Las tácticas de batalla de VC y PAVN comprendieron una combinación flexible de tácticas de batalla de guerrilla y de guerra convencionales utilizadas por el Viet Cong (VC) y el Ejército Popular de Vietnam del Norte (PAVN) para derrotar a sus oponentes estadounidenses y de Vietnam del Sur (GVN / ARVN ) durante la guerra de Vietnam. Guerra . [1]
El VC era supuestamente un paraguas de grupos de fachada para conducir la insurgencia en Vietnam del Sur afiliados a grupos independientes y simpatizantes, pero de hecho estaba totalmente controlado por el partido comunista norvietnamita y el PAVN. El brazo armado de la CV fueron las guerrillas regionales y locales, y las Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Popular (PLAF). La PLAF era la "Fuerza Principal": los soldados de tiempo completo de Chu Luc del músculo militar de VC. Muchas historias agrupan tanto al VC como al brazo armado bajo el término "Viet Cong" en el uso común. Ambos estaban estrechamente entrelazados y, a su vez, estaban controlados por el Norte. [2] [3] : 12-239 Otros consideran que el CV se refiere principalmente a los elementos armados. [4] El PAVN era el ejército regular de Vietnam del Norte. Colectivamente, ambas fuerzas - el brazo armado del sur y los regulares del norte eran parte de PAVN, [5] y son tratados como tales en las historias comunistas oficiales de la guerra. [6]
Tácticas VC / PAVN en batalla
Tomando la iniciativa: midiendo pérdidas y controlando el tempo
La PAVN y VC realizaron numerosos ataques y maniobras defensivas, generalmente teniendo la ventaja de elegir el momento y el lugar para tales operaciones. A veces, dicha iniciativa se vio frustrada por las contramedidas del ARVN o las tácticas agresivas de " búsqueda y destrucción " de las fuerzas estadounidenses bajo el mando del general William Westmoreland y las medidas de pacificación mejoradas de su sucesor, el general Creighton Abrams . Sin embargo, en la vasta área que era Vietnam del Sur, Laos y Camboya , las fuerzas de PAVN típicamente tomaron la iniciativa en un conflicto que se extendió por más de una década. Un estudio militar estadounidense, por ejemplo, encontró que el 88 por ciento de todos los enfrentamientos contra las fuerzas estadounidenses fueron iniciados por el enemigo. [7] : 188-192
En general, había dos enfoques para medir las pérdidas. El primero fue de desgaste : se llevaron a cabo operaciones para infligir pérdidas máximas a las fuerzas del ARVN / EE. UU. Esto significó gastar vidas y recursos en ataques (emboscadas, incursiones, etc.) o en operaciones defensivas (excavar para luchar, desangrar a los oponentes y luego retirarse cuando las fuerzas enemigas se volvieron demasiado fuertes). Los ataques se incrementaron o redujeron en función de una gran variedad de factores, incluida la situación política en un área en particular. [8] El segundo enfoque fue evitar la batalla a menos que la superioridad numérica y las posibilidades de éxito fueran buenas. En la Guerra de Vietnam, la mayoría de las unidades PAVN / VC (incluidos los regulares de PAVN móviles que usaban tácticas de guerrilla) pasaron solo un número limitado de días al año luchando. Si bien podrían verse obligados a una batalla no deseada por una acción del ARVN / EE. UU., La mayor parte del tiempo se dedicó al control de la población, el entrenamiento, la recopilación de inteligencia, el adoctrinamiento de propaganda o la construcción de fortificaciones , con las tropas de PAVN / VC típicamente solo luchando un promedio de 1 día en 30. [7] En esencia, el VC / PAVN lucharon en gran medida en el suelo sólo cuando querían luchar.
El dominio de la iniciativa hizo problemática la estrategia de desgaste de Estados Unidos de buscar grandes batallas, y también socavó los intentos de pacificación del Gobierno de Vietnam del Sur / ARVN. Las pérdidas de mano de obra siempre podrían compensarse con una mayor infiltración de regulares del Norte y un reclutamiento adicional de VC dentro del Sur. La llegada de las fuerzas estadounidenses en 1965 supuso un cambio de nuevo a la guerra de guerrillas y de unidades pequeñas. El promedio de ataques del tamaño de un batallón, por ejemplo, se redujo de 9,7 por mes a 1,3, mientras que las acciones a pequeña escala aumentaron en un 150 por ciento. [7] Mientras las tropas estadounidenses eran atraídas a regiones remotas en busca de áreas de base, grandes batallas y grandes tasas de bajas , el 90% de todos los ataques ocurrieron consistentemente en el 10 por ciento del país que albergaba a más del 80 por ciento de la población según un estudio estadounidense que cubría 1966 y 1967. La estrategia de Estados Unidos, por lo tanto, no solo no logró enfrentarse por completo a un enemigo escurridizo en los bordes exteriores, sino que tampoco logró mantenerlos alejados de las áreas pobladas del interior. [7]
Aprendizaje y adaptabilidad
La filosofía de batalla VC / PAVN puso gran énfasis en el aprendizaje y la adaptabilidad, y se esforzó sistemáticamente por mejorar las técnicas de batalla en los niveles más bajos. Se esperaba que las unidades y los individuos resolvieran problemas, haciendo un uso creativo de lo que podrían ser oportunidades fugaces y recursos escasos. Después de los compromisos, se llevaron a cabo informes detallados posteriores a la acción y se llevaron a cabo análisis detallados de varios problemas en el campo. Después de una acción, tanto los individuos como las unidades examinaron su desempeño a través de sesiones generalizadas de " crítica y autocrítica ", e incluso los comandantes fueron acusados en los niveles apropiados. Las lecciones aprendidas se incorporaron continuamente a las operaciones de NVA / VC. También se realizaron experimentos por diferentes unidades y los resultados se difundieron a través de conferencias, manuales de campo, memorandos y nuevos procedimientos. [[[Wikipedia:Citing_sources|
Esta capacidad de adaptación fue crucial a la hora de afrontar nuevas tecnologías , como los helicópteros estadounidenses . Se llevaron a cabo varios estudios sobre cómo combatir la amenaza desde arriba, y se elaboraron procedimientos para apuntar y disparar para una variedad de armas, como las ametralladoras pesadas . En una publicación de VC, disparar a 1 ½ longitudes por delante de la aeronave se consideró satisfactorio para golpear partes vitales del motor. [[[Wikipedia:Citing_sources|
Las fuerzas de PAVN / VC no solo estudiaron la tecnología de sus enemigos sino también sus operaciones, buscando debilidades para explotar. A veces, las actividades estadounidenses no se molestaban para que pudieran identificarse y analizarse patrones vulnerables. Las tácticas estadounidenses de "rodear y golpear", por ejemplo, a veces pueden ser predecibles. En la Batalla de Ong Thanh, por ejemplo, se convocaron fuertes ataques aéreos estadounidenses para golpear un complejo de búnkeres, que luego, como era de esperar, fue seguido por operaciones estadounidenses de "limpieza" al día siguiente. Las fuerzas estadounidenses de "limpieza" cayeron en una mortal emboscada preparada, con los cazas VC causando numerosas bajas. [10] Los helicópteros en vuelo estacionario en exceso también fueron un indicio de posibles zonas de aterrizaje. Tomar rutas y senderos predecibles también abrió a los oponentes del ARVN / estadounidenses a víctimas a través de trampas explosivas, minas y emboscadas. Los ataques aéreos estadounidenses a veces se marcaban en tierra con varios minutos de anticipación, lo que les daba a las unidades PAVN / VC tiempo suficiente para evacuar un área o prepararse para emboscadas. También se estudiaron las prácticas estadounidenses de marcado de humo y las tropas de PAVN / VC a veces se volvieron expertos en imitar las granadas de humo codificadas por colores que los estadounidenses usaban para señalar ataques aéreos o aterrizajes de helicópteros. [11] Este estudio y explotación intensivos nunca cesaron, y las lecciones aprendidas se difundieron a otras formaciones PAVN / VC.
Movilidad y movimiento
Control de movimiento y área
Los PAVN / VC estaban en constante movimiento y rara vez permanecían más de 2 a 4 días en un mismo lugar. Una parte integral de la movilidad era el camuflaje elaborado y los procedimientos de denegación de información, como restringir los movimientos de civiles antes o durante una operación. La rotación frecuente implicaba vivaquear en una serie de campamentos fortificados. Estos sitios fortificados también podrían estar dentro de las aldeas o sus aldeas subsidiarias. [2]
Los viajes constantes entre los campamentos o "nómadas" permitieron al VC y al PAVN evadir la detección y defenderse. Sin embargo, igualmente importante, les permitió controlar a las personas, los alimentos y otros materiales de un área. [12] Como se señaló anteriormente, Main Force VC y PAVN generalmente pasaban solo una pequeña cantidad de días al año luchando. La mayor parte del tiempo se dedicó al control del área, lo que proporcionó reclutas, alimentos y otros recursos. El control de un área se logró porque las formaciones de VC / PAVN en movimiento generalmente se mantenían a una distancia sorprendente de la población civil y, por lo tanto, estaban en condiciones de recolectar inteligencia, liquidar la oposición, intimidar a los reacios y hacer cumplir las demandas de impuestos, mano de obra y otros recursos.
Los procedimientos de movimiento variaron según la ubicación del enemigo, el terreno, etc., pero generalmente los elementos de reconocimiento de los batallones o compañías se reunieron con guerrilleros u operativos locales para obtener inteligencia, trazar un mapa del terreno y obtener guías según fuera necesario. La seguridad fue estricta y los soldados solo fueron informados en el último minuto. Una orden de movimiento fue acompañada de una limpieza a fondo del área para ocultar rastros de la unidad. Las trincheras, trincheras y otras fortificaciones generalmente se camuflaban para su posterior reutilización.
Una vez en movimiento, un equipo de reconocimiento avanzado precedió al cuerpo principal. Detrás de las tropas de avanzada, venían las unidades de combate, el Cuartel General, las armas pesadas, los soldados de apoyo al combate y otro elemento de combate. Detrás de la formación había un destacamento de retaguardia . La distancia entre hombres individuales fue generalmente de 5 a 10 metros, menos durante los movimientos nocturnos. Se mantuvo un silencio de radio completo durante un movimiento, y se aplicaron estrictos procedimientos de camuflaje y ocultación durante el movimiento diurno.
Los elementos de reconocimiento exploraron los flancos y la retaguardia extensamente, especialmente al cruzar obstáculos o en áreas controladas por el enemigo. La mayor parte del movimiento fue de noche. Una parte integral de cualquier movimiento en un campamento era el uso de múltiples vías de acercamiento, evitando patrones predecibles que pudieran ser explotados por fuerzas opuestas. Cuando se hacía una marcha de aproximación para una batalla planificada, generalmente se tomaba una ruta larga y rotonda, a menudo cruzando movimientos anteriores para engañar a la vigilancia enemiga. [13]
Señalización y comunicaciones
Las comunicaciones se basaron en gran medida en el teléfono de campo y el corredor hasta las últimas etapas de la guerra, cuando la mayoría de las fuerzas convencionales tomaron el campo. También se utilizó un sistema de señalización simple a través de una serie de disparos para comunicarse mientras se movía en la jungla, con el patrón y la secuencia de los disparos transmitiendo significado a otras tropas de la PAVN. [14] Cuando VC o PAVN adquirieron equipo moderno mediante captura o suministro, hicieron numerosos intentos de engaño de comunicaciones, imitando transmisiones de radio de EE. UU. Y distintivos de llamada para atraer helicópteros y tropas de EE. UU. / ARVN a emboscadas, o redirigiendo el fuego de artillería de ellos mismos a Posiciones de EE.UU. / ARVN a través de solicitudes falsas de ajuste y apoyo de artillería. [15]
Campamentos fortificados
Construcción de campamentos
El movimiento constante a menudo llevó a los combatientes de VC a vastas redes de campamentos, esparcidos por un área amplia. Algunos de estos movimientos requirieron nuevas construcciones. Otros volvieron a ocupar los viejos campamentos abandonados temporalmente o preparados con anticipación como parte de la rotación del movimiento. Incluso las paradas breves, ya sea en el campo, la jungla o la aldea, requerían la excavación de trincheras de combate y trincheras. Los campings tenían varias características: [16]
- Defensa en profundidad
- Uso extensivo de camuflaje
- Apoyándose mutuamente las redes defensivas
- Vías de enfoque restringidas
- Rutas de escape
- Uso de túneles, bunkers, trincheras de comunicación y trincheras
También era importante el requisito de que la ubicación elegida estuviera a una sola noche de marcha de otro campamento. Se prestó especial atención a las vías de acercamiento y retirada. Los batallones VC y PAVN se movieron independientemente dentro de sus propios sectores y a lo largo de sus propias rutas. Un batallón típico puede rotar entre 20 y 25 campamentos, todo dentro de una marcha nocturna de 3 o 4 campamentos más. Si bien un ataque de EE. UU. O del ARVN podría obligarlos a luchar, la misión principal era el control del área.
