalos en 1925–26 buscó revisar el Tratado de Lausana mediante una guerra con Turquía. Con este fin, Pangalos buscó el apoyo diplomático italiano, ya que Italia todavía tenía ambiciones en Anatolia, pero al final, nada resultó de sus propuestas a Mussolini. [26] Después de la caída de Pangalos y la restauración de la relativa estabilidad política en 1926, se emprendieron esfuerzos para normalizar las relaciones con Turquía, Yugoslavia, Albania y Rumania, sin mucho éxito al principio. En el mismo período, Grecia se acercó a Gran Bretaña y se alejó de Francia, exacerbada por una disputa sobre los reclamos financieros de las dos partes de la Primera Guerra Mundial [27].
El gobierno griego puso un renovado énfasis en mejorar las relaciones con Italia y, en noviembre de 1926, se firmó un acuerdo comercial entre los dos estados. Iniciado y perseguido enérgicamente por Andreas Michalakopoulos , el acercamiento italo-griego tuvo un impacto positivo en las relaciones griegas con Rumania y Turquía y después de 1928 fue continuado por el nuevo gobierno de Eleftherios Venizelos . [28] Esta política culminó con la firma de un tratado de amistad el 23 de septiembre de 1928. [29] [30] Mussolini explotó este tratado, ya que ayudó en sus esfuerzos por aislar diplomáticamente a Yugoslavia de los posibles aliados de los Balcanes. Venizelos rechazó una oferta de alianza entre los dos países, pero durante las conversaciones Mussolini ofreció personalmente "garantizar la soberanía griega" sobre Macedonia y aseguró a Venizelos que en caso de un ataque externo a Tesalónica por Yugoslavia, Italia se uniría a Grecia. [30] [31] [32]
A finales de la década de 1920 y principios de la de 1930, Mussolini buscó diplomáticamente crear "un bloque balcánico dominado por Italia que uniría a Turquía , Grecia, Bulgaria y Hungría". Venizelos contrarrestó la política con acuerdos diplomáticos entre vecinos griegos y estableció una "conferencia anual de los Balcanes ... para estudiar cuestiones de interés común, particularmente de naturaleza económica, con el objetivo último de establecer algún tipo de unión regional". Esto aumentó las relaciones diplomáticas y en 1934 se resistió a "todas las formas de revisionismo territorial". [33] Venizelos mantuvo hábilmente un principio de "diplomacia abierta" y tuvo cuidado de no alienar a los patrones griegos tradicionales en Gran Bretaña y Francia. [34] El acuerdo de amistad greco-italiano puso fin al aislamiento diplomático griego y dio lugar a una serie de acuerdos bilaterales, sobre todo la Convención de Amistad Greco-Turca en 1930. Este proceso culminó con la firma del Pacto de los Balcanes entre Grecia, Yugoslavia, Turquía y Rumania, que fue una contraria al revisionismo búlgaro. [35]
La Segunda Guerra Italo-Etíope marcó una renovación del expansionismo italiano y comenzó un período en el que Grecia buscaba cada vez más un firme compromiso británico por su seguridad. Aunque Gran Bretaña ofreció garantías a Grecia (así como a Turquía y Yugoslavia) durante la crisis de Etiopía, no estaba dispuesta a comprometerse más para evitar limitar su libertad de maniobra frente a Italia. [36] Además, con la restauración (respaldada por los británicos) de la monarquía griega en 1935 en la persona del anglófilo rey Jorge II , Gran Bretaña se había asegurado su influencia dominante en el país. Esto no cambió después del establecimiento del régimen dictatorial del 4 de agosto de Ioannis Metaxas en 1936. Aunque imitaba al régimen fascista en Italia en su ideología y apariencia exterior, el régimen carecía de una base popular de masas, y su pilar principal era el Rey, quien comandó la lealtad del ejército. [37] La política exterior griega se mantuvo así alineada con la de Gran Bretaña, a pesar de la creciente penetración económica paralela del país por parte de la Alemania nazi . El propio Metaxas, aunque un ferviente germanófilo en la Primera Guerra Mundial, siguió esta línea y, después de la Conferencia de Munich en octubre de 1938, sugirió una alianza entre Gran Bretaña y Grecia al embajador británico, argumentando que Grecia "debería prepararse para la eventualidad de una guerra entre Gran Bretaña e Italia, a la que tarde o temprano Grecia se vería arrastrada ". Reacios a verse envueltos en una posible guerra greco-búlgara, desdeñosos de la capacidad militar de Grecia y disgustados por el régimen, los británicos rechazaron la oferta. [38]
Preludio de la guerra, 1939-1940
El 4 de febrero de 1939, Mussolini se dirigió al Gran Consejo fascista sobre política exterior. El discurso describió la creencia de Mussolini de que Italia estaba siendo encarcelada por Francia y el Reino Unido y qué territorio se necesitaría para liberarse. Durante este discurso, Mussolini declaró a Grecia como "un [enemigo] vital de Italia y su expansión". [39] El 18 de marzo, como señales de una inminente invasión italiana de Albania, así como un posible ataque a Corfú, Metaxas escribió en su diario su determinación de resistir cualquier ataque italiano. [40]
Tras la anexión italiana de Albania en abril, las relaciones entre Italia y Grecia se deterioraron rápidamente. Los griegos comenzaron a hacer preparativos defensivos para un ataque italiano, mientras que los italianos comenzaron a mejorar la infraestructura en Albania para facilitar los movimientos de tropas. [41] El nuevo embajador italiano, Emanuele Grazzi , llegó a Atenas a finales de abril. Durante su mandato, Grazzi trabajó denodadamente para mejorar las relaciones italo-griegas, algo que Metaxas también deseaba (a pesar de su postura anglófila, Grazzi lo consideraba "el único amigo real que Italia podía reclamar en Grecia"), pero se encontraba en la incómoda posición de ignorante de la política real de su país hacia Grecia: había llegado sin instrucciones de ningún tipo y, a partir de entonces, se le dejaba constantemente fuera del circuito, y con frecuencia no recibía respuesta a sus despachos. [42] Las tensiones aumentaron como resultado de una continua campaña anti-griega en la prensa italiana, combinada con acciones provocativas italianas. Así, durante la visita del canciller Galeazzo Ciano a Albania, se exhibieron públicamente carteles que apoyaban el irredentismo albanés en Chameria ; el gobernador del Dodecaneso italiano, Cesare Maria De Vecchi , cerró las escuelas comunales griegas que quedaban en la provincia, y se oyó a las tropas italianas cantar " Andremo nell'Egeo, prenderemo pure il Pireo. E, se tutto va bene, prenderemo anche Aténe". "(" Vamos al Egeo, y tomaremos incluso el Pireo. Y si todo va bien, también tomaremos Atenas "). Cuatro de las cinco divisiones italianas en Albania se movieron hacia la frontera griega, y el 16 de agosto, el jefe del Estado Mayor italiano, el mariscal Pietro Badoglio , recibió órdenes de comenzar a planificar un ataque a Grecia. El 4 de agosto, Metaxas había ordenado a las fuerzas griegas que se prepararan y realizaran una movilización parcial. [43] [44]
Entrada en el diario de Ciano del 12 de mayo de 1939 [45]
Aunque tanto Gran Bretaña como Francia garantizaron públicamente la independencia de Grecia y Rumanía el 13 de abril de 1939, los británicos todavía se negaban a ser arrastrados a compromisos concretos con Grecia, ya que esperaban tentar a Mussolini a permanecer neutral en el próximo conflicto con Alemania, y vieron en una posible alianza griega sólo un drenaje de sus propios recursos. [46] Con el apoyo británico, Metaxas hizo propuestas diplomáticas a Italia en agosto, y el 12 de septiembre, Mussolini escribió a Metaxas, asegurándole que si entraba en la guerra, Italia respetaría la neutralidad griega y que las tropas italianas con base en Albania serían retrocedió unas 20 millas (32 km) de la frontera griega. El dictador italiano incluso ordenó a Grazzi que expresara su confianza hacia Metaxas y ofreciera vender aviones a Grecia. [47] [48] El 20 de septiembre, los italianos ofrecieron formalizar las relaciones renovando el tratado de 1928. Metaxas rechazó esto, ya que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores británico se opuso a un compromiso formal de Grecia con Italia, y solo hizo una declaración pública de amistad y buena voluntad. Las relaciones greco-italianas entraron en una fase amistosa que duró hasta la primavera de 1940. [49] [50]
En mayo de 1940, cuando la entrada de Italia en la guerra se hizo inminente, la prensa italiana inició una campaña de propaganda anti-griega , acusando al país de ser un títere extranjero y tolerar los buques de guerra británicos en sus aguas. [51] Tras la derrota de Francia , las relaciones greco-italianas se deterioraron aún más. Desde el 18 de junio, De Vecchi envió una serie de protestas a Roma, informando sobre la presencia de buques de guerra británicos en Creta y otras islas griegas y afirmó que se había establecido una base británica en Milos . [52] Las acusaciones fueron exageradas pero no del todo injustificadas: en enero de 1940, cediendo a la presión británica, Grecia concluyó un acuerdo comercial con Gran Bretaña, limitando sus exportaciones a Alemania y permitiendo que Gran Bretaña utilizara la gran flota mercante griega para su esfuerzo de guerra, marcando Grecia es un miembro tácito del campo anti-Eje, a pesar de su neutralidad oficial. [53] Los buques de guerra británicos navegaron profundamente en el Egeo, lo que llevó al embajador británico en Atenas a recomendar, el 17 de agosto, que el gobierno los detuviera. [54] Mussolini vio su guerra como una guerra paralllela ("guerra paralela") bajo la cual Italia finalmente conquistaría su spazio vitale aliado con Alemania, pero sin la ayuda de Alemania, ya que hasta principios de 1941 se mantuvo vehementemente opuesto a la Wehrmacht que operaba en el Mediterráneo. [55] Como tal, quería que Italia ocupara todo el territorio que veía como parte del spazio vitale de Italia , incluso en los Balcanes, antes de que Alemania obtuviera la esperada victoria sobre Gran Bretaña. [56] La constante oposición alemana a cualquier movimiento italiano en los Balcanes fue un gran irritante para Mussolini, ya que lo vio como un intento alemán de impedir que Italia obtuviera su parte justa del botín antes de que se ganara la guerra. [56] En julio de 1940, Mussolini se vio obligado, bajo la presión alemana, a cancelar una invasión planificada de Yugoslavia (una importante fuente de materias primas para el Reich ), lo que le resultó frustrante ya que durante mucho tiempo tenía planes en territorio yugoslavo. [56]
Las fuerzas militares italianas hostigaron a las fuerzas griegas con ataques aéreos contra buques de guerra griegos en el mar. [57] El 12 de julio, mientras atacaba un petrolero británico frente a Creta, aviones italianos con base en el Dodecaneso bombardearon buques de guerra griegos en el puerto de Kissamos . El 31 de julio, bombarderos italianos atacaron dos destructores griegos en el golfo de Corinto y dos submarinos en Nafpaktos ; dos días después, un barco de guardacostas fue atacado en Egina , frente a Atenas. [58] [59] El diario de Ciano confirma que durante el verano de 1940, Mussolini centró su atención en los Balcanes: el 6 de agosto, Mussolini estaba planeando un ataque contra Yugoslavia, mientras que del 10 al 12 de agosto arremetió contra los griegos, prometiendo rectificar la "asuntos pendientes" de 1923. [45] conde Ciano fue el oficial italiano que había empujado con más fuerza para la conquista de Albania en 1939 y posteriormente Albania fue descartado en gran medida como su propia "feudo personal", como el virrey Francisco Jacomoni era un lacayo de Ciano. [60] Como una forma de mejorar su prestigio dentro del régimen, Ciano fue el funcionario italiano que más presionó por la invasión de Grecia ya que veía conquistar Grecia (una invasión que tendría que ser lanzada desde Albania) como una forma de mostrar de lo bien administrada que estaba Albania bajo su gobierno. [60] El 10 de agosto de 1940, Ciano se reunió con Mussolini para contarle la historia del bandido albanés Daut Hoxha, a quien Ciano presentó a Mussolini como un patriota albanés pro italiano asesinado por los griegos. [60] En realidad, Hoxha era un ladrón de ganado con una "larga historia de extrema violencia y criminalidad" que había sido decapitado por una banda rival de bandidos albaneses. [60] Como se pretendía, la historia de Ciano llevó a Mussolini a un estado de ira contra los griegos, y Ciano escribió en su diario: "El Duce está considerando un 'acto de fuerza porque desde 1923 [el incidente de Corfú] tiene algunas cuentas que saldar y los griegos se engañan a sí mismos si creen que se ha olvidado '”. [60]
El 11 de agosto, orquestada por Ciano y el virrey italiano en Albania, Francesco Jacomoni , la prensa italiana y albanesa inició una campaña contra Grecia, con el pretexto del asesinato del bandido Daut Hoxha en junio. [60] Hoxha fue presentado como un patriota que lucha por la libertad de Chameria y su asesinato fue obra de agentes griegos. Ciano escribió con aprobación en su diario que Mussolini quería más información sobre Ciamuria (el término italiano para Epiro) y había ordenado tanto a Jacomoni como al conde general Sebastiano Visconti Prasca Guzzoni a Roma. [61] Visconti Prasca, el aristocrático comandante de las fuerzas de la Regio Esercito en Albania era un culturista excesivamente orgulloso de su "físico varonil" que descuidó sus deberes militares en favor de los ejercicios físicos, y rápidamente le dijo a Mussolini que sus fuerzas eran más que capaces de conquistar Grecia. [61] Aunque se denunció el "expansionismo" griego y se hicieron reclamos por la rendición de Chameria, Ciano y fuentes alemanas bien informadas consideraron la campaña de prensa como un medio para intimidar a Grecia, más que como un preludio de la guerra. [62] [63]
El 15 de agosto de 1940 (la Dormición de la Theotokos , una fiesta religiosa nacional griega), el crucero ligero griego Elli fue hundido por el submarino italiano Delfino en el puerto de Tinos . El hundimiento fue el resultado de las órdenes de Mussolini y el jefe de la Armada, Domenico Cavagnari, que permitían ataques submarinos en embarcaciones neutrales. Éste se recogió por De Vecchi, quien ordenó el Delfino ' comandante de s de 'sumidero todo a la vista en las proximidades de Tinos y Syros ', dando la impresión de que la guerra era inminente. El mismo día, otro barco de vapor griego fue bombardeado por aviones italianos en Creta. [64] [65] A pesar de la evidencia de la responsabilidad italiana, el gobierno griego anunció que el ataque había sido llevado a cabo por un submarino de nacionalidad desconocida. Nadie se dejó engañar y el hundimiento de Elli indignó al pueblo griego. El embajador Grazzi escribió en sus memorias que el ataque unió a un pueblo "profundamente dividido por diferencias políticas infranqueables y viejos y profundos odios políticos" y los imbuyó de una firme determinación de resistir. [66] La posición de Grazzi era particularmente problemática: un firme creyente en la amistad italo-griega, y sin darse cuenta del cambio de Ciano hacia la guerra, hizo todo lo posible para suavizar los problemas y evitar un conflicto. Como resultado, Metaxas, que creía que Grazzi era un "fiel ejecutor de las órdenes de Roma", no estaba seguro de las verdaderas intenciones de Italia, oscilando entre el optimismo y las "crisis del racionalismo prudente", en palabras de Tsirpanlis. Ni Metaxas ni Grazzi se dieron cuenta de que se mantenía a este último en su cargo "deliberadamente para disipar las sospechas del gobierno griego y para que los planes agresivos contra Grecia permanecieran ocultos". [67]
La intervención alemana, instando a Italia a evitar complicaciones balcánicas y concentrarse en Gran Bretaña, junto con el inicio de la invasión italiana de Egipto , llevó al aplazamiento de las ambiciones italianas en Grecia y Yugoslavia: el 22 de agosto, Mussolini aplazó el ataque a Grecia para el final de septiembre y el 20 de octubre sobre Yugoslavia. [45] [68] El 7 de octubre, las tropas alemanas entraron en Rumania para proteger los campos petrolíferos de Ploiești y prepararse para la Operación Barbarroja . Mussolini, que no había sido informado de antemano, lo consideró como una invasión de la esfera de influencia de Italia en los Balcanes y adelantó planes para una invasión de Grecia. [69] [70] El hecho de que Hitler nunca le dijera a Mussolini de ningún movimiento de política exterior por adelantado había sido considerado humillante por este último y estaba decidido a atacar Grecia sin informar a Hitler como una forma de afirmar la igualdad italiana con Alemania. [71] El 13 de octubre, Mussolini le dijo al mariscal Badoglio que Italia iba a la guerra con Grecia, y Badoglio no hizo objeciones. [72] Al día siguiente, Badolgio se enteró por primera vez de que Mussolini planeaba ocupar toda Grecia en lugar de solo Epiro, como le habían hecho entender, lo que llevó a Badoglio a decir que la Regio Esercito requeriría 20 divisiones en Albania, que a su vez requieren 3 meses, pero no presionó este punto. [73] El único hombre en Italia que podría haber detenido la guerra, el rey Víctor Manuel III , decidió bendecirla. [74] El rey le dijo a Mussolini en una reunión que tenía su apoyo ya que esperaba que los griegos se "desmoronaran". [74] Victor Emmanuel estaba ansioso por tener una cuarta corona para usar (Mussolini ya le había dado a Victor Emmanuel los títulos de Emperador de Etiopía y Rey de los albaneses).
