La intervención cubana en Angola (denominada Operación Carlota) comenzó el 5 de noviembre de 1975, cuando Cuba envió tropas de combate en apoyo del Movimiento Popular de Liberación de Angola (MPLA), alineado con comunistas, en contra de la pro occidental Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total. de Angola (UNITA) y Frente de Liberación Nacional de Angola (FNLA). La intervención se produjo después del estallido de la Guerra Civil de Angola , que se produjo después de que la ex colonia portuguesa obtuviera la independencia después de la Guerra de Independencia de Angola . La guerra civil se convirtió rápidamente en una guerra por poderes. entre el Bloque del Este liderado por la Unión Soviética y el Bloque Occidental liderado por Estados Unidos . Sudáfrica y Estados Unidos respaldaron a UNITA y al FNLA, mientras que las naciones comunistas respaldaron al MPLA. [31] [32] 4.000 soldados cubanos ayudaron a hacer retroceder un avance de tres frentes de la SADF , UNITA, FLNA y tropas zaireanas . [22] Posteriormente, 18.000 efectivos cubanos derrotaron al FNLA en el norte y a la UNITA en el sur. [22] Separatistas del Frente de Liberación del Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) lucharon contra los cubanos pero fueron derrotados. En 1976, el ejército cubano en Angola alcanzó los 36.000 efectivos. Tras la retirada de Zaire y Sudáfrica (marzo de 1976), las fuerzas cubanas permanecieron en Angola para apoyar al gobierno del MPLA contra UNITA en la continua guerra civil . [33] Sudáfrica pasó la década siguiente lanzando bombardeos y ataques con ametralladoras desde sus bases en el suroeste de África hacia el sur de Angola, mientras que UNITA participaba en emboscadas, ataques de atropello y fuga y hostigamiento de unidades cubanas. [34]
Intervención cubana en Angola | |||||||
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Parte de la guerra civil angoleña | |||||||
Ubicación de Cuba (rojo), Angola (verde) y Sudáfrica (azul), incluido el suroeste de África | |||||||
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Beligerantes | |||||||
Material de soporte:
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Material de soporte:
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Fuerza | |||||||
Tropas cubanas:
Total de efectivos cubanos:
Tropas del MPLA:
Tropas soviéticas :
| Militantes de UNITA:
Militantes del FNLA:
Tropas sudafricanas :
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Bajas y perdidas | |||||||
Desconocido 2.016-5.000 muertos [23] 10.000-15.000 muertos, heridos o desaparecidos [24] [25] 56.000 desertores [26] [27] 54 muertos [28] | Desconocido Desconocido 2.365 [29] –2.500 muertos [30] (incluidas las muertes en la Guerra Fronteriza ) Desconocido |
En 1988, las tropas cubanas (aumentadas a unas 55.000) volvieron a intervenir para evitar un desastre militar en una ofensiva de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares para la Liberación de Angola (FAPLA) liderada por los soviéticos contra la UNITA, que aún contaba con el apoyo de Sudáfrica, lo que condujo a la Batalla de Cuito Cuanavale y la apertura de un segundo frente. [35] Se considera que este giro de los acontecimientos ha sido el mayor impulso para el éxito de las conversaciones de paz en curso que condujeron a los Acuerdos de Nueva York , el acuerdo mediante el cual las fuerzas cubanas y sudafricanas se retiraron de Angola mientras que el suroeste de África obtuvo su independencia de Sudáfrica. [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] El compromiso militar cubano en Angola terminó en 1991, mientras que la Guerra Civil Angoleña continuó hasta 2002. Las bajas cubanas en Angola totalizaron aproximadamente 10,000 muertos, heridos o desaparecidos. [41] [27]
Fondo
Fracaso del Acuerdo de Alvor y Guerra Civil
La Revolución de los Claveles del 25 de abril de 1974 en Portugal tomó al mundo por sorpresa y tomó desprevenidos a los movimientos independentistas en sus últimas colonias africanas. [42] Después de negociaciones fluidas, la independencia de Mozambique fue concedida el 25 de junio de 1975, pero el control angoleño permaneció en disputa entre los tres movimientos independentistas rivales: MPLA, FNLA y UNITA en Angola propiamente dicha y Frente para la Liberación del Enclave de Cabinda ( FLEC) en Cabinda .
Hasta la independencia, la prioridad de los movimientos independentistas era luchar contra el poder colonial y, inicialmente, no tenían alianzas claras. Con la desaparición de Portugal como su enemigo común, las rivalidades étnicas e ideológicas pasaron a primer plano. Los enfrentamientos entre los tres ya estallaron en noviembre de 1974, comenzando en Luanda y extendiéndose rápidamente por toda Angola. El nuevo gobierno portugués de izquierda mostró poco interés en interferir, pero a menudo favoreció al MPLA. El país pronto se desmoronó en diferentes esferas de influencia, el FNLA se apoderó del norte de Angola y la UNITA en el centro-sur. El MPLA se apoderó principalmente de la costa, el extremo sureste y, en noviembre de 1974, obtuvo el control de Cabinda. [43] La desunión de los tres principales movimientos pospuso el traspaso del poder. El Acuerdo de Alvor , que los tres y Portugal firmaron el 15 de enero, resultó no ser una base sólida para el procedimiento. El gobierno de transición previsto por el acuerdo estaba igualmente integrado por los tres grandes movimientos independentistas y Portugal. Prestó juramento el 31 de enero de 1975; El día de la independencia se fijó para el 11 de noviembre de 1975, el mismo día del alto el fuego. [38] [44] [45] FLEC no fue parte del trato porque luchó por la independencia de Cabinda, a la que los portugueses se habían unido administrativamente como un enclave a Angola.
Los combates en Luanda (denominados "Segunda Guerra de Liberación" por el MPLA) se reanudaron apenas un día después de que asumiera el gobierno de transición. [46] Las tropas del FNLA, traídas desde Zaire , habían estado tomando posiciones en Luanda desde octubre de 1974. El MPLA había seguido más tarde en menor número. [47] Hasta ese momento, el MPLA y UNITA "habían dado todos los signos de su intención de honrar el acuerdo de Alvor". [48] Estallaron enfrentamientos en Luanda entre el FNLA y el MPLA. El FNLA contó con el respaldo de Mobutu y Estados Unidos . En marzo, el FNLA del norte de Angola conducía hacia Luanda junto con unidades del ejército de Zaire que Estados Unidos había alentado a Mobutu a proporcionar. [49] El 28 de abril, el FNLA desató una segunda ola de ataques y, a principios de mayo, 200 soldados zaireños cruzaron hacia el norte de Angola en su apoyo. [50] [51]
El MPLA, inicialmente más débil, se retiró hacia el sur, pero con los suministros que finalmente llegaron de la Unión Soviética , logró expulsar al FNLA de Luanda el 9 de julio. El FNLA tomó posiciones al este de Kifangondo en las afueras del este de la capital, desde donde mantuvo su presión, y eliminó toda la presencia restante del MPLA en las provincias del norte de Uige y Zaire . [52]
La lucha se reanudó en todo el país. Los movimientos independentistas intentaron apoderarse de puntos estratégicos clave, sobre todo la capital el día de la independencia. En una reunión del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de los Estados Unidos (NSC) el 27 de junio de 1975, el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Gerald Ford, dijo que, a pesar de las elecciones previstas, era importante que "su hombre" entrara primero, refiriéndose al entonces líder de la UNITA, Jonas Savimbi. tener el control de Luanda antes de las elecciones. Arthur Schlesinger señaló en la misma reunión que Estados Unidos "podría querer alentar la desintegración de Angola. Cabinda en las garras de Mobutu significaría una seguridad mucho mayor de los recursos petroleros". [53]
Participación extranjera
A principios de la década de 1960, los tres grandes movimientos independentistas contaron con el apoyo de una amplia gama de países, en algunos casos incluso de los mismos. En el momento de la independencia, FNLA y UNITA recibieron ayuda de Estados Unidos, Zaire, Sudáfrica y China.