El campamento estándar era aproximadamente circular y constaba de 2 líneas de fortificación, incorporando posiciones de combate individuales, búnkeres y trincheras. Los campamentos base semipermanentes o permanentes contenían fortificaciones más elaboradas. Un batallón típico de VC / PAVN generalmente distribuye sus compañías a intervalos de una hora en un área, equilibrando la necesidad de una rápida dispersión con la oportunidad de concentrarse según sea necesario. [17]
Los campamentos no estaban necesariamente en áreas remotas. A menudo estaban situadas cerca de las aldeas, o incluso dentro de ellas, y las tropas se refugiaban en casas individuales si la aldea estaba completamente dominada por las fuerzas guerrilleras. Después de excavar, se colocó el cable telefónico, se posicionaron las unidades y se estableció contacto con otras formaciones militares circundantes, especialmente milicias y guerrilleros. Estas unidades locales fueron cruciales para advertir, desviar y retrasar el ARVN o las fuerzas estadounidenses si el elemento de la Fuerza Principal era atacado. Las fuerzas de PAVN / VC generalmente evitaban las aldeas con altos bancos de canales, cementerios o árboles porque tales obstáculos dificultaban la observación y brindaban cobertura a las tropas estadounidenses y del ARVN que avanzaban. También se colocaron minas y trampas explosivas a lo largo de posibles vías de acceso. [[[Wikipedia:Citing_sources|
Vida y moral del campamento
La vida en el campamento siguió las rutinas militares comunes a todos los ejércitos, incluida la diana matutina, el entrenamiento con armas, la construcción de fortificaciones, los detalles del deber asignados a individuos y grupos, y los informes diarios de fuerza y preparación requeridos de los oficiales. Como es típico de todos los ejércitos comunistas, se dedicó una gran cantidad de tiempo a "sesiones de estudio" en las que se adoctrinaba a las tropas y se administraban "críticas y autocríticas". Las hazañas de los combatientes destacados contra el enemigo fueron ampliamente publicitadas y se instó a los hombres a emularlas.
Los suministros de alimentos, como los de otros ejércitos, estaban diseñados para mantener a las tropas en un cierto nivel de actividad en lugar de ser sabrosos. Los combatientes de VC / PAVN recibieron una asignación diaria en efectivo para alimentos que a veces podrían usar en los mercados locales. También se alimentaban ampliamente, incluida la caza. Al carecer de refrigeración, la mayoría de los alimentos se preparaban frescos. El arroz era el alimento básico. La ingeniosa estufa Hoang Cam se utilizó para preparar comidas sin que se detectaran llamas ni humo, incorporando una larga zanja de escape que permitía que el humo se dispersara gradualmente en la jungla lejos de la estufa real. [17]
La recreación fue proporcionada por grupos bien organizados de actores y músicos cuando fue posible, periódicos de la unidad y transmisiones de radio. Como en todas las cosas, estos fueron monitoreados por cuadros del Partido para asegurar que se difundiera la línea adecuada. La atención médica era difícil y austera en condiciones de guerra, y faltaban medicinas e instalaciones; sin embargo, el sistema altamente organizado brindaba un nivel rudimentario de atención a los combatientes heridos, con hospitales de campaña a veces ubicados en túneles, cuevas y búnkeres subterráneos. [17]
Tácticas defensivas
La doctrina defensiva de VC / PAVN generalmente enfatizó la evitación de la batalla prolongada. A menos que un barrido enemigo o una patrulla provoque un enfrentamiento, las fuerzas de PAVN / VC generalmente se mantienen bajas hasta que estén listas para iniciar sus propias acciones. Si se producía un enfrentamiento, el enfoque típico en términos de defensa era retrasar las fuerzas enemigas y retirarse lo antes posible, mientras se infligía el máximo de bajas antes de la retirada. Los barridos masivos de "búsqueda y destrucción" estadounidenses, por ejemplo, aunque de valor inconfundible en la denegación de área, la dispersión de oponentes, etc., arrojaron resultados mixtos frente a tales tácticas de evasión.
La operación más grande de este tipo, la Operación Junction City en 1967, por ejemplo, que involucró a unos 22 batallones estadounidenses y 4 batallones del ARVN y con el apoyo de una enorme potencia de fuego de artillería y aire, solo arrojó un promedio de aproximadamente 33 PAVN / VC muertos por día, durante sus 2 meses. Tales pérdidas eran manejables por un oponente que podía poner a decenas de miles de luchadores acérrimos en el campo y reforzarlos con más cada día. Aún más revelador, tales redadas masivas no lograron paralizar sus objetivos y entregar las grandes batallas buscadas por los estadounidenses. La opción de iniciar el contacto todavía estaba en gran parte en manos de las unidades PAVN / VC, y sus tácticas atrajeron a las poderosas fuerzas estadounidenses lejos de las áreas pobladas, su base clave hasta el final de la guerra. [7] : 171–192
Una parte clave del patrón defensivo de evitación también implicó el uso intensivo de fortificaciones y minas. Ambos sirvieron para permitir que las fuerzas del Frente escaparan para la lucha de otro día, mientras subían la pestaña enemiga en sangre y tesoros. [19]
Diseños defensivos: el sistema de dos cinturones
Las posiciones defensivas debían prepararse cada vez que las tropas de VC / PAVN se trasladaban a un nuevo destino, teniendo en cuenta la idoneidad del terreno, el camuflaje y las rutas de retirada. Por lo general, se utilizó un sistema de fortificaciones de dos líneas, a una distancia de entre 50 y 200 metros. Las líneas tenían típicamente la forma de una L, U o V para mejorar los campos de fuego entrelazados. También se excavaron posiciones de combate individuales en forma de L, con búnkeres en ángulo recto cubiertos con troncos gruesos y aproximadamente 2 pies de tierra. Trincheras poco profundas conectaban muchos bunkers y posiciones individuales en cada cinturón del sistema de 2 líneas. Los búnkeres proporcionaron cobertura de la inevitable artillería estadounidense y ataques aéreos y las posiciones de combate permitieron el fuego cruzado contra los asaltos de la infantería. La segunda línea de defensa no era visible desde la primera línea de posiciones y permitía a los cazas retroceder, ya sea para escapar de un fuerte bombardeo, para continuar retrocediendo o para proporcionar un punto de reunión para el contraataque. [4]
En las aldeas, VC y PAVN siguieron el mismo enfoque de 2 cinturones, colocando defensas para que se integraran con las casas y estructuras de la aldea. Esto aprovechó algunas Reglas de combate estadounidenses que limitan o retrasan el uso de armas pesadas en áreas habitadas. Otro beneficio de incorporar defensas entre los civiles era que se podían imputar atrocidades si las estructuras civiles fueran alcanzadas por fuego estadounidense o del ARVN. También se construyeron numerosas posiciones ficticias para atraer al ARVN y al fuego estadounidense. En áreas más remotas, las fortificaciones defensivas eran más elaboradas, a veces incorporando un tercer cinturón de defensas con búnkeres y sistemas de trincheras más fuertes. Los ataques estadounidenses contra posiciones tan duras buscaban evitar bajas estadounidenses confiando en la potencia de fuego. [20]
En algunas circunstancias, las fortificaciones no siguieron el esquema de diseño descrito anteriormente. Los búnkeres y los hoyos de combate se dispersaron más ampliamente para retrasar a los atacantes y crear la impresión psicológica de que estaban rodeados por todos lados. Los puestos de vigilancia se colocaron a menudo en senderos, rutas y posibles zonas de aterrizaje de helicópteros estadounidenses clave. Para mejorar su movilidad durante una batalla defensiva, se construyeron de antemano numerosos refugios antiaéreos, búnkeres y trincheras alrededor de un área de operaciones. Esto implicó una enorme cantidad de trabajo, pero demostró su valor para maniobrar bajo los ataques del ARVN / Estados Unidos. [19] Las trincheras excavadas por las tropas de VC durante la victoriosa Batalla de Ap Bac son testimonio de la dedicación casi religiosa de los insurgentes a las fortificaciones de campaña. Los agujeros fueron cavados tan profundos que un hombre podría estar adentro. La excavación de tierra se hizo desde la parte trasera, ocultando rastros reveladores de la excavación. Solo un impacto directo de un proyectil de artillería o una bomba podría matar a las tropas dentro de esos agujeros. Detrás de la línea de trincheras, el VC utilizó y mejoró una acequia de riego, permitiéndoles el movimiento oculto, la comunicación y la transmisión de suministros a pie o por sampán . La mayoría de estas posiciones de combate eran invisibles desde el aire. [21]
Minas y trampas explosivas
Las trampas explosivas y las minas causaron una inmensa presión psicológica sobre las tropas estadounidenses y del ARVN y también causaron numerosas bajas. Para 1970, por ejemplo, alrededor del 11% de las muertes y el 17% de las lesiones infligidas a las tropas estadounidenses fueron causadas por trampas explosivas y minas. [20] Identificados por una variedad de marcadores de fuerzas amigas, estos dispositivos ralentizaron las operaciones, desviaron recursos hacia actividades de seguridad y limpieza, dañaron equipos y envenenaron las relaciones entre los soldados y la población civil circundante.
Trampas explosivas
Las trampas explosivas iban desde las más simples hasta las más complejas. Las trampas no explosivas incluían la conocida estaca punji afilada recubierta de excremento, montada sobre gatillos de árboles jóvenes y colocada en pozos cubiertos y poco profundos. Se desplegaron estacas donde la infantería caminaba o se lanzaba para evitar ataques, como trincheras al borde de la carretera o detrás de troncos. Otro tipo de trampa era una bola de barro con púas que se balanceaba sobre su víctima después de soltar un cable de disparo y lo empalaba. Otros dispositivos de empalamiento incluían látigos de bambú y picos de retoños activados. También se utilizaron arcos con flechas envenenadas.
También se emplearon trampas explosivas explosivas, algunas de las cuales fueron detonadas por observadores ocultos. Van desde trampas de cartucho de una sola bala hasta granadas, bombas y proyectiles ficticios. Las trampas anti-vehículos iban desde minas hasta rondas de artillería enterradas. Las trampas para helicópteros a menudo se desplegaban en árboles que rodeaban una posible zona de aterrizaje, activadas por un observador o por el lavado del rotor. Las trampas explosivas también se hicieron con basura estadounidense y del ARVN en el campo. Las latas de raciones desechadas, por ejemplo, estaban cargadas con granadas a las que se les había quitado parcialmente las clavijas; el otro extremo estaba conectado a un cable trampa. Los lados de la lata mantuvieron el pasador en su lugar hasta que se activó el cable trampa. También se utilizaron baterías desechadas y cables de comunicaciones: las baterías se engancharon al cable de desecho, proporcionando una corriente de encendido para provocar la carga de municiones de mortero / artillería vacías o desechadas. [20]
Minas: el VC sustituto de la artillería
Las minas causaron aún más daño que las trampas explosivas. Según una historia del ejército de EE. UU.:
"El enemigo empleó" minería molesta ", es decir, dispersando minas en un área en lugar de campos de minas bien definidos, en una escala nunca antes encontrada por las fuerzas estadounidenses. Las minas y trampas explosivas generalmente las instalaba por la noche personal capacitado que había detallado Conocimiento del terreno A través de ingeniosas técnicas en la guerra de minas, el Viet Cong sustituyó con éxito las minas y las trampas explosivas por artillería.