Planes opuestos
Italia
El objetivo de la guerra italiana era establecer un estado títere griego , que permitiría la anexión italiana de las islas Jónicas y las islas Espóradas y Cícladas en el mar Egeo , para ser administradas como parte de las islas italianas del Egeo . [75] Las islas fueron reclamadas sobre la base de que alguna vez pertenecieron a la República de Venecia y al estado cliente veneciano de Naxos . [76] Las regiones de Epiro y Acarnania debían separarse del resto del territorio griego y el Reino de Albania, controlado por Italia, debía anexar territorio entre la frontera noroeste griega y una línea de Florina a Pindus , Arta y Preveza . [77] Los italianos intentaron compensar en parte a Grecia por sus extensas pérdidas territoriales permitiéndole anexar la Colonia de la Corona Británica de Chipre después de la guerra. [78]
El 13 de octubre, Mussolini finalizó la decisión de la guerra cuando informó al mariscal Badoglio que comenzara a preparar un ataque para el 26 de octubre. Badoglio luego emitió la orden para que el ejército italiano comenzara los preparativos para ejecutar el plan de guerra existente, "Contingencia G [reece]", que preveía la captura de Epiro hasta Arta, pero dejaba abierta la continuación de la campaña. [79] Al día siguiente, Badoglio y el Jefe de Estado Mayor interino del Ejército Mario Roatta se reunieron con Mussolini, quien anunció que su objetivo era la captura de todo el país y que se pondría en contacto con Bulgaria para una operación conjunta. Roatta advirtió que una extensión de la invasión más allá de Epiro requeriría diez divisiones adicionales, que tardarían tres meses en llegar y sugirió limitar el alcance de la desmovilización italiana. Ambos generales instaron a Mussolini a reemplazar al comandante local, el teniente general Sebastiano Visconti Prasca , por alguien de mayor antigüedad y experiencia. Mussolini aparentemente estuvo de acuerdo pero también insistió en que el ataque se adelantara en la fecha determinada, provisionalmente bajo el mando de Prasca. [72] Badoglio y Roatta no parecían estar convencidos de que la operación se llevaría a cabo, al igual que con proyectos similares contra Grecia y Yugoslavia. [80]
Al día siguiente, Mussolini convocó otra conferencia con Badoglio, Roatta, Visconti Prasca, Ciano y Jacomoni. [72] Ni al almirante Domenico Cavagnari de la Regia Marina ni a Francesco Pricolo de la Regia Aeronautica se les pidió que asistieran mientras Roatta llegó tarde, ya que fue invitado por el secretario de Mussolini a la reunión justo antes de que comenzara. [72] Mussolini reiteró sus objetivos; declaró que creía que ninguno de los aliados de Grecia en el Pacto de los Balcanes, Yugoslavia o Turquía actuaría; Expresó su determinación de que el atentado se produzca el 26 de octubre y solicitó la opinión de los reunidos. [72] Jacomoni estuvo de acuerdo en que los albaneses estaban entusiasmados pero que los griegos lucharían, probablemente con ayuda británica, mientras que Ciano sugirió que el pueblo griego era apático y no apoyaría a la clase dominante "plutocrática". [81] Prasca ofreció garantías de que la operación estaba tan perfectamente planeada como "humanamente posible", y prometió acabar con las fuerzas griegas en Epiro (que estimó en 30.000 hombres) y capturar el puerto de Preveza en diez a quince días. [82] [83] Prasca consideró la campaña como una oportunidad para ganar fama y alcanzar el codiciado rango de Mariscal de Italia al conquistar Atenas. Era relativamente menor en su rango y sabía que si exigía más tropas para el frente de Albania, era probable que se enviara a un oficial de mayor rango para comandar la operación, ganándose los elogios y los ascensos. [84]
Durante la discusión, solo Badoglio expresó objeciones, señalando que detenerse después de tomar Epiro —que admitió que presentaría pocas dificultades— sería un error, y que una fuerza de al menos veinte divisiones sería necesaria para conquistar todo el país, incluida Creta . a través de él no criticó los planes de Prasca. [85] Badoglio también declaró que creía que era muy poco probable que Gran Bretaña enviara fuerzas a Grecia y quería que una ofensiva italiana en Egipto se sincronizara con la invasión de Grecia. [86] Roatta sugirió que el programa de traslado de tropas a Albania tendría que acelerarse y pidió que se enviaran dos divisiones contra Salónica como distracción. Prasca señaló la insuficiencia de los puertos albaneses para la rápida transferencia de las divisiones italianas, el terreno montañoso y el mal estado de la red de transporte griega, pero confiaba en que Atenas podría ser capturada después de la caída de Epiro, con "cinco o seis divisiones ". [87] La reunión terminó con un esquema de plan, resumido por Mussolini como "ofensiva en Epiro; observación y presión sobre Salónica y, en una segunda fase, marcha sobre Atenas". [88] El historiador británico Ian Kershaw calificó la reunión en el Palazzo Venezia el 15 de octubre de 1940 como "una de las discusiones más superficiales y diletantes de la estrategia militar de alto riesgo jamás registradas". [89] El historiador griego Aristóteles Kallis escribió que Mussolini en octubre de 1940 "fue dominado por la arrogancia", un hombre sumamente confiado cuya búsqueda vanagloriosa del poder lo llevó a creer que bajo su liderazgo Italia estaba a punto de ganar, como él dijo, "la gloria que ella ha buscado en vano durante tres siglos ”. [71]
Para el 24 de octubre se acordó organizar los incidentes en la frontera para proporcionar un pretexto adecuado (análogo al incidente de Gleiwitz ). Mussolini sugirió que se adelantara el anticipado avance del 10º Ejército (Mariscal Rodolfo Graziani ) sobre Mersa Matruh , en Egipto, para evitar que los británicos ayudaran a Grecia. [82] Durante los dos días siguientes, Badoglio no logró obtener objeciones al ataque de los otros jefes de servicio ni logró su cancelación por motivos técnicos. Mussolini, enfurecido por el obstruccionismo del mariscal, amenazó con aceptar su renuncia si se le ofrecía. Badoglio retrocedió, logrando solo asegurar un aplazamiento del ataque hasta el 28 de octubre. [90]
El frente tenía aproximadamente 150 kilómetros (93 millas) de ancho en terreno montañoso con muy pocas carreteras. Las montañas Pindus lo dividieron en dos teatros de operaciones, Epiro y Macedonia occidental . [91] [ verificación necesaria ] Las fuerzas italianas en Albania se organizaron en consecuencia: el XXV Cuerpo de Ciamuria (teniente general Carlo Rossi ) en el oeste se encargó de la conquista de Epiro, mientras que el XXVI Cuerpo de Corizza (teniente general Gabriele Nasci ) en el este, alrededor de Korçë , inicialmente permanecería pasivo en dirección a Macedonia occidental. [92]
El 18 de octubre, Mussolini envió una carta al zar Boris III de Bulgaria invitándolo a participar en la próxima acción contra Grecia, pero Boris se negó, citando la falta de preparación de su país y su cerco por vecinos hostiles. [93] Esto no se consideró un gran revés, ya que el liderazgo italiano consideró que la amenaza de la intervención búlgara por sí sola obligaría al Alto Mando griego a enviar a la mayor parte de su ejército al este de Macedonia y Tracia. No fue hasta el 24 de octubre que Badoglio se dio cuenta de que no solo los griegos ya se estaban movilizando, sino que estaban preparados para desviar la mayor parte de sus fuerzas a Epiro, dejando solo seis divisiones contra Bulgaria. [93] Prasca todavía tendría superioridad numérica al comienzo de la campaña (unos 150.000 hombres contra 120.000) pero creció la preocupación por la vulnerabilidad del flanco izquierdo. La 29ª División Piemonte fue desviada del ataque en Epiro para reforzar el XXVI Cuerpo en el área de Korçë, mientras que la 19ª División de Infantería de Venecia recibió órdenes al sur desde su posición a lo largo de la frontera yugoslava. [94]
En 1936 el general Alberto Pariani había sido nombrado Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército, y había iniciado una reorganización de divisiones para librar guerras de rápida decisión , según pensaba que la velocidad, la movilidad y las nuevas tecnologías podían revolucionar las operaciones militares. En 1937, las divisiones de tres regimientos (triangulares) comenzaron a cambiar a dos regimientos ( divisiones binarias ), como parte de un plan de diez años para reorganizar el ejército permanente en 24 divisiones binarias, 24 triangulares, doce de montaña, tres motorizadas y tres blindadas. . [95] El efecto del cambio fue aumentar los gastos administrativos del ejército, sin un aumento correspondiente en la efectividad, ya que la nueva tecnología de tanques, vehículos de motor y comunicaciones inalámbricas tardó en llegar y fue inferior a la de los enemigos potenciales. . La dilución de la clase de oficiales por la necesidad de personal adicional de la unidad se vio agravada por la politización del ejército y la adición de la Milicia de Camisa Negra. [96] Las reformas también promovieron asaltos frontales con exclusión de otras teorías, abandonando el énfasis anterior en la guerra móvil rápida respaldada por artillería. [97]
Antes de la invasión, Mussolini dejó que 300.000 soldados y 600.000 reservistas se fueran a casa para la cosecha. [47] Se suponía que se utilizarían 1.750 camiones en la invasión, pero solo llegaron 107. La posibilidad de que los oficiales griegos situados en la zona del frente pudieran ser corrompidos o no reaccionaran a una invasión resultó ser principalmente una ilusión, utilizada por generales y personalidades italianas a favor de una intervención militar; lo mismo ocurrió con una supuesta revuelta de la minoría albanesa que vive en Chameria , ubicada en el territorio griego inmediatamente detrás de la frontera, que estallaría después del comienzo del ataque. [47]
La víspera del 28 de octubre de 1940, el embajador de Italia en Atenas , Emanuele Grazzi, entregó un ultimátum de Mussolini a Metaxas. Exigió el paso libre de sus tropas para ocupar puntos estratégicos no especificados dentro del territorio griego. Grecia había sido amistosa con la Alemania nazi, beneficiándose de las relaciones comerciales mutuas, pero ahora el aliado de Alemania, Italia, tenía la intención de invadir Grecia. Metaxas rechazó el ultimátum con las palabras " Alors, c'est la guerre " (en francés, "entonces es guerra"). En esto, se hizo eco de la voluntad del pueblo griego de resistir, una voluntad que se expresaba popularmente en una palabra: " ochi " (Όχι) (en griego, "no"). En cuestión de horas, Italia atacó a Grecia desde Albania. El inicio de las hostilidades fue anunciado por primera vez por Athens Radio a primera hora de la mañana del 28 de octubre, con el envío de dos sentencias del estado mayor, [ cita requerida ]
Desde las 05:30 de esta mañana, el enemigo ataca a nuestra vanguardia en la frontera greco-albanesa. Nuestras fuerzas defienden la patria.
