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Política de Ghana
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El Consejo de Liberación Nacional ( NLC ) dirigió al gobierno de Ghana desde el 24 de febrero de 1966 hasta el 1 de octubre de 1969. El organismo surgió de un golpe de estado presuntamente apoyado por la CIA [1] [2] (el primero de Ghana) contra el gobierno civil dirigido por Kwame Nkrumah . El Servicio de Policía de Ghana y las Fuerzas Armadas de Ghana llevaron a cabo el golpe de forma conjunta, con la colaboración del Servicio Civil de Ghana . Se alega que los conspiradores estaban bien conectados con los gobiernos de Gran Bretaña (bajo el primer ministro Harold Wilson ) y los Estados Unidos (entonces bajo Lyndon B. Johnson), que algunos creen que aprobó el golpe debido a la política exterior procomunista de Nkrumah.

El nuevo gobierno implementó políticas de ajuste estructural recomendadas por el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) y el Banco Mundial . El dinero del presupuesto nacional pasó de la agricultura y la industrialización a las fuerzas armadas. Las empresas, la propiedad y el capital nacionales fueron privatizados o abandonados. Nkrumah había condenado los proyectos de desarrollo de las corporaciones multinacionales como signos de neocolonialismo . El NLC permitió que los conglomerados extranjeros operaran en términos extremadamente favorables. El cedi de Ghana se devaluó en un 30%. Estos cambios económicos no lograron reducir la deuda del país ni aumentar la relación entre exportaciones e importaciones.

El régimen del Consejo de Liberación Nacional obtuvo el apoyo de grupos poderosos de la sociedad ghanesa: jefes locales, intelectuales y líderes empresariales, así como de las fuerzas militares y policiales en expansión. Sin embargo, sus políticas de austeridad económica no fueron amadas por los trabajadores en general, que sufrieron un aumento del desempleo y la represión de las huelgas. En 1969, el régimen pasó por una transición cuidadosamente gestionada a un gobierno civil. Las elecciones celebradas el 29 de agosto de 1969 inauguraron así un nuevo gobierno encabezado por el sucesor elegido por el NLC: el Partido del Progreso de Kofi Abrefa Busia .

Golpe de 1966 [ editar ]

Clima político [ editar ]

De 1951 a 1966, Ghana fue controlada por el Partido Popular de la Convención y su fundador Kwame Nkrumah. Durante la década de 1950, el CPP patrocinó una variedad de proyectos económicos populares y en el proceso creó una gran deuda externa. En 1960, el CPP tomó medidas para nacionalizar la economía de Ghana y reforzó fuertemente su control en áreas como la moneda y los impuestos. En 1963, el público sufría escasez y aumento de precios. Cada vez menos empresarios se beneficiaron de la afiliación al partido. En medio de una creciente impopularidad, el Partido incrementó su represión de los oponentes políticos. [3] Usó la Ley de Detención Preventiva para encarcelar a sus oponentes sin juicio por hasta cinco años. En 1964, Nkrumah ganó un referéndum muy amañadoeso convirtió al CPP en el único partido legal, con él mismo como presidente vitalicio tanto de la nación como del partido. [4] La libertad de prensa llegó a un punto bajo, como lo demuestra una declaración de octubre de 1965 del Ghanaian Times : "Nuestra sociedad socialista no puede, y no tolerará, la publicación de ningún periódico en Ghana que se aparte de la ideología y las lealtades exigidas a la prensa en la Ghana socialista y nkrumaista ". [5] El general Afrifa comentó más tarde, con respecto a Radio Ghana: "Desde temprano en la mañana hasta altas horas de la noche se derramó una corriente enfermiza de adulación estalinista y abyectas adulaciones. Las noticias se distorsionaron o suprimieron con tanta frecuencia que los ghaneses dejaron de creer lo que oían". [6]

El Partido actuó como un monolito político, con control funcional sobre poderosas organizaciones civiles como el Congreso de Sindicatos de Ghana y el Consejo Musulmán de Ghana . [7] Así, el CPP había centralizado el poder político y económico con el fin de perseguir una rápida industrialización bajo control nacional. [8]

Detrás de la escena estaba un grupo de élite de planificadores económicos que se puso de pie para avanzar en su agenda bajo el gobierno militar. [9] Estos tecnócratas dentro del gobierno encontraron una causa común con el ejército y la policía en su desdén por la política de masas del Partido Popular de la Convención. [10] Una de esas figuras fue BA Bentum, ex Secretario General del Sindicato de Trabajadores Agrícolas y posteriormente Ministro de Silvicultura en el marco del CPP. Bentum desaprobó las tendencias socialistas del país y colaboró ​​con los conspiradores proporcionándoles información (incluidos detalles sobre los campos de entrenamiento secretos chinos, que se utilizan para entrenar a revolucionarios de otros países africanos). Kojo Botsio, presidente de la Comisión de Planificación del Estado, estaba igualmente dispuesto, si no tan estrechamente involucrado. [11]

Insatisfacción militar y policial [ editar ]

Nkrumah culpó a la policía por permitir un intento de atentado con bomba contra él en 1962. Cuando el 2 de enero de 1964, un oficial de policía disparó contra Nkrumah y mató a su guardaespaldas, la fuerza policial se reorganizó desde arriba, ocho oficiales superiores fueron destituidos y la base fueron desarmados. [12] Posteriormente, en abril de 1965, la Ley del Servicio de Policía otorgó a Nkrumah autoridad directa para contratar y despedir a la policía. [13] Nkrumah también eliminó el servicio de inteligencia de la "División Especial" de la fuerza policial y lo puso bajo control civil. [12]

El comisionado de policía John Harlley y su segundo al mando, Anthony Deku, habían aspirado durante mucho tiempo a tomar el control del gobierno. [14] Harlley había compilado un gran expediente sobre corrupción dentro del CPP y utilizó estos archivos para ganar legitimidad para su causa. [15] Sin embargo, para apoderarse del país, la Policía tuvo que trabajar con los militares, no solo porque habían sido desarmados, sino también porque, como principales ejecutores de la represión y la brutalidad bajo el CPP, no disfrutaban de un buena reputación con el público en general. [dieciséis]

Los planificadores golpistas del ejército identificaron el maltrato de las fuerzas armadas y el trato preferencial del Regimiento de la Guardia del Presidente como fuentes de su descontento. [17] Los salarios de soldados y oficiales, establecidos en 1957, habían perdido gran parte de su valor en medio de la inflación general, y el ejército no tenía dinero para nuevos uniformes y equipo. [18]

Algunas figuras clave del golpe habían entrado en conflicto personal con Nkrumah. Otu, el Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa, y Ankrah, el Subjefe, habían sido despedidos en agosto de 1965 y reemplazados por oficiales considerados más leales. [17] Los generales afirmaron más tarde que acciones como estas representaban una extralimitación del poder civil sobre los militares. [19] Afrifa se enfrentaba a un consejo de guerra por insubordinación, que comenzaría el 25 de febrero de 1966. [20] Harlley y Deku fueron acusados ​​de participar en un plan recientemente expuesto para vender diamantes ilícitamente a un comerciante europeo; según el rumor, Nkrumah los han arrestado a su regreso al país. [21] [22]

Las lealtades étnicas también pueden haber influido en algunos de los planificadores del golpe. Un número significativo procedía del grupo Ewe , que había sido dividido por la frontera con Togo y sentía que había recibido un trato injusto bajo Nkrumah y el CPP. [23] Los oficiales Ewe, que formaron el círculo interno del golpe, crecieron todos en la misma área, y Harlley y Kotoka (los miembros más prominentes de cada una de las fuerzas) asistieron a la Escuela Presbiteriana de Anloga. [24] [25]

Todos los planificadores del golpe habían recibido formación en Gran Bretaña, ya sea en el Metropolitan Police College o en la Royal Military Academy Sandhurst , y eran ampliamente percibidos como "pro-occidentales". [26] En general, el cuerpo de oficiales de Ghana era profundamente anglófilo y veía la cultura británica como un indicador de estatus. [27] Por lo tanto, ya se opusieron a la destitución de oficiales británicos por parte de Nkrumah en 1961. [28] Tampoco estaban contentos con un realineamiento en curso desde Gran Bretaña hacia la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas para el entrenamiento de oficiales. [29] [30]El mariscal del aire Otu escribiría en junio de 1968 que Ghana "se había convertido en una dictadura totalitaria de partido único; también había abreviado las libertades personales; había echado a los vientos [el] principio sagrado del estado de derecho, reducido las elecciones a una farsa y mucho peor aún, rechazó todos sus lazos tradicionales con Occidente en favor de las dudosas ventajas de asociarse con extraños amigos del este ". [31]

Acusaciones de participación angloamericana [ editar ]

Algunas de las primeras acusaciones sobre la participación de Estados Unidos en el golpe vinieron del oficial retirado de la CIA John Stockwell en su libro de 1978, En busca de enemigos . [1] [2]

En una nota a pie de página que compara el golpe en Ghana con operaciones más recientes en el Congo, Stockwell escribió:

Esta es la forma en que se manejó el derrocamiento de Nkrumah en Ghana, 1966. El Comité 40 se reunió y rechazó una propuesta de la agencia para derrocar a Nkrumah. No obstante, el cuartel general alentó a la estación de Accra a mantener contacto con disidentes del ejército de Ghana con el fin de recopilar información de inteligencia sobre sus actividades. Se le dio un presupuesto generoso y mantuvo un contacto íntimo con los conspiradores cuando se tramó un golpe. Tan estrecha fue la participación de la estación que pudo coordinar la recuperación de algunos equipos militares soviéticos clasificados por parte de Estados Unidos cuando tuvo lugar el golpe. La estación incluso propuso al cuartel general a través de canales secundarios que un escuadrón estuviera disponible en el momento del golpe para asaltar la embajada china, matar a todos los que estaban adentro, robar sus registros secretos y volar el edificio para cubrir el hecho.Esta propuesta fue anulada, pero dentro de la sede de la CIA, la estación de Accra recibió todo el crédito, aunque no oficial, por el eventual golpe, en el que murieron ocho asesores soviéticos. Nada de esto se reflejó adecuadamente en los registros escritos de la agencia.[32]