En lugar de los campos de minas convencionales cubiertos por el fuego, el enemigo obstaculizó o impidió el uso de carreteras de suministro e inhibió las operaciones fuera de la carretera colocando artefactos explosivos en patrones indiscriminados. Si bien se benefició directamente al causar bajas en combate, pérdidas de vehículos y retrasos en las operaciones tácticas, igualmente importante fue el efecto psicológico. El simple hecho de saber que se podría colocar una mina o una trampa explosiva en cualquier lugar ralentizó las operaciones de combate y obligó a las tropas aliadas a limpiar casi toda la red de carreteras de Vietnam todos los días. [23]
Técnicas de abrazos, tiempos, contraataques y retiradas
Los cazas VC / PAVN buscaron neutralizar la potencia de fuego de los EE. UU. Y el ARVN "abrazando" a las tropas enemigas (vietnamita: Nắm thắt lưng địch mà đánh ), luchando tan cerca que los ataques de artillería o aviones tuvieron que ser restringidos por temor a bajas de fuego amigo. [24] Esta táctica fue creada por el general Nguyễn Chí Thanh [25] después de la Batalla de Ia Drang en noviembre de 1965. También se realizaron vigorosos contraataques, particularmente contra formaciones más débiles del ARVN. Por lo general, las tropas de VC / PAVN en una posición defensiva o de emboscada mantuvieron el fuego o maniobraron hasta que las tropas estadounidenses estuvieron muy cerca antes de abrir fuego. Esto inició el método del "abrazo". Dado que sus enemigos generalmente retrocedían al contacto y confiaban en los fuegos de apoyo, las tropas del frente se movían con ellos, "colgando del cinturón". [4]
Las acciones contra las fuerzas enemigas a menudo se iniciaban en la última parte del día, y el inminente anochecer proporcionaba condiciones favorables para la retirada. Cuando estaban rodeados, el Main Force VC y especialmente el PAVN lucharon tenazmente, pero por lo general con la mirada puesta en la retirada. Se hicieron grandes esfuerzos para recuperar los cuerpos, una medida de guerra psicológica que negó a los oponentes la satisfacción de ver al enemigo muerto.
Invariablemente, las unidades de VC y PAVN buscaban retirarse si las condiciones eran desfavorables, y los campamentos y las áreas de base se abandonaban sin sentimiento si se volvían insostenibles. Destacamentos de retaguardia, rutas minadas y ataques de distracción formaron parte de la retirada. La existencia de santuarios transfronterizos en Laos, Camboya y Vietnam del Norte, donde las tropas terrestres estadounidenses no pudieron seguir, ayudó en gran medida a la retirada segura de las formaciones PAVN / VC. [4]
Había un plan de retirada para todas las operaciones, ya fueran defensivas u ofensivas. Las rutas de escape y salida se planificaron y ocultaron de antemano, y luego se reagruparon en un punto de reunión planificado. Entre las técnicas habituales de abstinencia se incluyen las siguientes: [26]
- Fragmentación: dividirse en pequeños grupos cuando están bajo ataque, especialmente cuando se trata de romper un cerco.
- Dispersante: generalmente se usa cuando se descubre. Las tropas de VC / PAVN se dispersan, a veces arrojando paquetes para retrasar a las fuerzas enemigas que se detienen a inspeccionarlas.
- Ocultación: las tropas de VC / PAVN pasaron una gran cantidad de tiempo construyendo fortificaciones y escondites. Los movimientos de retirada utilizaban con frecuencia estos escondites, a menudo redes de túneles profundos.
- Engañar: realizar ataques de distracción para engañar y alejar a las fuerzas enemigas y así facilitar la retirada.
- Retraso: uso de unidades de retaguardia para retrasar a las fuerzas perseguidoras. Las unidades de retardo a veces se usaban para preparar fuerzas enemigas para una emboscada, donde los perseguidos se volvían contra sus perseguidores.
Medidas defensivas contra aviones estadounidenses
Si bien sus oponentes estadounidenses disfrutaban de la superioridad aérea, las fuerzas de la PAVN los desafiaban continuamente, desplegando una impresionante variedad de artillería para liquidar a los enemigos desde el aire. El sofisticado sistema de defensa antimisiles construido con ayuda soviética y china es bien conocido, pero PAVN hizo un uso extensivo de cañones antiaéreos e incluso de disparos de gran volumen por parte de soldados ordinarios. En el nivel más bajo, un estudio señaló que los artilleros de PAVN estaban entrenados para usar armas pequeñas contra todo tipo de aeronaves y se establecieron celdas de disparo especiales que podían disparar hasta 1000 rondas en 3 a 5 segundos en aviones de movimiento rápido. El volumen de tal potencia de fuego hizo que la vida fuera peligrosa en los niveles bajos para los aviones estadounidenses, lo que los obligó a moverse a altitudes más altas, donde el cañón antiaéreo especializado asumió el control. También se establecieron áreas especiales de "cebo", rodeadas de baterías antiaéreas ocultas para atraer aviones estadounidenses. El disparo de andanadas de muchas armas, mezclado en varios niveles, también fue a veces efectivo. Las zonas sensibles, como Hanoi, fueron las más defendidas. La mayoría de las pérdidas de aviones estadounidenses fueron causadas por armas automáticas pesadas y cañones antiaéreos de 14 mm, 35 mm, 57 mm y 85 mm. Las baterías antiaéreas obligaron a algunos aviones estadounidenses a subir aún más, donde estarían al alcance de las mortíferas baterías de misiles SA-2. Colocar armas automáticas al nivel de las copas de los árboles también ayudó en la lucha contra los helicópteros estadounidenses. Las pérdidas de aire iban a provocar una caída en la moral de los pilotos estadounidenses, algunos de los cuales sintieron que estaban siendo llamados a arriesgar sus vidas contra objetivos de relativamente poco valor. Los llamamientos al secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos, McNamara, para que eliminara las restricciones sobre objetivos más lucrativos a menudo se redujeron drásticamente o se vetaron. La incapacidad del poderío aéreo de los EE. UU. Para afectar decisivamente a las fuerzas de PAVN es testimonio no solo de los fracasos de EE. UU., Sino también de la tenacidad del soldado PAVN común en combate directo con enemigos aéreos y del enorme esfuerzo invertido en la construcción de sofisticadas fortificaciones y sistemas de túneles. [27]
Lucha contra las operaciones de vehículos aéreos estadounidenses
Las fuerzas estadounidenses a veces emplearon tácticas sofisticadas de aeronaves, utilizando aterrizajes integrados de helicópteros, apoyo de artillería e inserciones de tropas para rodear los contactos enemigos y cerrar las rutas de escape. La sobresaliente movilidad del helicóptero lo hizo posible, y estas máquinas versátiles podrían ponerse en acción en varias configuraciones (transporte de tropas, cañonera, evacuación médica, transporte pesado y suministro). Los helicópteros permitieron el transporte y despliegue de elementos de infantería, artillería, médicos y suministros a casi cualquier lugar, presentando un instrumento formidable que mejoró las operaciones estadounidenses y del ARVN. Cuando se combinó con otros elementos aéreos, como el apoyo aéreo de ala fija, este poder de combate se multiplicó y abrió una dimensión completamente nueva de maniobra operativa. [28] Pero los helicópteros también tenían varias vulnerabilidades. Necesitaban una enorme y costosa "cola logística" de mantenimiento, combustible, municiones y bases. Ninguna nación, excepto Estados Unidos, podía permitirse ese gasto: instalar unas 12.000 máquinas en Vietnam, casi la mitad de las cuales fueron derribadas o perdidas debido a accidentes. [29] La capacidad de los helicópteros para mover hombres y material a cualquier lugar fue impresionante, pero también significó que las tropas estadounidenses y del ARVN en algunos casos dependían en gran medida de ellos. La destrucción de la línea de vida del helicóptero podría descarrilar una operación o maniobra, y la necesidad de transportar hombres y material a lugares remotos significaba que cada nueva llegada de evacuación médica, suministros, transporte o vuelos de tropas brindaba al VC / PAVN oportunidades para paralizar misiones y máquinas. Los helicópteros también eran muy vulnerables a las ametralladoras pesadas, la artillería AA ligera, los sistemas de defensa aérea portátiles como el SA-7 e incluso el fuego concentrado de armas pequeñas. Según algunos historiadores del poder aéreo, los costos a veces no estaban a la altura de las ganancias, y las operaciones de vehículos aéreos estadounidenses podrían reducirse a máquinas enormemente costosas y sus sistemas de apoyo para perseguir a un puñado de adolescentes o milicianos de segunda fila armados con rifles baratos. [30]
Anti-guerrilla sweeps in populated areas
During anti-guerrilla sweeps, by some US units like the 9th Infantry Division, contact was first established with VC/PAVN forces via air or foot patrol, or planned raids on locations identified by intelligence sources. Usually conducted in daytime at the brigade level, planned strikes would allocate artillery and helicopter assets to battalions tasked with the fight. Artillery elements positioned firebases early to create an umbrella of steel over the proposed zone of battle. Helicopter assets were assigned and divided into 3 segments- light scout helicopters for reconnaissance, heavily armed gunships for firepower and larger "slicks", or troop transports for the infantry. The force commander, sometimes in a helicopter, was in constant communication with all elements via rUHF, FM and field radio as needed.[31]
As the American operation commenced, light scout helicopters flew ahead of the strike force at low level to detect opponents or draw their fire. Above the scouts, the helicopter gunships would lurk, ready to pounce on enemy movement, fire or fortifications. Behind and below the gunships came the "slicks." These transport choppers would sometimes carry "people sniffer" technology designed to detect chemical traces or fumes left from human waste, smoke or sweat- indicators that PAVN/VC troops might be hiding nearby. People sniffing often required steady low altitude flying to improve reliability of results. Once PAVN/VC were detected, hiding places might be saturated with Tear gas. If flushed out, the enemy was attacked by the gunships, and the transports began to land infantry to surround the target and seal off escape routes. Artillery firebases would then begin their fires to smash the opposition, bombard exit routes and provide cover for the American infantry. US troops on such operations did not usually drive home attacks with direct assault, but sealed the enemy in a ring, while he was worked over by artillery and gunship strikes. Fixed-wing aircraft were on call if needed. This "surround and pound" approach substituted metal for men and lowered US casualties, but in turn caused massive noncombatant civilian casualties.[32]
PAVN/VC forces deployed several countermeasures against the American tactics. Avoidance and concealment was a primary method- sometimes made more difficult by the "sniffer" technology. But chemical detection was not always reliable- and could be thrown off by the use of animal decoys, urine bucket diversions, or was affected by wind, rain and other factors. PAVN/VC units also built their fortifications in the high brush along canal banks and streams- providing a route of easier escape from the American attack. These locations could be a double-edged sword: they gave clear fields of fire against American infantry but the adjacent rice paddies sometimes created convenient enemy landing zones, and the water escape routes could become bottlenecks.[31] Pre-built fortifications and trenches helped shield the communist forces from annihilation as the ring closed in, and previously prepared ground, laced with booby-traps also delayed enemy forces. If there was enough advance warning, PAVN/VC forces would prepare kill zones near or in likely landing spots. Trees could also make effective defensive positions. Booby traps were laid on trails and rice paddy dikes, and in jungle growth in a random pattern, and often caused multiple casualties to American troops.[31]
The primary tactic after being surrounded was to delay until nightfall, after which breakouts would begin. Large formations were broken down into smaller units to facilitate escape and a rendezvous was pre-planned in advance. Special units were deployed to probe the encirclement, looking for weak points, and decoy units were held ready for action to occupy American forces once the breakouts began. Breakouts could be made with diversions while bodies of troops slipped away, or strength could be concentrated on a weak spot, providing enough local superiority to penetrate the American encirclement and disperse. Escaping units would link up later at designated marshaling points.[31] Harassment and diversionary tactics also paid dividends. As noted by some airpower historians, relatively small bodies of local fighters armed with inexpensive rifles, could divert and tie down expensive and massive allocations of men, material and time deployed by more sophisticated opponents.[33]
Ironically, the very efficiency and convenience of firebases, could at times aid PAVN/VC forces. In some areas, US troops, often used as "bait" to draw out an enemy response, developed "firebase psychosis"- a reluctance to move too far away from the covering artillery of their firebases. As a result, combat movement and operational flexibility was hampered and more mobile PAVN/VC forces attacked, broke contact, maneuvered around and eluded their opponents. Many firebases were also totally dependent on helicopters for construction, resupply and evacuation and attacks against these fortresses could at times force their abandonment.[34]
Main force confrontation