Mientras Portugal estuviera presente en Angola, los movimientos debían tener su sede en países vecinos independientes, por lo que Congo-Léopoldville ( Zaire / República Democrática del Congo , antes belga), tanto para el MPLA como para el FNLA, una opción lógica. Después de su expulsión de Léopoldville (ahora Kinshasa ) en noviembre de 1963, el MPLA se trasladó al otro lado del río Congo hacia el antiguo Congo- Brazzaville ( República del Congo ) francés , donde fue invitado por su nuevo gobierno de izquierda. [54] El FNLA permaneció en Congo-Léopoldville al que permaneció estrechamente vinculado y desde donde recibió la mayor parte de su apoyo. El líder del FNLA, Holden Roberto, estaba vinculado a Mobutu por matrimonio y estaba obligado a él por muchos favores pasados. A lo largo de los años, el FNLA se había convertido en poco más que una extensión de las propias fuerzas armadas de Mobutu. Gran parte del apoyo de Zaire provino indirectamente de Estados Unidos, con el que el líder de Zaire, Mobutu, tenía estrechos vínculos. Zaire fue el primer país en enviar tropas a Angola en marzo de 1975 y en participar en la lucha contra el MPLA en el verano de ese año. [55]
En el verano de 1974, China fue la primera en actuar después de la Revolución portuguesa y envió 200 instructores militares a Zaire, donde entrenaron a las tropas del FNLA y proporcionaron asistencia militar. La participación china fue una medida contra la influencia soviética más que contra la de los países occidentales. El 27 de octubre de 1975, también fueron los primeros en retirar a sus instructores militares. UNITA, que se separó del FNLA en 1965/66 fue inicialmente maoísta y recibió cierto apoyo de China. [56] China había estado entrenando a la división de élite de Mobutu, Kamanyola , también entrenó al FNLA pero retiró su apoyo a Zaire y al FNLA a fines de diciembre de 1975. [57] En 1975, China también fue la primera en retirarse del área. después de la Revolución portuguesa. Cuando cesó su apoyo, el FNLA y UNITA se establecieron firmemente en el campo occidental.
Estados Unidos tenía un historial de apoyo al régimen de Salazar en Portugal, por ejemplo, permitiendo el uso de equipos de la OTAN en Angola, así como movimientos de independencia que luchan contra el colonialismo portugués. [58] El apoyo de Estados Unidos al FNLA fue asumido por la administración Kennedy en 1960. Holden Roberto había estado en la nómina de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) desde 1963. [59] El 7 de julio de 1974, la CIA comenzó a financiar al FNLA a pequeña escala. [60] El 22 de enero de 1975, una semana después de la firma de los Acuerdos de Alvor y justo antes de que el gobierno provisional de Angola asumiera el cargo, el " Comité 40 " del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de los EE. UU. , Que supervisó las operaciones clandestinas de la CIA, autorizó 300.000 dólares en forma encubierta. ayudas al FNLA. [61] [62]
Como la CIA sospechaba del MPLA de tendencia izquierdista, "no deseaba que el gobierno de Estados Unidos tratara con el MPLA" y no quería que fueran parte del gobierno de transición. [63] Estados Unidos aumentó su apoyo al FNLA y por primera vez asumió la financiación de UNITA. El 18 de julio de 1975, el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Ford, aprobó la operación encubierta de la CIA " IAFEATURE " para ayudar al FNLA y la UNITA con dinero (30 millones de dólares), armas e instructores. Los instructores militares estadounidenses (CIA) llegaron al sur de Angola a principios de agosto, donde cooperaron estrechamente con sus homólogos sudafricanos que llegaron casi al mismo tiempo. El apoyo incluyó el reclutamiento de mercenarios y una campaña de propaganda ampliada contra el MPLA. El público estadounidense no fue informado. Estados Unidos "se comprometió públicamente con un embargo contra la entrega de armas a las facciones angoleñas mientras lanzaba en secreto un programa paramilitar". [59]
Sudáfrica , que entonces estaba bajo el gobierno de una minoría blanca conocida como Apartheid , pronto se convirtió en los aliados más cercanos tanto de UNITA como de FNLA. [64] [65] Otros países occidentales con su propio apoyo clandestino para FNLA y UNITA fueron Gran Bretaña y Francia. [66] Israel apoyó al FNLA de 1963 a 1969 y el FNLA envió miembros a Israel para su formación. Durante la década de 1970, Israel envió armas al FNLA a través de Zaire. [67]
Algunos países del Bloque del Este y Yugoslavia establecieron por primera vez lazos con el MPLA a principios de la década de 1960 durante su lucha contra los portugueses. La Unión Soviética inició una modesta ayuda militar a finales de la década de 1960. Este apoyo permaneció clandestino, llegó en forma de gotas y, a veces, cesó por completo. Este fue el caso en 1972, cuando el MPLA sufrió una fuerte presión de los portugueses y fue desgarrado por luchas internas (lucha entre el líder del MPLA António Agostinho Neto y Chipenda de 1972 a 1974). La ayuda soviética se suspendió en 1973 con la excepción de unos pocos envíos limitados en 1974 para contrarrestar el apoyo chino al FNLA; sólo Yugoslavia continuó enviando suministros al MPLA. [45] [66] [68] En respuesta al apoyo estadounidense y chino al FNLA, el apoyo soviético al MPLA se reanudó en marzo de 1975 en forma de entregas de armas por aire a través de Brazzaville y por mar a través de Dar-es-Salaam . [45] [55] La ayuda soviética al MPLA siempre fue algo reacia; nunca confiaron plenamente en Neto y su relación permanecería ambivalente durante los años siguientes. Los soviéticos preferían una solución política, pero no querían ver marginado al MPLA. [69] Incluso después de las incursiones sudafricanas, los soviéticos solo enviaron armas, pero no instructores para el uso de armas sofisticadas. [70] Entre los otros países del Bloque del Este, el MPLA tenía contactos bien establecidos con Alemania del Este y Rumania , el primero enviaba grandes cantidades de suministros no militares. Aunque era izquierdista, Neto estaba interesado en un equilibrio ideológico en su apoyo extranjero, pero a pesar de las "propuestas" hasta bien entrado 1975, no pudo conseguir apoyo para el MPLA de los Estados Unidos, por lo que se volvió dependiente únicamente del campo oriental. [71]
Cuba y el MPLA antes de la Guerra Civil
Los primeros contactos informales de Cuba con el MPLA se remontan a finales de la década de 1950. [72] Las guerrillas del MPLA recibieron su primer entrenamiento de cubanos en Argel a partir de 1963 y el Che Guevara se reunió con el líder del MPLA, Agostinho Neto, para las primeras conversaciones de alto nivel el 5 de enero de 1965 en Brazzaville, donde Cuba estaba estableciendo una misión militar de dos años. Esta misión tenía el propósito principal de actuar como reserva estratégica para la operación cubana en el este del Congo. También debía prestar asistencia al gobierno de Alphonse Massemba-Débat en Brazzaville y, a petición de Neto, al MPLA con sus operaciones contra los portugueses en Cabinda y en el norte de Angola, donde su principal enemigo era el FNLA. Esta cooperación marcó el inicio de la alianza Cuba-MPLA que duraría 26 años. [73]
Las operaciones cubanas del MPLA en Cabinda y el norte de Angola tuvieron muy poco éxito y los cubanos terminaron la misión a Brazzaville como estaba planeado en julio de 1966. El MPLA trasladó su cuartel general a Lusaka a principios de 1968. Algunos guerrilleros del MPLA continuaron recibiendo entrenamiento militar. en Cuba, pero los contactos entre Cuba y el MPLA se enfriaron cuando La Habana dirigió su atención a la lucha por la independencia en Guinea-Bissau . [74] [75] Tras la gira de Castro por países africanos en mayo de 1972, Cuba intensificó sus operaciones internacionalistas en África iniciando una misión de entrenamiento en Sierra Leona y misiones técnicas más pequeñas en Guinea Ecuatorial , Somalia , Argelia y Tanzania .