El historiador John Prados ha escrito que no se ha verificado que la CIA haya tenido algún papel en la dirección del golpe, aunque estaban al tanto de las tensiones que estaban aumentando entre el ejército de Ghana y el gobierno de Nkrumah. [33] El operativo de la CIA Howard Bane incluso afirmó en febrero de 1966 que una serie de golpes de estado que habían ocurrido en otras naciones africanas también estaban motivando al ejército de Ghana a derrocar a Nkrumah. [34]

Los memorandos publicados en 2001 sugieren que Estados Unidos y Reino Unido discutieron un plan "para inducir una reacción en cadena que eventualmente conduzca a la caída de Nkrumah". Los archivos relevantes del servicio de inteligencia británico, MI6 , permanecen clasificados (a partir de 2009). [35]

Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos comenzaron las discusiones sobre el cambio de régimen en Ghana en 1961. Los detalles de los planes de esta época son en su mayoría desconocidos, ya que los documentos desclasificados de este período permanecen censurados. [36] Uno de esos complots involucró al Ministro de Finanzas KA Gbedemah , quien aseguró el apoyo de la CIA y el Departamento de Estado para un plan para derrocar a Nkrumah, pero fue detectado por el servicio de inteligencia nacional. [37]

El interés de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia en Ghana aumentó nuevamente en 1964, cuando el Director de Inteligencia Central, John A. McCone, comenzó a participar en reuniones de alto nivel para discutir las relaciones futuras con el país. El 6 de febrero de 1964, el secretario de Estado de Estados Unidos, Dean Rusk, le pidió a McCone que estudiara la posibilidad de una toma de posesión del gobierno encabezada por JA Ankrah. McCone indicó el 11 de febrero que tal política podría llevarse a cabo en cooperación con los británicos. [36] El 26 de febrero de 1964, Nkrumah escribió al presidente estadounidense Lyndon Johnson criticando "dos establecimientos en conflicto" que operan en Ghana. [38]

Existe la Embajada de los Estados Unidos como institución diplomática que realiza negocios diplomáticos formales con nosotros; También existe la organización de la CIA que presumiblemente funciona dentro o fuera de este organismo reconocido. Esta última organización, es decir, la CIA, parece dedicar toda su atención a fomentar la mala voluntad, los malentendidos e incluso actividades clandestinas y subversivas entre nuestro pueblo, al menoscabo de las buenas relaciones que existen entre nuestros dos Gobiernos.

-  Kwame Nkrumah, carta al presidente Johnson , 26 de febrero de 1964

Cuando a principios de 1965 Nkrumah solicitó ayuda financiera de Estados Unidos, el Departamento de Estado lo rechazó y le sugirió que se lo pidiera al FMI. Sin embargo, el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Lyndon Johnson, accedió a prestarle ayuda financiera para los proyectos del río Volta . [33] Estados Unidos se mostró reacio a negociar con Nkrumah en parte porque previeron un golpe de estado liderado por Otu, Ankrah y Harlley. [39] [40] En abril, la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Accra presentó un informe al Departamento de Estado titulado "Postura propuesta de ayuda de Estados Unidos hacia un gobierno sucesor del de Nkrumah". [41]

Un memorando del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos de Robert Komer a McGeorge Bundy evaluó la situación: [42]

McGB—

Para su información, es posible que pronto tengamos un golpe pro-occidental en Ghana. Ciertas figuras militares y policiales clave han estado planeando uno durante algún tiempo, y la situación económica en deterioro de Ghana puede proporcionar la chispa.

Los conspiradores nos mantienen informados, y State cree que estamos más en el interior que los británicos. Si bien no estamos directamente involucrados (me dijeron), nosotros y otros países occidentales (incluida Francia) hemos estado ayudando a configurar la situación al ignorar las súplicas de Nkrumah de ayuda económica. La negativa del nuevo grupo OCAM (francófono) a asistir a cualquier reunión de la OUA en Accra (debido a la conspiración de Nkrumah) lo aislará aún más. Considerándolo todo, se ve bien.

RWK

-  Robert W. Komer, Memorando a McGeorge Bundy , 27 de mayo de 1965

El mismo Nkrumah temía por su vida y sintió una gran angustia durante este tiempo. [43] Las relaciones diplomáticas con Occidente parecieron deteriorarse, con la publicación de Nkrumah de Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism y su crítica de la respuesta de Gran Bretaña a la secesión de Rhodesia Blanca . [44] [45] Nkrumah también se resistió a las políticas económicas propuestas en mayo de 1965 por el Fondo Monetario Internacional y reafirmadas por el Banco Mundial en septiembre de 1965. [46]

Acción [ editar ]

Nkrumah salió del país el 21 de febrero de 1966 para una reunión diplomática con Ho Chi Minh . Viajó primero a China. Estados Unidos lo alentó a ir a esta misión diplomática y, de hecho, prometió detener el bombardeo de Vietnam del Norte para garantizar su seguridad. [45]

Se ordenó a un grupo de 600 soldados estacionados en la parte norte del país que comenzaran a moverse hacia el sur, hacia Accra, una distancia de 435 millas (700 km). Al principio se les dijo que se estaban movilizando para responder a la situación en Rhodesia. [47] Los líderes del golpe les dijeron a los soldados, cuando llegaron a Accra, que Nkrumah se estaba reuniendo con Ho Chi Minh en preparación para un despliegue de soldados ghaneses en la guerra de Vietnam . Además, se les dijo a los soldados que iban a ser desplegados en Rhodesia para luchar contra el gobierno blanco de Ian Smith. [47]

Los soldados se dividieron y se llevaron a capturar varios edificios gubernamentales clave. Con el Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa en una reunión de la OUA, el oficial de mayor rango era el general Charles Barwah, al parecer asesinado a tiros cuando se negó a cooperar con el golpe. La State Broadcasting House y los edificios de comunicaciones internacionales se capturaron rápidamente. Los combates más duros estallaron en The Flagstaff House , la residencia presidencial, donde los derrocadores militares se encontraron con la resistencia de la Guardia Presidencial. [48]

Los golpistas informaron a la opinión pública del cambio de régimen por radio en la madrugada del 24 de febrero de 1966. [49] La declaración del coronel Kokota por radio fue la siguiente: [50]

Conciudadanos de Ghana, he venido a informarles que los militares, en cooperación con la Policía de Ghana, se han hecho cargo hoy del gobierno de Ghana. El mito que rodea a Nkrumah se ha roto. Se disuelve el Parlamento y se destituye a Kwame Nkrumah. Todos los ministros también son destituidos. El Partido Popular de la Convención se disuelve con efecto a partir de ahora. Será ilegal que cualquier persona pertenezca a él.

Los soldados procedieron a arrestar a los ministros del CPP mientras continuaban los enfrentamientos con la Guardia Presidencial. Cuando el coronel Kokota amenazó con bombardear la residencia presidencial si la resistencia continuaba después de las 12 de la noche, la esposa de Nkrumah, Fathia Nkrumah, aconsejó a los guardias que se rindieran y lo hicieron. [50]

Un telegrama de la CIA informó a Washington sobre el golpe y dijo: "Los líderes del golpe parecen estar implementando los planes que se informó anteriormente habían acordado para el período inmediatamente posterior al golpe". [51] Según militares, 20 miembros de la guardia presidencial habían resultado muertos y 25 heridos. [52] Otros sugieren una cifra de muertos de 1.600. Según el biógrafo de Nkrumah, June Milne, "cualquiera que sea el número de muertos, está lejos del 'golpe incruento' que informa la prensa británica". [45]

Eventos tempranos [ editar ]

Formación del Consejo [ editar ]

Francis Kwashie, parte del grupo central de planificación para la toma de posesión, comentó más tarde que él y sus camaradas carecían de "la más mínima idea" de cómo proceder para obtener el poder. [53] Varios participantes parecían creer que los oficiales victoriosos simplemente seleccionarían a los administradores civiles aceptables y los pondrían a cargo. Marginar a Nkrumah y a otros radicales permitiría una especie de fusión entre el Partido Popular de la Convención y el opositor Partido Unido, y el trabajo del gobierno podría continuar. [54]El grupo decidió que era necesario un gobierno interino y procedió a determinar su membresía. Kokota y Harlley, los candidatos más obvios para el liderazgo nominal, rechazaron el puesto, prefiriendo en cambio mantener el mando sobre sus respectivas fuerzas. Así, el 21 de febrero (el día en que Nkrumah abandonó el país; tres días antes del golpe) el grupo seleccionó a JA Ankrah, un general popular que sufrió un retiro involuntario en agosto de 1965 [55].