PAVN/VC forces also faced American airmobile attacks in remoter areas, around their base camps and border sanctuaries. In these encounters PAVN regulars and VC main-force units confronted their opponents, which sometimes included airlifted ARVN elements. Typically, such airmobile operations involved preparation of fire support bases, carved out of jungle terrain. Suitable areas (usually on high ground) were selected and heavily bombarded with artillery and airstrikes, then US engineers and security troops landed to commence construction of fortifications, bunkers, artillery emplacements and helicopter landing pads. The ability of helicopters to transport all the needed men and heavy equipment to almost any location gave American arms tremendous power and flexibility.[35] Several of these firebases could be built relatively quickly and deliver devastating mutually supporting fire within a combat zone. Under the artillery umbrella, Marine and Army infantry deployed for combat. The versatility of helicopters enabled such forces to be resupplied and maneuvered to numerous points on the field of battle. Firebases could also be "leapfrogged" or shifted in response to an advance or operational needs.[36]
Against such methods the PAVN/VC used a variety of approaches. If the objective was to cause attrition, PAVN regulars would sometimes fight directly with their opponents using conventional tactics, particularly on the DMZ against the US Marines, and in remote border areas near Laos and Cambodia. Such attrition objectives were sometimes part of the North's overall strategy of drawing the Americans into remote areas, and away from key population clusters dominated or contested by the VC.[37] Some American postwar memoirs comment favorably on the bravery and tactical discipline of the PAVN in these encounters.[38] To stem an advance from airmobile enemies PAVN troops sometimes held their ground in prepared fortifications, buying time for their comrades to maneuver elsewhere. PAVN forces also attempted with limited success to attack the quickly constructed firebases from which the lethal firepower issued. Gaps between maneuvering US units were infiltrated and attacks mounted. Ambushes were also executed. Another tactic was fighting close to US units, so close that deadly American firepower from fixed bases was discouraged for fear of hitting their own troops.[39] Tactical airstrikes in support of ambushed Americans units, were also met by well-timed PAVN pullbacks from the contact zone.[40] If things were going badly, PAVN forces withdrew to cross-border sanctuaries, where American ground forces were forbidden to follow. The fast-moving US operations, where there was no time for the usual months of communist initiative and rehearsed preparations, could catch PAVN off-guard, and casualties against US forces could be heavy. In Operation Dewey Canyon for example, US after-action reports claim some 1,617 PAVN killed, for a loss of 121 Marines killed and the capture of hundreds of tons of munitions, equipment and supplies.[41]
Against ARVN opponents, PAVN had greater success. In the Operation Lam Son 719, ARVN troops were inserted by helicopter, covered by US airmobile, road advance operations and massive aerial firepower. The operation met heavy resistance, including intense antiaircraft fire. ARVN air insertions took them to the outskirts of Tchepone, but numerous helicopters were shot down or damaged. PAVN flanking tactics and ambushes also mauled the ARVN infantry battalions. US/ARVN reports claimed some 13,000 PAVN deaths and destruction of tons of material, but the ARVN was forced to withdraw, a maneuver that turned into a humiliating rout, salvaged only by unrelenting American airpower. Some 105 US helicopters were lost and an additional 615 damaged. The PAVN base area at Tchepone was back in business within a week. The vital role of sanctuary areas which could be developed in depth into strong bases was again illustrated.[42]
Protracted war and staying power
American airmobile tactics caused substantial casualties to the VC and PAVN in thousands of such confrontations, but the North's strategy of attritional, protracted war, aided by plentiful manpower, was designed to absorb these losses, while wearing down their opponents over time. Successful air-mobile tactics also failed to address what happened after the mobile force and their helicopters departed. The population was often still left unsecured, subject once more to communist control, intimidation and infiltration. ARVN follow-up action might continue to be ineffective. Cross-border sanctuary routes were still open, and the bulk of the networks of tunnels, base camps and fortification honeycombing a region usually survived. Once their opponents had left, communist forces eventually regrouped, replaced their losses, and returned.[43]
Offensive tactics: doctrine and planning
In offensive operations, the PAVN/VC typically sought to wear their opponents down by thousands of small attacks, each one gradually reducing enemy strength. Winning and holding specific blocks of territory was not as important as wearing down the enemy in accordance with Mao's dictum: "To win territory is no cause for joy, to lose territory is no cause for sorrow."[44] Bigger set-piece assaults on installations and bases as well as ambushes were sometimes executed, but the general pattern was one of protracted, attritional warfare, conducted by relatively small formations over a wide area. This meant absorbing large numbers of casualties, but both manpower and time were plentiful.
Attack planning
Planning for attacks was a careful, deliberate process, that could take many months. Below is an outline of some considerations and actions involved.[45]
Attack criteria and approval: The political dimensions of the attack were carefully considered, such as the timing of an election in the enemy camp, or the appointment of certain government officials. Planning involved a coordinated effort by military and logistics staff and the all-important political operatives, the party cadres who had the last word. Proposals for an operation were first sent up the chain of command. Depending on the scale of the planned operation, an idea to attack a certain village post might float up from Provincial, to Zone, to Interzone levels. Great stress was placed on a successful outcome that would be beneficial in terms of actual military results or propaganda. Numerical superiority was deemed essential.
Preliminary recon: If approved for further study, reconnaissance teams would case the area, analyzing political, logistics and military issues. Information gleaned from informers and sympathizers was joined to data from direct reconnaissance via patrols, infiltration or probing attacks. The analysis was comprehensive, and might involve size and composition of enemy forces, avenues of approach and withdrawal, civilian morale, hit lists of suspected traitors or troublesome dissenters who did not support the Revolution, available civilian labor to support logistics, detailed location of individual walls, ditches or fences and a host of other factors, both political and military.
Rehearsals for the attack: If the objective was deemed feasible along political and military lines, detailed planning for the actual operation began, including construction of sand tables, and string and stick mock-ups of the target. Main Force or regular units tasked with the assault were selected and rehearsed. Each phase of the attack was carefully reviewed and rehearsed, including actions before opening fire, actions during fire, and actions taken upon withdrawal. Numerous postponements and changes might be undertaken until conditions and preparations were judged right to launch the assault.
Logistics and security: Logistics formations might prepare coffins, pre-position medical or porter teams, and carefully tabulate the amount of ammunition needed for the operation. Guerrilla elements and laborers began to move supplies and material forward to support the impending battle. Security surrounding the operation was usually very tight with units only being informed at the last feasible moment.
Echelons of attack: Depending on the complexity of the attack, numerous sub-divisions might be involved. Local guerrillas might conduct certain preliminary tasks, such as diversionary attacks, or clearance or denial (via mining, booby traps etc.) of certain areas for movement purposes. Sappers might be tasked with opening the assault via infiltration and demolition of key objectives. A main force might swing into action once the sappers commenced their action. A blocking force might be deployed to ambush relief troops rushing to the battle area.
Attack doctrine: "one slow, four quick"
The discussion on PAVN/VC offensive methods below is adapted from Bernard B. Fall, Street without Joy; Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA; and United States Army Center of Military History: Vietnam Studies[46]
Attacks were invariably characterized by adherence to the principle of 'one slow, four quick' – a doctrine which prevailed in both attack and defense. In offensive operations the 'quick attack' was further broken down to incorporate 'three strongs' – strong fight, strong assault and strong pursuit. Presented in sequence the doctrine can be summarized as follows:
Slow Plan – This involved a steady but low-key logistical build up in forward supply areas, being positioned ahead of the fighting forces to make a solid base for the operation. The degree of planning and preparation necessary to undertake a large operation could take as long as 6 months and often included numerous 'rehearsals'.
- Quick Advance – This was a rapid movement forward, generally after a circuitous approach march meant to confuse the enemy. Once all the units in the operation were on track, a quick advance was usually made in small and inconspicuous groups to a forward staging area from where the attack would be launched.
- Quick Attack – Here the attacking forces would be concentrated at the weakest point of the target as identified by prior reconnaissance. The duration of an attack could often be measured in minutes. Surprise was essential and large volumes of fire were poured on the target. Phase 2 of the attack involved the three strongs:
- Strong fight – an attempt to achieve and exploit the element of surprise
- Strong Assault – against a pre-arranged position using concentration of force, effort and mass to overwhelm the defense.
- Strong pursuit – the attacking force's reserves would be committed to exploit the breaches in the targets defenses so as to deliver a decisive blow
- Quick Clearance – The attacking force would rapidly re-organize and police the battlefield so as to remove weapons and casualties and was pre-planned to prevent confusion on the objective
- Quick Withdrawal – Involved a quick egress from the battle area to a pre-arranged rendezvous point where the attackers would again break down into smaller groups to continue their dispersal.
Anatomy of an attack: Lima Site 85 Radar station – Laos 1968
The careful methods of PAVN forces are illustrated in the successful attack against the US Air Force's Lima Site 85 TACAN radar navigation facility in Laos, in March 1968. Situated on a mountain peak that was considered too tough to assault, the facilities were manned by a small force of USAF technicians on top, and about 1,000 Hmong and Thai irregulars deployed further down the slopes. PAVN commandos however successfully climbed the mountain, killing or dispersing most of the guards and US airmen at the peak, while a larger follow-on echelon of PAVN and Pathet Lao assaulted the rest of the mountain slopes below. The outgunned and outnumbered Hmong and Thai irregulars were defeated and PAVN/VC forces held the site despite several days under counterattack by US aircraft.
A full after-action report by PAVN was translated in 1986 and along with other US reports, furnishes numerous details about offensive tactics.[48] These include extensive preliminary recon and rehearsals, vetting and clearance by Communist Party operatives, numerical superiority at the point of attack (3,000 versus 1,000), a secure advance to the objective (avoiding or hiding from civilian traffic), detailed sub-division of tasks for each assault element, rapid movement once the battle began, and cooperation between special forces (sappers), regulars, and local guerrillas. This operation did not involve the typical quick withdrawal however. The attackers dug in on the site and defended it against counterattack, a pattern that occurred when the PAVN/VC wanted to inflict maximum casualties, or achieve some political or propaganda objective, or control a particular area.
In this case, the radar station helped guide US bombers – including the devastating B-52s, and its capture was also a strong propaganda bonus demonstrating PAVN/Pathet Lao strength in Laos to the local people. The base was isolated and superior forces could be concentrated on it, maximizing chances for success – a key consideration in a PAVN offensive operation. The raid also illustrated another method of neutralizing US airpower- attack its support facilities and bases on the ground. Subsequent attempts by Royal Lao Army forces to retake the area were only partially successful. The mountain peak was never recaptured.[49]
Ambush techniques
The terrain for the ambush had to meet strict criteria:
- provide concealment to prevent detection from the ground or air
- enable ambush force to deploy, encircle and divide the enemy
- allow for heavy weapons emplacements to provide sustained fire
- enable the ambush force to set up observation posts for early detection of the enemy
- permit the secret movement of troops to the ambush position and the dispersal of troops during withdrawal
One important feature of the ambush was that the target units should 'pile up' after being attacked, thus preventing them any easy means of withdrawal from the kill zone and hindering their use of heavy weapons and supporting fires. Terrain was usually selected which would facilitate this and slow down the enemy. The terrain around the ambush site which was not favorable to the ambushing force, or which offered some protection to the target, was heavily mined and booby trapped or pre-registered for mortars.