En un memorando del 22 de noviembre de 1972, el Mayor cubano Manuel Piñeiro Lozada comunicó a Raúl Castro la solicitud del MPLA de pequeñas cantidades de entrenamiento y tripulación. [76] Estas consideraciones en 1972 no dieron frutos y la atención de Cuba se mantuvo centrada en Guinea-Bissau. Fue solo después de la Revolución portuguesa que una delegación del MPLA presentó una solicitud de ayuda económica, entrenamiento militar y armas a Cuba el 26 de julio de 1974. A principios de octubre Cuba recibió otra solicitud, esta vez más urgente, de cinco militares cubanos para ayudar a organizar el ejército del MPLA, FAPLA. En diciembre de 1974 / enero de 1975 Cuba envió al Mayor Alfonso Pérez Morales y Carlos Cadelo en una misión de investigación a Angola para evaluar la situación. [77] En una carta del 26 de enero de 1975, entregada a Cadelo y Morales, Neto enumeró lo que el MPLA quería de Cuba, incluido "El establecimiento, organización y mantenimiento de una escuela militar para cuadros", "Un barco [cubano] para transportar el material de guerra que tenemos en Dar-es-Salaam a Angola ”,“ Uniformes y equipo militar para 10.000 hombres ”y“ Asistencia financiera mientras nos estamos estableciendo y organizándonos ”. [78]
Aunque Cuba estaba considerando el establecimiento de una misión militar (entrenamiento militar) en Angola, nuevamente no hubo respuesta oficial a esta solicitud. El MPLA sólo lo reiteró en mayo de 1975 cuando el comandante cubano Flavio Bravo se reunió con Neto en Brazzaville mientras los portugueses se preparaban para retirarse de sus colonias africanas. [79] Las esperanzas de ayuda del MPLA se dirigieron a los países del bloque oriental, de donde no se materializó suficiente ayuda de acuerdo con sus deseos. Neto es citado en un informe cubano quejándose del deslucido apoyo de Moscú. También expresó su esperanza de que la guerra en Angola se convierta en "un tema vital en la lucha contra el imperialismo y el socialismo". Pero ni la URSS ni el propio MPLA esperaban que estallara una guerra importante antes de la independencia. [80] En marzo de 1975, el MPLA envió ca. 100 miembros para la formación en la Unión Soviética y la asistencia financiera solicitada (100.000 dólares EE.UU.) que recibió de Yugoslavia.
Sudáfrica interviene
La repentina retirada de Portugal de Angola y Mozambique en 1975 puso fin a una historia de cooperación militar y de inteligencia de Sudáfrica con Portugal contra los movimientos de independencia de Angola y Namibia que se remontan a la década de 1960, formalizados más tarde en una alianza secreta denominada Ejercicio Alcora . [81] También puso fin a la cooperación económica con respecto al proyecto hidroeléctrico de Cunene en la frontera entre Angola y Namibia, que Sudáfrica había financiado. [82] [83]
La participación de Sudáfrica en Angola, subsumida en lo que llamó la Guerra Fronteriza de Sudáfrica, comenzó en 1966 cuando el conflicto con el movimiento independentista de Namibia, la Organización del Pueblo de África Sudoccidental ( SWAPO ), que en ese momento tenía sus bases en Ovamboland y Zambia , primero estalló. Con la pérdida de los portugueses como aliados y el establecimiento de un gobierno comunista pro-SWAPO en las dos antiguas colonias, el régimen del apartheid perdió secciones muy valiosas de su "cordon sanitaire" ( zona de amortiguamiento ) entre él y el hostil África negra. [84] [85] [86] En los años siguientes, Sudáfrica participó en numerosas actividades militares y económicas en la región, respaldando a RENAMO en la Guerra Civil de Mozambique , adoptando diversas medidas de desestabilización económica contra Botswana , Lesotho , Malawi , Mozambique , Swazilandia , Tanzania , Zambia y Zimbabwe , respaldando una intervención mercenaria fallida en las Seychelles en 1981, y apoyando un golpe en Lesotho en 1986. Estuvo detrás de un intento de golpe en Tanzania en 1983, brindó apoyo a los rebeldes en Zimbabwe desde la independencia, llevó a cabo redadas contra las oficinas del Congreso Nacional Africano en Maputo , Harare y Gaborone y llevaron a cabo una guerra de contrainsurgencia en Namibia contra la SWAPO. [40] La SWAPO se retiró y operó desde bases en Angola, y Sudáfrica se enfrentó no solo al problema de tener que cruzar otra frontera en pos de la SWAPO sino también de otro gobierno de izquierda en la región. A diferencia de los demás países de la región, Sudáfrica no tenía influencia económica sobre Angola, por lo que la acción militar era el único medio posible para ejercer alguna influencia en el curso de los acontecimientos. [40]
El 14 de julio de 1975, el primer ministro sudafricano, John Vorster, aprobó la compra secreta de armas por valor de 14 millones de dólares para el FNLA y la UNITA. [87] [88] Los primeros envíos de armas para el FNLA y la UNITA de Sudáfrica llegaron en agosto de 1975.
El 9 de agosto de 1975, una patrulla de 30 hombres de las Fuerzas de Defensa de Sudáfrica (SADF) se trasladó unos 50 km hacia el sur de Angola y ocupó el complejo hidroeléctrico Ruacana - Calueque y otras instalaciones en el río Cunene . Varias incidencias hostiles con UNITA y SWAPO que atemorizaban a trabajadores extranjeros habían sido el pretexto. [89] La defensa del complejo de la presa de Calueque en el sur de Angola fue la justificación de Sudáfrica para el primer despliegue permanente de unidades regulares de la SADF dentro de Angola. [55] [90]
El 22 de agosto de 1975, la SADF lanzó la operación "Sausage II", un gran ataque contra la SWAPO en el sur de Angola. Además, el 4 de septiembre de 1975, Vorster autorizó la provisión de entrenamiento militar, asesoramiento y apoyo logístico limitados. A su vez, FNLA y UNITA ayudarían a los sudafricanos que luchan contra la SWAPO. [91] Debido a los recientes éxitos del MPLA, el territorio de UNITA se había ido reduciendo a partes del centro de Angola, [92] y quedó claro para Sudáfrica que el día de la independencia encontraría al MPLA en control de Luanda; "ni Estados Unidos ni Sudáfrica estaban dispuestos a aceptar eso". [93] La SADF estableció un campo de entrenamiento cerca de Silva Porto y preparó las defensas de Nova Lisboa (Huambo). Reunieron la unidad de ataque móvil "Foxbat" para dejar de acercarse a las unidades de las FAPLA con las que se enfrentaron el 5 de octubre, salvando así Nova Lisboa para la UNITA. [94]
El 14 de octubre, los sudafricanos lanzaron en secreto la Operación Savannah cuando la Task Force Zulu, la primera de varias columnas sudafricanas, cruzó de Namibia a Cuando Cubango. El sur de Angola estaba sumido en el caos con los tres movimientos independentistas luchando entre sí por el dominio. FAPLA tardó un poco en darse cuenta de a quién más se enfrentaba y la SADF avanzó muy rápido. El grupo de trabajo Foxbat se unió a la intervención a mediados de octubre. [62] [95] La operación preveía la eliminación del MPLA de la zona fronteriza sur, luego del suroeste de Angola, de la región central y finalmente la captura de Luanda. [96]
"Pretoria creía que al invadir Angola podría instalar sus representantes y apuntalar el apartheid en el futuro previsible". [91] Estados Unidos alentó a los sudafricanos, había sabido de sus planes encubiertos de antemano y cooperó militarmente con sus fuerzas, en contra del testimonio del Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger ante el Congreso en ese momento, así como en desacuerdo con la versión en sus memorias y en contraste con lo que el presidente Ford dijo a los chinos, quienes apoyaban al FNLA pero estaban preocupados por el compromiso sudafricano en Angola. [38] [97] Según John Stockwell , un ex oficial de la CIA, "había una estrecha relación entre la CIA y los sudafricanos" [93] y "los 'altos funcionarios' en Pretoria afirmaron que su intervención en Angola se había basado en un 'entendimiento' con los Estados Unidos ". [98]
Misión militar cubana
Hasta finales de agosto, Cuba solo contaba con unos pocos asesores técnicos [ ¿cuáles? ] en Angola, del que tomó nota la CIA. [99] El 3 de agosto, una delegación cubana viajó por segunda vez a Angola para evaluar la situación, elaborar planes para el programa de capacitación solicitado por Neto y entregar US $ 100.000. [100] Neto se había quejado "de la poca ayuda de los países socialistas y" que la URSS detuvo la ayuda al MPLA en 1972, a pesar de que nos dijeron que ahora están ayudando con las armas, pero es muy poca en comparación con su enorme necesidades ". Argüelles coincidió con Neto al ver los bandos en Angola" claramente definidos, que el FNLA y UNITA representaban a las fuerzas imperialistas internacionales y la reacción portuguesa, y el MPLA representaba a las fuerzas progresistas y nacionalistas " [101] [102].