La decisión de formar un consejo gobernante se tomó la mañana del golpe, en una reunión que incluyó a Harlley, Kokota y Ankrah (pero excluyó a varios del grupo original), así como a Emmanuel Noi Omaboe , jefe de la Oficina Central de Estadísticas, el juez de la Corte Suprema Fred Kwasi Apaloo , el director del Ministerio Público Austin NE Amissah y el oficial de seguridad DS Quacoopome. [56] Según los informes, el nombre del gobierno militar "Consejo de Liberación Nacional" fue propuesto por el general Kotoka como una alternativa al "Consejo Nacional Revolucionario", para indicar que los nuevos líderes buscaban liberar al país de Nkrumah y el CPP en lugar de transformar sociedad. [57]

El consejo estaba formado por cuatro soldados y cuatro policías. [58]

  • Mayor General JA Ankrah - Presidente del NLC y Jefe de Estado (24 de febrero de 1966 - 3 de abril de 1969)
  • Sr. JWK Harlley ( Inspector General de Policía ) - Vicepresidente del NLC
  • Teniente Coronel Emmanuel K. Kotoka (24 de febrero de 1966 - 17 de abril de 1967)
  • Brigadier Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa
  • Sr. BA Yakubu (Comisionado Adjunto de Policía)
  • Coronel Albert Kwesi Ocran
  • Sr. Anthony K. Deku (Comisionado de Policía, CID )
  • Sr. JEO Nunoo (Comisionado de Policía, Administración)

Con esta membresía, el Consejo mostró más diversidad étnica que el grupo central de planificadores golpistas. Dos miembros, Nunoo y Yakubu, no tenían ningún conocimiento previo del golpe. [59]

Continuidades y cambios políticos inmediatos [ editar ]

Tres comités —el Comité Económico, el Comité Administrativo y el Comité de Publicidad— se manifestaron el día del golpe como órganos de gobierno. El Comité Económico, en particular, estaba compuesto por miembros de alto rango del servicio civil preexistente y desempeñó el papel principal en la creación de las políticas del nuevo gobierno. [60] Los líderes golpistas y los "tecnócratas" de la administración pública compartían la opinión de que la política y los políticos debían dejarse de lado para establecer un aparato de gobierno más eficaz. Los militares y la policía, que carecían de conocimientos económicos y de gobernanza, dependían de la administración pública para elaborar y diseñar los cambios necesarios. [61]

La primera proclamación del nuevo gobierno, emitida dos días después del golpe, suspendió la Constitución de Ghana de 1960, destituyó a Nkrumah, disolvió la Asamblea Nacional y el Partido Popular de la Convención, y nombró a Ankrah como presidente y a Harlley como vicepresidente. [62] A continuación, el Consejo declaró su intención de restaurar el gobierno civil "lo antes posible" y su plan para la separación de poderes entre los poderes ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial. [63] El Consejo decretó que el sistema judicial continuaría con el mismo modelo, pero se pidió a los jueces que tomaran nuevos juramentos en los que aceptaban acatar los decretos del gobierno. [64](En la práctica, las comisiones militares asumirían la autoridad sobre las funciones judiciales de importancia política). [65]

El nuevo gobierno ilegalizó la pertenencia al Partido Popular de la Convención y puso a cientos de personas bajo "custodia protectora". Entre ellos se encontraban ex miembros del parlamento y comisionados de distrito, así como 446 personas afiliadas directamente a Nkrumah, incluidos su asesor financiero y su conductor. [66] Los líderes del Consejo Musulmán de Ghana fueron destituidos por sus lealtades partidistas. [7] Se prohibió la formación de nuevos partidos políticos. [67] Se establecieron comisionados para investigar la corrupción en el régimen anterior y organizar la represión continua del CPP. [68]

El NLC disolvió y confiscó los activos de ocho organizaciones nkrumaistas, incluido el Consejo Cooperativo de Agricultores Unidos de Ghana, el Consejo Nacional de Mujeres de Ghana y los Jóvenes Pioneros de Ghana. [69] Se introdujeron grupos de Boy Scouts y Girl Guides para reemplazar a este último. [70]

Una vez que el CPP dejó de ser visto como una amenaza política, el nuevo gobierno indicó que no tomaría represalias excesivas contra los funcionarios del antiguo régimen. [69] Todos menos veinte de los cientos de nkrumaists encarcelados estaban libres en 1968. [71] Y aunque el sistema de ministerios fue reorganizado, la membresía y la jerarquía del servicio civil permanecieron casi intactas, y de hecho ganaron poder después de la golpe. [72]

BA Bentum (en verdad un ministro del CPP) fue nombrado secretario general del Congreso de Sindicatos y se le autorizó a eliminar a su antiguo liderazgo del CPP. Bentum disoció el Congreso de Sindicatos de la Federación Sindical Africana, inició un "impulso de productividad" para aumentar la producción, ayudó al gobierno con las relaciones públicas en el extranjero y creó un mecanismo para suministrar trabajadores civiles para ayudar a las fuerzas armadas. [73]

Apoyo popular [ editar ]

Se llevaron a cabo manifestaciones públicas en apoyo del nuevo gobierno, especialmente por parte de organizaciones públicas en Accra. Nkrumah, en China, afirmó que los militares habían orquestado estas manifestaciones. [74] En parte porque el ejército de Nigeria había logrado un golpe de Estado en enero de 1966, el cambio de régimen en Ghana no fue un shock total. [75] Bajo un nuevo liderazgo, grupos como el Congreso de Sindicatos y los Jóvenes Pioneros de Ghana (poco antes de su disolución) celebraron el golpe y renunciaron al socialismo nkrumaista. [76] El 4 de marzo, el principal ayudante de Nkrumah, Emmanuel Ayeh-Kumi, acusó públicamente al ex presidente de corrupción. Otros líderes del partido siguieron su ejemplo. [77]El gobierno liberó a más de 800 prisioneros del régimen anterior. [78]

En junio de 1966, los portavoces del nuevo gobierno comenzaron a matizar sus declaraciones sobre la restauración del gobierno civil, diciendo que se necesitaba más tiempo "para establecer una maquinaria de gobierno eficaz" y para que la gente "se reajustara a la nueva situación". [79] El gobierno del Consejo de Liberación Nacional fue sostenido por un fuerte apoyo de la intelectualidad, en el servicio civil y en la universidad, así como por las propias fuerzas militares y policiales. [80]

Realineación diplomática [ editar ]

Se interrumpieron las relaciones diplomáticas con Rusia, China y Cuba, se cerraron sus embajadas y se expulsó a sus técnicos. [81] Ghana retiró sus embajadas de estos países, de Hanoi en Vietnam del Norte y de cinco países de Europa del Este. [82]

Desde Occidente, el golpe fue recompensado inmediatamente con ayuda alimentaria y una relajación de las políticas diseñadas para aislar a Ghana. Los precios mundiales del cacao comenzaron a subir. [83] Se restablecieron las relaciones con Gran Bretaña, que habían sido suspendidas por la cuestión de Rhodesia. [82]

Robert Komer del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional escribió a Lyndon Johnson, [84]

El golpe en Ghana es otro ejemplo de una ganancia inesperada fortuita. Nkrumah estaba haciendo más para socavar nuestros intereses que cualquier otro africano negro. En reacción a sus inclinaciones fuertemente procomunistas, el nuevo régimen militar es casi patéticamente pro-occidental. El punto de este memorando es que debemos seguir adelante con habilidad y consolidar tales éxitos. Unos pocos miles de toneladas de excedente de trigo o arroz, dados ahora cuando los nuevos regímenes son bastante inciertos en cuanto a sus futuras relaciones con nosotros, podrían tener un significado psicológico desproporcionado con el costo del gesto. No estoy abogando por obsequios generosos para estos regímenes; de hecho, darles un poco solo les abre el apetito y nos permite utilizar la perspectiva de más como palanca.

-  Robert W. Komer, Memorando al presidente Johnson , 12 de marzo de 1966

Los líderes del nuevo régimen, así como los observadores de los negocios y la prensa, declararon que Ghana estaba abierta a los negocios con las multinacionales occidentales. [85] Representantes del FMI y el Banco Mundial llegaron a Accra en marzo de 1966, estableciendo rápidamente un plan de "colaboración muy estrecha". [86]

Asuntos militares [ editar ]

Presupuesto [ editar ]

Una declaración en marzo de 1966 eximió a los miembros de las fuerzas armadas de pagar impuestos, restauró su plan de pensiones y les dio derecho a varios servicios públicos. [87] [88] El personal del Ejército, la Armada, la Fuerza Aérea y la Policía recibió bonificaciones en efectivo de tamaño no revelado. [89]

Between 1966 and 1969, military spending doubled, from NȻ 25.5 million to NȻ54.2 million.[90]

Status[edit]

The military borrowed techniques from the British to upgrade the social status of the armed forces; for example, they used publicity in magazines to create an image of the soldier as a powerful, humane, elite member of society.[27] These policies dramatically increased Ghanaians' interest in military careers.[91]

The coup plotters from within the armed forces all promoted themselves to higher ranks and eventually all had become some sort of General.[92] The preferred philosopher of this group was Plato, whose Republic offers the slogan: "The punishment which the wise suffer who refuse to take part in the Government is to live under the Government of worse men."[93]

Britain turned down the new government's request for military uniforms, but the United States was willing to supply some, and thus U.S. Army uniforms were worn by the Ghanaian Army.[94]

Counter-coup[edit]

Junior officers attempted an unsuccessful coup on April 17, 1967. The three leaders of this counter-coup were young officers from the Akan ethnic group. With a force of 120 men, they succeeded in capturing the State Broadcasting House and the former president's house, into which General Kokota had moved. General Kokota died in the fighting, and Lt.-Gen Ankrah escaped by climbing over a wall and jumping into the ocean. The rebel officers laid siege to the military headquarters and announced themselves over state radio. However, the plotters were outmaneuvered at a conference held to determine plans for the new government, and subsequently captured.[95]

The counter-coup was widely believed to be motivated by divisions between the southwestern (Akan, Ashanti, Fanti) ethnic groups and the southeastern (Ga, Ewe) ethnic groups—so much so that the military issued an official statement denying it.[96]

Three hundred soldiers and six hundred civilians were jailed in retaliation.[71] On May 26, 1967, two officers convicted of treason became the subjects of Ghana's first public execution.[97] Fearing future actions from within the military, the NLC decommissioned eight senior officers and reappointed some of its own members to command positions.[98] Air Marshal Michael Otu was accused of subversion in November 1968.[99]

Political governance[edit]

The Council established many commissions and advisory committees to make policies and engage with civil society. Various committees were assigned to areas such as the economy, public relations, foreign relations, law, farming, and the structure of government itself (which did indeed undergo frequent reorganization). Regional and local commissioners were replaced by "management committees"; administrative districts were consolidated from 168 to 47.[100] The management committees were constituted mostly by civil servants as well as one private citizen nominated by the police. Many personnel from the old councils participated in the new committees.[101] Subsequent involvement of military officials in the local management committees did not functionally challenge the political dominance of the civil service.[102] The power of the civil service proved a source of resentment from other groups within the constituency of the 1966 coup.[103]

The heads of ministries were designated as commissioners and their deputies as principal secretaries.