- Estado Mayor griego, 28 de octubre de 1940
Grecia
En 1936, el régimen del 4 de agosto llegó al poder en Grecia, bajo el liderazgo de Ioannis Metaxas . Se establecieron planes para la reorganización de las fuerzas armadas griegas, incluida la construcción de la " Línea Metaxas ", una fortificación defensiva a lo largo de la frontera greco-búlgara. Se gastaron grandes sumas de dinero para reequipar al ejército, pero debido a la creciente amenaza y el eventual estallido de la guerra, las compras extranjeras más importantes de 1938 a 1939 solo se entregaron en parte o no se entregaron en absoluto. Se elaboró un plan de contingencia masivo y se almacenaron grandes cantidades de alimentos y equipo en muchas partes del país como medida de precaución en caso de guerra. Después de la ocupación italiana de Albania en la primavera de 1939, el Estado Mayor griego preparó el plan "IB" (Italia-Bulgaria), anticipando una ofensiva combinada de Italia y Bulgaria. Dada la abrumadora superioridad de tal alianza en mano de obra y material, el plan prescribía una estrategia puramente defensiva, incluida la retirada gradual de las fuerzas griegas en Epiro al río Arachthos - Metsovo - río Aliakmon - monte. Línea Vermion , para ganar tiempo para completar la movilización. [98]
Con la finalización de la movilización parcial de las formaciones fronterizas, el plan fue revisado con las variantes "IBa" (1 de septiembre de 1939) e "IBb" (20 de abril de 1940). Estos modificaron el papel de la principal fuerza griega en la región, la 8ª División de Infantería (General de División Charalambos Katsimitros ). El plan "IB" lo preveía cubrir el flanco izquierdo del grueso de las fuerzas griegas en Macedonia occidental, asegurando el paso de Metsovon y bloqueando la entrada a Etolia-Acarnania , "IBa" ordenó la cobertura de Ioannina y la defensa de la línea del río Kalamas . Katsimitros tuvo discreción para elegir la línea defensiva y eligió la línea Kalpaki, que se encontraba a horcajadas sobre el eje principal de invasión de Albania y le permitió usar los pantanos de Kalamas para neutralizar la amenaza de los tanques italianos. [99] El Estado Mayor griego siguió centrado en Bulgaria como su principal enemigo potencial: de los 851 millones de dracmas gastados en la fortificación entre abril de 1939 y octubre de 1940, solo 82 millones fueron a la frontera albanesa y el resto a la Línea Metaxas y otras obras. En el noreste. [100]
Sin embargo, dada la enorme superioridad numérica y material del ejército italiano, la dirección griega, desde Metaxas hacia abajo, era reservada y cautelosa, con pocas esperanzas de una victoria absoluta en un conflicto con Italia. El plan del Estado Mayor para la defensa de Epiro contemplaba la retirada a una línea más defendible, y fue solo a través de la insistencia de Katsimitros que el ataque italiano se enfrentó cerca de la frontera. El propio Metaxas, durante una sesión informativa para la prensa el 30 de octubre de 1940, reiteró su confianza inquebrantable en la victoria final de Gran Bretaña y, por lo tanto, de Grecia, pero se mostró menos confiado en las perspectivas a corto plazo, y señaló que "Grecia no está luchando por la victoria . Está luchando por la gloria. Y por su honor ... Una nación debe poder luchar, si quiere seguir siendo grande, incluso sin esperanza de victoria. Simplemente porque tiene que hacerlo ". [101] Por otro lado, este pesimismo no fue compartido por la población en general, cuyo entusiasmo, optimismo y la indignación casi religiosa por el torpedear de Elli , creó un ímpetu que ayudó a transformar el conflicto a favor de Grecia. [102] En marzo de 1941, cuando se avecinaba la intervención alemana, un oficial italiano resumió la actitud de los griegos hacia Mussolini con las palabras de un oficial griego capturado: "Estamos seguros de que perderemos la guerra, pero darte las nalgadas que necesitas ". [103]
Órdenes de batalla
Italia
En el sector de Epiro, el XXV Cuerpo de Ciamuria estaba formado por la 23a División de Infantería Ferrara (12.785 hombres, 60 cañones y 3.500 tropas auxiliares albanesas ), la 51a División de Infantería Siena (9.200 hombres y 50 cañones) y la 131a División Blindada Centauro (4.037 hombres , 24 cañones y 163 tanques ligeros , de los cuales solo 90 operativos). Además, fue reforzado por unidades de caballería en un mando a nivel de brigada que operaba en la extrema derecha italiana a lo largo de la costa (4.823 hombres y 32 cañones). El XXV Cuerpo comprendía 22 batallones de infantería , tres regimientos de caballería, 61 baterías de artillería (18 pesadas) y 90 tanques. Junto con los batallones de Camisas Negras y las tropas auxiliares, contaba con c. 42.000 hombres. [104] El XXVI Cuerpo de Corizza en la zona de Korçë comprendía la 29ª División de Infantería de Piemonte (9.300 hombres y 32 cañones) y la 49ª División de Infantería de Parma (12.000 hombres y 60 cañones). Además, el Cuerpo comprendía la División de Venecia (10.000 hombres y 40 cañones), moviéndose hacia el sur desde su despliegue a lo largo de la frontera yugoslava entre el lago Prespa y Elbasan , y más tarde se reforzó con la 53a División de Infantería de Arezzo (12.000 hombres y 32 cañones) alrededor Shkodër . El XXVI Cuerpo totalizó 32 batallones de infantería , alrededor de diez tanques y dos compañías de caballería, 68 baterías (7 pesadas) para un total de c. 44.000 hombres. [105] La 3ª División Alpina de élite Julia con (10,800 hombres y 29 cañones), fue colocada entre los cuerpos para cubrir el avance del XXV Cuerpo a lo largo de las montañas Pindus. [106] La Regia Aeronautica tenía 380 aviones disponibles para operaciones contra Grecia. [107] Aproximadamente la mitad de la fuerza de combate consistía en 64 biplanos Fiat CR.42 Falco (Hawk) y 23 Fiat CR.32 Freccia (Arrow) (este último ya obsoleto). Más modernos y efectivos fueron los cincuenta Fiat G.50bis , primeros cazas totalmente metálicos italianos, disponibles al comienzo de las hostilidades. Sesenta CANT Z.1007s Alcione (Halcyon) representaron el grueso de la fuerza de bombarderos italianos. De construcción de madera, estos aviones de tres motores podían soportar mucho castigo y eran muy maniobrables. Otros trimotores también se basaron en aeródromos albaneses: 72 Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 Pipistrello (Bat), un veterano de la guerra española , con tren de aterrizaje fijo, [108] y 31 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero (Sparrowhawk) construido con tubos de acero , madera, aluminio y tela y con escasa potencia de fuego defensiva. [109]
Grecia
El 28 de octubre, el ejército griego tenía 14 divisiones de infantería , una división de caballería y tres brigadas de infantería, todas al menos parcialmente movilizadas desde agosto; cuatro divisiones de infantería y dos brigadas estaban en la frontera con Albania; cinco divisiones de infantería se enfrentaron a Bulgaria y cinco más con la división de caballería estaban en reserva general. [110] Las divisiones del ejército griego eran triangulares y tenían hasta un 50 por ciento más de infantería que las divisiones binarias italianas, con un poco más de artillería y ametralladoras medianas pero sin tanques. [111] La mayor parte del equipo griego todavía era de la Primera Guerra Mundial, de países como Bélgica, Austria, Polonia y Francia, todos los cuales estaban bajo la ocupación del Eje, cortando el suministro de repuestos y municiones. Muchos oficiales griegos de alto rango eran veteranos de una década de guerra casi continua, incluidas las guerras de los Balcanes de 1912-13, la Primera Guerra Mundial y la Guerra Greco-Turca de 1919-22 . [ cita requerida ]
En Epiro, la 8ª División de Infantería ya estaba movilizada y reforzada con un regimiento y el personal de la 3ª Brigada de Infantería , con 15 batallones de infantería y 16 baterías de artillería . En el momento del ataque italiano, el Regimiento Evzone 2/39 se estaba moviendo hacia el norte desde Missolonghi para reforzar la división. [104] El sector de Macedonia occidental estaba en manos de la Sección del Ejército de Macedonia Occidental (TSDM), con base en Kozani (Teniente General Ioannis Pitsikas ), con el II Cuerpo de Ejército (Teniente General Dimitrios Papadopoulos ) y el III Cuerpo de Ejército (Teniente General Georgios Tsolakoglou ), cada una de las dos divisiones de infantería y una brigada de infantería. Las fuerzas totales disponibles para TSDM al estallar la guerra consistieron en 22 batallones de infantería y 22 baterías de artillería (siete pesadas). El sector Pindus estaba cubierto por el "Destacamento Pindus" ( Απόσπασμα Πίνδου ) (Coronel Konstantinos Davakis ) con dos batallones, una compañía de caballería y 1,5 baterías de artillería . [106]
La Real Fuerza Aérea Helénica ( Ellinikí Vasilikí Aeroporía , RHAF) tuvo que enfrentarse a la Regia Aeronáutica superior numérica y tecnológicamente . Constaba de 45 cazas, 24 bombarderos ligeros , nueve aviones de reconocimiento, unos 65 aviones auxiliares y 28 aviones de cooperación naval . Consistió en los escuadrones de persecución 21, 22, 23 y 24, los escuadrones de bombarderos 31, 32, 33, los escuadrones de cooperación militar 1, 2, 3, 4, el Vuelo de Cooperación Militar Independiente 2828 y la cooperación naval 11, 12 y 13 escuadrones. Al estallar la guerra, la flota operativa de combate de la Fuerza Aérea Griega contaba con 24 cazas PZL P.24 y nueve Bloch MB.151 , así como once bombarderos Bristol Blenheim Mk IV , diez Fairey Battle B.1 y ocho bombarderos Potez 633 B2. . [112] Los aviones de apoyo naval y de ataque a tierra en servicio incluían alrededor de nueve bombarderos biplanos Breguet 19 biplaza, 15 aviones de reconocimiento y observación Henschel Hs 126 , 17 aviones de observación Potez 25 A, nueve aviones de reconocimiento anfibios Fairey III , 12 torpedos Dornier Do 22 G bombarderos y 9 aviones de reconocimiento marítimo Avro Anson . [113] Las principales bases aéreas estaban ubicadas en Sedes , Larissa , Dekeleia , Faleron , Eleusis , Nea Anchialos y Maleme . [112]
La Real Armada Helénica tenía el crucero ancianos Georgios Averof , dos destructores modernos , cuatro poco mayores destructores italianos y cuatro obsoletos Aetos -class destructores . Había seis viejos submarinos, quince torpederos obsoletos y una treintena de otras embarcaciones auxiliares. [110]
Bretaña
El 22 de octubre de 1940, seis días antes de la invasión italiana de Grecia, a pesar de la invasión italiana de Egipto, se ordenó al oficial aéreo de la RAF Comandante en jefe de Oriente Medio en El Cairo que preparara escuadrones para Grecia, basándose en descodificaciones Ultra y otras fuentes que una invasión italiana de Grecia era inminente. [114] La RAF envió por primera vez el Escuadrón 30 , que consistía en un vuelo de cazas nocturnos Blenheim IF y un vuelo de bombarderos ligeros Blenheim I, que tenían su base en el aeródromo Atenas-Eleusis. [115] Poco después, seis bombarderos medianos Vickers Wellington se separaron del Escuadrón 70 y llegó un vuelo de Blenheim Is del Escuadrón 84 . Todos los activos de la RAF se colocaron bajo el mando del vicemariscal de aire John D'Albiac . [116] El avión de la RAF participó en la contraofensiva griega que comenzó el 14 de noviembre, con el Escuadrón No. 84 operando hacia adelante desde Menidi . [117] Unos días después, los cazas Gloster Gladiator del Escuadrón 80 avanzaron hacia Trikala , causando pérdidas significativas a la Regia Aeronautica . [118] El Escuadrón 211 con Blenheim Is, seguido antes de finales de noviembre, se unió al Escuadrón 84 en Menidi y el Escuadrón 80 se trasladó a Yannina , a unos 64 kilómetros (40 millas) de la frontera con Albania. En la primera semana de diciembre, 14 Gladiadores fueron transferidos de la RAF a la RHAF. [119]
Campaña
La historia oficial griega de la guerra greco-italiana la divide en tres períodos: [120] [121]
- la ofensiva italiana y su derrota del 28 de octubre al 13 de noviembre de 1940
- la contraofensiva griega, del 14 de noviembre al 6 de enero de 1941, la contraofensiva griega inicial del 14 al 23 de noviembre, con la restauración de la frontera de antes de la guerra en Epiro y la captura de Korçë, seguida del avance griego en Albania hasta el 6 de enero de 1941
- la estabilización gradual del frente desde el 6 de enero de 1941 hasta el inicio del ataque alemán el 6 de abril; los últimos avances griegos, hasta el 8 de marzo, seguidos de la ofensiva primaveral italiana y el estancamiento hasta abril.