The PAVN/VC ambush formations consisted of:
- lead-blocking element
- main-assault element
- rear-blocking element
- observation posts
- command post
Other elements might also be included if the situation demanded, such as a sniper screen along a nearby avenue of approach to delay enemy reinforcement.
When deploying into an ambush site, the PAVN first occupied several observation posts, placed to detect the enemy as early as possible and to report on the formation it was using, its strength and firepower, as well as to provide early warning to the unit commander. Usually one main OP and several secondary OP's were established. Runners and occasionally radios were used to communicate between the OP's and the main command post. The OP's were located so that they could observe enemy movement into the ambush and often they would remain in position throughout the ambush in order to report routes of reinforcement and withdrawal by the enemy as well as his maneuver options. Frequently the OP's were reinforced to squad size and served as flank security. The command post was situated in a central location, often on terrain which afforded it a vantage point overlooking the ambush site.
Reconnaissance elements observing a potential ambush target on the move generally stayed 300–500 meters away. Sometimes a "leapfrogging" recon technique was used. Surveillance units were echeloned one behind the other. As the enemy drew close to the first, it fell back behind the last recon team, leaving an advance group in its place. This one in turn fell back as the enemy again closed the gap, and the cycle rotated. This method helped keep the enemy under continuous observation from a variety of vantage points, and allowed the recon groups to cover one another.[51]
Ambush considerations
The size and sophistication of an ambush varied from hasty meeting engagements, to full scale, carefully planned, regimental sized ambushes that included forces sufficient to encircle the enemy in the kill zone. In instances where smaller units didn't have enough troops to stage a complete five-element ambush they would set up one of the preferred ambush types and avoided close assaulting the enemy.
The preferred time for ambushes was just before dark. Enemy units were often deliberately delayed by the deployment of small patrols or snipers which harassed it. Roads and bridges to the rear of the enemy unit would also be sabotaged or mined to prevent withdrawal. This limited the enemy's use of air support and the deployment of reinforcements. It often also resulted in the ambushed unit being pinned in place for the night and having to set up a defensive perimeter in a hostile area.
All ambushes, in keeping with universal ambush doctrine, were intended to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy and to allow the ambushing force to withdraw before effective fire could be returned.
Ambush types
The PAVN/VC favored seven types of ambushes; Mine, Bloody Nose, Flank, L-shaped, Maneuver, V-shaped, and Z-shaped. The following discussion is adapted from the MACV monograph (Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No 60, 1966)[52] and from the US Army's Handbook: ("What A Platoon Leader Should Know about the Enemy's Jungle Tactics," 1967)[16]
Mine Ambush. This depended on the use of command-detonated mines which were triggered by hidden troops who held a detonating device connected to the demolitions by electrical wire. Mine ambush kill zones might also include punji traps or other homemade traps, land mines and natural obstacles. However, the ambush was always triggered by electrically detonating a mine, when enemy troops moved within the mine's killing range.
Bloody Nose Ambush. Used by small units against larger enemy forces as a means of harassment, delay and disruption. By positioning the ambush to enfilade an avenue of approach, the PAVN/VC obtained more effective results. Minefields, mantraps and booby traps were placed along both sides of the trail and perpendicular to it. As the enemy unit came under fire and attempted to maneuver right or left to close with the ambushers, the protective barriers would inflict casualties. As soon as the ambushing element realized that the enemy had advanced into, and taken casualties from, the mine/trap line, the ambushers withdrew to another pre-selected site where they might repeat the maneuver.
Flank or Linear Ambush. This was one of the simplest to set up and operate and was most commonly used by the PAVN. It was also easy to get into and away from quickly. The ambush position was laid parallel to the target area. Mines or other obstacles were placed on the other side of the ambush site. Upon command, fire was brought to bear on the kill zone from multiple, overlapping firing positions. The linear ambush pumped bullets into the flank of a surprised enemy column.
The 'L' Ambush. L-shaped ambushes included the most effective aspects of both the 'Bloody Nose' and Linear ambush. The short end, or base, of the 'L' was positioned so that at least one machine gun could fire straight down the kill zone, enfilading it. Parallel to the kill zone and tied into the 'L' was a second, flanking ambush.
The 'L' shaped ambush could also provide its own flank security. The base of the 'L' might be placed along either flank of the ambush position, not to fire into the kill zone, but to ambush enemy units that were attempting to flank the main ambush position along obvious avenues of approach.
In some situations the enemy located a reserve unit in line with the vertical bar of the 'L' forming a 'T' ambush. After the ambush was sprung, the attacker maneuvered his reserves to block the enemy line of withdrawal. The reserves either close assaulted or set up another ambush along the first linear obstacle to the immediate rear of the kill zone.
The Maneuver Ambush. This was usually directed against a road bound column of vehicles. The PAVN/VC usually sprang it from high ground and near a bend in the road, which allowed cover and longer fields of fire for automatic weapons. Weapons frequently opened fire from positions within forty yards of the road or less.
A road bend was included in the kill zone so that the end of the column was out of sight of the head of the column when the ambush was sprung. Interruption of a column's front-to-rear line of sight increased the likelihood that the head and tail of the column would split and try to fight separately.
The ambush was initiated by a small element striking the head of an enemy column and stopping it by fire. Then the main body would attack the column from the rear and/or flank, fragmenting it and rolling it up. The two strikes were timed close enough together so that the target column was engaged from both ends before it could deploy and face toward either danger.
The 'V' Ambush. Positioned with its open mouth toward the enemy advance, this was a favorite of the VC. It was used in both fairly open terrain as well as jungle. The ambushers, in good concealment along the legs of the 'V', would wait until the enemy point had passed and then creep close to the trail. The 'V' ambush was virtually undetectable by enemy point or flank security until at least a portion of the enemy force was in the kill zone. Enfilading fire was often directed down the enemy axis of advance, and interlocking fire from each leg across the 'V'. The 'V' ambush also lent itself to the use of controlled mines and booby traps.
The 'Z' Ambush. Usually laid along a road, the 'Z' ambush was both effective and confusing to the unit being ambushed. This complicated ambush was usually well planned with low bunkers lining the kill zone, often prepared months prior to the ambush. The ambush position was only occupied after word was received that an enemy battalion or larger unit would be using the road, which passed through the ambush site.
The long end of the 'Z' ambush was located on one side of a trail or road enabling the ambushers to employ both enfilading and flanking fire. It was also placed to neutralize attempts to flank the ambush from nearly every direction. Ambushing units deployed along the two short ends of the 'Z' could fire in either direction. The 'Z' ambush was dangerous to ambushers because ambush elements could easily fire into each other.
"Bait" tactics in ambush and harassment encounters
VC/PAVN "bait" tactics
Numerous VC/PAVN actions were quick, harassment affairs- firing a few mortar or artillery rounds and then disappearing. But others involved detailed planning and execution. These offensive and defensive tactics often involved luring ARVN and US troops into a maze of concealed fortifications, or into ambush positions, where they could be bled before the PAVN/VC forces withdrew. Initial positions were sometimes made to appear deliberately weak, including unmanned bunkers and light sniper-type resistance to bait enemy forces inside the killing zone. In the meantime, more lethal elements maneuvered and concentrated inside the fortified complex to inflict maximum damage.[53] Less elaborate than the fortified bunker complexes were individual "spider holes" – one-man excavations, some 2 feet wide by 4–5 feet deep, with a vegetation-covered lid, carefully camouflaged to be invisible from the air, or even foot-infantry several yards away. One US Marine memoir describes 12 such spider holes strung along both sides of a road, covered with grass and then dirt. As a US convoy passed, the PAVN popped out of these hideaways and opened fire, pinning down the entire column. Supporting mortars behind the spider holes hammered the trapped Americans for several hours before the PAVN pulled out.[54]
Jungle terrain offered ideal environments for such methods, but ambushes and harassment tactics were also used in civilian areas. Firing a few rounds and withdrawing could not only lure enemy troops into a trap based on civilian structures but could also induce US/ARVN forces to unleash hasty artillery and tactical air strikes after relatively token provocation. This created excessive destruction in the built up areas and helped radicalize the populace against the US/ARVN troops.[53]
Bait tactics exploited the US focus on body counts and its lavish use of firepower, including relatively ineffective Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) fire.[7]:180–211 One related method was to occupy a hamlet or deploy near it, digging into positions at the treeline on the perimeter of the hamlet for attack or defense. ARVN or US forces would often counterattack by unleashing air and artillery strikes on the community, causing destruction to the persons and property of the civilians they were supposed to be protecting. The damage done, and protected by their dug-in positions, VC and PAVN fighters melted away at their earliest convenience, later repeating the cycle elsewhere.[7]:57–126
Another PAVN/VC variant was to let a few advance scouts show themselves briefly to US formations, hoping to lure them forward into a prepared trap. Since US forces were often eager for contact and body counts, this gambit was sometimes successful. One war history for example records the astonishment of an American unit that followed these lures, when above them, they observed what appeared to be the tree canopy moving. The "moving trees" turned out to be camouflaged VC recon elements that signaled for the trap to be sprung from entrenched bunkers, machine guns, and assault elements that hit the Americans from three sides, inflicting heavy casualties before pulling out.[55]
American use of "bait" tactics
American forces also ran their own version of bait tactics, hoping to turn the tables on opponents and increase kill ratios. Whether based on airmobile or more ground oriented "search and destroy" missions, this approach involved using small bodies of US troops as "bait" – inviting communist forces to attack them, after which air and artillery firepower, and follow-on forces held in reserve would presumably crush the attackers. Such tactics were heavily used to obtain the most valued metric- a high body count of enemy. According to US Major General William E. DePuy, commander of the 1st Infantry Division: "The game in the jungle is to send in a small force as bait, let the enemy attack, and be able to react with a larger force in reserve nearby. But if the enemy doesn't want to fight, then the jungle goes off in 360 directions."[56] American superiority and speed in bringing massive quantities of firepower to bear greatly aided this approach and at times, caused heavy communist casualties. However it also put tremendous psychological pressure on the small groups of US soldiers dangled as "bait" before the opposing VC/NVA, who continually whittled down American strength and morale with mining and booby traps, and consistently ambushed US formations in the field.[57] In these encounters, as in the war as a whole, Communist forces still controlled the overall initiative of when and where to strike. Per one historian:
For the individual soldier serving as "bait," the unpredictable nature of search-and-destroy missions took a heavy psychological toll. Constant fear and tension pervaded American patrols with potential threats lurking in every hamlet or rice paddy... Despite Westmoreland's emphasis on finding and killing the enemy, these patrols often consisted of long marches, a great deal of searching, and little fighting.[58]
One US Army primer (Marshall and Hackworth 1967) on fighting Communist forces recognized some of these problems and counseled against hasty reaction fires, or careless advances on contact.[53] Pressure from higher commanders for body counts in pursuit of the US attrition strategy contributed to these outcomes, sometimes making a bad tactical situation worse in the view of these and other authors.[59]
Effectiveness of ambushes
Ambushes were an important part of VC/NVA offensive effort, though they could sometimes be used defensively to thwart, delay or evade an attack. Against ARVN forces they could cause tremendous damage and close vital arteries of transport. Not all ambushes were fully successful however. While VC/NVA forces typically held the initiative as to where and when to strike, US mobility and firepower sometimes blunted or dispersed their attacks. In a war of attrition however, where the clock was running on impatient US commitments, time favored Communist forces.