OFFICENAMETERM
Commissioner for Foreign AffairsJoseph Arthur Ankrah1966 – 1967
John Willie Kofi Harlley1967 – 1968
Patrick Dankwa Anin1969
Commissioner for DefenceLt. Gen. Emmanuel Kotoka1966 – 1967
Lt. Gen. J. A. Ankrah[104]1967 – 1969
Lt. Gen. Akwasi Afrifa[104]1968 – 1969
Commissioner for InteriorAnthony K. Deku[105]Feb 1966 – Mar 1966
John Willie Kofi HarlleyMar 1966 – Aug 1969
Commissioner for FinanceAkwasi Amankwa Afrifa1966 – April 1969
J. H. Mensah[106]April 1969 – September 1969
Attorney General of GhanaVictor Owusu1 October 1966 – 13 April 1969
Nicholas Yaw Boafo AdadeApril 1969 – September 1969
Commissioner for Economic AffairsEmmanuel Noi Omaboe1966 – 1969
Commissioner for EducationModjaben Dowuona1966 – 1969
Commissioner for HealthEustace Akwei[107]1966 – 1969
Commissioner for AgricultureJacob Ofori Torto1967 – 1968
Albert Adomakoh1968 – 1969
K. Twum Barima1969
Commissioner for CommunicationsPatrick Dankwa Anin1966 – 1968
Matthew PokuFeb 1968 – Apr 1969
Commissioner for Social Affairs
Commissioner for Labour and Social Welfare		Susanna Al-Hassan1967
S. T. Nettey1968 – 1969
Commissioner for InformationK.G. Osei Bonsu[108]1966 – January 1968
Ibrahim Mahama1968
Issifu Ali1969
Commissioner for IndustryR. S. Amegashie1966
J. V. L. Phillips1968–1969
Commissioner for Land and Mineral ResourcesJ. V. L. Phillips1966–1968
R. S. Amegashie1968–1969
Commissioner for Local GovernmentDr. Alex A. Y. Kyerematen1966–1969
Commissioner for TradeR. A. Quarshie1966–1968
J. V. L. Phillips1968–1969
Commissioner for Works and HousingIssifu Ali1966– April 1969
Lt. Colonel E. A. Yeboah1969
Commissioner for Rural DevelopmentI. M. Ofori1969
Commissioner for Cultural AffairsAnthony K. Deku1969

Regional Administration Chairmen (Regional Ministers)[edit]

PortfolioMinisterTime frameNotes
Ashanti RegionBrig. D. C. K. Amenu1966 – ?
Brong Ahafo RegionLt.-Col. I. K Akyeampong1966 – ?
Central RegionLt.-Col R. J. G. Dontoh.1966 – ?
Eastern RegionG. A. K. Dzansi1966 – ?
Greater Accra RegionRear Admiral D. A. Hansen1966 – ?
Northern RegionJ. M. Kporvi1966 – ?
Upper RegionJ. W. O. Adjemang1966 – ?
Volta RegionE. Q. Q. Sanniez1966 – ?
Western RegionLt.-Col. J. G. D. Addy1966 – ?

[109]

Principal Secretaries to the Ministries[edit]

PortfolioMinisterTime frameNotes
Ministry of Foreign AffairsF. E. Boaten1966 – 1969
Ministry of DefenceD. E. Awotwi1966 – 1969
Ministry of InteriorN. K. F. Owoo1966 – 1969
Ministry of FinanceK. Gyasi-Twum1966 – 1969
Ministry of Economic AffairsB. K. Mensah1966 – 1969
Ministry for EducationD. A. Brown1966 – 1969
Ministry of HealthW. Y. Eduful1966 – 1969
Ministry of Agriculture and ForestryC. A. Dadey (Agriculture)
R. Kofi-Johnson(Forestry)		1966 – 1969
Ministry of CommunicationE. A. Winful1966 – 1969
Ministry of Social AffairsJ. K. Chinebuah1966 – 1969
Ministry of InformationJ. B. Odunton1966 – 1969
Ministry of IndustryE. R. Hayford1966 – 1969
Ministry for Land and Mineral ResourcesA. J. Prah1966 – 1969
Ministry for Local GovernmentG. F. Daniel1966 – 1969
Ministry for Works and HousingH. F. Winful1966 – 1969
Chieftaincy SecretariatE. O. N. Aryee1966 – 1969
Establishment SecretariatA. O. Mills1966 – 1969

[110]

Whereas the Convention People's Party had claimed legitimacy from its status as a mass party, the new regime increased the role of intermediate groups to interact with the public at large.[111] Many of these groups, including religious, legal, and economic organizations established before the CPP, had opposed the one-party system and found they could work effectively with the military government.[112]

Chiefs such as the powerful Asantehene approved of the regime change, which they saw as restoring their power after years of African socialism.[113] The NLC "destooled" at least 176 chiefs appointed during the Nkrumah era.[114] To the dismay of tenant farmers, the NLC granted the chiefs' collective request for more favorable economic policies such as an end to the cap on land rent.[115]

In November 1968 the government established a Constituent Assembly, which contained representatives from 91 organizations such as the House of Chiefs, the Ghana Midwives' Association, and the National Catholic Secretariat.[116]

The NLC integrated government intelligence gathering with military and police forces, thereby increasing the effectiveness of both.[117]

Civil liberties[edit]

Austerity and unemployment led to unrest and crime, which the government met with repression by police and military forces.[118] In January 1967, the NLC authorized the use of military tribunals for civilians accused of subversion.[97]

The country's two largest daily papers, the Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times, remained state-owned. These newspapers readily changed their allegiance from the Nkrumah government to the National Liberation Council.[119] Other newspapers, such as the Legon Observer published at the University of Ghana, were more critical of the regime.

In general, the press was allowed limited criticism of government policies, but were sufficiently intimidated that they did not question the legitimacy of the government itself, nor advocate for an alternative regime.[120] Early words about "freedom of the press" were somewhat undermined by caveats and retaliatory actions. The "Prohibition of Rumour Decree" issued in October 1966 authorized 28 days of detention and up to three years in prison for journalists who might "cause alarm and despondency", "disturb the public peace", or "cause disaffection against the N.L.C."[121] Criticism of the 1967 arrangement between the American firm Abbott Laboratories with the State Pharmaceutical Corporation led the NLC to fire four editors from the nation's three leading newspapers.[122]

Books including Nkrumah's Dark Days in Ghana were allowed into the country.[123]

Complaints about immigration and foreign business activity led to a rule published in 1968 which starting on July 1, 1968, barred non-Ghanaians from operating retail and small wholesale businesses, driving taxis, or running other small businesses with fewer than 30 workers. Another decree restricted where non-Ghanaians could live.[124]

Economics[edit]

The new government empowered the International Monetary Fund to supervise the country's economy. Under IMF influence, the government cut spending, limited wage increases, and allowed foreign companies to conduct businesses operations on their own terms.[125] The overall result was a shift away from the CPP's efforts at national industrialization, towards resource extraction and limited manufacturing for short-term profits—most of which were gleaned by foreign companies and elites within government including the military.[126] The National Liberation Council did not receive the debt relief it expected in exchange for cooperation with outside financial institutions, and indeed Ghana's debt increased by Ȼ89.7 million under agreements made in 1966 and 1968.[127]

The Economic Committee, headed by E. N. Omaboe, was responsible for economic policy and played an influential role in the overall government. The organization of this committee predated the formation of the National Liberation Council itself, and Omaboe was involved in the planning meeting to create the NLC on February 24, 1966. R. S. Amegashie, Director of the Business School at Achimota, was another influential member.[128]

Privatization and multinational business[edit]

1 New Cedi (NȻ) note

The NLC promised "structural changes" of state corporations, some of which were fully privatized. The Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, created in September 1967, became owner of 19 such corporations.[129] Control over large production sectors was granted to foreign multinational corporations such as Norway Cement Export and Abbott Laboratories.[130] These ventures held extremely low risk for the foreign companies, since they relied on capital already within Ghana, enjoyed various economic privileges, and had outside backing to prevent expropriation.[131]

Under guidance of the International Monetary Fund, the government in 1967 devalued the Ghanaian Cedi (formerly the Ghanaian pound) by 30% relative to the United States dollar. The rationale for this policy was that if other countries could buy Ghanaian goods at lower prices, exports would increase, and conversely imports would decrease. In fact, the opposite results occurred. Exports of all commodities except wood and diamonds decreased. Imports increased by a larger factor.[132]

Various state-run development projects were abandoned, including some which were nearly complete. These included manufacturing and refining operations under state control which would have competed with foreign business interests.[133] A plan to stockpile cocoa (the top export at the time) in order to take improve Ghana's position in the world market, was canceled; the nearly-built silos, intended to accomplish this goal, allowed to fall into disrepair.[134] Agricultural projects were privatized or canceled and newly purchased equipment left in fields to rust.[135] Overall spending on agriculture decreased by 35%.[136] A fleet of fishing boats were grounded to lie idle and deteriorating—leading the country to begin importing foreign fish.[137] Much of the capital and property obtained by the state from 1957–1966 now fell into the hands of the private sector.[138]

Labour and quality of life[edit]

Under the National Liberation Council, inflation decreased, production went up, and wages rose. The minimum wage increased from 0.65 cedi to 0.70 cedi in 1967 and 0.75 cedi in 1968. However, fewer people had jobs—and even for those who did, higher costs of living offset some of the wage increases.[139] Food prices increased dramatically due to the collapse of state-run agriculture and withdrawal of credit to independent farmers.[140] In the public sector, minimum wage rose from Ȼ0.70 to Ȼ0.75, with future increases capped at 5%, while top wages increased by much more.[136] Judges, high-ranking civil servants, and university professors received job benefits and raises.[141]