Tras el regreso de la delegación el 8 de agosto, los cubanos consideraron las opciones de sus instructores en Angola en caso de una intervención de Sudáfrica o Zaire que sería o "guerra de guerrillas" o retirada a Zambia, donde Cuba procedió a abrir una embajada. . [103] En un memorando de 11 de agosto de 1975, el Mayor Raúl Díaz Argüelles al Mayor Raúl Castro explicó los motivos de la visita e informó sobre el contenido de las conversaciones. Subrayó que se tuvieron en cuenta los ataques del FNLA y de Mobutu al MPLA y el posible desarrollo de acciones futuras hasta la independencia en el mes de noviembre y la conciencia de que "los reaccionarios y los imperialistas intentarían todos los métodos posibles". para evitar que las fuerzas del MPLA tomen el poder ”. El mismo día Argüelles propuso una misión de 94 hombres a Castro. [104] El 15 de agosto, Castro instó a la URSS a aumentar el apoyo al MPLA, se ofreció a enviar tropas especiales y pidió ayuda. Los rusos declinaron. [105]
En vista de la intervención zairense en el norte y la ocupación sudafricana del complejo hidroeléctrico Ruacana-Calueque en el sur, se decidió dotar a los CIR con casi 500 cubanos en lugar de los 100 solicitados, que iban a formar unas 4.800 FAPLA. reclutas en 16 batallones de infantería, 25 baterías de mortero y varias unidades antiaéreas en tres a seis meses. Estos 500 hombres incluyeron 17 en una brigada médica y 284 oficiales. [90] [104] [106] "La decisión de ampliar la operación reflejó un sentimiento en La Habana de que ... tenía que haber suficientes para cumplir con su misión y defenderse en caso de que la operación saliera mal. claro que… esperaban que (la misión) fuera a corto plazo y que durara alrededor de 6 meses ”. [107]
El envío de los voluntarios cubanos comenzó el 21 de agosto y una avanzadilla con los especialistas más necesitados utilizó vuelos comerciales internacionales. Pequeños grupos continuaron llegando a Luanda en esos vuelos, así como en los viejos aviones Britannia de Cuba, y la mayor parte llegó después de un viaje de dos semanas a bordo de tres cargueros cubanos; el primero, el "Vietnam Heroico" atracó en Porto Amboim el 5 de octubre. [100] La llegada de dos barcos cubanos a Angola con instructores a bordo fue informada por la CIA [108] y no dio ninguna alarma en Washington. [109]
Los CIR se ubicaron en Cabinda , Benguela , Saurimo (antes Henrique de Carvalho) y en N'Dalatando (antes Salazar). El CIR de Cabinda representó casi la mitad del total, 191 hombres, mientras que los demás tenían 66 o 67 cada uno. Algunos estaban destinados en la sede de Luanda o en otros lugares del país. La razón del mayor destacamento en Cabinda fue la amenaza percibida de Zaire a Cabinda o al Congo. [100] [110] Para cuando los centros de formación contaban con todo el personal y estaban operativos entre el 18 y el 20 de octubre, sin que el mundo lo notara, la Operación Savannah ya estaba en pleno apogeo. [111]
En contraste con los éxitos en el sur, donde a mediados de octubre el MPLA había ganado el control de 12 de las provincias de Angola y la mayoría de los centros urbanos, apenas lograron mantener al FNLA bien equipado y sus aliados al tanto en el frente norte, al este de Luanda. . [112] El FNLA estaba recibiendo armas y equipo de Estados Unidos a través de Zaire a partir de finales de julio [113] y se había fortalecido en septiembre con la llegada del Cuarto y Séptimo Batallón de Comando zairenses. [90] De julio a noviembre, el frente se movió de un lado a otro entre Caxito y Quifangondo (Kifangondo). Neto pidió más apoyo a la Unión Soviética, que no tenía intención de enviar personal antes de la independencia y solo envió más armas a regañadientes. Los cubanos estaban ocupados lidiando con la llegada de los contingentes de los CIR y recién el 19 de octubre prestaron suficiente atención a la precaria situación de Luanda. Al darse cuenta de la amenaza, cerraron el CIR en Salazar solo 3 días después de que comenzara a operar y desplegaron a la mayoría de los reclutas e instructores cubanos en Luanda. [114] Cuarenta instructores del CIR Salazar fueron los primeros cubanos en involucrarse en la defensa de Quifangondo el 23 de octubre de 1975 cuando lanzaron un infructuoso asalto a las fuerzas del FNLA-Zaire en Morro do Cal. Un segundo grupo apoyó al MPLA el 28 de octubre a lo largo de la misma línea de defensa al este de Kifangondo. [115]
Sin embargo, desapercibido para los cubanos, el territorio que el MPLA acababa de ganar en el sur se perdió rápidamente ante los avances sudafricanos. Después de que asesores sudafricanos y armas antitanques ayudaron a detener un avance del MPLA en Nova Lisboa (Huambo) a principios de octubre, Zulu tomó Roçadas el 20 de octubre, Sá da Bandeira el 24 de octubre y Moçâmedes el 28 de octubre. Del 2 al 3 de noviembre, los instructores cubanos se involucraron por tercera vez en los combates, esta vez 51 hombres del CIR Benguela, cuando intentaron sin éxito ayudar a las FAPLA a detener el avance zulú cerca de Catengue. Este primer encuentro entre cubanos y sudafricanos también dio lugar a las primeras muertes cubanas reconocidas oficialmente. "Su participación llevó al comandante zulú Breytenbach a concluir que sus tropas estaban 'enfrentando la oposición de las FAPLA mejor organizada y más fuerte hasta la fecha'". [116]
Primera intervención de Cuba
Operación Carlota
Fue solo después de la debacle del MPLA en Catengue que los cubanos se dieron cuenta de la intervención sudafricana, que Luanda sería tomada y que sus misiones de entrenamiento estaban en grave peligro a menos que tomaran medidas inmediatas. Neto había solicitado refuerzos inmediatos y masivos a La Habana a instancias de Argüelles. El 4 de noviembre Castro decidió lanzar una intervención a una escala sin precedentes, con el nombre en clave de la misión Operación Carlota , en honor a ' Carlota Negra ', líder de una rebelión de esclavos en 1843. El mismo día, un primer avión con 100 especialistas en armas pesadas, que el El MPLA había solicitado en septiembre, partió hacia Brazzaville, llegando a Luanda el 7 de noviembre. El 9 de noviembre llegaron a Luanda los dos primeros aviones cubanos con los primeros 100 hombres de un contingente de un batallón de 652 efectivos de las Fuerzas Especiales de élite. [117] La primera prioridad de los cubanos fue ayudar al MPLA a mantener el control de Luanda. Fidel Castro explicó la intervención cubana: "Cuando comenzó la invasión de Angola por tropas regulares sudafricanas el 23 de octubre, no podíamos quedarnos de brazos cruzados. Y cuando el MPLA nos pidió ayuda, ofrecimos la ayuda necesaria para evitar que el Apartheid se sintiera cómodo en Angola ". [37] [105]
Con la Operación Carlota, Cuba se convirtió en un actor importante en el conflicto. A diferencia de sus compromisos en el extranjero en los años sesenta, esta no fue una operación secreta. Castro decidió apoyar al MPLA con toda franqueza, enviando fuerzas especiales y 35.000 infantes a fines de 1976, desplegándolos por cuenta de Cuba y con sus propios medios desde noviembre de 1975 a enero de 1976. Como en sus misiones anteriores, todo el personal era voluntario. y la convocatoria fue extremadamente popular.