The encounter between the 274th VC Main Force Regiment and the US 11th Armored Cavalry shown in the diagram above illustrates several facets of the contending forces. The ambush took place on Highway 1, a vital road artery close to Saigon. There seems to have been careful preparation by Communist forces, including pre-built bunkers to shelter troops from US firepower along the line of retreat. A number of vehicles were destroyed but US airpower broke up the VC concentrations. A follow-up sweep by US forces killed a small number of additional VC but the bulk of them escaped.[60]
VC formations continually refined their techniques. At the Battle of Ong Thanh in 1967 they sprung another ambush, inflicting heavy casualties on American troops. In this encounter the VC used a variety of methods to neutralize dreaded US firepower, including "hugging" or fighting close to US troops. They also moved rapidly parallel to the line of ambush, sliding along its length and thus presenting a harder target for American counter-attack. While US firepower caused significant losses for the VC throughout the conflict, these methods show a force that was learning, adapting, and growing more proficient on the battlefield. Time as always, still favored Communist forces. Sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam were always available, forbidden to US ground attack. Inevitably, the ARVN and Americans would have to move on. The VC and NVA regrouped and returned.[61]
Sapper attacks
Sapper organization
The NVA used special assault troops or sappers for a wide range of missions, sometimes by themselves, or sometimes as spearheads for a main-force echelon. The Viet Cong also deployed sappers particularly after Tet Offensive losses had made large-scale attacks hazardous. Called dac cong by the Vietnamese, sappers were a force economy measure that could deliver a stinging blow. They were an elite group, especially adept at infiltrating and attacking airfields, firebases and other fortified positions. About 50,000 men served in the PAVN as sappers, organized into groups of 100–150 men, further broken down into companies of roughly 30–36 men, with sub-divisions into platoons, squads and cells. Specialist troops such as radiomen, medics, and explosives experts were also attached. Many were volunteers. Sappers were often assigned to larger units (regiments, divisions etc.) – carrying out attacks and recon duties, but could also be organized as independent formations. Sappers trained and rehearsed carefully in all aspects of their craft and made use of a variety of equipment and explosive devices, including captured or abandoned American munitions.[62] Sappers also carried out intelligence missions and could work undercover. One of the sappers in the spectacular 1968 Tet Offensive attack against the US Embassy for example, was once a driver to the US Ambassador.[63]
Sapper techniques
Assault planning. As with most VC Main Force/PAVN operations, the general pattern of "one slow, four quick" was followed – slow recon and initial penetration, then fast approach, attack, clearance and withdrawal. A typical assault began with a detailed recon of the target- pinpointing bunkers, ammo dumps, command and communications centers, barracks, power generation facilities and other vital points. Data from many other sources (farmers, spies, informers etc.) was collected and added to this. Detailed mortar ranges to each target area were plotted. A mock-up of the target was created and detailed rehearsals took place. Assaults were usually planned after nightfall.[62] Signalling systems were sometimes devised using colored flares. A typical signal package by the assault teams might be as follows: red flare: area hard to get into; white flare: withdrawal; green followed by white: reinforcements requested; green flare: victory.[64]
Assault organization and formations. Depending on the size of the attack, sappers were usually divided into 10–20 man assault groups or teams, which were further subdivided into 3–5 man assault cells. Each was tasked with destroying or neutralizing a specific area of the enemy defense. Four echelons might be employed on a typical sapper operation. An Assault group took on the main burden of the initial penetration through the wire and other defenses. A Fire-support group might be used to lay down covering fire via RPGs, mortars or machine guns at key points such as when the penetration elements cleared the wire, or at a set time, or via a pre-arranged signal. A small Security group might be deployed to position themselves to ambush reinforcements that attempted to rush to the defense of the besieged area. A Reserve group might be held back to exploit success, mop up or extract their fellow soldiers if the situation began to deteriorate.[65] Deployment of these elements depended on the target and available forces. In larger attacks, where the sappers were to lead the way, the fire support, exploitation or security roles might be undertaken by bigger echelons of regular follow-on forces which used breaches created by the sappers to conduct their operations.[62][66]
Initial assault movement. Movement to the target area was typically by long, roundabout routes to conceal the mission and fool enemy observation.[64] Once they had reached the target, infiltrators in the advance units spread themselves around the perimeter according to their assigned tasks. Detailed prior reconnaissance helped in this effort. They strapped weapons and explosive charges to their bodies to minimize noise as they maneuvered through the outer band of fortifications, and often covered their bodies in charcoal and grease to aid movement and make detection more difficult. Barbed wire was sometimes only cut partially, with the remaining strands broken by hand to muffle the tell-tale "snip" of wire-cutters. Tripflares were neutralized by wrapping their triggers with cloth or strips of bamboo carried in the teeth of the vanguard fighters. Claymore mines might be turned in another direction.
A point man usually preceded each team – crawling silently through defenses, probing with his fingers to detect and neutralize obstacles, while the others followed behind. Sometimes gaps in the wire were created by tying down strands to make an assault corridor. Woven mats might be thrown over barbed wire to facilitate passage. Sappers often used Bangalore torpedoes made from blocks of TNT tied to bamboo poles to blast open assault routes. Attack routes often took unexpected avenues of approach, such as through the trash pits of US Firebase Cunningham in 1969.[64]
The main attack and withdrawal. Based on the target and relevant military situation, some attacks proceeded mainly by stealth, with little initial covering fire until the last moment. Breaches might be created in the wire at several points, then left open while the penetration teams aligned with their objectives, and hunkered down, awaiting the hour of decision. Other strikes, particularly against heavily defended US targets used a barrage of covering fires to keep defenders penned in their positions, heads down, while the assault groups moved stealthily into position. Targets were usually hit in priority order- according to the level of danger they presented to the sapper units, or based on relevant military or political objectives. Emphasizing utmost ruthlessness in attack, the sub-doctrine of the "3 strongs" (surprise, concentration of force and exploitation of success) was generally followed.[66]
If discovered, the sappers often sprang up and attacked immediately. Diversionary assaults and fires were also created to screen the main sapper effort. Once the fierce fighting of the main phase was over, the pullout began. While small rearguard type elements might be left in place for delaying or diversionary purposes, withdrawal was generally a quick affair. Valuable enemy weapons and other equipment were rounded up, and the bodies of the dead and wounded were removed. Detailed after-action reports and "self-criticism" exercises were conducted by VC/PAVN forces, absorbing lessons learned and sharpening their skills for the next assault.[62][66]
Examples of sapper attacks
Sapper attack on 242d Aviation Company – Củ Chi, 1969
Attacks on the US 25th Infantry Division base at Củ Chi, in 1969, illustrate sapper operations that caused less destruction, but they were carried out nevertheless on one of the most important and well-defended US bases in Vietnam. This particular action involved an apparent mix of VC and NVA elements that destroyed nine Boeing CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, damaged three more and blew up an ammo dump.[68] VC sappers by some reports led the assault, with NVA providing follow-on ground or fire-support attacks. However, by 1969, most Main Force VC formations were manned by northern soldiers, and communist forces continually used shifting unit numbers to confuse ARVN and US order of battle experts,[4] so the VC-NVA distinction and unit designations are less than clear.
POW interrogations revealed close coordination with local guerrilla elements and informers, including provision of detailed drawings and sketches of the target area. Penetration teams achieved almost complete surprise, with the sappers cutting 10 barbed wire fences, and advancing without being detected by sentries, obstacles or patrols. A rocket attack was the signal for the sappers to go into action against the helicopters and soldiers. Aside from the aircraft, US troop losses were comparatively light (1 dead, 3 wounded versus some 30 NVA or VC dead),[68] nevertheless the incident reveals the ability of the VC/NVA to stay in the field while they rebuilt after the losses of Tet.
Sapper attack on Firebase Mary Ann, 1971
The attack against US Army Firebase Mary Ann in 1971 by the Main Force VC 409th Sapper Battalion, is another example of these techniques. Surprise was achieved on the objective – with many on the US side not believing the NVA would attack such a small outpost. The Firebase had seen little serious threat in the past, and was manned by 250 mostly American soldiers and some ARVN. In addition, earlier helicopter and aircraft operations at the base had touched off a number of warning flares in the wire surrounding the complex. These had not been replaced when the attack came.[66] A mortar barrage was laid down at a set time to open the battle. This provided cover for the sappers, who were already pre-positioned far forward, to move quickly towards their objectives. They destroyed the Battalion Operations Center and a number of command posts, and created general mayhem before withdrawing when helicopter gunships arrived.
The final US toll was almost 30 dead and 82 wounded. Suspicion still lingers about this controversial attack, including charges that VC infiltrators posed as ARVN soldiers to facilitate the assault.[66] If so, the incident demonstrates the long reach of the VC intelligence services, and their sophisticated planning and execution of the assault. Several senior American commanders were relieved of duty or were reprimanded after the event. Audaciously, the VC attacked the ruins of the firebase the following day with machine gun fire. One Vietnam War historian calls this incident the "U.S. Army's most blatant and humiliating defeat in Vietnam."[69]
VC/NVA use of terror
Final victory by conventional forces
Improvements in PAVN performance over the 1972 Offensive
Assessment of VC/NVA performance must look beyond the American interlude, and the guerrilla warfare phases to the final outcome of the Vietnam War in 1975. Well before the end, the Viet Cong were reduced to a minor force, and regular PAVN formations controlled the field. While final victory was aided by absence of American airpower, the PAVN/VPA armies were no longer the light-infantry formations mauled at the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965, but a tough, proficient, well-equipped modern force. Their capabilities had grown considerably, and several shortcomings of the conventional 1972 Easter Offensive were remedied.
In 1972 there was distinct weaknesses in the coordination of armor, artillery and infantry, with the three fronts of advance failing to support one another satisfactorily.[70] Armored forces were often committed in penny packets, with lack of effective infantry support and artillery co-operation, making them vulnerable to US and ARVN countermeasures. The logistics system was also unable to support the tempo of full-scale conventional battle. By 1975, these weaknesses had been substantially corrected, and a sophisticated military machine attained a rapid victory. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was increasingly a network of paved roads easing the logistical flow for the Offensive and tactical concentration and coordination of infantry, armor and artillery was much tighter.[70]
Integral to the PAVN advance was combined infantry and armor columns, that threw ARVN opponents off balance with swift moves and rapid concentrations. Extensive use was made of the "blooming lotus" tactic to assault cities and towns.[71] Rather than surround them and work inward in the orthodox manner of many contemporary Western armies, PAVN mobile columns bypassed opposition on the target's perimeter, and drove inward to seize vital command and control nodes in the central areas first, before striking outward to liquidate opposition. A reserve force was held on standby to defeat counterattacks against the penetration force.[71]
A leap-frogging tactic was also employed to maintain momentum. Spearhead units would sometimes deploy quickly to tackle opposition, while follow-on echelons bypassed such engagements to strike deeper.[70] Infiltration units like sappers also assisted the push by seizing bridges, road junctions and other key points ahead of the main forces. Deception measures were also widely used, with diversionary operations across a broad area, and troop movements timed until the last minute, to avoid telegraphing the main points of attack. Such methods for example, enabled quick conquest of towns like Ban Me Thuot and their surrounding highways, and paved the way for further operations towards Saigon.[71]
Terror and panic played their part in the NVA/PAVN advance, particularly in the Central Highlands where five rapidly moving divisions overwhelmed hapless ARVN formations. During the retreat from the Highlands, massive columns of civilian refugees mingled with fleeing South Vietnamese troops. PAVN forces shelled these columns indiscriminately with mortars, rockets and artillery, killing over 100,000 civilians by some estimates, and liquidating some 40,000 out of 60,000 retreating ARVN soldiers.[72]
PAVN as a modern, professional army
The final PAVN triumph was aided by numerous weaknesses and failures in South Vietnamese forces and leadership.[73] Thieu's "hold everywhere" strategy in the months before the Northern offensive stretched ARVN forces too thinly and withered away any central reserve. Ongoing corruption and incompetence dogged and demoralized the ARVN rank and file. For example, rampant inflation wiped out the inadequate wages of troops that already had little medical care available. In a society where regular full-time soldiers and their dependents made up about 20% of the population, this amounted to widespread impoverishment of important segments of South Vietnamese society.[73] Desertion rates after the American pullout approached 25% of total force strength, reductions that were not made up when the end came. Of the total 1,000,000 men theoretically mobilized for defence (including about half a million militia), only about 10% were direct combat troops.[73] Disastrous leadership decisions in the final weeks of fighting such as the debacle in the highlands (see Ho Chi Minh Campaign) sealed the doom of a troubled force.[73]
Such weaknesses were skillfully exploited by the fast-moving Northern conquest, in a final campaign that illustrates a coming of age for the PAVN forces in the minds of some Western historians.