Most of the profits from higher productivity went to business owners and foreign investors, and society became more economically stratified.[139]

The new regime made some initial concessions to workers, such as an increase in the threshold of taxable income, and a decrease in taxes (and thus prices) of some basic goods. The goodwill generated by these initial policies faded when 38,000 people lost their jobs in July–October 1966 and requests for a NȻ1/day basic wage were soundly rejected. Strikes were illegal and in February 1967 incitement to general strike became a crime punishable by 25+ years in prison, or by death. The Trades Union Congress, under the leadership of B. A. Bentum (the chief civilian collaborator in the 1966 coup), made efforts to prevent these strikes from happening, and was therefore widely distrusted by workers.[142]

Workers in Ghana went on strike 58 times from 1966–1967, 38 times in 1968, and 51 times in 1969. Strikers were fired and sometimes fired upon.[143] The latter happened at a gold mine in Obuasi in March 1969.[144] By August 1968, 66,000 workers (representing 10% of the national workforce and 36% of the Accra workforce) had lost their jobs.[145]

Nkrumah in exile[edit]

Nkrumah left China and traveled to Guinea, arriving in Conakry on March 2, 1966. Guinean President Sékou Touré named Nkrumah as co-president, supplying him with a place to live, a staff, food, office supplies, etc. He occupied himself with reading, writing, and political discussion; he reportedly sometimes listened to vinyl recordings of Black Americans activists like Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael.[146] He turned away Western reporters seeking interviews.[147] He was loosely involved in various intrigues to dethrone the military regime in Ghana.[148]

Nkrumah remained an intellectual leader of the Pan-Africanist movement and continued to articulate visions of African Revolution.[149] In his 1968 book Dark Days in Ghana, Nkrumah placed the struggles of Ghana in the context of 15 military coups which took place in Africa between 1962 and 1967.[150] The same year, he published Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, addressing revolutionary warriors in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Rhodesia and expanding his analysis to Southeast Asia and Latin America.[149] His ideology became more overtly communist, and in 1969 he wrote, in Class Struggle in Africa, that Pan-African socialism would "advance the triumph of the international socialist revolution, and the onward progress towards world communism, under which, every society is ordered on the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[151]

The government declared a campaign to eliminate the "myth of Nkrumah", which involved pulling down Nkrumah's statue, renaming various streets and institutions, and "re-educating" the public through other channels.[152] Thus a public relations campaign was launched to "destroy the image of Nkrumah"—and thus legitimize the coup—among people in rural areas.[153] The Ministry of Information deployed 37 vans for 12 weeks to visit 700 villages promoting the new government.[70]

Transition to civilian government[edit]

Plans were made to transfer the government to civilian rule, headed by K. A. Busia, the leader of a former opposition party outlawed by Nkrumah.[154] In May 1968, General Ankrah announced plans for the transition to take place on September 30, 1969. In the interim, a Constituent Assembly would draft a new constitution, and political parties would be legalized starting May 1, 1969.[155] Busia had obviously been selected to lead the new government.[156]

To ensure that the transition in power would not create a transition in policy, the NLC passed various regulations to limit the scope of political change. For example, it banned high-level CPP members from serving in government (creating exceptions to this rule for some of the latter it had already appointed).[157]

The National Liberation Council underwent some internal turmoil during this period. Ethnic tension intensified after the 1967 counter-coup, which resulted in the death of Kotoka, an important Ewe general.[96] General Otu and an aide were arrested on November 20, 1968, accused of plotting in London to restore Nkrumah to power.[158] Ankrah, the Head of State, was forced to resign on April 2, 1969, amidst accusations that he was planning to form a political party and run for president. Afrifa was appointed his successor.[159] Otu and Ankrah were both members of the Ga ethnic group, and when Assistant Police Commissioner John E. O. Nunoo, himself Ga, suggested that ethnicity might have motivated the aforementioned actions, he himself was fired.[160]

A new constitution, passed on August 15, 1969, provided for a judiciary, a unicameral legislature, a prime minister, and a president.[161]