El transporte aéreo para despliegues rápidos resultó ser un problema importante. Cuba solo tenía tres viejos aviones turbohélice Bristol Britannia de mediano alcance que no estaban en condiciones de hacer 9.000 kilómetros de travesías transatlánticas sin escalas. Sin embargo, entre el 7 de noviembre y el 9 de diciembre los cubanos lograron realizar 70 vuelos de refuerzo a Luanda. Inicialmente pudieron hacer escalas en Barbados, las Azores o Terranova, lo que provocó la presión de Washington para negar los derechos de desembarco de Cuba. Pero trasladando los despegues al aeropuerto más oriental de Cuba, Holguín, con el menor peso necesario y agregando tanques adicionales, los aviones se utilizaron para numerosos recorridos a través del océano hasta que los soviéticos se lanzaron con aviones a reacción de larga distancia. [37] [118]
Para el grueso de las tropas y el equipo, los cubanos se apoderaron de todos los barcos disponibles en su marina mercante, los tres primeros zarparon de La Habana el 8 de noviembre. Atracaron en Luanda los días 27 y 29 de noviembre y 1 de diciembre con 1.253 efectivos y equipo. [119]
El despliegue de tropas no fue arreglado previamente con la URSS, como a menudo informa y describe la administración estadounidense. Al contrario, también tomó por sorpresa a la URSS. [120] Los soviéticos se vieron obligados a aceptar el despliegue de tropas cubanas para no poner en peligro las relaciones con su aliado más importante en las proximidades de los Estados Unidos. Pero tenían en mente mantener bajo control el alcance del compromiso cubano y simplemente enviaron armas y algunos especialistas a Brazzaville y Dar-es-Salaam. Sólo dos meses después de que los combates se inclinaran a favor de los cubanos y Estados Unidos aprobara la Enmienda Clark, Moscú accedió a un grado de apoyo al disponer un máximo de 10 vuelos de transporte de Cuba a Angola. [121]
Con el FNLA atacando desde el este, la situación para el MPLA sólo unos días antes de la independencia parecía sombría. Además de esto, Cabinda estaba bajo la amenaza de ser tomada por una fuerza FLEC-Zairense. [81] Las tropas cubanas que pudieron intervenir antes de la declaración de independencia del 11 de noviembre fueron básicamente las que estaban apostadas en los tres CIR, los 100 especialistas que llegaron a Luanda el 7 de noviembre y las primeras 164 fuerzas especiales de la Operación Carlota que llegaron en dos aviones. en la tarde del 8 de noviembre. [122] Los 100 especialistas y 88 hombres de las fuerzas especiales fueron enviados inmediatamente al frente cercano en Quifangondo donde la fuerza FNLA-Zairense había lanzado un asalto esa misma mañana. Apoyaron a 850 FAPLA, 200 katanganos y un asesor soviético. Las primeras armas pesadas ya habían llegado desde Cuba por barco el 7 de noviembre, entre ellas cañones, morteros y 6 lanzacohetes múltiples BM-21 ( Katyusha ). Los cubanos recibieron informes de que la esperada invasión de Cabinda había comenzado en la mañana del 8 de noviembre.
Northern front and Cabinda
The invasion of Cabinda was conducted by three FLEC and one Zairian infantry battalions under the command of 150 French and American mercenaries. The MPLA's had the 232 Cubans of the CIR, a freshly trained and an untrained FAPLA infantry battalion at its disposal. In the ensuing battle for Cabinda from 8–13 November they managed to repel the invasion without support from Operation Carlota, thus saving the exclave for the MPLA.[123]
Two days before independence the most imminent danger for the MPLA came from the northern front where the FNLA and its allies stood east of Quifangondo. 2,000 FNLA troops were supported by two battalions of Zairian infantry troops (1,200 men), 120 Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent, and 52 South Africans led by General Ben de Wet Roos. They were manning the artillery provided by the SADF which had been flown into Ambriz only two days before.[124]
After artillery bombardment on Luanda and Quifangondo through the night and a bombing raid by the South African air force in the early hours the final attack of the FNLA was launched on the morning of 10 November. The attacking force was ambushed and destroyed by the FAPLA-Cuban forces. Cuban forces also bombarded their South African and FNLA enemies with BM-21 Grad rocket launchers which had been put into place only the night before, and were well out of range of the antiquated South African guns. The defeat of the FNLA in the Battle of Quifangondo secured the capital for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power "to the people of Angola" and shortly after midnight Neto proclaimed independence and the formation of the "People's Republic of Angola".[125][126] Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services, the FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo. Yet, UNITA and FNLA could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.[127][128][129] On the day of independence the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola inland toward Zaire and the exclave of Cabinda. On 4 December the FAPLA-Cubans launched a counter-offensive against the FNLA. But with Luanda and Cabinda secured and the defeat of the FNLA at Quifangondo they could finally turn more attention to the south.[130]
Cuba operated independently through December and January bringing in their troops in slowly, but steadily. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota the Soviets agreed to ten charter flights on long-range IL-62 jet airliners, starting on 8 January.[131] This was followed one week later by an agreement that "the Soviets would supply all future weaponry … transporting it directly to Angola so that the Cuban airlift could concentrate on personnel."[130]
By early February, with increasing numbers in Cuban troops and sophisticated weaponry, the tide changed in favour of the MPLA. The final offensive in the North started on 1 January 1976. By 3 January FAPLA-Cuban forces took the FNLA air bases of Negage and Camabatela and a day later the FNLA capital of Carmona. A last-ditch attempt by FNLA to use foreign mercenaries enlisted by the CIA (see next chapter: U.S. response) failed; on 11 January FAPLA-Cubans captured Ambriz and Ambrizete (N'zeto) an on 15 February the FNLA's last foothold, São Salvador. By late February one Cuban and 12 FAPLA and battalions had completely annihilated the FNLA, driving what was left of them and the Zairian army across the border.[132][133] The South African contingent on the northern front had already been evacuated by ship on 28 November.[134] The last mercenaries left northern Angola by 17 January.[135]
U.S. response
It was several days before the U.S. realised the severity of the FNLA defeat at Quifangondo, but even then had little idea of the extent of the Cuban involvement. The news from the southern front was, in their view, still positive.[136] Kissinger, like the South Africans, was shaken by the scale of the Soviet and Cuban response. The CIA's Angolan task force at CIA headquarters at Langley had been so confident of success by the Zairian and South African regulars, that on 11 November the members had celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their offices.[55] The U.S. had not commented on the South African intervention in Angola but denounced the Cuban intervention when it first acknowledged Cuban troops in Angola in an official statement on 24 November 1975. Kissinger said "that US efforts at rapprochement with Cuba would end should 'Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate' continue."[93] On 28 February 1976, Ford called Castro "an international outlaw" and the Cuban intervention a "flagrant act of aggression".[137]
Due to the hostility between the U.S. and Cuba, the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted.[138] The U.S. assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference.[37][139] On 9 December Ford asked the Soviets to suspend the airlift, still assuming it was a Soviet-run operation.[140] The Americans also depicted the motivations and timings of the Cubans differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in the Vietnam War. Only years later did it become clear to them that the Cubans acted on their own behalf.[141]
Castro responded to the U.S. reaction: "Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before 11 November? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism.[37]
On 3 December 1975, in a meeting with officials from the U.S. and China including Deng Xiaoping (Vice Premier and deputy of Mao Zedong), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State/Foreign Minister), Brent Scowcroft (Assistant to the President for NSA) and George H. W. Bush (Chief of U.S. Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed, one of them being Angola. Although China had supported the MPLA in the past, they now sided with the FNLA and UNITA. China was especially concerned about African sensitivities and pride and considered South African involvement as the primary and relative complex problem. Kissinger responded, that the U.S. is prepared to "push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created".[142] It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: "We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in".[142] He also said that he had approved US$35 million more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. They discussed and agreed who should support the FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner taking into account the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.[142]
It was only when the U.S. administration asked Congress for US$28 million for IAFEATURE that Congress really paid attention to the events in Angola. By then "the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the stench of US-collusion with Pretoria hung in the air. Worse, the growing numbers of Cuban troops had derailed the CIA's plans and the administration seemed at a loss what to do next."[143] The money was not approved and on 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment banning covert assistance to anti-Communist forces and curtailing CIA involvement in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill sponsored by Dick Clark extended the ban. (Clark Amendment)[144] The U.S. administration resorted to other means of support for FNLA and UNITA of which one was raising mercenaries. The CIA initiated a covert programme to recruit recruit Brazilians and Europeans to fight in the north of Angola. Altogether they managed to enlist around 250 men, but by the time meaningful numbers arrived in January 1975 the campaign in the north was all but over.[145] Other ways of continued support for the FNLA and UNITA were through South Africa and other U.S. allied states such as Israel and Morocco.[146]
A report by Henry Kissinger of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:[147]
2. There follows an updated situation report based on classified sources.
A: Diplomatic
- (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting, one delegation, headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba's ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
- (2) In late December early January a MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.
B: Military
- (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of US$30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and material, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
- (2) Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
- (3) Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
- (4) Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda's airport complex.