El comandante en jefe griego, Alexandros Papagos , en sus memorias consideró que la segunda fase terminaba el 28 de diciembre de 1940; como comenta el historiador Ioannis Koliopoulos, esto parece más apropiado, ya que diciembre marcó un punto de inflexión en el curso de la guerra, con la contraofensiva griega deteniéndose gradualmente, la amenaza alemana volviéndose clara y el comienzo de los intentos británicos de orientar y dar forma a la estrategia griega. Según Koliopoulos, los últimos tres meses de la guerra fueron de poca importancia militar, ya que no alteraron la situación de los dos combatientes, sino que estuvieron dominados principalmente por los desarrollos diplomáticos y políticos que condujeron a la invasión alemana. [110]
Ofensiva italiana (28 de octubre - 13 de noviembre de 1940)
Las fuerzas italianas invadieron Grecia en varias columnas. En el extremo derecho italiano, el grupo costero se movió hacia el sur en dirección a Konispol con el objetivo final de capturar Igoumenitsa y de allí conducir hacia Preveza. En el sector central, la División de Siena se movió en dos columnas hacia el área de Filiates , mientras que la División de Ferrara se movió en cuatro columnas contra la línea principal de resistencia griega en Kalpaki con el objetivo de capturar a Ioannina. En el sector de Pindus, la División Julia lanzó cinco columnas con el objetivo de capturar Metsovo y aislar a las fuerzas griegas en el sector de Epiro desde el este. [120] Con el inicio de la ofensiva italiana, Papagos, hasta entonces Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército Helénico , fue nombrado comandante en jefe del Cuartel General recién establecido. El Estado Mayor del Ejército, que funcionó como el principal estado mayor de campo durante la guerra, fue entregado al teniente general Konstantinos Pallis , retirado del retiro. [122] Con la neutralidad búlgara asegurada, siguiendo los términos del Pacto de los Balcanes de 1935, los turcos amenazaron con intervenir del lado de Grecia si los búlgaros atacaban Grecia, el alto mando griego era libre de lanzar la mayor parte de su ejército contra las fuerzas italianas en Albania. . [123] Casi la mitad de las fuerzas asignadas al frente búlgaro (13ª y 17ª Divisiones, 16ª Brigada de Infantería) y la totalidad de la reserva general ( I Cuerpo de Ejército con 2ª, 3ª y 4ª Divisiones de Infantería, así como la 5ª de Infantería de Creta División y División de Caballería ) se dirigieron al frente de Albania. [124]
Epiro y sectores costeros
En el sector de Epiro, Katsimitros había dejado cinco batallones a lo largo de la frontera para retrasar el avance italiano, e instaló su principal línea de resistencia en un frente convexo con el paso de Kalpaki en el centro, tripulado por nueve batallones. Otros dos batallones al mando del general de división Nikolaos Lioumbas se hicieron cargo del sector costero en Thesprotia . Los pantanos del río Kalamas, especialmente antes de Kalpaki, constituían un obstáculo importante no solo para las formaciones blindadas, sino incluso para el movimiento de la infantería. Un batallón más y algo de artillería se destacó en el área de Preveza en caso de un desembarco italiano, pero como esto no se materializó, se trasladaron rápidamente para reforzar el sector costero. [125] En la noche del 29/30 de octubre, las unidades de cobertura griegas se habían retirado a la línea Kalpaki, y el 1 de noviembre, las unidades italianas hicieron contacto con la línea griega. Durante estos tres días, los italianos prepararon su asalto, bombardeando las posiciones griegas con aviones y artillería. Mientras tanto, la creciente amenaza italiana en el sector de Pindus obligó a Papagos a cablegrafiar a Katsimitros diciéndole que su misión principal era cubrir los pasos de Pindus y los flancos de las fuerzas griegas en Macedonia occidental, y evitar ofrecer resistencia si dejaba mermadas sus fuerzas. Sin embargo, Katsimitros ya había decidido defender su línea e ignoró estas instrucciones, pero separó algunas fuerzas para cubrir su derecha a lo largo del río Aoös . [126] El 1 de noviembre, los italianos lograron capturar Konitsa y el Comando Supremo dio prioridad al frente albanés sobre África. [127]
El asalto anfibio italiano programado sobre Corfú no se materializó debido al mal tiempo. El comandante de la marina italiana, el almirante Domenico Cavagnari , pospuso el desembarco hasta el 2 de noviembre, pero en ese momento Visconti Prasca exigía refuerzos con urgencia, y Mussolini ordenó que la 47.a División de Infantería de Bari , destinada a la operación, fuera enviada a Albania. [128] Mussolini propuso un desembarco en Preveza el 3 de noviembre para romper el impasse emergente, pero la propuesta se encontró con la negativa inmediata y categórica de los jefes de servicio. [129]
The main Italian attack on the Kalpaki front began on 2 November. An Albanian battalion, under the cover of a snowstorm, managed to capture the Grabala heights, but were thrown back by a counterattack on the next day. On the same day, an attack spearheaded by 50–60 tanks against the main Kalpaki sector was also repulsed. The Greek units east of the Kalamas were withdrawn during the night. On 5–7 November, repeated assaults were launched against the Grabala and other heights; on the night of the 7th, Grabala briefly fell once more, but was swiftly recaptured. On 8 November, the Italians began withdrawing and assuming defensive positions until the arrival of reinforcements.[130] On the coastal sector, the Italians made better progress. The Greek covering units were forced south of the Kalamas already on the first day, but the bad state of the roads delayed the Italian advance. On the night of 4/5 November, the Italians crossed the river and broke through the defences of the local Greek battalion, forcing Lioumbas to order his forces to withdraw south of the Acheron River. Igoumenitsa was captured on 6 November, and on the next day, the Italians reached Margariti. This marked their deepest advance, as the Thesprotia Sector began receiving reinforcements from Katsimitros, and as on the other sectors the situation had already turned to the Greeks' favour.[131]
As evidence of the Italian offensive's failure mounted, on 8 November, Visconti Prasca was relieved of overall command in Albania and relegated to command the Italian forces in the Epirus front, while General Ubaldo Soddu, State Undersecretary of War, assumed his place. Soddu's report from Albania underlined Greek resistance in Epirus and the mounting threat of the Greek concentration in western Macedonia, and recommended taking up defensive positions "while awaiting the reinforcements that would permit us to resume action as soon as possible". Mussolini consented.[132] With the Italians on the defensive, 8th Division began launching local counterattacks to regain the lost ground. By 13 November, the Greek forces once again stood at the Kalamas river along its entire length. On 12 November, I Army Corps under Lieutenant-General Panagiotis Demestichas took over the Epirus sector. 8th Division was subordinated to it, while the coastal sector was placed under the independent Lioumbas Detachment.[124][133]
Pindus sector
A greater threat to the Greek positions was posed by the advance of the Julia Alpine Division, under Mario Girotti, over the Pindus Mountains towards Metsovo, which threatened to separate the Greek forces in Epirus from those in Macedonia. The opposing Greek force, the Pindus Detachment, numbered 2,000 men, was formed of reservists of the 51st Regiment, mobilized on 29 August, while one of its three battalions (III/51) was formed as late as 15 October and was still on its way to the front. Colonel Davakis and his men had to cover a front some 37 km in width, and moreover over extremely broken terrain.[134] The Italian attack began under torrential rainfall and made rapid progress, forcing the Greeks to abandon their forward posts, especially in the Detachment's central sector. Davakis was forced to deploy the companies of the III/51 Battalion piecemeal as soon as they arrived, leaving himself with no reserves.[135]
The situation worried the TSDM, which began sending whatever reinforcements it could muster, and assigned the Pindus sector to the 1st Infantry Division. Despite the onset of snowfall on the 29th, the Julia Division continued pressing its attack on the Greek centre and left during 29–30 October, forcing the Greeks to withdraw towards Samarina.[136] From 30 October, however, the Greeks managed to stabilize the situation. Command in the Pindus sector passed to 1st Division and Major-General Vasileios Vrachnos, while additional forces—the Cavalry Division, 5th Brigade, and he newly formed Cavalry Brigade—were deployed on the flanks of the Italian salient and in the rear to secure the vital passes.[137]
After covering 25 miles (40 km) of mountain terrain in icy rain, the Julia Division captured the village of Vovousa, on 2 November, but failed to reach its primary objective; Metsovo, 19 miles (30 km) south. That same day, Davakis was gravely wounded during a reconnaissance mission near Fourka.[138] However, it had become clear to the Italians that they lacked the manpower and the supplies to continue in the face of the arriving Greek reserves.[139][139] On 3 November, the Italian spearhead was surrounded from all sides. The commander of the Julia Division requested from the Italian headquarters relief attacks and Italian reserves were thrown into the battle. Thus, Visconti Prasca sent forward the Bari Division to its aid, but it was unable to reach the cut-off Italian forces. In the meantime, the assistance of the local civilians, including men, women, and children, to the Greek forces proved invaluable.[140] As a result of the Greek pressure the Julia Division was virtually wiped out,[141] while the villages previously taken by the Italians were recaptured on 3 and 4 November.[142] Within less than a week, the remaining Italian troops in this sector were in roughly the same positions they occupied before the declaration of the war.[141] By 13 November the Greek forces had completed the re-occupation of the Grammos and Smolikas mountain ranges.[143] On the same day, Visconti Prasca was relieved and recalled to Italy.[144]
Greek counter-offensive (14 November 1940 – 6 January 1941)
By 14 November, the Italian forces in Albania had been reorganized in two field armies: the Ninth Army, formed out of the XXVI Corps in the Korçë sector, comprising five infantry and two Alpini divisions as well as a number of independent regiments, including Blackshirt and Albanian battalions; and the Eleventh Army (former XXV Corps) on the Epirus sector, with three infantry, an armoured, and a cavalry division, as well as a number of independent units.[145] The Italian situation was very difficult, as the troops on the front had been fighting non-stop for three weeks and were exhausted. The supply situation was abysmal, with the army lacking lorries, horses, and mules; the limited capacity of Albania's two main ports, Valona and Durrës, created a bottleneck for supplies and reinforcements, while the airlift initiated between Italy and Tirana—which consumed all of the Italian Air Force's transport capacity to the detriment of Africa—could transport troops, but not heavy equipment.[146] The Greek order of battle on 14 November consisted of Lieutenant-General Demestichas' I Corps on the coastal sector (2nd, 8th, and the Cavalry Divisions, and the Lioumbas Detachment), Lieutenant-General Papadopoulos' II Corps in the Pindus sector (1st Infantry Division, 5th Brigade and the Cavalry Brigade), and Lieutenant-General Tsolakoglou's III Corps in western Macedonia (9th, 10th, 15th Infantry Divisions, with 11th Division assembling in its rear). The latter two corps were under the command of TSDM, led by Lieutenant-General Pitsikas. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 16th Brigade, were kept in reserve.[145][147] By 12 November, Papagos had over 100 infantry battalions on familiar terrain against fewer than fifty Italian battalions.[139]
Fall of Korçë (14–23 November)
From the first days of November, III Corps had undertaken limited advances into Albanian territory, and already on 6 November, it submitted plans for a general offensive. Judged too ambitious for the moment, Papagos postponed the offensive for 14 November.[148] III Corps' main objective was the capture of the Korçë plateau, which controlled access to the interior of Albania along the valley of the Devoll river. The plateau lay behind the Morava and Ivan mountains on the Greco-Albanian frontier, which were held by the 29th Piemonte, the 19th Venezia, and the 49th Parma divisions. The Italians were later reinforced by the 2nd Alpine Division Tridentina, the 53rd Arezzo Division, and 30–50 tanks of the Centauro Division.[148] Leaving five battalions to secure its rear, III Corps attacked with twenty battalions and 37 artillery batteries. Due to the lack of tanks or anti-tank weapons to counter Italian armour, the Greeks decided to limit their movement along the mountain ridges, never descending to the valleys. The offensive was launched on the morning of 14 November, with the corps' three divisions moving on converging lines of attack towards Korçë. To achieve surprise, the attack was not preceded by an artillery barrage.[148]
The Italian forces were indeed taken by surprise, allowing the Greeks to force several breaches in the Italian positions on 14–16 November.[149] On 17 November, III Corps was reinforced with 13th Division, and on the next day, with 11th Division, which along with the 10th Division formed a new command, the "K" Group of Divisions or OMK (Lieutenant-General Georgios Kosmas).[150] The most critical moment for the Greeks came on 18 November, when elements of the 13th Division panicked during an ill-coordinated attack and the division almost retreated; its commander was sacked on the spot and the new commander, Major-General Sotirios Moutousis, forbade any further retreat, restoring the front.[151] On 19–21 November, the Greeks captured the summit of Morava. Fearing that they would be surrounded and cut off, the Italians retreated towards the Devoll valley during the night, and on 22 November the city of Korçë was captured by 9th Division.[152][151] By 27 November, TSDM had captured the entire Korçë plateau, suffering 624 dead and 2,348 wounded.[151] Further south and west, I and II Corps had moved to evict the Italians from Greek territory, which they achieved by 23 November. II Corps further moved across the border line, capturing Ersekë on 21 November and Leskovik on the next day.[148][153] On 23 November, bowing to pressure from Badoglio and Roatta, Mussolini finally reversed his early October order for demobilization.[154]
Greek offensive towards Valona (23 November – December 1940)
Following the capture of Korçë and the eviction of the Italian forces from Greek soil, the Greek GHQ faced two options: continue the offensive in the Korçë sector in the direction of Elbasan or shift focus on the left flank and drive towards the port of Valona.[151] The latter was chosen, as the capture of Valona would be of great strategic significance, leaving the Italians with only Durrës as an entrepôt.[155][156] TSDM, comprising III Corps and OMK, would defend their positions on the Greek right and apply pressure, while I Corps would move north along the Gjirokastër–Tepelenë–Valona axis. II Corps would form the pivot of the movement, securing the connection between I Corps and TSDM, advancing in step with its western neighbour in the direction of Berat. I Corps was reinforced with 3rd Division (21 November) and II Corps with 11th Division (27 November) and the Cavalry Division (28 November).[151]
Mussolini's speech in Palazzo Venezia, 18 November 1940[157][158]
Between 24 and 30 November, I Corps moved north into Albania along the Drinos river, while II Corps moved in the direction of Frashër, which it captured in early December.[159] TSDM continued to apply pressure against the Italians and the 10th Division captured Moscopole on 24 November. Pogradec was captured unopposed by the 13th Division on 30 November.[160] The continued Greek advance caused another crisis in the Italian hierarchy. The news of the fall of Pogradec and the pessimistic reports of the Italian commanders in Albania reportedly caused Mussolini to consider asking for a truce through the Germans but in the end he recovered his nerve and ordered Soddu to hold fast. The Greeks would be worn out, since they had "... no war industry and can only count on supplies from Great Britain".[161] Mussolini, encouraged by the hardline Fascist Party secretary Roberto Farinacci, sacked Badoglio on 4 December and replaced him with Ugo Cavallero as Chief of the General Staff. The resignation of the governor of the Italian Dodecanese, Cesare Maria De Vecchi and Admiral Cavagnari, followed within a few days.[162]
I Corps captured Delvinë on 5 December and Gjirokastër on 8 December; the Lioumbas Detachment captured Sarandë— renamed Porto Edda after Edda Mussolini—on 6 December. Further east, the 2nd Division captured the Suhë Pass after a fierce struggle from 1–4 December, while 8th Division launched repeated attacks on the heights around the Kakavia Pass, forcing the Italians to withdraw on the night of 4/5 December. The division had suffered considerable losses but took over 1,500 prisoners, several artillery pieces and thirty tanks.[163] In the TSDM sector, Lieutenant-General Kosmas (in command of the K Group, essentially the 10th Division) captured the Ostravicë Mountain on 12 December, while III Corps—since 1 December reinforced with 17th Division, which replaced 13th Division—completed its occupation of the Kamia massif and secured Pogradec.[163]
On 2 December, Papagos, and Crown Prince Paul, visited the front. Pitsikas and Tsolakoglou urged him to order an immediate attack on the strategic Klisura Pass, without waiting for I and II Corps to level with TSDM. Papagos refused and ordered the plan to continue, with III Corps relegated to a passive role. (This decision was later criticized, coupled with the onset of winter, it immobilised the Greek right wing.[153] Despite the atrocious weather and the heavy snowfall, the Greek offensive continued on the left throughout December. I Corps, now comprising 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions (8th Division and the Lioumbas Detachment were moved back into reserve) captured Himarë on 22 December. II Corps, moving between the Aöos and the Apsos rivers, reached the vicinity of Klisura, but failed to capture the pass. To its right, the V Army Corps (the former K Group but still comprising only the 10th Division) managed to advance up to Mount Tomorr and secure the connection between II and III Corps, which remained in their positions.[164]
End of the Greek offensive (6 January – 6 April 1941)
On 28 December 1940, the Greek GHQ took the decision to halt large-scale offensive operations in view of the stiffening Italian resistance, the worsening supply situation and the bad weather, which inter alia led to a large number of frostbite casualties. This decision took effect on 6 January, whereby only local offensive operations would take place to improve Greek lines until the weather improved.[165] The Italians had eleven infantry divisions, (11th Infantry Division Brennero, 29th Infantry Division Piemonte, 19th Infantry Division Venezia, 23rd Infantry Division Ferrara, 33rd Mountain Division Acqui, 37th Mountain Division Modena, 48th Infantry Division Taro, 49th Infantry Division Parma, 51st Siena, 53rd Arezzo and 56th Casale) and four Alpini divisions (2nd Tridentina, 3rd Julia, 4th Cuneense, and 5th Alpine Division Pusteria) and the Centauro Armoured Division, with the 6th Infantry Division Cuneo and the 7th Infantry Division Lupi di Toscana moving to the front. There were also two independent Bersaglieri regiments, a grenadier regiment, two cavalry regiments, Blackshirt and Albanian battalions and other units. According to official Italian documents, on 1 January 1941, Italy had 10,616 officers, 261,850 men, 7,563 vehicles, and 32,871 animals in Albania.[166] This strengthening of the Italian position prompted Cavallero, who after Soddu's recall on 29 December combined his post as Chief of the General Staff with the overall command in Albania, to pronounce that the "period of crisis [was] almost overcome" and to begin planning for an attack aiming to recapture Korçë in early February.[167]
Struggle for Klisura Pass and Tepelenë