Five political parties went into action for the August 29 elections. Of these, the largest were the Progress Party, led by longtime opposition politician K.A. Busia, and the National Alliance of Liberals, led by former Finance Minister and coup plotter K. A. Gbedemah.[161] Gbedemah, a Ewe, was supported by Ewe elements within the NLC, to oppose Busia, an Ashanti.[162] Members of the two groups voted markedly along these lines, but in the nationwide results Busia and the Progress Party won the sizeable majority of seats: 105 of 140.[163] Before handing over power, the NLC passed an ambiguous constitutional amendment which empowered them to expel Gbedemah from parliament.[164]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b "CIA helped depose Nkrumah, says ex-agent", Irish Times, 10 May 1978.
  2. ^ a b Seymour Hersh, "CIA Aid In Ghana Plot Told", Atlanta Constitution, 9 May 1978.
  3. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 34–37. "At both the local and national level, tight groups or party favorites commanded access to market stalls, publicly financed housing, GNTC supplies and Government contracts. The effect of this was the encouragement of massive corruption in which the President and top party men participated. Both ordinary party businessmen and non-party businessmen could secure needed resources only at a price. This transition of the CPP from an open politico-economic machine, dispensing economic favours in return for support, to the instrument of an avaricious elite concerned only with maximizing its privileges and defending at all cost its monopoloy of power, was particularly responsible for alienating the rank and file of the party who had associated with CPP with their modest economic demands."
  4. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 84.
  5. ^ Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 202.
  6. ^ Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 203.
  7. ^ a b Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 17.
  8. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 17.
  9. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 16–17. "Thus, while 'socialism' was anti-imperialist, non-capitalist and populist, the welfare state was pro-imperialist, capitalist in orientation and frankly anti-mass. Nevertheless both 'socialism' and 'welfare state' had their antecedents in the CPP. Officially 'welfare state' ideology had been transcended in faovr of 'socialism'; in reality it was alive and well in the state planning organs and important sectors of the CPP. By and large the planners who were the architects of the 'Seven-Year Development Plan' were also the draughtsmen of the 'Economic Policy' of the military government. The immediate genesis of the coup would thus appear to be the policy differences within the party leadership itself".
  10. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 96–97. "Like the intelligentsia, the political prospectives of the officers are pervaded by a dislike of political parties, professional politicians, and 'mass' politics. This is particularly apparent in the officers' analysis of the struggle for independence, which transferred power from the British not to the intelligensia politicians as contemplated but to the CPP."
  11. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 131.
  12. ^ a b Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 95.
  13. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 82.
  14. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 119–121. "These two police officers had conceived a coup against the CPP as far back as 1963. Their position as officers in charge of the Special Branch, the country's largest and most reputable security agency, could permit them to achieve swiftly and in absolute secrecy two vital targets of the conspiracy: information about the regime, and linkage with actual or potential sympathizers."
  15. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 126.
  16. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 121–122. "Police had been used to arrest prominent members of the United Party and politicians opposed to Nkrumah, who were subsequently detained without trail, and they had been employed by the notorious District Commissioners for the arbitrary arrests of local opposition figures. The security activities of the Special Branch and the C.I.D. were regarded with considerable dread. […] Such was the dislike and contempt for the Police that there was never any doubt that a coup by the Police would fail to win popular support. Secondly, following the attempted assassination of President Nkrumah in January 1964 by a police constable, the entire Police Force in the country was disarmed."
  17. ^ a b Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 1–2. "Writing a book on the coup d'état some months after it had occurred, General Afrifa, one of its principal architects, devoted a chapter to the plight of the Ghanaian soldier, in which he described the better pay and equipment enjoyed by the President's Own Guard Regiment in comparison with the regular army, and the way in which Major General Otu, the most senior officer, was often by-passed by his subordinates in advising the president. The dismissal of Generals Ankrah and Otu was said to be a 'major reason' for the coup."
  18. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 2. [Quoting from General Ocran's memoirs] "The commanders were hard put to it. They had known and been accustomed to a high standard of turnout and cleanliness. What, then, could they do to soldiers who turned out on parade in torn uniforms, with the underwear showing underneath their shorts or trousters? Soldiers with no polish or shine on their boots or with their toes showing through their canvas shoes? By late 1965, the going was getting tough for most senior officers. The salaries introduced in 1957 meant little in 1965. They were worth only a third of their value."
  19. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 90–91.
  20. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 145. " Afrifa was to be court-marshaled for in-subordination after he had ordered troops under him to return to barracks when they were to be used in a special operation ordered by the Head of military Intelligence Brigadier Hassan to arrest certain civilians in the second largest city Kumasi. This refusal to obey military orders on the part of Afrifa was reported to the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff General Barwah and on February 25, 1966 Afrifa was to be court-marshaled."
  21. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 82. "Adding to this deep-seated disenchantment with Nkrumah, in December 1965 the president had ordered an enquiry into diamond smuggling operations involving a European diamond dealer and a number of Ghanaians. Both Harlley and Deku were implicated in the scandal. It was rumoured—days before the coup—that on Nkrumah's return from Vietnam, he would have arrested his police chiefs for complicity in the scandal. The execution of the coup enabled Harlley and Deku to evade exposure and possible incarceration."
  22. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 144–145.
  23. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 99–102. "The possibility that the five officers shared these grievances cannot be discounted. After 1966 these officers were accused of attempting to promote the interests of Ewes against those of other ethnic groups. There is some (admittedly tenuous) evidence that this solicitude for Ewe tribal interests preceded the coup."
  24. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 124–125.
  25. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 143–144.
  26. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 4, 46. "Seven of the eight members of the military Government had attended mission schools, and all had received military or police training in Britain. They had thus been exposed to the sort of Western values which many of the civilian politicians they had ousted despised."
  27. ^ a b Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 82–87. "British references, training procedures, and pastimes have been woven into the fabric of military professionalism in Ghana. […] Hence, years after the army has passed from British to Ghanaian control, officers cadets are still taught horse-riding, boating, and mountaineering. Officers are required to wear dinner jackets to messes in which abound dart boards, billitard tables, and artifacts of British military history. The conversation of officers is usually sprinkled with British expletives and references. Such Anglophilia has often seemed remarkable even in an intelligentsia weighted down with British and colonial status symbols. What may be relevant here is less the commitment of the officer corps to British standards and ways of life than to a certain vision of the status to which it aspires."
  28. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 92.
  29. ^ Hettne, "Soldiers and Politics" (1980), p. 178.
  30. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 89–90.
  31. ^ M. A. Otu in Ghana Armed Forces Magazine, June 1968, quoted in "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 116.
  32. ^ John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story; New York: W. W. Norton, 1978; p. 201.
  33. ^ a b John Prados, Safe For Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 329.
  34. ^ Prados, Safe For Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (2006), p. 330.
  35. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 84. "In 2001, newly released American government files revealed that the USA, Britain and France were complicit in the overthrow. According to journalist Paul Lee, 'formerly classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC) and State Department documents confirm long-held suspicions of US involvement in the coup d’état that overthrew Nkrumah's government on 24 February 1966'.20 The memoranda reveal that the plans between the three Western countries went back to February 1964 when the US State Department proposed to their British counterpart a plan 'to induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah's downfall'."
  36. ^ a b Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), pp. 208–210.
  37. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 164–165. "Richard D. Mahoney (1983:172) who is the son of William P. Mahoney, Jr. (former U.S. ambassador to Ghana in the 1960s) details Gbedemah's contact with the CIA during Nkrumah's absence thus: 'Despite the virtual paralysis of his country, Nkrumah elected to remain in Russia. Former Finance Minister Gbedemah (then serving on the three-man presidential commission ruling in Nkrumah's absence) saw his chance to seize power. Gbedemah had no problem in obtaining CIA backing for his conspiracy, but he wanted an official assurance of American support. He approached Russel on September 6 and told him of his plans. Would the U.S. support him? Washington gave an unequivocal yes.' Gbedmah however was unlucky in his plans to overthrow Nkrumah but rather lost his job as Finance Minister after Ghanaian intelligence picked up his conversations on a transatlantic line detailing his plans for the coup."
  38. ^ Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah (2007), p. 333.
  39. ^ Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), pp. 214–215.
  40. ^ Paul Lee (June 7, 2002). "Documents Expose U.S. Role in Nkrumah Overthrow". SeeingBlack.com. Archived from the original on 2007-07-05. Retrieved 2007-03-19.
  41. ^ Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), p. 216.
  42. ^ Cited in Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), pp. 216–217.
  43. ^ Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), p. 216. "During a meeting with Mahoney, Nkrumah pleaded through his own tears that the Ambassador try and appreciate the strain he had been under. He maintained his belief that the CIA was attempting to assassinate him."
  44. ^ Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah (2007), p. 336.
  45. ^ a b c Osei Boateng, "How Nkrumah was lured to his end", New African, December 1999.
  46. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 15. "This outline provides some understanding of the significance of policy measures proposed to the Nkrumah Government by the IMF in May 1965, and supported by the World Bank mission of September... The basic issue was the very direction of economic policy in Ghana. In the view of the World Bank, the fundamental problem was Ghana's 'voluntary exclusion from accepted approaches to economic development'. According to the Bank this had proved 'detrimental to growth'. Ghana's development programme was thus not only to be reduced but 'reoriented' Here lies the basic incompatibility between Nkrumah and the Fund/Bank missions that set the stage for the coup. While Nkrumah emphasized the leading role of the state 'socialist' sector, the Bank espoused the primacy of foreign capital in development, and saw as its 'first priority' in Ghana the task of 'confirming a positive environment for private investment'. While Nkrumah stressed equity and structural transformation, the World Bank saw the issue entirely in terms of 'growth'."
  47. ^ a b Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 136
  48. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 138.
  49. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 7.
  50. ^ a b Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 140.
  51. ^ "Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), p. 220.
  52. ^ "Montgomery, "Eyes of the World" (2004), p. 221.
  53. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 132.
  54. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 133–135. "There were no discussions as to which CPP or UP politicians would actually be brought into the new government, nor was there any mention of which specific wings of the CPP would be purged. However, the officers' antipathy to socialism, and their contacts with ministers in the anti-socialist faction in the CPP made it obvious they had in mind the radical socialists within the Party. The purge of the socialists would facilitate the merger of the conservative wings of the CPP with the conservative United Party."
  55. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 134–136.
  56. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 141.
  57. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 7. "The name 'National Revolutionary Council' was suggested, but General Kotoka wanted to make it clear that the aim was to liberate the nation from Nkrumah, not to change the structure of society, and he persuaded his colleagues to adopt the title 'National Liberation Council'."
  58. ^ "The National Liberation Council". Ghana Home Page. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
  59. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 142–143.
  60. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 200–201.
  61. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 210–211. "In the view of both the NLC and the civil service the solution after the coup was therefore to banish, if temporarily, politicians and 'politics', and to create structures that would permit only competetent and skilled technicians to tackle problems. Thus following the coup civil servants were assured that the NLC would rely 'solely on the advice of qualified professional men' in seeking solutions to the country's problems. In a classic statement, one NLC member argued that Ghana's problems after the coup were in any event 'not political at all, but administrative.'"
  62. ^ Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), p. 1097.
  63. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 3. "Only three days after the coup, the new rulers proclaimed their anxiety to hand over power to a duly-constituted representative civilian government 'as soon as possible', and announced their intention to appoint a constitutional commission to prepare a constitution in which 'the sovereign power of the state would be fairly and judiciously shared between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and which would make the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual impossible."
  64. ^ Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), p. 1099. "The Proclamation provided that, despite the suspension of the Constitution, the courts should continue to function with the same powers as before. Judges and all others holding posts in the judicial service were continued upon the pre-coup terms and conditions of service. The judges were required to take a new oath, however, swearing to act not only in accordance with the 'laws and usage,' but also in accordance with the 'decrees' of Ghana."
  65. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 179–180.
  66. ^ Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), pp. 1103–1104. "Even before repeal, however, the Council had laid the legal foundation for its own detention powers under the euphemism of 'protective custody.' The protective custody net has been sweeping. Many persons have been held as part of a class, e.g., all members of the dissolved Parliament or all district commissioners. Subsequent decrees have authorized protective custody for 446 named individuals. Descriptions of the detained persons rarely suggest the basis for their detention; they range from 'Financial Advisor to the Presidency' to 'Lorry Driver' and 'C.P.P. Activist'.
  67. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 43–44.
  68. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 146–147. "In an effort to further legitimize their rule, win public approval for their actions, and to discredit the overthrown regime, the NLC set up several judicial commissions headed mostly by former opposition members whom the military felt were sympathetic to their course to investigate and unearth possible corrupt practices of the old regime."
  69. ^ a b Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 198.
  70. ^ a b Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 209.
  71. ^ a b Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 38.
  72. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 199–200. "Nevertheless the military government depended directly upon the civil service, and the regime relied directly for its day to day operation on the advice and co-operation of senior civil servants. The immediate vacuum that resulted from the post-coup dissolution of Parliament, the banning of the CPP, and the arrest of government ministers, regional and district commissioners and local councillors was filled largely by the civil service; politically, the civil service replaced the CPP."
  73. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 194.
  74. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 7–8.
  75. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 50. "Very few civil servants had been let into the secret plans of the army and police officers who were to topple Dr Nkrumah, but the unpopularity of the Nkrumah Government as a result of economic hardship and what was felt to be a loss of personal freedom, and the ease with which the army had taken power in Nigeria a few weeks previously, meant that the coup of February 1966 was not unexpected, and the transition from a civilian government to a military one was remarkably smooth."
  76. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 137.
  77. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 137–138. "On March 4th, Ayeh-Kumi, long-time intimate, tribesman, and economic adviser to the deposed president, held a press conference to allege that Nkrumah had been corrupt and had grown wealthy through illicit financial dealings, particularly with foreign business concerns. This was followed by a number of similar press conferences at which important party leaders hastened to denounce Nkrumah and applaud the coup."
  78. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 49.
  79. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 139–140.
  80. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 155–158. "What made the establishment of military rule feasible, however, was the wide support generated by the coup among the urban civilian professional elite and the civil service. The response of the University of Ghana typified the reaction of this professional elite to the coup. A memorandum sent to the NLC by the university administration soon after the coup expressed the full support of the 'entire University body' for the NLC and offered to place the 'talents and skills' of 'various experts' in the university at the service of the NLC."
  81. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 146
  82. ^ a b Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 148–149.
  83. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 148. "On the international scene, the military government got some immediate help from its 'Western friends'. Foreign aid which the West had denied the old democratic regime started pouring in. The British government sent in a huge shipment of food aid and medicine. The United States which had earlier refused the Nkrumah regime food aid lifted that sanction within days of the February 24, 1996 coup, and by March shipments of American yellow corn, powdered milk and other food items started arriving. The former West Germany provided loans on generous terms and so did the IMF and World Bank (First, 1970). On the world market the price of cocoa (Ghana's main foreign exchange earner) which had dropped to its lowest ever in 1965 by no accident started rising again."
  84. ^ Cited in: Osei Boateng, "Nkrumah surely must be turning in his grave", New African 404, February 2002, p. 25.
  85. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 149–150. "At a press conference held shortly after the coup, Major-General Spears of Ashanti Gold Mines, urging assistance for the NLC, remarked (in what West Africa called 'the understatement of the year') that there were 'indications' that the West would 'find the new regime much more satisfactory to deal with than the old'."
  86. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 150–151.
  87. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 24. "According to directives issued by General Kotoka, the leader of the coup, to the National Economic Committee in March 1966 all military officers and ranks were to be granted total exemption from income tax, payment of quartering charges, electricity, water and conservancy, in addition to the restoration of pension rights and special maintenance and transfer grants abolished by Nkrumah's Government. Faced with this proposed plunder of the state treasury, the Ministry of Finance quaked and vacillated, finally concluded that 'a loss of Ȼ4.8 million is undoubtedly not too high a price to pay for the true freedom that has been brought to the Nation by the Armed Forces and Police'."
  88. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 157. "For instance, rent for officers was abolished by the NLC, "outstation" allowances was re-instated, free water and electricity was introduced. Other benefits such as allowances for uniforms, car maintenance, training, car mileage were all re-introduced into the military."
  89. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 181. "Almost immediately after the coup, in flagrant disregard for the economic situation of the country, a bonus payment of unspecified amound was made to all officers and ranks of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police, presumably in reward for their part in the coup."