Almost a quarter century ago, a third world country won the final battle of a long and difficult war through the use of an unexpected and decidedly modern strategy. The tutorial embodied in this victory is worth remembering today, in an age when there is a tendency to rely more on technology than on strategy and to assume that our enemy's strategic skills are as backward as his nation's economy, social structure and technological base... For the first time, PAVN's campaign strategy was not based primarily on the demonstrated willingness of its troops to die in greater numbers than those of its opponents. Moreover, it paid only lip service to the old dogma of a popular uprising. The PAVN campaign relied instead on deception, diversion, surprise, an indirect approach and alternate objectives – in short, a highly cerebral strategy. PAVN finally mounted a campaign worthy of the modern, professional army the Vietnamese communist leadership worked so long to build.[74]
Evaluación del desempeño de NLF / PAVN
Focus on American versus Vietnamese perspectives
Numerous Western histories of the Vietnam War, some scholars argue[75] tend to assign the Vietnamese a secondary role in terms of the developments that led to victory by the North. For example, while American combat deaths are often referenced in the large number of Western histories, comparatively little mention is made of the 275,000 combat deaths suffered by the South Vietnamese, almost 5 times the American total. Just the evacuation of Da Nang in March 1975 cost the South Vietnamese an estimated 60,000 deaths, more than total US military losses for the entire conflict.[76]
There is often heavy concentration on the American effort and its mistakes, contradictions and strategy, but comparatively little on the Vietnamese side, save as it ties into the theme of American failure or missteps.[77] Whatever the merits of these arguments about war coverage, it is clear that the main 8-year American interlude (albeit important) was only a relatively short one in the decades-old struggle for hegemony in the Second Indochina War.
VC/NVA battlefield performance
VC/NVA performance waxed and waned with the fortunes of war. Weapons and equipment at the small arms level were equal with those of their enemies, and in some categories of heavy artillery they also achieved parity. The struggle against US bombing saw deployment of one of the most sophisticated air defence systems in the world, albeit with Soviet assistance. In other categories they could not match the wide range of advanced US technology.
Against their ARVN opponents the VC/NVA generally did well in both guerrilla and conventional warfare, and were on the verge of victory in 1965, before the American intervention. While ARVN forces achieved a number of impressive successes,[78] they were, on balance, clearly outclassed by the PAVN armies, which suffered from weaknesses in certain areas, such as airpower and the handling of armor- illustrated particularly in the 1972 Easter Offensive.[37] Subsequent campaigns in Indochina however, illustrate a number of PAVN strengths – from the rapid victory of 1975, to the initial 1979 invasion of Cambodia which saw well coordinated corps-sized combined arms operations including an amphibious assault against the coast. PAVN strengths were also shown in its defensive operations during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.[79]
Against US forces the record is more mixed. There were a number of successes particularly in ambushes, sapper attacks and various other engagements. When entrenched in strong positions, they were able to exact a price on attacking American troops, before withdrawing to cross-border sanctuaries to fight another day. VC/NVA operations however were sometimes marked by very heavy casualties. Typical of these were the Tet attacks and the border battles that saw heavy losses against superior US air, ground and naval firepower. American strategic mobility, using airpower and helicopters also took a heavy toll and blunted several communist initiatives, most notably at the Ia Drang, Tet and other places. In general during the war, US forces caused far more casualties to the VC/NVA than the other way round. However, the communist forces were usually able to replenish their forces. Expansion of the battle-space over a wide area, and attrition over time however, the linchpin of their protracted war strategy, kept their forces intact until this formidable opponent withdrew.
Elements in NLF/PAVN triumph
There are numerous keys to the final outcome of the Vietnam War. A few of these interrelated factors are summarized below:[77]
- A protracted, integrated strategy that maximized Northern strengths against the weaknesses of their Southern and American opponents. This was the strategy of protracted war, that tightly integrated political and military factors, and slowly weakened opposition over time by an attritional campaign. Protracted war also involved sequencing a mix of combat styles. This ranged from small-scale guerrilla attacks, to main-force battles that even when costly, atrophied enemy strength and morale. It also drew powerful US forces into peripheral areas, while allowing VC/NVA forces to control the key to any People's War, the population. All these measures were keyed to political ends, and included ruthless assassination, kidnapping and sabotage efforts throughout the war. To some US soldiers who fought against the VC/NVA, like US Lt. General Phillip Davidson, Chief of Military Intelligence from 1967 to 69,[37]:803–850 and US war historians like Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.[7] this strategy was a superior one in terms of Communist objectives and strengths, and American/GVN weaknesses.
- Superior motivation and morale. Seen in terms of determination to achieve final victory in Indochina, Communist motivation and morale was superior to that of their enemies. For VC/NVA forces the conflict was not simply another costly Cold War episode but a life and death struggle spanning generations. Some northern leaders stressed the predominance of spiritual over material factors,[4] a notion sometimes paid for with dire results and painful lessons under enemy (particularly American) firepower. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that over the course of almost two decades, both PAVN leadership and the ordinary PAVN soldier were more determined to achieve final triumph, and more willing to expend lives and treasure towards this end, than their opponents.[37]:801–850[77]
- Detailed, overlapping organization backed by thorough going indoctrination. Historian Douglas Pike in 'Viet Cong' (1966) asserts that the closest thing to a "secret weapon" of the revolutionary forces was organization[80] – tight, overlapping mechanisms of structure that enmeshed its subjects in a tight web of control. This structure included the parallel system of party control at all levels of civilian and military life, the overlapping plethora of organizations from province to village hamlet that enhanced resource exploitation, the three-man cells all troops were organized into, and the heavy use of "criticism and self-criticism" that pervaded all levels. One American Vietnam War historian calls the Viet Cong "more disciplined and organized than nearly any insurgents in history."[81]
- Logistical, military, political and diplomatic support by friendly communist nations. Aid from China and the Soviet Union was indispensable to the tough military machine on the ground, and the equally tenacious machine on the diplomatic and political fronts. This aid made North Vietnam dependent on their suppliers, but it was able to play one off against the other to enhance their bargaining power and maintain a stance of relative independence.[82] Support by communist nations also included the threat of massive Chinese intervention if the US opted to eliminate the northern regime by a conventional invasion, or threatened China itself. This threat, or perceived threat, effectively stymied that option. Though China was reluctant to confront the US directly in another Korean War style morass, it conveyed deterrent threats to the United States not only through military aid and deployment of over 300,000 supporting PLA troops in North Vietnam, but on some occasions, signaled China's readiness for action through such indirect diplomatic channels as Pakistan and Britain.[83] Some historians argue that the Chinese threat was overstated, and that Peking was more concerned with internal turmoil and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, and was willing to tolerate US intervention "as long as that intervention did not include rolling back communism in North Vietnam." This implicit guarantee of the North's survival, backed by the ultimate menace of massive Chinese action, curtailed America's full freedom of action.[84]
- Logistical resilience, manoeuvring space and a massive manpower pool. The enormous, and successful Communist logistics effort in the face of devastating enemy firepower provided another key to victory. Supplied by supportive socialist allies, distribution to the battle zone, utilizing the manoeuvring space that was the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails was an impressive logistical feat. This vast space – encompassing parts of Laos, Cambodia as well as the two Vietnams, stymied American and South Vietnamese interdiction efforts. Thorough organization and lavish expending of manpower were the skeleton and muscle of this achievement. The manpower available to communist forces in the struggle was critical. As noted above, some of this was external, with CHina providing over 300,000 troops to maintain logistical support on roads, railways, supply instillations and military facilities such as anti-aircraft batteries, and cross-border sanctuary airbases. Within South Vietnam, VIet Cong forces around the time of the Tet Offensive are estimated by some Western analysts as around 300,000 main force fighters, local guerillas and cadre.[85] Northern sources claims a combined total of 690,000 NVA and VC troops in place as early as 1966.[86] The exact communist Order of Battle on the ground was a matter of controversy with competing and shifting estimates between American MACV and CIA analysts, but most agreed on the huge manpower pool available to the north - with approximately 175,000 males reaching draft-age annually, and a total of 4 million draft-age males available for the war.[87] Such human resources were organized and maneuvered in an unrelenting struggle spanning four countries- all tied together by the Trail, or what the North called the Trường Sơn Strategic Supply Route. In terms of the tremendous effort to achieve victory at any cost, one American war historian asserts: "By any standard of human endeavor and achievement, what happened on the Ho Chi Minh Trail must rank high among the works of men and women."[14]
- Time and tempo. While they absorbed severe blows at times, the VC/NVA had time on their side under the strategy of protracted conflict. Communist forces suffered some one million dead according to their own estimates [89] but this was relative in a conflict where manpower reserves were plentiful and key allies like China were providing tens of thousands of troops to keep border supply and transport routes open. Tempo manifested itself at the local level. Except for those times when they were forced into a battle by US sweeps, or during deployment for a major operation, Communist troops spent most of their time in area control and consolidation, not fighting. Overall, they controlled the initiative – when, where and with what intensity to strike. Tempo was also a factor in the long-term struggle. Communist forces were able to meter their losses as the conflict waxed and waned – depending on the political, diplomatic and military situation – scaling back after the setbacks of Tet, and increasing effort dramatically in 1972 and 1975, when the situation looked more favorable.[37]:318
- Shrewd performance on the political and diplomatic fronts. Communist forces waged a number of effective propaganda and diplomatic campaigns to exploit contradictions in the camps of their enemies. One key triumph of politics (albeit backed by force of arms) was the continued use of sanctuaries in supposedly "neutral" countries, the cultivation of indigenous "liberation forces" like the Pathet Lao, and the inability of their opponents to make significant inroads against these indispensable rear bases. Other triumphs included the division of American opinion (epitomized in visiting American celebrities and media reports), the isolation of the Southern regime from their American backers, the "talk-fight" stonewalling strategy to extract maximum concessions, and perceptive calculation of the limits US leaders would observe in deploying military force.[89] Considerations of political performance must include the efficacy of dau tranh strategy in the creation and manipulation of numerous "front" or shell groups within South Vietnam to isolate its ruling regime, mobilize grassroots support for revolutionary aims, and encourage evasion and defection among its armed forces.[90]
- The ruthless determination of leaders of the revolutionary struggle. This includes both northerners and a heavy southern presence in the North's ruling echelons. By the time of the final victory in 1975, many of these leaders had been on the field of struggle for two decades. There was often division within this leadership. More conservative "north-firsters" clashed with "south-firsters" but ultimately, their collective determination prevailed.
- Failure of the South Vietnamese leadership to develop an effective political narrative and administration. Some of this failure grew out of the difficult conditions in which South Vietnam was initially established. This initial weakness was also reflected in political instability, endemic corruption, and inefficient administration. Despite these vulnerabilities however, it is also clear that millions of South Vietnamese opposed the takeover of their society by a communist dictatorship and fought resolutely against this outcome.[91] The southern regime however, could not develop a convincing political narrative and the degree of thorough political organization and mobilization to meet it, compared to their opponents. The American failure was marked by its own set of shortcomings and miscalculations, but was inextricably linked to South Vietnamese difficulties, some historians maintain.[92] Given a merciless civil war, ultimate settlement of the conflict was between the Vietnamese.