The main operation envisaged by the Greek GHQ was the capture of the Klisura Pass by II Corps, coupled with minor offensives by I Corps and TSDM to improve their positions. II Corps attacked on 8 January, with 1st Division on the left and 15th Division, followed by the 11th Division, on the right flank. The 15th Division faced the Julia Division, and after a hard struggle managed to capture its positions in a costly success. The 11th Division followed up on 9 January next day captured the pass. The offensive forced Cavallero to deploy the reserves he had husbanded for the Korçë offensive, which never took place.[166] The newly arrived Lupi di Toscana division was routed.[f] The division went into action on 9 January to support the Julia Division, after a 24-hour forced march in horrendous weather, without having time to reconnoitre the front, without maps and without coordinating fire support with the Julia Division. The commander and the chief of staff failed to coordinate its two regiments, which became entangled on the same mule track. Despite attacking downhill and facing a numerically inferior enemy, the division lost a battalion to encirclement and were driven back to their starting positions after two days. By 16 January, the division had disintegrated and "ceased to exist as an organized force", with only 160 officers and men immediately available and over 4,000 casualties.[168] On 26 January, the Italians counter-attacked to recover the pass but II Corps, reinforced with 5th Division, managed to repel them and then counter-attacked. In the Battle of Trebeshina, a series of engagements from 2–12 February, the Trebeshinë massif was captured.[166] The capture of the strategic Klisura pass by the Greek army was considered a major success by the Allied forces, with the Commander of the British forces in the Middle East, Archibald Wavell, sending a congratulatory message to Alexander Papagos.[169]
As the threat of a German invasion from Bulgaria increased, the need to transfer Greek divisions to the Bulgarian frontier forced Papagos to launch a final effort to capture Valona as quickly as possible. The RAF agreed to challenge the air superiority of the Regia Aeronautica, which had recovered with the loss of much of the RHAF in ground-attack operations, rather than continue ineffective attempts at interdiction. With reinforcements from Egypt and the drying of a landing-ground at Paramythia, the RAF managed 200 close support sorties by the end of February. Launched in mid-February, the attack saw I Corps gain ground towards Tepelenë; Italian resistance and a deterioration in the weather forced a suspension of operations before Tepelenë, let alone Valona or Berat, were reached. The Italian defensive success was costly, and signs of an imminent Italian offensive in the central sector of the front forced a return to the defensive.[170][171][172]
By early February 1941, the Greek Army was down to less than two months of artillery ammunition overall and had shortages in every area of material, while the Italians possessed ample reserves, endangering their position. The Greeks appealed to the United States for material aid, but the British ensured that they themselves got first priority for US production. Furthermore, there were shortages of materials and even food across the country. Continuing degradation of their logistical capability would soon mean the end of effective Greek resistance. British material and air support had been provided, but at this point it was "relatively small." Further British aid in March and April would only partially alleviate this problem.[173]
On 14 February, in view of GHQ's increasing concern with developments on the Bulgarian frontier, a new higher command, the Epirus Army Section (TSI), under Lieutenant-General Markos Drakos, was formed, comprising I and II Corps.[166] Despite Greek success in Albania, dissension within the Greek leadership emerged over strategy towards the expected German attack and the need for a withdrawal in Albania. The front commanders in Albania represented their views to GHQ in Athens and in early March, Papagos moved to replace virtually the entire leadership in the Albanian front: Drakos, Kosmas and Papadopoulos, the commanders of TSI, I and II Corps respectively, were replaced by the TSDM commander Lieutenant-General Pitsikas, Lieutenant-General Demestichas and Major-General Georgios Bakos, TSDM being taken over by Tsolakoglou.[174]
Italian Spring Offensive
On 4 March, the British sent the first convoy of Operation Lustre with W Force (Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) and supplies for Greece.[175][g] The Italian leadership desired to achieve a success against the Greek army before the impending German intervention and reinforced the Albanian front to 28 divisions with an average of 26 serviceable bombers, 150 fighters, along with 134 bombers and 54 fighters of the 4° Squadra in Italy.[176] Cavallero planned an attack on a 32 km (20 mi) of the centre of the front, to recapture Klisura and advance towards Leskovik and Ioannina.[177] The attack would be carried out by the VIII Army Corps (59th Cagliari, 38th Puglie and 24th Pinerolo divisions), XXV Corps' Sforzesca Division, the 47th Bari, 51st Siena, and 7th Lupi di Toscana divisions as a second echelon, and the Centauro and Piemonte divisions as general reserves.[178] The Greek units opposite them were II Corps (17th, 5th, 1st, 15th, and 11th Divisions), with three regiments as TSI's general reserve, and 4th Division providing reinforcement. II Corps continued limited offensive action as late as 8 March to improve its positions.[178]
The Italian attack, watched by Mussolini, began on 9 March, with a heavy artillery barrage and air bombardment; on the main sector, held by the Greek 1st Division, over 100,000 shells were dropped on a 6 km (3.7 mi) front. Despite repeated assaults and heavy shelling, the positions of 1st Division held during 9–10 March. A flanking manoeuvre on 11 March ended in Italian defeat. The exhausted Puglie Division was withdrawn and replaced with the Bari Division during the subsequent night, but all attacks until 15 March failed.[178] The Italian offensive halted on 16–18 March, allowing the Greeks to bring reserves forward and begin a gradual reshuffle their line, relieving the 1st Division with the 17th. The Italian offensive resumed on 19 March with another attack on Height 731 (the 18th thus far). Attacks, preceded by heavy artillery bombardments, followed daily until 24 March, the last day of the Italian offensive, without achieving any result.[179] Mussolini admitted that the result of the Italian offensive was zero.[180][181][182][183] Italian casualties amounted to over 11,800 dead and wounded, while the Greeks suffered 1,243 dead, 4,016 wounded and 42 missing in action.[179]
Greek logistical situation in early 1941
Although it failed, the Italian Spring Offensive revealed a "chronic shortage of arms and equipment" in the Greek Army. Even with British support, the Greeks were fast approaching the end of their logistical tether. British intelligence estimated that Greece's reserves, although numbering 200,000–300,000 partly-trained men on paper, could not be mobilized for lack of arms and equipment, which were being consumed by the Albanian front.[184] By the end of March 1941, the Greek Army as a whole possessed only a single month's supply of 105mm, 85mm, and 155mm artillery ammunition. Requests were sent to London after the Italian Spring Offensive for 5 million 75mm, 200,000 105mm, 120,000 85mm, 120,000 125mm, and 75,000 155mm shells, as well as 41 million rifle rounds. The British had already supplied, among other goods, 40 million 7.92 rounds and 150 mortars (50 51mm and 100 76mm) the previous month, but had not yet fulfilled the Greeks' mid-January request of 300,000 uniforms and sets of shoes.[185]
Worse, while the Italians still had reserves of men and materiel, the Greek defences of Macedonia and Thrace, which would face the German attack, were left undermanned and underequipped due to the demands of the Albanian front.[186] The Eastern Macedonia Army Section (TSAM), which manned the Metaxas Line, was left with only 70,000 men to defend against any potential German advance, though plans called for the fortifications to be held by 200,000 men. Furthermore, by the end of February TSAM was left with only 100 artillery pieces. British planners disagreed with the Greek plan to hold on to the Metaxas Line, as well as the insistence of not ceding a single bit of ground to the Italians, noting that the Greek forces—"a small force" spread over "an impossibly long front"—were insufficient to prevent or resist a German breakthrough.[187] The Central Macedonia Army Section (TSKM), which manned the Yugoslav border, was even weaker: its three divisions were recently raised from reserves and possessed no anti-air weaponry, anti-tank weaponry, armored vehicles, or almost any motor vehicles. They had few automatic weapons and faced even shortages of basic supplies such as tents and helmets.[188] 14 out of the 20 available divisions of the Greek army were facing the Italians on the Albanian front as part of the Epirus Army Section, totaling 33 regiments.[189]
In an effort to keep Greece in the fight, British aid drastically stepped up in March and April, which included uniforms, weapons, and ammunition of various types. Among other goods, the British sent the Greeks 200,000 boots, 50,000 helmets, 45 tons of uniform cloth, 23,000 tents, 1,009 cars/trucks, 104 light tanks and Universal Carriers, 2,000 cases of artillery fuses, 40,000 cases of artillery shells, 18,000 Italian 75mm shells, 200,000 Italian mortar shells, 600 cases of .303 ammunition, 5 million rounds of Italian rifle ammunition, 20,000 Italian rifles and machine guns, and extensive amounts of food, explosive materials, coiled wire, and other goods. However, the Greeks still did not consider this sufficient for successfully prosecuting the rest of the war. On 2 April, the Greek Prime Minister implored the British in a message to immediately supply 700,000 more shells and 30,000 more rifles. Even if the British could spare these stocks, they could not transport them to Greece in a timely manner.[190]
German invasion
With most of the Greek army on the Albanian border, Operation Marita began through Bulgaria on 6 April, which created a second front. Greece had received a small reinforcement from British forces based in Egypt in anticipation of the German attack, but no more help was sent after the invasion. The Greek army was outnumbered; the Bulgarian defensive line did not receive adequate troop reinforcements and was quickly overrun. The Germans outflanked the immobile Greek forces on the Albanian border, forcing the surrender of the Eastern Macedonia Field Army section in only four days. The British Empire forces began a retreat. For several days Allied troops contained the German advance on the Thermopylae position, allowing ships to be prepared to evacuate the British force. The Germans reached Athens on 27 April and the southern shore on 30 April, capturing 7,000 British troops. The conquest of Greece was completed with the capture of Crete a month later and Greece was occupied by the military forces of Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria until late 1944.[191]
On 6 April, Papagos ordered TSDM to launch an attack towards Elbasan, in conjunction with Yugoslav forces. The attack began on 7 April and the 13th Division made some progress, but the Yugoslav army, attacked by the Germans, rapidly collapsed and the operation was cancelled.[192] On 12 April, GHQ in Athens ordered the Greek forces on the Albanian front to retreat but the decision was too late.[193] The Greek commanders knew that Italian pressure, the lack of motor transport and pack animals, the physical exhaustion of the Greek army, and the poor transport network of Epirus meant that any retreat was likely to end in disintegration. Advice to retreat before the start of the German attack had been rejected and they petitioned Pitsikas to surrender. Pitsikas forbade such talk, but notified Papagos and urged a solution that would secure "the salvation and honour of our victorious Army".[194][195] The order to retreat, the disheartening news of the Yugoslav collapse, and the rapid German advance in Macedonia led to a breakdown of morale in the Greek troops, many of whom had been fighting without rest for five months and were forced to abandon hard-won ground. By 15 April, the divisions of II Army Corps, beginning with the 5th Division, began to disintegrate, with men and even entire units abandoning their positions.[194][196][197]
On 16 April, Pitsikas reported to Papagos that signs of disintegration had also begun to appear among the divisions of I Corps and begged him to "save the army from the Italians" by allowing it to capitulate to the Germans, before the military situation collapsed completely. On the following day TSDM was renamed III Army Corps and placed under Pitsikas' command. The three corps commanders, along with the metropolitan bishop of Ioannina, Spyridon, pressured Pitsikas to unilaterally negotiate with the Germans.[196][198][199] When he refused, the others decided to bypass him and selected Tsolakoglou, as the senior of the three generals, to carry out the task. Tsolakoglou delayed for a few days, sending his chief of staff to Athens to secure permission from Papagos. The chief of staff reported the chaos in Athens and urged his commander to take the initiative in a message that implied permission by Papagos, although this was not in fact the case. On 20 April, Tsolakoglou contacted Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the nearest German unit, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) brigade, to offer surrender. The protocol of surrender was signed by Tsolakoglou and Dietrich at 18:00 on the same day. Presented with the fait accompli an hour later, Pitsikas resigned his command.[200][201][202]
Campaña marítima y aérea
Thoroughly outclassed by the far larger and more modern Italian Regia Marina, the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was unable to attempt a direct naval confrontation. Its role was rather limited to patrol and convoy escort duties, a particularly important task given the general inadequacy of the Greek transport network on land; apart from large quantities of matériel, c. 80,000 mobilized men and over 100,000 animals were moved by sea during the war.[203] The RHN carried out limited operations against Italian shipping in the Strait of Otranto with submarines (losing one vessel), sinking at least 23,000 long tons (23,000 t) of transport and merchant shipping, but lack of maintenance facilities made it impossible to continue the effort.[204] However, the Greek submarine force was too small to be able to seriously hinder the supply lines between Italy and Albania; between 28 October 1940 and 30 April 1941 Italian ships made 3,305 voyages across the Otranto straits, carrying 487,089 military personnel (including 22 field divisions) and 584,392 tons of supplies while losing overall only seven merchant ships and one escort ship.[205] Destroyers carried out bold but fruitless night raids on 14 November 1940, 15 December and 4 January 1941.
The British fought the Battle of the Strait of Otranto on 12 November acting as a decoy force and the Regia Marina had half of its capital ships put out of action by the British Royal Navy (RN) during the Battle of Taranto (11–12 November) but Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to escort convoys between Italy and Albania. On 28 November, an Italian squadron bombarded Corfu and on 18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania. From January 1941, the main task of the RHN was to escort the convoys of Operation Excess to and from Alexandria, in co-operation with the RN. As the convoys transporting Lustre Force began in early March, the Italian Fleet sortied against them and the British were forewarned by Ultra decrypts. The Mediterranean Fleet intercepted the Italians at the Battle of Cape Matapan on 28 March and sank three cruisers and two destroyers, the greatest Italian naval defeat at sea of the war.[206]
Air operations
Regia Aeronautica
The poor infrastructure in Albania air bases hindered communications and movements between the Italian flying units. Only two airfields – Tirana and Valona – had Macadam runways so Autumn and Winter weather made operations more difficult. There was also the usual lack of co-operation with Italian Navy and Army.[207] Two days after the start of the war, on 30 October, there was the first air battle. Some Henschel Hs126s of 3/2 Flight of 3 Observation Mira took off to locate Italian Army columns. But they were intercepted and attacked by Fiat CR.42s of 393a Squadriglia. A first Henschel was hit and crashed, killing its observer, Pilot Officer Evanghelos Giannaris, the first Greek aviator to die in the war. A second Hs 126 was downed over Mount Smolikas, killing Pilot Officer Lazaros Papamichail and Sergeant Constantine Yemenetzis.[208]
Royal Hellenic Air Force
On 2 November, a squadron of 15 Italian CANT Z.1007 bombers, with Fiat CR.42 fighter escorts headed towards Thessaloniki and was intercepted by Greek PZL P.24 fighters of the 22nd Squadron. Second Lieutenant Marinos Mitralexis shot down one bomber and being out of ammunition, aimed the nose of his PZL P. 24 at the tail of a bomber, smashed the rudder and sent the bomber out of control.[209] The news of Mitralexis' feat quickly spread throughout Greece and boosted morale.[210] On 2 December, the 21st Pursuit Squadron re-equipped with 14 ex-RAF Gladiators.[211]
RAF
Ultra decrypts of orders to the Regia Aeronautica and nightly reports from 4° Zona Aerea Territoriale in Italy to Comando Aeronautico Albania della Regia Aeronautica in Tirana, disclosed bombing targets for the next day and were sent to RAF HQ in Greece, to assist in fighter interception.[212] From mid-November to the end of December, the Blenheim and Wellington bombers from Egypt flew 235 sorties but almost 1⁄3 failed, due to a lack of all-weather airfields and the season, when flying was possible for about 15 days per month.[213][214] The bombing effort was concentrated on Durazzo and Valona but some close support operations were carried out and the fighters near Athens helped to reduce the number of Italian raids. By the end of 1940, the Gladiator pilots had claimed 42 aircraft shot down for the loss of six, which established a measure of air superiority over the Pindus mountains. In January 1941, 11 Squadron and 112 Squadron were sent to Greece despite being at half strength. 33 Squadron, 113 Squadron (Blenheims) and 208 Squadron (Lysanders and Hurricanes) moved in March.[215]
The British fighters were able to prevent most Italian air operations after mid-February, when the Greek army made a maximum effort to capture Valona. The RAF managed fifty sorties on 13 and 14 February; Gladiators and Hurricanes intercepted a raid by fifty Italian aircraft on 28 February, the RAF claiming 27 aircraft for the loss of one. When the Greek advance was slowed by more bad weather and Italian reinforcements, the RAF returned to attacks on airfields and ports. On the eve of the German invasion in April, the RAF had claimed 93 Italian aircraft confirmed and 26 probables, for a loss of four pilots and ten aircraft.[214] RAF Greece had been increased to nine squadrons and two Wellington detachments of about 200 aircraft, of which only 80 were serviceable, in support of about 100 Greek and Yugoslav aircraft.[216] RAF losses in the Greek campaign were 163 men killed, missing or prisoner (150 aircrew) and 209 aircraft, 72 in the air, 55 on the ground and 82 destroyed or abandoned during the evacuation.[217]
Frente de casa
Greece
The war was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Greek population, in Athens crowds filled the streets with patriotic fervour, as newspapers hurried to publish their newest editions to stir up the people further. The popular story that Metaxas had defiantly told Grazzi "ochi!" ("no!") on the night of 28 October 1940 made the previously unpopular prime minister into a national hero.[218] Georgios Vlachos in an editorial in his newspaper Kathimerini wrote: "Today there is no Greek who does not add his voice to the thunderous OCHI. OCHI, we will not hand over Greece to Italy. OCHI, Italian ruffiani will not set foot on our land. OCHI, the barbarians will not desecrate our Parthenon".[218] He also wrote his famous article "The dagger" (To stileto).