  90. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 181–182.
  91. ^ Eboe Hutchful, "The Development of the Army Officer Corps in Ghana, 1956-1966"; Journal of African Studies 12.3, Fall 1985; pp. 172–173.
  92. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 150.
  93. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 115.
  94. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 115. "One of the first acts of the military regime was to request Britain (which turned it down) and the United States for military uniforms. Soon the officers and men of the Ghana Army were parading through Accra in the green uniforms and baseball caps of the U.S. Army.
  95. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 151–155. "Still hoping that other officers might join his cause, Lieutenant Arthur accepted a call from a number of other officers for a meeting at Military Headquarters in Burma Camp, and as Ruth First (1970:400) explains Arthur 'found himself tricked or talked out of his bid for control at a strange conference of the coup-makers and the Accra commander. Only then did troops arrive to arrest the mutineers.'"
  96. ^ a b Hettne, "Soldiers and Politics" (1980), p. 180. "In April 1967 the key figure in the coup, E. K. Kotoka, was killed by army insurrectionists and the NLC made the remarkable annonuncement that the abortive coup had not been planned by Ashanti and Fanti against Ga and Ewe (Dowse 1975, p. 26). Obviously this was what everyone believed. The ethnic composition of the NLC now changed in disfavour of the Ewes, and since the most influential Ewe after Kotoka was Harlley, the police chief, a cleavage emerged between the army and the police."
  97. ^ a b Adinkrah, "Political Coercion" (1988), p. 44.
  98. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 39.
  99. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 37.
  100. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 21–22. "At the regional level, regional commissioners appointed from the ranks of Mps were replaced by regional committees of administration made up of soldiers, policemen and civil servants. At the local level, the number of administrative districts was reduced from 168 to 47, with nominally elected councillors replaced by management committees, including originally a majority of central and local government officials, but later a larger number of nominated politicians. The main innovations by the NLC were the creation of a network of advisory committees and the appointment of numerous commissioners and committees of inquiry, many of which contained representatives of pressure groups and so provided a means by which groups could convey their demands. Immediately after the coup the NLC appointed standing committees to cover administration, economics, external affairs and publicity. Committees on law, tenders, agriculture and logistics were added later. A Political Committee was established in July 1966 'to make proposals to the NLC on modifications to enactments, decisions and policy to serve the public interest'."
  101. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 203–204.
  102. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 205–209.
  103. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 213– 214. "The monopolisation of power in the regime by officers and civil servants circumscribed the influence and power of the politicians, chiefs, and professional men in the new regime."
  104. ^ a b "MINISTER FOR DEFENCE". www.mod.gov.gh. Ghana Government. Retrieved 19 March 2020.
  105. ^ "Past Ministers". Official Website. Ministry of Interior, Ghana. Archived from the original on 20 January 2015. Retrieved 10 August 2014.
  106. ^ The Standard Bank Review. Standard Bank Limited. 1969.
  107. ^ Ashitey, Gilford A. (1994). Disease Control in Ghana (PDF). Accra: Ghana Universities Press. p. 11. ISBN 9964301960. Retrieved 30 October 2019.
  108. ^ Jubilee Ghana - A 50-year news journey thro' Ghana. Accra: Graphic Communications Group Ltd. 2006. p. 122. ISBN 9988809786.
  109. ^ "West African directory". T. Skinner, London. 1964: 81. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  110. ^ "Common wealth Yearbook". Great Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office.; Commonwealth Secretariat. 1968: 230. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  111. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 19. "Several factors made the relationship between the Government and pressure groups different after the coup. The most obvious ones were due to the new Government's different claims to legitimacy, its different ideology and its greater ignorance and inexperience at the time of assuming power. The NLC could not pretend to reflect a 'general will' by presiding over a mass party Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ghana) with 'integral wings', and it destroyed most of the nominally democratic machinery by suspending the Republican Constitution. This left only pressure groups as a means of contact with the public. Ideologically, the speeches made by NLC members contrasted with those of their predecessors. General Ankrah, speaking of the functions of regional committees of administration, mentioned the need for them to advise the Government on public reactions to its policies, and to inform it of the needs of the people."
  112. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 23. "The different situation in Ghana can be attributed at least in part to the relationship between leaders of the army and police, and leaders of other institutions such as the bar, business, the churches and the chieftaincy, many of whom had provided the core of traditional and middle-class opposition to Nkrumah. All these institutions antedated the CPP, and many of their members preferred a political system in which they, as members of the 'élite', could negotiate directly with the Government, without the encumbrance of a mass party."
  113. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 25. "The chiefs wasted no time in showing their attitude to the coup. The Asantehene, generally considered to be one of the most influential chiefs on account of his age and experience and the size of his chiefdom, welcomed the opportunity for chiefs to reign in peace now that Nkrumah had gone, and the general reaction was that a usurper had got his just deserts. Demands were soon made for the restoration of various powers taken away by Nkrumah, and the granting of a few others, and for the restoration of chiefs 'improperly' deposed by Nkrumah. By January 1967 the Chieftaincy Secretariat reported that petitions over stool disputes were still 'pouring in'. (The 'stool' is the chiefly equivalent of a royal throne.)"
  114. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 26–27.
  115. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 184–190.
  116. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 11–13.
  117. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 47. "Armed force was made more effective by the intelligence systems which the army and police controlled. Previously, Nkrumah had his own intelligence system, largely independent of the army and police. The fact that they were able to overthrow him, and that John Harlley, his own appointee at the head of the police, played a major part in this, is a measure of the ineffectiveness of that system."
  118. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 23. "Mass unemployment and economic hardship bred crime and social unrest: 'Towns and villages [in the Central Region and Ashanti]. . . are being subjected to a wave of terrorism and dacoity unparalleled in the history of this country', complained the Ghanaian Times in February 1967. To deal with this situation the NLC turned increasingly to legal repression and military force."
  119. ^ Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 211. "And, the press did accommodate quickly. On February 22, 1966, the Daily Graphic was filled with praise for Nkrumah's peace-seeking mission to Hanoi. Three days later its front page was devoted to the coup with photographs of NLC officers. It endorsed the takeover, praised the NLC for releasing the detainees, and urged everyone to cooperate with the new leaders."
  120. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 45. "Opinions that hardly appeared at all in print included those that advocated the return of Nkrumah or the CPP, those suggesting the use of undue violence in the coup, and those that questioned the NLC's legitimacy or suggested corruption in the NLC. Asked what would happen if someone wrote to his paper praising Nkrumah, one journalist replied: 'Nobody knows what would happen. That's why they don't do it.' Unsure how far they could go, most people with unorthodox views played for safety."
  121. ^ Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), pp. 214–215 .
  122. ^ Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 218.
  123. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 43. "No restriction was placed on the importation of books critical of the NLC, and both Bing's Reap the Whirlwind and Nkrumah's Dark Days in Ghana were readily available, but no one living in Ghana felt it prudent to write anything as critical as these authors."
  124. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 31–32 .
  125. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 19. Finally, the NLC was to reorganize state enterprises and terminate state subsidies to them, and cut expenditures on diplomatic representation, administration, and the national airline. The IMF was also granted wide powers of supervision over the Ghana economy. Ghana was obliged to 'remain in close consultation with the fund, and to keep the Fund informed of developments in the exchange, trade, monetary, credit and fiscal situation.' Budget-balancing, rather than the transformation of Ghana's economy, became the main objective of NLC economic policy."
  126. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 34–35. "It is worth stating again that the main problem posed by state industries was not that of simple profitability but of transformation of the neocolonial economy. The requirements for transformation are not necessarily the same as those for profitability a(and vice versa), particularly for multinational companies, for whom maximum profitability often requires that the local economy be maintained in its dependent and disarticulated mould."
  127. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 38.
  128. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 147. "It is interesting to observe that Omaboe was present at the meeting at the Police Headquarters at which the NLC was formed, and was most probably the person who drafted the new regime's first statement on the causes of the coup. Amegashie, who was out of the country when the coup occurred, was telephoned by Harlley to return immediately to Ghana. Both civilians were appointed to the Economic Committee, with Omaboe as Chairman. We may recall that the Economic Committee was the only institution of the military government to have been formed before the coup, Omaboe having compiled the names of most of the civilians on the Committee for Harlley's approval."
  129. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 29.
  130. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 29–30. "During 1966 and early 1967 a sub-committee of the National Economic Committee, the economic advisory organ of the NLC, negotiated with a number of foreign companies for participation (in reality, virtual takeover) in selected state enterprises. During the negotiations the companies demanded and obtained wider-ranging management and policy control over the enterprises as well as extensive tax and other concessions."
  131. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 32. "Much of the finance required for the acquisition of the assets by Abbott and Norcem would then have been derived from profits generated from operating these assets, with minimum investment of their own capital. At any rate, whatever capital was advanced by the foreign companies could hardly be described as risk capital. Both the original capital and return on it were guaranteed by extensive economic and political concessions: token rent, generous capital allowances, tax exemptions, remission of import duties, monopolistic conditions of production and pricing, etc., as well as state and USAID guarantees against expropriation. Risk was further reduced by heavy undervaluation of the original assets."
  132. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 25–26. "In 1969 the Economic Survey complained that 'in spite of the devaluation, the quantum of exports, instead of increasing, rather decreased. . . for all commodities except timber and diamonds, while the quantum of imports increased, contrary to expectations'."
  133. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 20. "From the beginning 'stabilization' was used as an excuse for large-scale destruction of socialist projects. With the expulsion of their techbnical personnel in March 1966 all the Eastern projects were brought to an abrupt halt. The subsequent fate of some of these projects was instructive. The reinforced concrete panel factory, which at the time of the coup had been completed at a cost of NȻ2.3 million in civil works and required only working capital to commence operations, was abandoned. It was not until 1973 and two governments later that an effort was made to put the factory into operation on the basis of a partnership between the government, the National Investment Bank, and a West German construction company. The Tarkwa gold refinery, 90% completed at the time of the coup, was abandoned altogether. According to the World Bank, it was 'understood that the ore could be refined more cheaply abroad'. In fact this project, designed to make Ghana self-sufficient in the processing of gold ores, had been opposed by the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and other foreign gold interests."
  134. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 20–21. "Although not an 'Eastern project' the cocoa storage silos were also abandoned, thus effectively ending Nkrumah's world cocoa market strategy. […] Instead the World Bank, which had consistently opposed the project, recommended that the silos be converted into general storage for the Tema Harbour, and conveyor belts built to connect them to the docks some two miles away. Since none of Ghana's subsequent rulers found this advice palatable, the massive shells of the semi-completed silos have continued to stand to this day, stark and decaying against the Tema skyline."
  135. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 21. "An Agricultural Committee established by the NLC to advise on agricultural policy had recommended the abolition of the corporation and the disposal of its 125 farms (see document 20). Between 1966 and the end of 1968 state farms and agricultural projects transferred or abandoned amounted to Ȼ6.6 million in net book value. In spite of the substantial value of the assets there were no controls or proper documentation of the transfers. Much of the farm machinery was simply abandoned where it lay, and by late 1966 various parts of the Ghanaian countryside were littered with rusting Soviet and Eastern machinery, some still uncrated."
  136. ^ a b Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 24. "The committee advised that the minimum wage be raised by 5 pesewas (to Ȼ0.75), and that negotiated wage increases be restricted to 5%. Nevertheless the committee recommended salary increases for top civil servants that would have raised the differential between the highest and lowest paid public servants upwards to 1.39. Even before the salary committee sat substantial salary increases had been granted to state lawyers, doctors, and university lecturers. Salary increases of up to 106% were also granted to the managing directors of state banks and corporations."
  137. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 21–22. "Twenty-eight fishing vessels belonging to the State Fishing Corporation (SFC) and private Ghanain fishing companies were laid up at Tema Harbour when their 350 Soviet crew and technicians were expelled in March 1966. The timing of the expulsion coincided with the withdrawal from service of the remaining (Japanese and Norwegian) vessels of the Fishing Corporation, either for maintenance or to await the arrival of fresh crews from abroad. The result was that 'within a few months after the coup, almost the whole of the deep-sea fishing operations of the SFC had come to a halt. Efforts were initially made to get the uAC to arrange replacement crew but nothing came of this. The resulting fish shortages had to be met by imports of frozen fish and landings from foreign vessels in foreign exchange."
  138. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 190–193. "Property acquired from the co-operatives without compensation at the establishment of the monopoly in 1961 were returned, and Ghanaian co-operatives and private firms allowed to purchase the cocao crop. The price paid to cocoa producers was raised three times in the three years. The operations of the State Construction Corporation and the Ghana National Trading Corporation, both state-owned enterprises, were scaled down, and much of their public and private business, import licenses and credit facilities transferred to private Ghanaian businessmen."
  139. ^ a b Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 23. "The share of labour in total value-added in the large-scale manufacturing sector (where most of the gains were said to have been realized) fell from 30.4% in 1962 to 20.6% in 1970, meaning that capital had increased its profits at the expense of labour. In a study of the manufacturing sector the World Bank admitted that 'the industrial workers did not benefit from the growth of productivity which took place during this period . . . Recipients of non-wage incomes [i.e. capital] have gained most from the industrial expansion that has occurred.' This was not unexpected, given the extensive concessions to big business and foreign investors by the NLC. Stabilization policies thus had the effect of intensifying existing income differentials in Ghanaian society, both between labour and capital and within the various strata of the working classes."
  140. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 27. "Both state investment in agriculture and commercial bank credit to the sector fell substantially throughout the stabilization period (Table 2) Shortfalls in local food production were met by increasing resort to commodity imports from the Western countries, thus further eroding the capacity of the agricultural sector for self-sufficiency. Although an unusually favourable harvest briefly brought down food prices in 1967, the local food price index continued to climb, from 167 in 1967 to 200 in 1969 and a record 236 in 1971."
  141. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 183.
  142. ^ Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 193–195.
  143. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 34–35.
  144. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 158.
  145. ^ Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 22. "Between the coup and August 1968, over 66,000 workers, constituting almost 10% of the total wage-labour force, were dismissed from their jobs, 36% of these in the Accra capital district alone. Unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the construction industry took the brunt, with 26,000 jobs. Employment in the private commercial sector also fell by almost 50%."
  146. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), pp. 85–86.
  147. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 87.
  148. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 89.
  149. ^ a b Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 91.
  150. ^ Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), pp. 82–83. "He contextualized the coup within what he considered as the disturbing emergence of 15 armed mutinies and military takeovers that had taken place on the African continent between 1962 and March 1967. He saw the coup d’état in Ghana as the product of an alliance between neo-colonial forces in the army and the police force, in collusion with imperialist interests."
  151. ^ Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa, p. 88; quoted in Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), pp. 94.
  152. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 10.
  153. ^ Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 11.
  154. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 149.
  155. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 159.
  156. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 159–160. "For the ordinary Ghanaian, it was however very clear to all and sundry that the military were going to hand-over power to the man of their choice — Dr K.A. Busia the leader of the former opposition to Nkrumah who was poised to be the next Head of State. Dr Busia by now was the head of the military appointed National Advisory Committee and at the same time heading the Center for Civic Education that was formed in June of 1967 with a mandate to educate Ghanaians about their civic duty. These two jobs allowed Dr Busia to travel throughout the state at government expense thus providing him with an excellent platform to expose himself to the Ghanaian electorate to the huge disadvantage of those who wished to challenge him for the job of Head of State in the coming elections despite the ban on political activity which was yet to be lifted on May 1, 1969."
  157. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 163–164.
  158. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 160.
  159. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 160–161.
  160. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 161–162. "Nunoo also made it clear in his public condemnation that the whole dismissal of General Ankrah and the earlier arrest and exoneration of the Chief of Defense Staff General Otu was a plot against the Ga ethnic group (Nunno, Otu and Ankrah are from this group). He further openly accused the State Attorney General Victor Owusu (an Ashanti) as the one behind the conspiracy to undermine the Ga people."
  161. ^ a b Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 167.
  162. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 165–166, 168. "Apaloo, Harley and Deku (all Ewe) wanted a Ewe candidate in the coming general elections to challenge the Ashanti candidate Dr K.A. Busia who was the overall preferred candidate of the military specially with absolute support from Brigadier Afrifa."
  163. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 168–169.
  164. ^ Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 170. "In order to oust Gbedemah from parliament and to prevent him from ever heading the new opposition in the second Republic (Nkrumah's government was the first Republic), the inserted clause in the Constitution that effectively banned certain individuals from holding any government job if a State Commission of Inquiry had made any 'adverse findings' against them was invoked. Gbedemah was now firmly caught in this Constitutional net and there was no escape this time despite his friendship with Police Commissioners Harley and Deku. He was denied his seat and forced out of parliament."