- (5) Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-62 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-62 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL-18 which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-62 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.
C: Other:
- All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.
"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola."[148] "Cuban sources, however, indicate that the number hovered around 3,500 to 4,000."[149] This more or less would have put the Cubans at par with the South Africans on the southern front. Gabriel García Márquez wrote that Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez: 'Our intelligence services have grown so bad that we only found out that Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already there.' At that moment, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola — more even than Kissinger imagined. Indeed, there were so many ships anchored in the bay of Luanda that by February 1976 Neto said to a functionary close to him: 'It's not right', if they go on like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves.' It is unlikely that even the Cubans had foreseen that their intervention would reach such proportions. It had been clear to them right from the start, however, that the action had to be swift, decisive, and at all costs successful.[150] But one result of the events in Angola in 1976 was the American's heightened attention to African affairs, especially in the south of the continent. Kissinger worried, "if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself." With the need to distance themselves from outcasts in the eyes of black Africa this also meant the U.S. would drop support for the white regime in Rhodesia, a price it was willing to pay to "thwart communism".[151][152]
International press coverage
The South Africans had managed to keep their intervention hidden from world view for quite some time. It even took the MPLA until 23 October 1975 to notice that not white mercenaries but the SADF was advancing on Luanda. Yet it took another whole month for the world press to take notice: A day after the South African coastal advance was stopped, two correspondents from Reuters and British Independent Television News published news that South Africans were fighting in Angola.[153] On 23 November 1975 a major Western newspaper, the Washington Post, announced that regular South African troops were fighting inside Angola. Although other papers were still slow to follow, e.g., the New York Times on 12 December, the fact eventually became internationally known. The South African public had also been kept in the dark, and only on 19 December learned more about what was called the "Border War" when papers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and the Cubans.[154]
Southern front
SADF advance is stopped
By the time FAPLA and the Cubans were able to turn more attention to the southern front after the battle of Quifangondo, the South Africans had gained considerable ground. On 6 and 7 November 1975, Task Force Zulu took the harbour cities of Benguela and Lobito which had been unexpectedly abandoned. The towns and cities taken by the SADF were handed over to UNITA. In central Angola, at the same time, combat unit Foxbat had moved 800 km north toward Luanda.[55] By then it became clear that Luanda could not be taken by independence day on 11 November and the South Africans considered to break off the advance and retreat. But on 10 November 1975 Vorster gave in to UNITA's urgent request to keep up the military pressure with the aim of capturing as much territory as possible before the upcoming meeting of the OAU.[155] Thus, Zulu and Foxbat continued north with two new battle groups formed further inland (X-Ray and Orange) and "there was little reason to think the FAPLA would be able to stop this expanded force from capturing Luanda within a week."[156] Through November and December 1975, the SADF presence in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 personnel.[157]
Zulu now faced stronger resistance advancing on Novo Redondo after which fortunes changed in favour of the FAPLA and the Cubans. The first Cuban reinforcements arrived in Porto Amboim, only a few km north of Novo Redondo, quickly destroying three bridges crossing the Queve river, effectively stopping the South African advance along the coast on 13 November 1975.[158] Despite concerted efforts to advance north to Novo Redondo, the SADF was unable to break through FAPLA defences.[159][160][161] In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops took Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December.[162]
By mid-December, South Africa extended military service and called in reserves.[163][164] "An indication of the seriousness of the situation …. is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place".[165] By late December, Cuba had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda [154] and eventually the tide turned in favour of the MPLA.[93] Apart from being "bogged down" on the southern front,[166] South Africa had to deal with two other major setbacks: the international press taking note of the operation and the shift in U.S. policies.
South Africa withdraws
In light of these developments, Pretoria had to decide whether it would stay in the game and bring in more troops. In late December 1975, there were heated debates between Vorster, foreign minister Muller, defence minister Botha, head of BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) van den Bergh and a number of senior officials as to withdraw or to stay. Zaire, UNITA and the U.S. urged South Africa to stay. But the U.S. would not openly endorse the South African intervention and assure continuing military assistance in case of an escalation.
On 30 December 1975, Vorster planned to withdraw after the OAU emergency session in Addis Ababa on 13 January 1976 to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border.[167] "In military terms the advance had come to a halt anyway, as all attempts by Battle-Groups Orange and X-Ray to extend the war into the interior had been forced to turn back by destroyed bridges."[168]
In early January 1976, the Cubans launched a first counter-offensive driving Foxbat from the Tongo and Medunda hills.[169] The OAU meeting which the South Africans had hopes for finally debated the Angola issue and voted on 23 January 1976, condemning the South African intervention and demanding its withdrawal.[170] Sobered by the Cubans' performance and by the West's cold shoulder, Pretoria chose to fold and ordered the retreat of its troops from Angola.[171][172]
The sentiment of the Pretoria government at the time was expressed in a speech by Botha before South African parliament on 17 April 1978, in which he charged the U.S. with "defaulting on a promise to give them all necessary support in their campaign to defeat the MPLA":[137] "Against which neighbouring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years, when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story: the story must be told and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch".[173]
Once the decision was made, South Africa rapidly withdrew its forces towards Namibia. In late January, the SADF abandoned the towns of Cela and Novo Redondo [174] Apart from a few skirmishes, the Cubans stayed well behind the retreating South Africans and easily overcame the remaining UNITA resistance. By early February 1976, the SADF had retreated to the far south of Angola, leaving behind mine fields and blown up bridges. UNITA's capital, Nova Lisboa (Huambo) fell into FAPLA hands on 8 February, the ports of Lobito and Benguela on 10 February. By 14 February, control of the Benguala railway was complete and on 13 March UNITA lost its last foothold in far south-eastern Angola, Gago Gouthinho (Lumbala N'Guimbo). It is in this attack that the Cubans for the first time employed their airforce.[175]
Four to five thousand SADF troops kept a strip along the Namibian border up to 80 km deep until Angola at least gave assurance that it wouldn't supply bases for SWAPO and that it would continue to supply electricity to Namibia from the Cunene dams.[176] While the Cubans and FAPLA were slowly approaching the southern border, South Africa and the MPLA took up indirect negotiations about South African withdrawal brokered by the British and Soviet governments. Neto ordered FAPLA and the Cubans to halt at a distance to the border, forestalling what some feared might turn into a much bigger conflict.[177] In exchange for South African recognition, he offered to guarantee the safety of South Africa's 180 million US$ investment in the Cunene hydroelectric complex in northwest Namibia, close to the Angolan border.[177] On 25 March, Botha announced the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 27 March 1976.[178] On 27 March, the last 60 military vehicles crossed the border into Namibia.
Consolidation
With the withdrawal of South Africa, FNLA and UNITA resistance crumbled and the MPLA was left in sole possession of power.[137] With the help of its Cuban allies the MPLA "not only vanquished its bitterest rivals – the FNLA and UNITA – but in the process had seen off the CIA and humbled the mighty Pretoria war machine."[175] Whatever remained of UNITA retreated into the Angolan bush and Zaire. A number of African countries publicly discredited UNITA for its links with the apartheid government, the CIA and white mercenaries.[179]
The United Nations Security Council met to consider "the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola" and on 31 March 1976, branded South Africa the aggressor, demanding it provide compensation for war damages. Internationally South Africa found itself completely isolated and the failure of its Operation Savannah left it "without a single crumb of comfort".[180] "The internal repercussions of the Angolan debacle were felt quickly when, on 16 June 1976 – emboldened by the FAPLA-Cuban victory – the Soweto Uprising began, inaugurating a period of civil unrest which was to continue up until and beyond the collapse of apartheid."[180] Another setback for Pretoria within four years was the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia as it emerged as the next black majority-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, completing the total geographic isolation of apartheid South Africa. Angola obtained recognition by the OAU on 10 February 1976. The OAU recognized the MPLA as Angola's government. The majority of the international community albeit not the U.S. soon did the same.[177] The U.S. was unable to prevent its admittance to the UN General Assembly as its 146th member.[181]
At the height of the deployment in 1976, Cuba had 36,000 military personnel stationed in Angola.[182] At their meeting in Conakry on 14 March 1976, when victory was already assured, Castro and Neto decided that the Cubans would withdraw gradually, leaving behind for as long as necessary enough men to organize a strong, modern army, capable of guaranteeing the MPLA's future security without outside help. The Cubans had no intention of getting bogged down in a lengthy internal counter-insurgency and started to reduce their presence in Angola as planned after the retreat of the South Africans. By the end of May, more than 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba, and many more were on the way.[183] By the end of the year the Cuban troops had been reduced to 12,000.