Men in Greece rushed to volunteer for the war effort, cramming into the back of trams to get to the recruiting offices. Morale amongst the troops was as high as it could get with a universal feeling that Greece must fight, with few entertaining the idea of failure. This enthusiasm was not shared by some of the political leadership, there was a sense that Greece would lose the war but needed to fight nonetheless, Metaxas stated in a letter to Winston Churchill that "The war we confront today is thus solely a war of honour" and that "The outcome of the world war will not be decided in the Balkans."[219]
The popularity of Metaxas' regime would also receive a boost, with Metaxas becoming a national hero overnight, with even many left-wing and liberal Greeks who opposed Metaxas showing admiration and support for him, flocking to the cause.[219]
Soon, with the first victories at the front, Greek artists started to write and sing patriotic and festive songs. The reputation of Sofia Vembo skyrocketed when her performance of patriotic and satirical songs became a major inspiration for the fighting soldiers as well as the people at large for whom she quickly became a folk heroine. Another satirical popular song named Koroido Mussolini (Mussolini fool) was written by Nikos Gounaris in the rhythm of "Reginella Campagnola", a popular Italian song of the era.
Italy
The announcement of the Italian attack was greeted with favour but not much enthusiasm, by the Italian public. The situation changed as the Italian attack devolved into a stalemate in early November, especially after the British Taranto raid and the start of the Greek counter-offensive.[220] In private conversations, Italians soon took to calling the war in Albania "a second and worse Caporetto".[221] The regime's popularity slumped further with the introduction of strict rationing in food, oil and fats in early December. Despite imposing a price freeze in July, prices rose and the state distribution network of staple foods and heating oil broke down. Coupled with the dismissal of Badoglio and the British advance in North Africa in Operation Compass, it produced "the regime's most serious crisis since the murder of Giacomo Matteotti in 1924" (MacGregor Knox).[222] In a move designed to bolster the Fascist Party's flagging standing, in mid-January 1941 Mussolini ordered the all senior gerarchi and officials under 45 years, to go to the Albanian front (much to their displeasure). According to Dino Grandi at least, this move caused much resentment against Mussolini among the Party leadership that simmered underground and resulted in his dismissal in July 1943.[223]
On the other hand, the Greek historian Zacharias Tsirpanlis observes that while post-war Italian accounts confirm the view that "due to the Greek success Italian public opinion slowly turned against the Fascist regime, marking the beginning of the end for Mussolini", this did not yet materialize in any form of active resistance, including in the front itself. While a cynicism towards the Fascist regime and its symbols and leaders had set in, incidents of insubordination remained isolated. Indeed, according to the eyewitness account of Air Force chief Francesco Pricolo, when Mussolini made an unannounced visit to the front on 2 March 1941, the Duce was himself surprised by the enthusiasm with which he was greeted, having expected open hostility from the soldiers.[224]
Albania
In an effort to win Albanian support for Italian rule, Ciano and the Fascist regime encouraged Albanian irredentism in the directions of Kosovo and Chameria.[225] Despite Jacomoni's assurances of Albanian support in view of the promised "liberation" of Chameria, Albanian enthusiasm for the war was distinctly lacking.[226] The few Albanian units raised to fight alongside the Italian Army mostly "either deserted or fled in droves". Albanian agents recruited before the war, are reported to have operated behind Greek lines and engaged in acts of sabotage but these were few in number.[227] Support for the Greeks, although of limited nature, came primarily from the local Greek populations who warmly welcomed the arrival of the Greek forces.[227] Despite official Greek proclamations that they were fighting for the liberation of Albania, Greek claims on Northern Epirus were well-known. Albanian suspicions were reinforced, when a new municipal council of eleven Greeks and four Albanians was appointed at Korçë, and when the military governor of Gjirokastër prohibited the celebration of the Albanian independence day on 28 November (his counterpart in Korçë allowed it to go ahead and was reprimanded). The Greek authorities even ignored offers of Albanian expatriates to enlist as volunteers against Italy. The Greek occupation regime followed the regulations of international law and the Albanian civil administration was left intact and continued to operate, including law courts. No atrocities were committed and the safes of the state bank were discovered unopened after the Greeks withdrew.[228]
Secuelas
Analysis
Impact on Barbarossa
Hitler blamed Mussolini's "Greek fiasco" for his failed campaign in Russia. "But for the difficulties created for us by the Italians and their idiotic campaign in Greece", he commented in mid-February 1945, "I should have attacked Russia a few weeks earlier," he later said. Hitler noted that, the "pointless campaign in Greece", Germany was not notified in advance of the impending attack, which "compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of our troops would have been quite unnecessary". "We have no luck with the Latin races", he complained afterwards. Mussolini took advantage of Hitler's preoccupation with Spain and France "to set in motion his disastrous campaign against Greece".[229] Andreas Hillgruber has accused Hitler of trying to deflect blame for his country's defeat from himself to his ally, Italy.[230]
Ian Kershaw wrote that the five-week delay in launching Operation Barbarossa, caused by the unusually wet weather in May 1941, was not decisive. For Kershaw, the reasons for the ultimate failure of Barbarossa lay in the arrogance of the German war goals, in particular the planning flaws and resource limitations that caused problems for the operation from the start. He adds that the German invasion into Greece in spring 1941 did not cause significant damage to tanks and other vehicles needed for Barbarossa, the equipment diverted to Greece being used on the southern flank of the attack on the Soviet Union.[231] Von Rintelen emphasizes that although the diversion of German resources into Greece just prior to the attack on the Soviet Union did little for the latter operation, Italy's invasion of Greece did not undermine Barbarossa before the operation started. Instead, Italy's invasion of Greece was to have serious consequences for its ongoing campaign in North Africa. Moreover, Italy would have been in a better position to execute its North African campaign had it initially occupied Tunis and Malta.[232]
Effect on Italy
In the preface to the collection of documents published in 1965 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the historian and diplomat Mario Toscano summed up the war as follows: "As we all know, the campaign against Greece ended in total failure. This was due, as the published material confirms, to Mussolini’s conviction, based on indications he received from his colleagues, that the campaign would be decided in the political rather than the military sector. The consequences of this error were so serious as to bring about Italy’s complete subjection to Germany as far as the political and military direction of the war was concerned."[233] This has been echoed by other writers since: Gann and Duignan regarded that the fighting in France, Yugoslavia and Greece reduced Italy to the status of a [German] satellite,[234] while Ian Kershaw considers that the Greek failure, the Battle of Taranto (11–12 November 1940) and the loss of Cyrenaica (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941) served to end Italian aspirations to great power status. [235]
Other authors have been critical of the Italian leadership's handling of the operation. Jowett wrote in 2000 that Mussolini's "quick and relatively easy victory" turned to defeat and stalemate, which exposed the incompetence of the Fascist government and its war machine. Italian soldiers suffered great hardship in the Albanian mountains, "due to the incompetence and unforgivably bad planning of their leaders".[236] In 2008, Paoletti wrote that the Italian army fought in difficult terrain, was short of clothing and equipment and units were split up as they arrived and used piecemeal. Mussolini was guilty of "criminal improvidence", in causing the great number casualties of the Italian army. The German invasion "went smoothly, because the Greek army was concentrated against the Italians".[237] In 2009, Mazower wrote that the Italian invasion of Greece was a disaster and the "first Axis setback" of the war. Mussolini had sent 140,000 poorly-equipped troops to attack Greece, over some of the worst mountain country in Europe, at the beginning of winter. The Greeks repulsed the invasion, to the surprise of enemies and Allies alike, an event made worse for the Fascist regime because of the attack on Taranto and the disasters in Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia.[238]
Several military historians have blamed the poor performance of the Italian Army in Greece, as well as in France and North Africa, on "innate defects" that had been evident already during World War I but were consistently ignored due to institutional indifference. The Italian military historian Lucio Ceva remarks that the Italian military was largely unable to learn from its failures or from the enemies it faced; as military historian Brian R. Sullivan points out, it took several decades before the historical office of the Italian General Staff published studies on Italian reverses like Caporetto or Guadalajara. Sullivan also demonstrates that the deficiencies in doctrine, training, leadership, organization and logistics that were apparent during the Spanish Civil War were simply ignored.[239] A typical example is the testing in Spain of the new binary divisions; although they proved "too weak against opponents better armed than the Ethiopians and [...] too inflexible in maneuver", so that the Italian divisions in Spain reverted to the traditional triangular pattern in November 1937, in the very same month, Army chief of staff Pariani insisted on pressing on with the reorganization as the greater number of divisions resulting from it "would give Fascist Italy the appearance of greater military power".[240] The diversion of large quantities of material and funds to the Spanish intervention also impacted the Italian Army negatively: according to the official Italian history of the conflict, the material left in or donated to Spain would have sufficed to provide for 55 fully equipped divisions in June 1940, rather than the 19 fully and 34 partially equipped ones in reality.[241]
According to James Sadkovich, the effect of the Italo-Greek war has been exaggerated by other authors, because Axis victories in the spring of 1941 cancelled the Italian defeats of the previous winter. However, even he admits the adverse effect that the start of the Greek campaign had on Italy's war already under way in North Africa. Between October 1940 and May 1941, five times as many men, one and a third times as much matériel, three and a half times more merchant ships and at least twice the amount of escort vessels were deployed on the Greek operation as in North Africa.[242] As a result, the initial numerical superiority that the Italians enjoyed over the British in the region, was not to last. Graziani deferred his advance, aware that Italian strength was insufficient to mount the major offensive through Egypt that Mussolini was urging and expecting. The Germans saw the importance of the sector and offered troops and equipment. The Comando Supremo wanted to take advantage of the offer. It could have made the difference but Mussolini refused.[243]
Impact on Greece
Anti-Italian feeling among the Greek public, already strong, reached its peak after the sinking of "Elli" on 15 August 1940, the day of the Dormition of the Mother of God, a major Orthodox religious holiday.[244][h] Greek optimism that the Italian attack would fail was evident from the first moments of the war. Besides, official propaganda, as well as the spontaneous reaction of the people created the optimism which was necessary for the first difficult moments. From the first hours of the war a strong national feeling was quite evident "to teach a lesson to the macaroni-boys" (Greek: Μακαρονάδες, "Makaronades"), as the Italians were pejoratively called.[244][i][245] Various factors have contributed to the high morale of the Greek side and the subsequent repulsion of the Italian attacks: the strong belief in a just cause, the specialized and well trained military personnel of the Greek army and its leadership, as well as the devotion of the civilian population who lived next to the battlefields, including women, children and the elderly, to the Greek cause.[246][j] Public opinion in Greece still accepts that the failure of the numerically superior Italian army came as a result of its unjustified action against Greece.[247][k]
After the Italian troops were driven from Greek soil, Greek morale was further strengthened.[248] The unpublished and unknown up to now documents (memoranda, letters, plans) of Ubaldo Soddu (who did not write memoirs), Commander of the Italian forces in Albania from 10 November to 30 December 1940, reveal the desperate efforts for control, the strict measures for unjustified retreats and abandonment of positions, the tragic appeal even for German help (on 24 November and 17 December). In his reports, Soddu analysed Greek offensive tactics and the bravery and the moral strength of the enemy, during this period from November–December, the Greeks used no new method of military tactics or quickly took advantage of the land left back by the Italian retreat. Mussolini, after the capture of Himara by the Greeks, wrote of the high morale that contributed to the victory of the enemy (24 December).[249] The Greek successes against Italy helped raise morale in Allied Europe and showed that the Axis were not invincible. Inspired by these military developments, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, declared that "today we say that Greeks fight like heroes, from now on we will say that heroes fight like Greeks".[250]
In 2007, Fisher wrote that although the advance of the Greek army stalled at January 1941, due to harsh winter conditions and Italian reinforcements, Greece had managed to secure a strong bridgehead in southern Albania (Northern Epirus to the Greeks). Thus, it not only delivered a humiliation to Mussolini, but also occupied an area inhabited by a substantial ethnic Greek population,
As the only active ally of Britain fighting in Europe, Greece, overcoming its comparative disadvantage, provided the first victory against the Axis forces ... Greek advances stalled in early January 1941, falling victim to the harsh winter and to Italian reinforcements. Nonetheless, the strong positioning of Greek forces in southern Albania provided not only humiliation for Mussolini but also an unexpected gain for Greece, which now occupied an area inhabited by many Greeks that had been relegated to Albanian rule after the First World War.