Sources[edit]

  • Adinkrah, Mensah. "Political Coercion in Military-Dominated Regimes: A Subcultural Interpretation." Dissertation accepted at Washington University, November 1988.
  • Al-Hassan, Osman. Politicized Soldiers: Military Intervention in the Politics of Ghana, 1966–1993. Dissertation accepted at Washington State University, May 2004.
  • Ama Biney, "The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile, 1966–1972", Journal of African History 50, 2009.
  • Barker, Peter (1969). Operation Cold Chop: The coup that toppled Nkrumah. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation. ISBN 978-0876760659.
  • Harvey, William Burnett. "Post-Nkrumah Ghana: The Legal Profile of a Coup". Wisconsin Law Review, 1966.
  • Hettne, Björn. "Soldiers and Politics: The Case of Ghana." Journal of Peace Research 17.2, 1980.
  • Hutchful, Eboe. The IMF and Ghana: The Confidential Record. London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd (Institute for African Alternatives), 1987.
  • Hutchful, Eboe. "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarisation in Ghana, 1966–1969." Dissertation accepted at University of Toronto, 15 June 1973.
  • Last, Deborah R. "An Interpretative History of Ghana's Mass Media". Dissertation accepted at University of Southern California, June 1980.
  • Montgomery, Mary E. "The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and the United States, 1957–1966." Dissertation accepted at University of Maryland, 8 January 2004.
  • Pinkney, Robert. Ghana Under Military Rule 1966–1969. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972. SBN 41675080X
  • Rooney, David. Kwame Nkrumah : Vision and Tragedy. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2007. ISBN 9789988647605
  • Steinberg, S. H. (editor) (1968). The Statesman's Year-Book 1968-69. London: Macmillan. p. 445. ISBN 9780230270978.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)

External links[edit]

  • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa: Ghana. Ed. Nina Davis Howland & David S. Patterson U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. Provides an annotated and chronologically ordered set of declassified documents related to U.S. foreign policy in Ghana.
  • Ghana-pedia webpage – Operation Cold Chop: The Fall Of Kwame Nkrumah[permanent dead link]
  • Ghanaweb – Picture of the NLC
Preceded by
Nkrumah government (1957-1966)
(Convention Peoples' Party)		 Government of Ghana
1966 – 1969		Succeeded by
Busia government (1969-1972)
(Progress Party)