- Corruption, incompetence and ineffective politicization of South Vietnamese military leadership. Southern ineffectiveness was reflected in the appointment of military leaders based on loyalty or family ties rather than professional competence, the ineffectual intertwining of officers in both military and civilian affairs, and widespread nepotism, corruption and factionalism that focused on personal agendas and profit rather than winning the war at hand.[93] The best ARVN units such as the Rangers, Marines, paratroops and special forces were too often unavailable for battle because they were held back by Saigon's leaders for internal political maneuvering.[94] PAVN/NLF military leadership was likewise heavily politicized, but in the communist case, effective management and accountable personnel were in place to fight the war to a victorious conclusion. RNAF effectiveness in combat was mixed, and often marred by incompetent higher leadership, such as the performance of General Hoang Xuan Lam (later relieved of command) during the 1971 Laos incursion). Lower level leaders in general made a better showing, but too often lacked initiative, determination and skill under battle conditions. There were exceptions at all levels, such as Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, and some lower level officers[95] but the general pattern above fared badly against the more dedicated and efficient NVA/NLF.[96] Even such key fundamentals as mobilizing available troop strength or furnishing supplies to the front line were mired in malfeasance. Quartermaster units for example sometimes demanded bribes before furnishing fighting men with rice, ammunition, gasoline, and other material. [97] As much as 10 percent of the regular armed forces were non-existent "ghost" soldiers (deserters, disabled, deceased etc) who still appeared on the official rosters with leaders pocketing the extra payroll of the bogus troops.[98] Such weaknesses were untenable in the face of a ruthlessly determined northern enemy.
- The mobilizing force of Marxism-Leninism, mated to Vietnamese nationalism. While in some ways Marxism was alien to the Vietnamese landscape, revolutionary leaders succeeded in blending it with traditional Vietnamese xenophobia and a growing modern sense of nationalism. Marxism also presented a sense of inevitable historical progress that enhanced mobilization, and included the key role of the Lao Dong, the Communist Party of North Vietnam. These factors helped mobilise some support within South Vietnam.
- Ability to learn and adapt. Against both the US and ARVN the VC/NVA demonstrated an ability to adapt on the battlefield. They learned from their mistakes and adopted tactics and measures to reduce losses. These ranged from deep tunnel systems, "hugging" techniques in infantry battles, widespread random mining, fast-moving sapper assaults, treetop fighting positions to foil US helicopters, deployment of new Soviet supplied technology like man-portable missiles, to simple avoidance of battle without overwhelming numerical superiority. The keen study of their own strengths and weaknesses through "criticism and self-criticism," and the systematic distribution of "lessons learned" through reports and memorandum was part of this crucial learning ability, demonstrating that the NLF/PAVN were not the hapless peasants of popular lore, but a well equipped, serious and sophisticated military organization.[2]
Ver también
- NLF and PAVN strategy, organization and structure
- NLF and PAVN logistics and equipment
- Strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare
- Weapons of the Vietnam War
- History of Vietnam
- Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group
- The United States and the Vietnam War
Referencias
- ^ Arnold R. Isaacs. 1998. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia
- ^ a b c RAND Corp 1967, p. 3–195.
- ^ Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (Viking Press: 1983)
- ^ a b c d e f Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA, (Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 33–56
- ^ Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, (Presidio: 1996) pp. 37–169
- ^ Merle Pribbenow (transl). 2002 "Victory in Vietnam. The official history of the people's army of Vietnam". University Press of Kansas, pp. 18–211, ISBN 0-7006-1175-4
- ^ a b c d e f g h Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam [Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986]
- ^ Gen W. C. Westmoreland, "Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964 – June 1968," in Report on the War in Vietnam [As of 30 June 1968], by United States Pacific Command [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969], appendix L, 284.
- [[[Wikipedia:Citing_sources|
page needed]] ="this_citation_requires_a_reference_to_the_specific_page_or_range_of_pages_in_which_the_material_appears. (november_2017)">]-9">^ a b c d RAND Corp 1967, p. [page needed]. - ^ MacGarrigle, George L. (1998). Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1067. Washington D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. p. 350-357
- ^ James E. Westheider. 2007. The Vietnam War. pp 146–152
- ^ UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND – VIETNAM, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No 60, (San Francisco, JUNE 1966), pp. 1–24
- ^ Lanning & Crag 1993, p. 169–190.
- ^ a b John Prados, The Blood Road, p. 374
- ^ UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, "Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No. 64: Imitative Communications Deception," (APO San Francisco), MAC J343 15 September 1967
- ^ a b US Army, Combined Intelligence Center-Vietnam, Handbook: "What A Platoon Leader Should Know about the Enemy's Jungle Tactics," (US Army: October, 1967), pp. 1–44
- ^ a b c Lanning & Crag 1993, p. 150–168.
- ^ Robert W. Chandler, War of Ideas – The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam, A Westview Special Study, Boulder, CO, 1981
- ^ a b Gordan L. Rottman, Viet Cong and NVA Tunnels and Fortifications of the Vietnam War (Osprey: 2006) pp. 10–14
- ^ a b c Lanning & Crag 1993, p. 33-56.
- ^ Mark Moyar. 2006. Triumph Forsaken: the Vietnam War, 1954–1965. Cambridge University press, 182–277
- ^ from: US Army, Combined Intelligence Center-Vietnam, Handbook: "What A Platoon Leader Should Know about the Enemy's Jungle Tactics," (US Army: October, 1967), p 26-30
- ^ Hay, Lieutenant General John H (Jr) (2003) [1974], Tactical and Materiel Innovations CMH Pub 90-21, US Army, Vietnam Studies, Washington D.C.: Department of Army, p. [page needed]
- ^ The Vietnam War, Episode Three: The River Styx (January 1964 – December 1965). PBS. Event occurs at 1:44:35. Retrieved 2018-09-08.
- ^ "Sự sáng tạo trong tư duy quân sự của Đại tướng Nguyễn Chí Thanh". Retrieved 2018-09-08.
- ^ US Army, Combined Intelligence Center-Vietnam, Handbook: "What A Platoon Leader Should Know about the Enemy's Jungle Tactics", (US Army: October, 1967), p 1-44
- ^ JACOB VAN STAAVEREN. 2002. GRADUAL FAILURE: THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM 1965–1966. Air Force History and Museums Program. because of don skeptic United States Air Force, pp 164–168
- ^ Ira A Hunt, 2004. Ninth Infantry Division In Vietnam, p. 61-78
- ^ Martin Van Creveld. 2011. The Age of Airpower, 379-400N
- ^ Martin Van Creveld. 2011. The Age of Airpower, 379–400
- ^ a b c d Hunt, Ninth Infantry, 61–65
- ^ Christian G. Appy. 2016. American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity p. 178-183
- ^ Van Creveld 379–400
- ^ John Martin Carroll, Colin F. Baxter. eds. 2007. The American Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to the Present. p 253-255
- ^ Lt. Gen John Tolson, 1989, Airmobility: 1961–1971, US Army Vietnam Studies
- ^ Albert Conord, General Raymond Davis and the Principles of War. Monograph, Command and Staff College Marine Corps University, Quantico. 2002)
- ^ a b c d e Davidson, Philip Davidson (1988). Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. pp316-415
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- ^ Impact Zone, 100–174
- ^ The American Military Tradition p 253-255
- ^ The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military, Spencer C. Tucker ed. 2011, pp 290–293
- ^ The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: pp 290–293
- ^ Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. (1986). The Army and Vietnam, pp135–274.
- ^ On Guerrilla Warfare, by Mao Tse-tung, 1937, See the text of Mao's work online at www.marxists.org
- ^ Lanning & Crag 1993, p. 179–190.
- ^ Bernard B. Fall, Street without Joy, (Publisher: Stackpole Books: 1954, rev 1994), pp. 22–174; and Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA, (Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 179–190; and US Army, Center of Military History: Vietnam Studies, ( DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1989)
- ^ 25th INFANTRY DIVISION, "Battle of Soui Cut," Vol 3 No. 04, TROPIC LIGHTNING NEWS, January 22, 1968
- ^ US Air Force, Translation entitled "Raid On the "TACAN" Site Atop Pha-Thi Mountain.." [People's Army of Vietnam Publishing House], Hanoi, 1996. Air Force translation – Robert J. Destatte, 11 May 1997 and 7 April 1998.; weblink: "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2007-11-21. Retrieved 2007-12-07.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link), and http://limasite85.us/do_chi_ben.htm Archived 2012-08-01 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ US Air Force- translation "Tacan Raid.." Destatte 1967
- ^ Terrence Maitland, A CONTAGION OF WAR: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE SERIES, (Boston Publishing Company), 1983, p. 180
- ^ RAND Corp 1967, p. 3–195.
- ^ UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND – VIETNAM, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No 60, (San Francisco, JUNE 1966), pp. 1–14
- ^ a b c Military Operations; Vietnam Primer – Dept of the Army, 1967 by Brig.Gen. SLA Marshall (Ret.) & Lt.Col. David Hackworth (Ret.)
- ^ Jim Brown. 2004. Impact Zone: The Battle of the DMZ In Vietnam, 1967–1968, p. 70
- ^ David Maraniss, 2003. They Marched into Sunlight, p 529-601
- ^ Gregory Daddis, 2011. No Sure Victory. p 90–113
- ^ Daddis, p90–113
- ^ Daddis, p95
- ^ Marshall and Hackworth, Military Operations; Vietnam Primer – Dept of the Army, US Army 1967
- ^ John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum: "Seven Firefights in Vietnam: CONVOY AMBUSH ON HIGHWAY 1, 21 NOVEMBER 1966," US Army, Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Research Library, United States Army Center of Military History: Vietnam Studies, (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1985). CMH Pub 70-4 (web ref: http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/7-ff/Ch2.htmm).
- ^ Maraniss, David, They Marched into Sunlight: (Simon & Schuster, 2004)[page needed]
- ^ a b c d James F. Dunnigan, The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, (Citadel Press: 2003), pp. 150–212
- ^ Don North, "VC Assault on the U.S. Embassy." Vietnam Magazine, February 2000, pp. 38–47, 72.
- ^ a b c Michael R. Conroy, "SAPPER ATTACK ON FSB CUNNINGHAM," URL: (http://www.foxco-2ndbn-9thmarines.com/dewey_canyon.htm). Background descriptions from The Vietnam Experience: Fighting for Time, by Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle. (Boston Publishing Company, 1983)
- ^ United States Army Center of Military History, Vietnam Studies, "FIELD ARTILLERY, 1954–1973," by Major General David Ewing Ott, (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY: WASHINGTON, D.C., 1975) pp. 1–13
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- ^ a b 25th Infantry Division, 242d Aviation Company (Aslt Spt Hel) 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat) 12th Aviation Group (Combat), "After Action Report 45", CU CHI BASE CAMP, February 26. 1969, US Army: 1969, pp. 1–12, weblink: http://25thaviation.org/history/id829.htm
- ^ Nolan, p. 1.
- ^ a b c Stacey, K., "Armour in Vietnam: the lessons of 1972 and 1975", Defence Force Journal, Australia (May/June 1980 (No.22))
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- ^ North Vietnam's final offensive: Strategic endgame nonpareil. By: Pribbenow, Merle L., Parameters: US Army War College, 00311723, Winter99/2000, Vol. 29, Issue 4
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- ^ Lewis Sorley, "Courage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Offensive," Parameters, 29 (Summer 1999), 38–56
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- ^ Douglas Pike. 1966. Viet Cong: Organization and Techniques of the National Front. 33–59; 97–133;404
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- ^ Khoo, Collateral Damage, 30–31
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- ^ Dougan, Clark; Weiss, Stephen; et al. (1983). Nineteen Sixty-Eight. p 11-48
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- ^ CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 1966, The Current status of PAVN Infiltration to South Vietnam. Central Intelligence Agency. April 9, 1966. p 3-12
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- ^ Pike, Viet Cong.. 32–59
- ^ Lewis Sorley 1999. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. 1–17; 372–389
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- ^ Clarke, Advice and Support, p 11-78
Fuentes
- RAND Corp (August 1967), Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964–1966, Santa Monica
- Lanning, Michael Lee; Crag, Dan (1993), Inside the VC and the NVA, Ballantine Books