— Fisher[251]
The Greco-Italian War is viewed as a triumph in Greece and often referred to as "the Epic of 40" ("Το Έπος του '40") and 28 October, the day Metaxas rejected the Italian ultimatum, is a national holiday known as Ohi Day (Greek: Επέτειος του Όχι, "Anniversary of the 'No'").[251]
German opinion
The difficulty Italy encountered in subduing a minor power such as Greece further lowered the opinion among the Germans of their Italian allies. German SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich labeled the Albania campaign as one of the three "great disasters [that have] deprived the Italian Army of its former confidence", along with the Italian invasion of France and Operation Compass. He bitterly noted: "For this attack they used troops from Southern Italy- exactly what was needed for a winter campaign in mountainous country, without proper equipment, over an impracticable terrain, and without any organization in depth!".[252] Wilhelm Keitel, commenting about the end of the campaign, said that "this miserable spectacle, laid on by our gallant ally, must have produced some hollow laughter from the Greeks."[253]
Others among the German leadership were less critical, most notably Adolf Hitler. In his address to the Reichstag following the conclusion of the Balkan Campaign, Hitler was complimentary to the Greeks for their "extremely brave resistance", but stated that given the Greek logistical situation, German involvement was not decisive in the Greco-Italian conflict: "The Duce... was convinced that a quick decision would be arrived at one way or another in the forthcoming season. I was of the same opinion." He stated that he had no quarrel with Greece (which he had acknowledged as part of the Italian sphere anyway) and that his intervention was aimed solely at the British as he suspected that they planned to set up a threat to his rear in the vein of the Salonika Front of the First World War: "the German forces, therefore, represented no assistance to Italy against Greece, but a preventive measure against the British." He further noted that by the beginning of April the Albanian campaign against the Italians "had so weakened [Greece] that its collapse had already become inevitable", and credited the Italians with having "engaged the greater part of the Greek Army."[254] In his private correspondence in April 1942, Hitler said: "It is equally impossible to imagine what might have happened if the Italian front had not been stabilized in Albania, thanks to Mussolini; the whole of the Balkans would have been set alight at a moment when our advance towards the southeast was still in its early stages."[255]
Casualties
The Italian invasion began with a force of about 87,000 men and was increased to about 565,000 troops, supported by 463 aircraft and 163 light tanks.[256][257][258] Italian forces suffered casualties of 13,755 killed, 50,874 wounded and 25,067 missing (of whom 21,153 were taken prisoner), for a total of 89,696 losses in action and 52,108 sick, 12,368 frostbite cases for a grand total of 154,172 casualties. Eighteen ships of the Regia Marina were sunk. The Regia Aeronautica had 79 aircraft destroyed (65 shot down) and more than 400 damaged, with 229 aircrew killed, while claiming 218 kills against Greek and British and 55 probables.[259][260][261][262][263][258] Greek military forces amounted to fewer than 260,000 men with casualties of 13,325 killed, 42,485 wounded, 1,237 missing and 1,531 prisoners, for a total of 58,578 losses and c. 25,000 frostbite cases, a grand total of about 90,000 casualties. The RHAF lost between 52 and 77 aircraft.[258][264] (In Operation Marita, the Germans took 244,000 Yugoslav, 218,000 Greek and 9,000 British prisoners.)[265]
In January 2018, following an agreement between the Greek and Albanian foreign ministers, a systematic effort to recover the bodies of fallen Greek soldiers from the war was undertaken between Greece and Albania.[266][267][268] It is estimated that between 6,800 and 8,000 fallen Greek soldiers were hastily buried on location following their death, and their remains not properly identified.[267] Work by joint Greek-Albanian teams began on 22 January in the Kelcyre Gorge, site of the Battle of Kleisoura Pass. A small number of Cham Albanian activists tried to disrupt the work but were removed by Albanian police.[267] The remains of the Greek soldiers will be buried in the Greek military cemeteries in the Kelcyre Gorge and in the Greek minority village of Bularat (Vouliarates) near the Greek-Albanian border.[268]
Occupation of Greece
On 13 April, Hitler issued Directive 27, including his occupation policy for Greece and jurisdiction in the Balkans with Directive No. 31 (9 June). Italy occupied the bulk of the mainland, German forces occupied Athens, Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia and several Aegean islands, including most of Crete and Florina, subject of disputed claims by Italy and Bulgaria.[269] Bulgaria, which had not participated in the invasion, occupied most of Thrace on the same day that Tsolakoglou surrendered taking the territory between the Strymon river and a line through Alexandroupoli and Svilengrad west of the Evros River.[270] Italian troops took over their zone of occupation from 28 April to 12 June.[271]
Notas
- ^ Italian invasion of Greece
- ^ Greco-Italian armistice
- ^ a b While Greek divisions were larger in terms of men, both Italian and Greek divisions had 9 batteries of artillery per division
- ^ Hitler was originally content to simply let the Italians wear the Greeks down and (he predicted) finish the war in the summer of 1941
- ^ Greece originally surrendered to the Germans under the condition that they would not have to surrender to the Italian troops; this condition was agreed to but later revoked as Mussolini issued protests on the ground that the Albanian stalemate favored Germany's rapid and successful invasion.
- ^ Knox called the experience of the Lupi di Toscana Division an example of the failings of the Italian Army in Albania: "[r]ecently reconstituted after partial demobilization, it arrived without mules or motor transport, organic artillery, a full complement of headquarters and service troops, and communications equipment. Many of the troops were practically untrained".[168]
- ^ W Force consisted of the 1st Armoured Brigade and part of the 2nd Support Group of the 2nd Armoured Division, the 6th Australian Division, 7th Australian Division, New Zealand Division and the Independent Polish Brigade Group (the Polish brigade was not dispatched).[175]
- ^ "Undoubtedly a solid anti-Italian sentimental substratum had developed among public opinion, despite the conventional propriety that the dictatorship of Metaxas was trying to maintain. Following the torpedoing of "Еlli", on 15 August 1940 at Tinos, on the nameday of the Virgin Mary, the sentimental charging, in combination with the injustice and the insult to the Orthodox religious tradition, reached its peak."[244]
- ^ Carr, 2013, p. 39: "At 6.00 am air raid sirens woke the Athenians who quickly filled the streets and squares in a paroxism of patriotic fervor. Newspapers rushed out special Monday morning editions with screaming headlines and ecstatic editorials whipping up public enthusiasm- if it really needed whipping up- for a stern lesson to be delivered to the 'macaroni-boys' (makaronades) ..."
- ^ The optimism of the Greek rank and file reinforced by his ignorance which "did not cause any hesitation"; the familiar smile of the soldier; his satisfactory training; the adequately organized mobilization; the strong feeling of justice which had been deceitfully and crudely offended by a coarse Italian propaganda; the capable NCOs and officers, from the rank of platoon leader to that of regiment or division commander who reacted adroitly and very quickly carried out successful decisions, whether they concerned artillery firing or mortar shots or the capture of strategic points; the biological superiority of mountain or rural population (especially people from Epirus, Roumeli, Macedonia, Thessaly), which made up the biggest mass of the infantry forces; the complete devotion of the non-combatant people (women, old people and children) living on the border line (of Epirus and Western Macedonia); the extremely unfavorable weather conditions, which hindered both sides equally, but which were more adverse for the attacker. These are, I believe, the most important factors which made a joint contribution to a profound psychological transformation, which changed the defender into a ruthless attacker, regardless of any sacrifice, at any cost.[246]
- ^ "Still, inexorable questions are put forth to the historian: what is the content, finally, of the "miracle" or of those glorious days of war in Albania if the Greek victors defeated an easy enemy, whose superiority in numbers and arms seemed to play a completely unimportant role. Strong proof of that optimistic over-simplification of probably the most serious factor, which has to do with the justification or non-justification of a military conflict, has survived up to date among the Greek public opinion: that is, that the Italian "macaronis" took to their heels and the Greeks nearly threw them into the sea."[247]
Notas al pie
- ^ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236801104_The_First_Victory_Greece_in_the_Second_World_War_review
- ^ "The First Victory: Greece in the Second World War". terzopoulosbooks.com.
- ^ a b Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 120–122.
- ^ a b Clodfelter, p. 442
- ^ Sadkovich 1993, p. 37.
- ^ "Ιστορία Πυροβολικού | Army gr". www.army.gr.
- ^ http://www.army.gr/sites/default/files/main6d.pdf
- ^ "Historical Aircrafts".
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 45, 87–88.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 87.
- ^ James J. Sadkovich. "Understanding Defeat." Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 24, 1989. Page 38. Citing:' SME/US, Grecia, I, 943'.
- ^ Mack Smith 1982, p. 170.
- ^ Martel 1999, pp. 184, 198.
- ^ Bideleux & Jeffries 1998, p. 467.
- ^ Bell 1997, pp. 70–71.
- ^ Martel 1999, p. 198.
- ^ Preston & MacKenzie 1996, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Preston & MacKenzie 1996, pp. 22, 50–51.
- ^ Zabecki 1999, p. 1353.
- ^ Knox 2000a, pp. 181–182.
- ^ Knox 2000a, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Verzijl 1970, p. 396.
- ^ Plowman 2013, p. 910.
- ^ Bell 1997, p. 68.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 342–343.
- ^ Klapsis 2014, pp. 240–259.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 343–345.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 345–347.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, p. 348.
- ^ a b Kitromilides 2008, p. 217.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, p. 349.
- ^ Steiner 2005, p. 499.
- ^ Steiner 2005, pp. 499–500.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 349–350.
- ^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 352–358.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 380–381.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 381–391.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 397–402.
- ^ Gooch 2007, p. 451.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 18–19.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1982, pp. 30–33, 42.
- ^ Cervi 1972, pp. 7–9.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 21–22, 24, 293 (note 16).
- ^ a b c Tsirpanlis 1982, p. 42.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 402–403, 406.
- ^ a b c Cervi 1972, pp. 7–10.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 403–404.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 404–405.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 28–29.
- ^ Petraki 2014, p. 30.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 139.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 406–408.
- ^ Petraki 2014, p. 299 (note 69).
- ^ Kallis 2000, p. 175.
- ^ a b c Kallis 2000, p. 176.
- ^ Tucker 2012, p. 323.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 167–168.
- ^ a b c d e f Kershaw 2007, p. 164.
- ^ a b Kershaw 2007, p. 165.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 34–35.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 170–173.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 35–37.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 173–174.
- ^ Petraki 2014, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1982, pp. 33–35.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 174–177.
- ^ Sadkovich 1993, pp. 439–445.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 37.
- ^ a b Kallis 2000, p. 178.
- ^ a b c d e Kershaw 2007, p. 170.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, pp. 170-171.
- ^ a b Kershaw 2007, p. 175.
- ^ Rodogno 2006, pp. 103–104.
- ^ Rodogno 2006, pp. 84–85.
- ^ Rodogno 2006, p. 104.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 138.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 209.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 209–211.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 211–212.
- ^ a b Knox 1986, p. 212.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 8.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 8, 10–11.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, pp. 171-172.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, p. 172.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 213–214.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 214.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, p. 171.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 214–216.
- ^ Bauer 2000, p. 99.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 8–10.
- ^ a b Knox 1986, p. 218.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 218–219.
- ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 197.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 24.
- ^ Jowett 2000, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 6.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 7.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 412.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, pp. 119–120.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, pp. 112–113, 121–122.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, p. 128.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 9.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 9–10.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 10.
- ^ Argyle 1980, p. 49.
- ^ Carr 2012, pp. 27–28.
- ^ Carr 2012, p. 28.
- ^ a b c Koliopoulos 1978, p. 416.
- ^ Buell 2002, p. 37.
- ^ a b Kaisarou-Pantazopoulou, Beldekos & Karytinos 2000, pp. 82–90.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 27.
- ^ Hinsley 1994, pp. 62–63.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 32–33, 30–31.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 34–38, 33.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 39.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 41, 43, 48.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 11.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 414.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 233.
- ^ a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 417.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 13–14.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Knox 2000, p. 80.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 232.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 234.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 15.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 17–18.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 235.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 18.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 18–19.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 19.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 20.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 64.
- ^ a b c Bauer 2000, p. 105.
- ^ Mackenzie 1943, pp. 75, 391.
- ^ a b Schreiber 1995, p. 437.
- ^ Nikolaidou 1997, p. 391.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 21.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 237.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 22.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 238.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 420.
- ^ a b c d Gedeon 2001, p. 23.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 22–23, 24.
- ^ a b c d e Gedeon 2001, p. 24.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 421.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 249.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1954, p. 333.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 257.
- ^ CM 2009.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 261.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 24, 26.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 250–251.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 243–249.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 26.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 27.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 27–28.
- ^ a b c d Gedeon 2001, p. 28.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 257–258.
- ^ a b Knox 1986, p. 258.
- ^ Hadjipateras & Phaphaliou 1995, p. 97.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1954, pp. 336–337.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 29.
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 259.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 45.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 442.
- ^ a b Raugh 1993, p. 143.
- ^ Playfair 2004, p. 75.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 29–30.
- ^ a b c Gedeon 2001, p. 30.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 31.
- ^ Carr 2013, p. 157.
- ^ Electris & Lindsay 2008, p. 187.
- ^ Zapantis 1987, p. 54.
- ^ Carruthers 2013, p. 9.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 81.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 81–82.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 82.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 82–88.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 77.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 122.
- ^ Dear & Foot 1995, pp. 102–106.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, p. 32.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 444.
- ^ a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 446.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 225–227, 282.
- ^ a b Gedeon 2001, p. 33.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 258.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 448.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 282–283, 382.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 448–450.
- ^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 383–384, 396–398, 401–402.
- ^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 422.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1954, p. 335.
- ^ Pier Filippo Lupinacci, Vittorio Emanuele Tognelli, La difesa del traffico con l'Albania, la Grecia e l'Egeo, Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, Rome 1965, pp. 47–49.
- ^ O'Hara 2009, p. 98.
- ^ Neulen 2000, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Carr 2012, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Piekalkiewicz & Heurck 1985, p. 110.
- ^ Carr 2007.
- ^ Thomas 2002, p. 62.
- ^ Hinsley 1994, p. 64.
- ^ Richards 1974, pp. 255–258.
- ^ a b Terraine 1997, p. 331.
- ^ Richards 1974, pp. 258, 274, 284.
- ^ Richards 1974, pp. 286, 294.
- ^ Terraine 1997, p. 334.
- ^ a b Brewer 2016, p. 9.
- ^ a b 1948–, Carr, John C. (2 July 2013). The defence and fall of Greece 1940–1941. Barnsley, South Yorkshire. ISBN 978-1781591819. OCLC 883632282.CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
- ^ Knox 1986, p. 260.
- ^ Lepre 1989, p. 119.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 261–262.
- ^ Knox 1986, pp. 269–270.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, pp. 124–125.
- ^ Fischer 1999, pp. 70–73.
- ^ Fischer 1999, p. 75.
- ^ a b Fischer 1999, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Fischer 1999, pp. 79–81.
- ^ The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler–Bormann Documents February–April 1945, ed. François Genoud, London, 1961, pp. 65, 72–3, 81. For textual problems with this source, see Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945. Nemesis, London, 2000, n. 121, pp. 1024–5.
- ^ Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, 3rd edn., Bonn, 1993, p. 506 n. 26.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, p. 178.
- ^ Rintelen, pp. 90, 92–3, 98–9
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1982, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Duignan & Gann 1995, p. 14.
- ^ Kershaw 2007, pp. 180–183.
- ^ Jowett 2000, p. 7.
- ^ Paoletti 2008, p. 174.
- ^ Mazower 2009, pp. 132–133.
- ^ Sullivan 1995, pp. 707–708.
- ^ Sullivan 1995, p. 709.
- ^ Sullivan 1995, p. 711.
- ^ Sadkovich 1993, pp. 439–464.