The Cubans had high hopes that after their victory in Angola, in co-operation with the USSR, they could remove all of southern Africa from the influence of the U.S. and China.[184] In Angola, they put up dozens of training camps for Namibian (SWAPO), Rhodesian (ZAPU) and South African (ANC) guerrillas. An SADF intelligence report in 1977 concluded "that SWAPO's standard of training had improved significantly because of the training they had received from the Cuban instructors".[185] Cuba saw its second main task in training and equipping the FAPLA which the Soviets generously supplied with sophisticated weapons including tanks and an own air force with MiG-21 fighters.
In early 1977, the new Carter administration had in mind to recognize the MPLA-government despite of the presence of Cuban troops assuming they would be withdrawn once the Namibian issue was settled and the southern border of Angola was secure.[186] The MPLA and Cuban troops had control over all southern cities by 1977, but roads in the south faced repeated UNITA attacks. Savimbi expressed his willingness for rapprochement with the MPLA and the formation of a unity, socialist government, but he insisted on Cuban withdrawal first. "The real enemy is Cuban colonialism," Savimbi told reporters, warning, "The Cubans have taken over the country, but sooner or later they will suffer their own Vietnam in Angola."
On the international stage, Cuba's victory against South Africa boosted Castro's image as one of the top leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement of which he was secretary-general from 1979 to 1983.[187] Although with Cuba's help the MPLA-government became firmly established, Cuban attempts to hand over the defence of the country failed and it soon became drawn[weasel words] into MPLA's war against UNITA.
Humanitarian engagement
According to the Cubans, the overriding priority of their mission in Angola was humanitarian, not military. In the wake of Operation Carlota, around 5,000 Cuban technical, medical and educational staff were constantly posted in Angola to fill the gaps the Portuguese had left behind. "For a generation of Cubans, internationalist service in Angola represented the highest ideal of the Cuban Revolution" and for many it became a normal part of life to volunteer for an internationalist mission, principally in Angola, which lasted 18 to 24 months. In the following years, tens of thousands of volunteers were processed each year.[188] By 1978, Angola's health system was almost completely run by Cuban doctors. After the Portuguese left the country, there was only one doctor per 100,000 inhabitants.[189] The Cubans posted a large medical team at Luanda's University and Prenda hospitals and opened clinics in remote areas all across Angola.[189]
At the time of independence, over 90% of the Angolan population was illiterate. Starting in June 1977, an educational programme began to take shape. 2,000 students were granted scholarships in Cuba and by 1987 there were 4,000 Angolan students studying on the "Isla de la Juventud" (Isle of Youth).[190] In March 1978, the first Cuban 732-strong secondary school teacher brigade (Destacamento Pedagógico Internationalista) took up its work in Angola. These were later joined by 500 primary school teachers and 60 professors at Luanda's university. Through the 1980s the level was constantly held at about 2,000 teachers of all levels.[citation needed]
The technical programme was the largest branch of Cuba's humanitarian mission as Angola was desperate for technicians to oversee the reconstruction projects. Cuban engineers, technicians and construction workers worked on construction sites, especially repairing the badly damaged infrastructure (bridges, roads, buildings, telecommunication etc.) of the country. The first teams arrived in January 1977 and in the following 5 years they built 2,000 houses in Luanda and 50 new bridges, reopened several thousand km of road, electricity and telephone networks. Attempts to revive Angolan coffee and sugar cane production soon failed due to the spread of war with UNITA. According to Cubatecnica, the government office for non-military foreign assistance, there were more Cuban volunteers than could be accepted and long waiting lists.[191] Cuba's engagement laid the foundations for Angola's social services.[192]
Guerra de poderes, resoluciones y negociaciones de la ONU (finales de los años setenta y ochenta)
In the following years, Cuba kept itself engaged in a number of other African countries. In 1978, Cuba sent 16,000 troops to the Ethiopian Ogaden War, but this time in close coordination with the Soviets. Smaller military missions were active in the People's Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Cuban technical, educational and medical staff in the tens of thousands were working in even more countries: Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ethiopia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, the Congo and Benin. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on full Cuban scholarships per year on the island.[191][193]
Towards the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, Angola slipped away from wider international public attention but despite Cuba's victory on the ground, the war in Angola was far from over. UNITA was able to take up its insurgency operations in the south with the help of military and logistical support from South Africa and the MPLA still had not gained control over the whole country. While the vast majority of the Cuban troops remaining in Angola stayed in the bases, some of them helped in 'mopping-up' operations, clearing remaining pockets of resistance in Cabinda and in the north. The operations in the south were less successful because of "Savimbi's tenacity and determination to fight on".[194] "Most of the Cubans were organized and deployed in motorized infantry, air defense, and artillery units. Their main missions were to deter and defend against attacks beyond the southern combat zone, protecting strategic and economically critical sites and facilities, and provide combat support, such as rear-area security for major military installations and Luanda itself. At least 2000 Cuban troops were stationed in oil-producing Cabinda Province".[195]
After the South African retreat SWAPO again established bases in southern Angola, now supported by the MPLA, and stepped up its operations in Namibia. In turn, as of early 1977, South African incursions into Angola were on the increase.[185]
Cuban forces soon again were increased due to tensions between the MPLA and Zaire in March 1977 (see Shaba I). Mobutu accused the MPLA of instigating and supporting an attack of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) on the Zairian province of Shaba and Neto charged Mobutu with harbouring and supporting the FNLA and FLEC. Two months later the Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and foiling the Nitista Plot when Nito Alves and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster, which is another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Neto as well as the differing interests between the Soviets and the Cubans.[196][197] Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened.[198] Thousands of people were estimated to have been killed by Cuban and MPLA troops in the aftermath of Nito's attempted coup over a period that lasted up to two years, with some estimates claiming as high as 70,000 murdered.[199][200][201][202]
In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the "Contact Group", to work with South Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favour of the installation of a SWAPO government in Namibia.[203][204]
South Africa continued to support UNITA, which not only took up the fight against the MPLA but also helped the South Africans hunt down SWAPO, denying it a safe zone along Angola's southern border. The SADF established bases in Cuando Cubango Province in south-eastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) supplied UNITA with air cover from bases in Namibia.[205] South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi's image abroad, especially in the US. Apart from being a friend to some African dictators[who?] Savimbi became the toast of the Reagan White House and was feted by the rightwing establishment in many countries.[when?][179][206] Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions and UNITA's northward expansion in the east forced the MPLA to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military personnel from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba.[197]
The first large-scale incursions by the SADF occurred in May 1978 (Operation Reindeer), which became South Africa's most controversial operation in Angola.[207] It involved two simultaneous assaults on a heavily populated SWAPO camps at Cassinga (Kassinga) and Chetequera. SADF intelligence believed Cassinga to be a PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of SWAPO) camp. The operational order was "to inflict maximum losses", but where possible, to "capture leaders".[208] In the air borne raid on 8 May 1978 (SADF-terminology: Battle of Cassinga) over 600 people were killed, including some women and children. In addition, up to 150 Cubans of a unit rushing to the camp's aid lost their lives in an air attack and ambush on the way from their garrison in Tchamutete 15 km to the south.[209] Thus, Cuba suffered its highest single-day casualty of its Angolan intervention. According to the controversial[citation needed] findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the camp most likely served civilian as well as a military purposes and the raid constituted a breach of international law and the "commission of gross human rights violations".[208] SWAPO and the international media branded the incident a massacre turning it into a political disaster for South Africa. The revulsion at the carnage of the "Cassinga raid" and the ensuing international outcry led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on 29 September 1978, calling for Namibia's independence and, to that end, for the establishment of a "Transition Assistance Group".[40][210] Pretoria signed the resolution which spelled out the steps for granting independence to Namibia, and according to Bender, raised expectations that peace was in sight in southern Africa.[211]
In Resolution 447 of 28 March 1979, the UN Security Council concluded "that the intensity and timing of these acts of armed invasion are intended to frustrate attempts at negotiated settlements in southern Africa" and voiced concern "about the damage and wanton destruction of property caused by the South African armed invasions of Angola launched from Namibia, a territory which South Africa illegally occupies". It strongly condemned "the racist regime of South Africa for its premeditated, persistent and sustained armed invasions ... of Angola", its "utilization of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard for armed invasions and destabilization of ... Angola" and demanded that "South Africa cease immediately its provocative armed invasions against ...Angola".[212] On 2 November 1979 the UN Security Council passed yet another resolution (454), branding South Africa in a similar fashion for its armed incursions, calling upon South Africa "to cease immediately all acts of aggression and provocation against ... Angola" and "forthwith to withdraw all its armed forces from Angola" and demanding that "South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity ... of Angola" and that "South Africa desist forthwith from the utilization of Namibia, a territory which it illegally occupies, to launch acts of aggression against ... Angola or other neighbouring African States".[213] Nevertheless, by the end of 1979, following the bombing of Lubango, an undeclared war was in full swing.[205]
Hardly 2 weeks later, on 17 May 1978, 6,500 Katangese gendarmes invaded the Zairian province of Shaba from bases in eastern Angola and the U.S. accused Cuba of having a hand in it. Although there is no proof for a Cuban involvement it is likely that the Katangese had the support of the MPLA. They were driven back across the border by French and Belgian military and Cuba and the U.S. coaxed Neto and Mobutu to sign a non-aggression pact. While Neto agreed to repatriate the Katangese Mobutu cut off aid to FNLA, FLEC and UNITA and their bases along the border were shut down.[214] By late 1978 the MPLA's security had been steadily deteriorating and UNITA emerging as a formidable guerrilla army, expanding its operations from Cuando Cubango into Moxico and Bié while the SADF intensified its cross-border campaigns from Namibia.