- ^ Rintelen, p. 101.
- ^ a b c Tsirpanlis 1992, p. 112.
- ^ Carr 2013, p. 39.
- ^ a b Tsirpanlis 1992, p. 121.
- ^ a b Tsirpanlis 1992, p. 113.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, p. 122.
- ^ Tsirpanlis 1992, pp. 122–123.
- ^ Clogg 2008, p. 4.
- ^ a b Fisher 2007, p. 194.
- ^ Cameron and Stevens, p. 135
- ^ Keitel, Wilhelm (1979). "Prelude to the Attack on Russia, 1940–1941". In Görlitz, Walter. In the Service of the Reich. transl David Irving. New York: Stein & Day. Page 166.
- ^ Hitler, Adolf, .
- ^ Cameron and Stevens, p. 315
- ^ Richter 1998, pp. 119, 144.
- ^ Cervi 1972, p. 129.
- ^ a b c HAF 2005.
- ^ Neulen 2000, p. 38.
- ^ Cervi 1971, p. 308.
- ^ Montanari 1980, p. 805.
- ^ Rochat 2005, p. 279.
- ^ Cervi 1972, p. 267.
- ^ Rodogno 2006, p. 446.
- ^ Cervi 1971, p. 306.
- ^ "MFA welcomes measures to disinter, identify fallen Greek soldiers in Albania". ekathimerini.[permanent dead link]
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- ^ a b Σύνταξης, Αίθουσα (21 January 2018). "Αρχίζει η εκταφή των Ελλήνων στρατιωτών πεσόντων στα βουνά της Αλβανίας". Tribune.gr.
- ^ Richter 1998, pp. 602, 615–616.
- ^ Miller 1975, p. 51.
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- Mack Smith, Denis (1982). Mussolini. London: Littlehampton Book Services. ISBN 978-0-297-78005-2.
- Maiolo, Joe (2010). Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War 1931–1941. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-6519-9.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Mazower, Mark (2009) [1993]. Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44. London: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-08923-3.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Martel, Gordon, ed. (1999). The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-16325-5.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Miller, Marshal L. (1975). Bulgaria during the Second World War. Stanford University Press. p. 51. ISBN 978-0-8047-0870-8.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Montanari, Mario (1980). La Campagna di Grecia [The Greek Campaign]. Ufficio Storico (in Italian). I. Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito. OCLC 476593622.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Schreiber, Gerhard; et al. (1995). The Mediterranean, south-east Europe and north Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of Non-belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822884-4.
- O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
- Paoletti, Ciro (1985). A Military History of Italy. Westport, CT: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-98505-9.
- Petraki, Marina (2014). 1940: Ο άγνωστος πόλεμος. Η ελληνική πολεμική προσπάθεια στα μετόπισθεν [1940 The Unknown War. The Greek War Effort in the Rear] (in Greek). Athens: Patakis Editions. ISBN 978-960-16-6026-4.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Piekalkiewicz, Janusz; Van Heurck, Jan (1985). The Air War: 1939–1945. Poole: Blandford Press. ISBN 978-0-918678-05-8.
- Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; Stitt RN, Commander G. M. S.; Molony, Brigadier C. J. C. & Toomer, Air Vice-Marshal S. E. (1954). Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume I: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. 3rd impression, 1959. HMSO. OCLC 888934805 – via Hyperwar Foundation.
- Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; et al. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO 1956]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume II: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84574-066-1.
- Plowman, Jeffrey (2013). War in the Balkans: The Battle for Greece and Crete 1940–1941. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-78159-248-9.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship. London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 0-08-040983-0.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Richards, Denis (1974) [1953]. Royal Air Force 1939–45 VolumeI: The Fight at Odds. History of the Second World War, The War in the Air (paperback ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-11-771592-1. Retrieved 11 June 2015 – via Hyperwar Foundation.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Richter, Heinz A. (1998). Greece in World War II (in Greek). trans. Kostas Sarropoulos. Athens: Govostis. ISBN 960-270-789-5.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Rochat, Giorgio (2005). Le guerre italiane 1935–1943. Dall'impero d'Etiopia alla disfatta [The Italian Wars 1935–1943: From the Empire of Ethiopia to Defeat]. Einaudi storia. Torino: Einaudi. ISBN 88-06-16118-0.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Rodogno, Davide (2006). Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-84515-1.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Shores, Christopher F.; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-0-948817-07-6.
- Sakellariou, M. V. (1997). "The Greek-Italian War Operations on the Epirote Front". Epirus: 4,000 Years of Greek History and Civilization. Historikoi Hellēnikoi chōroi. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A. pp. 389–401. ISBN 960-213-371-6.
- Neulen, Hans Werner (2000). In the skies of Europe – Air Forces allied to the Luftwaffe 1939–1945. Ramsbury, Marlborough, UK: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-799-1.
- Steiner, Zara S. (2005). The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-822114-2.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Stockings, Craig; Hancock, Eleanor (2013). Swastika over the Acropolis: Re-interpreting the Nazi Invasion of Greece in World War II. Leiden: BRILL. ISBN 978-90-04-25459-6.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Svolopoulos, Konstantinos (1978). "Η εξωτερική πολιτική της Ελλάδος" [The Foreign Policy of Greece]. In Christopoulos, Georgios A. & Bastias, Ioannis K. (eds.). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους, Τόμος ΙΕ΄: Νεώτερος Ελληνισμός από το 1913 έως το 1941 [History of the Greek Nation, Volume XV: Modern Hellenism from 1913 to 1941] (in Greek). Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon. pp. 342–358. ISBN 978-960-213-111-4.
- Terraine, John (1997) [1985]. The Right of the Line (Wordsworth ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton. ISBN 1-85326-683-3.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Thomas, Andrew (2002). Gloster Gladiator Aces. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84176-289-0.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Verzijl, J. H. W. (1970). International Law in Historical Perspective (Brill Archive ed.). Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff. ISBN 90-218-9050-X.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Zapantis, Andrew L. (1987). Hitler's Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR. Eastern European Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-88033-125-8.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Encyclopaedias
- Preston, Paul; MacKenzie, Ann, eds. (1996). "Mussolini's Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War". The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 21–52. ISBN 978-0-7486-0861-4.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Tucker, Spencer (2012). World War II at Sea: An Encyclopedia. I. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Journal articles
- Klapsis, Antonis (2014). "Attempting to Revise the Treaty of Lausanne: Greek Foreign Policy and Italy during the Pangalos Dictatorship, 1925–1926". Diplomacy & Statecraft. London: Taylor & Francis (online). 25 (2): 240–259. doi:10.1080/09592296.2014.907062. ISSN 1557-301X. S2CID 153689615.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Sadkovich, James J. (1993). "The Italo–Greek War in Context. Italian Priorities and Axis Diplomacy". Journal of Contemporary History. London: Sage. 28 (3): 439–464. doi:10.1177/002200949302800303. ISSN 0022-0094. S2CID 159955930.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Sullivan, Brian R. (1995). "Fascist Italy's Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War". The Journal of Military History. 59 (4): 697–727. doi:10.2307/2944499. JSTOR 2944499.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Tsirpanlis, Zacharias N. (1982). "The Italian view of the 1940–41 War. Comparisons and problems". Balkan Studies. Institute for Balkan Studies. 23 (1): 27–79. ISSN 2241-1674.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- Tsirpanlis, Zacharias N. (1992). "The Morale of the Greek and the Italian Soldier in the 1940–41 War". Balkan Studies. Institute for Balkan Studies. 33 (1): 111–141. ISSN 2241-1674.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Websites
- Carr, John (2007). "Greeks bravely met the Axis". Speronews. Archived from the original on 10 June 2011. Retrieved 11 June 2015.CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
- "Cronologia del Mondo 2 November 1940". Cronologia.leonardo.it. 2009. Retrieved 6 August 2014.
- "Hellenic Air Force". Hellenic Air Force History. 2005–2015. Archived from the original on 12 December 2008. Retrieved 25 March 2008.
Otras lecturas
Books
- Anamali, Skënder; Prifti, Kristaq (2002). Shqiptarët gjatë luftës së dytë botërore dhe pas saj: 1939–1990 [Albanians During World War II and its Aftermath: 1939–1990]. Historia e popullit shqiptar në katër vëllime (in Albanian). IV. Tirana: Toena. ISBN 99927-1-622-3.
- Badoglio, Pietro (1948). Italy in the Second World War; Memories and Documents. London/New York/Toronto: Oxford University Press. OCLC 1369527.
- Beevor, Antony (1992). Crete: The Battle and the Resistance. London: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-016787-0.
- Carr, John (2012). On Spartan Wings. Barnsley, SY: Pens & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-84884-798-9.
- Ceva, Lucio (1975). La condotta italiana della guerra: Cavallero e il Comando supremo 1941–1942 [The Conduct of War: Cavallero and the Supreme Command 1941–1942]. I Fatti e le idee. Milano: Feltrinelli. OCLC 1955885.
- Churchill, Winston S. (1948). The Second World War: The Gathering Storm. I. London: Cassell. OCLC 219846129.
- Churchill, Winston S. (1949). The Second World War: Their Finest Hour. II. London: Cassell. OCLC 264739165.
- Creveld, Martin van (1973). Hitler's Strategy 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-20143-8.
- Felice, Renzo de (1990). Italia in guerra 1940–1943 [Italy at War 1940–1943]. Mussolini l'alleato, 1940–1945 (in Italian). I. Torino: Einaudi. OCLC 901699257.
- Fowler, Will (2003). The Balkans and North Africa 1941. Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan. ISBN 0-7110-2946-6.
- Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books. 1990. ISBN 1-85367-060-X.
- An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940–1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions. 1997. OCLC 45409635.
- Higham, Robin (2015) [1986]. Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece 1940–41. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-9291-8.
- Hillgruber, Andreas (1993). Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941 [Hitler's Strategy: Politics and Warfare 1940–1941] (in German) (3rd ed.). Bonn: Bernard & Graefe D. L. ISBN 3-7637-5923-9.
- Hitler, Adolf; Bormann, Martin (1961). Genoud, François (ed.). The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler–Bormann Documents, February–April 1945. London: Cassell. OCLC 185760846.
- Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303573-8.
- Kershaw, Ian (2000). Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis. London: Allen Lane. ISBN 0-7139-9229-8.
- Kirchubel, Robert; Gerrard, Robert (2005). Opposing Plans, Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North. Campaign. II. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-857-X.
- Knox, MacGregor (1984). "Fascist Italy Assesses its Enemies, 1935–1940". In May, Ernest R. (ed.). Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-04717-0.
- Lamb, Richard (1998). Mussolini as Diplomat. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-88064-244-0.
- Mack Smith, Denis (1974). Mussolini as a Military Leader. Stenton Lecture. Reading: University of Reading. ISBN 0-7049-0204-4.
- Mack Smith, Denis (1976). Mussolini's Roman Empire. London/New York, 1976: Longman. ISBN 0-582-50266-7.CS1 maint: location (link)
- Mack Smith, Denis (1983). Mussolini. London: Grenada. OCLC 655460413.
- Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1948). Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. London: Odhams. OCLC 753172847.
- Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1947). Ciano's Diary 1939–1943. London: Heinemann. OCLC 6941231.
- Papagos, Alexandros (1949). The Battle of Greece 1940–1941 (Alpha ed.). Athens: J. M. Scazikis. OCLC 3718371.
- Payne, Stanley G. (1995). A History of Fascism 1914–45. London: UCL Press. ISBN 0-299-14874-2.
- Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti (1946). Io Ho Aggredito La Grecia [I Attacked Greece]. Seconda guerra mondiale; colezione di memorie, diari e studi (in Italian). V. Milano: Rizzoli. OCLC 23489678.
- Francesco, Pricolo (1946). Ignavia contro eroismo; l'avventura italo-greca, ottobre 1940 – aprile 1941 [Apathy Against Heroism: The Italo-Greek Adventure: October 1940 – April 1941]. Roma: Ruffolo. ISBN 88-428-1604-3.
- Rintelen, Enno von (1951). Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom 1936–1943 [Mussolini as Ally: Memoirs of the German Military Attaché in Rome, 1936–1943] (in German). Tübingen/Stuttgart: Rainer Wuderlich Verlag Hermann Leins. OCLC 887128808.
- Sullivan, Brian R. (2002). "Where One Man, and Only One Man, Led. Italy's Path from Non-Alignment to Non-Belligerency to War, 1937–1940". In Wylie, Neville (ed.). European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-64358-9.
- The Balkan Campaign 1940–1941. West Point, NY: Department of Military Art and Engineering. 1948. OCLC 680001502.
- Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-646-4.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44317-2.
- Willingham, Matthew (2005). Perilous Commitments: the Battle for Greece and Crete: 1940–1941. Staplehurst UK: Spellmount. ISBN 978-1-86227-236-1.
- Wint, Guy; Pritchard, John (1999). Calvocoressi, Peter (ed.). The Penguin History of the Second World War. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-195988-7.
- Wylie, Neville, ed. (2002). European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-64358-9.
- Zabecki, David T., ed. (1999). World War II in Europe: An Encyclopaedia. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-8240-7029-8.
Journals
- Carrier, Richard C. (October 2003). "Hitler's Table Talk: Troubling Finds". German Studies Review. 26 (3): 561–576. doi:10.2307/1432747. ISSN 2164-8646. JSTOR 1432747. S2CID 165484812.
- Ceva, Lucio (1979). "La campagna di Russia nel quadro strategico della guerra fascista" [The Campaign of Russia in the Strategic Framework of the Fascist War]. Politico. Saggi di Enzo Collotti et al. OCLC 848260125.
- Creveld, Martin van (1971). "25 October 1940: A Historical Puzzle". Journal of Contemporary History. Sage. 6 (3): 87–96. doi:10.1177/002200947100600306. ISSN 0022-0094.
- Creveld, Martin van (1974). "Prelude to Disaster: The British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940–41". Journal of Contemporary History. Sage. 9 (3): 65–92. doi:10.1177/002200947400900303. ISSN 0022-0094. S2CID 220875543.
- Ledet, Michel (November 1996). "1940–1941: L'aviation grecque au combat (1ère partie)" [Greek Aircraft in Combat]. Avions: Toute l'aéronautique et son histoire (in French) (44): 22–27. ISSN 1243-8650.
- Ledet, Michel (December 1996). "1940–1941: L'aviation grecque au combat (2ème partie)". Avions: Toute l'aéronautique et son histoire (in French) (45): 34–38. ISSN 1243-8650.
- Ledet, Michel (January 1997). "1940–1941: L'aviation grecque au combat (3ème et dernière partie)". Avions: Toute l'aéronautique et son histoire (in French) (46): 36–41. ISSN 1243-8650.
- Sadkovich, James J. (1989). "Understanding Defeat. Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II". Journal of Contemporary History. London: Sage. 24: 27–61. doi:10.1177/002200948902400102. ISSN 0022-0094. S2CID 161195027.
- Sadkovich, James J. (1 May 1994). "Italian Morale During the Italo-Greek War of 1940–1941". War and Society. Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach. 12 (1): 97–123. doi:10.1179/072924794794954323. ISSN 0729-2473.