Neto died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow and was succeeded by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Barely one month later Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, immediately adopting a harder line with the MPLA: The Cubans were absolutely to be driven out of Angola.[37]
In elections held in February 1980; the leader of the leftist Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and outspoken opponent of apartheid, Robert Mugabe, was elected president, ending white minority rule in Zimbabwe. Losing its last ally (Rhodesia) in the region, South Africa adopted the policy of "Total Onslaught" vowing "to strike back at any neighbouring states which harboured anti-apartheid forces".[215] On 10 June 1980 Pretoria launched its largest operation since World War II, 180 km into Angola, during which, for the first time, it was attacked by the FAPLA. In the following September, the SADF assisted UNITA in the capture of Mavinga.
In the early 1980s, the United States, in their endeavour to get the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, became directly involved in negotiations with the MPLA. The MPLA argued it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it wasn't for the continuing South African incursions and threat at its southern border. The most obvious solution was an independent Namibia which South Africa had to give up. After having to accept a leftist regime in Angola, Pretoria was reluctant to relinquish control of Namibia because of the possibility that the first elections would bring its "traditional nemesis", SWAPO, to power. It continued to attend negotiating sessions of the Contact Group throughout the early 1980s, always prepared to bargain but never ready to settle.[203] Cuba, not involved in the negotiations, basically agreed to such a solution paving the way to Namibia's independence. Yet, towards the end of Reagan's second term in office, the negotiations had not born any fruit.[37]
After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia failed in January 1981, (South Africa walked out of the Pre-Implementation Conference in Geneva on 13 January [146]) in April 1981 the new American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, took up negotiations combining 'constructive engagement with South Africa' with the 'linkage' proposal (independence for Namibia in change for Cuba's withdrawal). Both the MPLA and South Africa deeply distrusted the U.S. for various reasons and the idea was rejected. It continued to be the basis of further negotiations; yet, the Contact Group members as well as the 'frontline states' (states bordering South Africa) were opposed to linking Namibian independence with Cuban withdrawal.[216] Despite its overwhelming presence in Angola, the Cubans remained uninvited to the negotiations.[217]
The same year, South African military activity increased against MPLA targets and SWAPO guerrillas. On 23 August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea with eleven thousand troops penetrating 120 kilometres into southwestern Angola and occupying about 40,000 km² in southern Cunene (holding the territory until 1988). Bases were established in Xangongo and N'Giva. The South Africans not only fought SWAPO but also wanted FAPLA out of the border area and openly intensified assaults on Angolan economic targets. The U.S. vetoed a UN Resolution condemning the operation, instead insisting on Cuba's withdrawal from Angola.[40][62][218] Within five months of the South African intervention the Soviets started a new two-year military programme for the FAPLA to which Cuba committed another 7,000 troops. FAPLA-Cuban forces refrained from larger actions against South African operations, which were routinely undertaken deep into MPLA territory following Operation Protea.[219] Through 1982 and 1983 the SAAF also participated in operations by UNITA, which gained more and more control of south-eastern Angola. The attacks by far exceeded the previous hit and -run operations and were aimed primarily at the Benguela Railway. Increasingly Cubans got involved in the fighting, either because they had garrisons in the embattled area or because they came to the rescue of FAPLA units under attack. The civil war had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure, created hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA guerrillas took foreign technicians as hostages.[40][220]
On 6 December 1983 Pretoria launched its twelfth incursion, Operation Askari, in pursuit of SWAPO which was also to inflict as much damage as possible on FAPLA's increasing military presence in southern Angola. In protest, France and shortly after Canada, left the UN Contact Group. On 20 December the UN Security Council passed yet another resolution (546) demanding withdrawal and reparations by South Africa. Unlike during Operation Protea this operation was met with strong resistance by the FAPLA-Cuban forces leading to the fiercest fighting since independence. A battle ensued after a SADF attack on a SWAPO camp near Cuvelei (northern Cunene) on 3 – 7 January 1984. Although SWAPO suffered a severe defeat in this campaign the South Africans were unable to unseat the FAPLA from bases at Cahama, Mulondo and Caiundo as it had planned. Under growing international pressure Pretoria stopped the operation and retreated south of the border on 15 January but kept the garrisons in Calueque, N'Giva and Xangongo.[221] A cease fire between the MPLA and South Africa was signed on 31 January, the first treaty between Luanda and Pretoria. Peace negotiations were taken up again and in February 1984 Crocker met with the MPLA and South Africans in Lusaka, Zambia. The resulting first 'Lusaka Accord' of 16 February 1984 detailed the disengagement of MPLA and South African forces in southern Angola. Already during this process the accord was doomed to fail because SWAPO was not involved in the talks and continued its operations. UNITA also stepped up its raids including mine-laying, truck bombs, hostage taking and attacking foreign civilians as far north as Sumbe.[222]
In a joint statement on 19 March 1984 Cuba and the MPLA announced the principles on which a Cuban withdrawal would be negotiated: unilateral withdrawal of the SADF, implementation of Resolution 435 and cessation of support for UNITA and armed actions in Angola. Cuban withdrawal would be a matter between Cuba and Angola. In a similar joint announcement in 1982 these principles had been formulated as demands. The proposal was rejected by Botha.[223] In September 1984 the MPLA presented a plan calling for the retreat of all Cubans to positions north of the 13th parallel and then to the 16th parallel, again on the condition that South Africa pulled out of Namibia and respected Resolution 435. 10.000 Cuban troops around the capital and in Cabinda were to remain. A major obstacle in the negotiations was the timeline for the withdrawal of Cuban troops. While Pretoria demanded a maximum of 7 months the Cubans wanted four years. Crocker managed to reduce the Cuban's timeline to two years upon which the South Africans suggested only 12 weeks. Crocker then proposed a timeline of 2 years and a withdrawal in stages and a maximum of 6,000 troops remaining up to another year in the north. But both parties and UNITA rejected this proposal and the negotiations stalled. On 17 April Pretoria installed an 'Interim Government' in Namibia which was in direct contravention of Resolution 435.[224] The Lusaka Accord completely fell apart when South Africa broke the cease-fire. On 20 May 1985 it sent a commando team to blow up an American-run Gulf Oil facility in northern Angola. The raid failed, but it showed that Pretoria was "not interested in a cease-fire agreement or the Namibian settlement to which a cease-fire was supposed to lead."[225]
On 10 July 1985 the U.S. Congress rescinded the 10-year-old Clark Amendment. Within a year at least seven bills and resolutions followed urging aid to UNITA, including overt military support and some US$15 million. From 1986 the U.S. openly supported UNITA.[84][226] By 1986 the war reached a stalemate: FAPLA was unable to uproot UNITA in its tribal stronghold and UNITA was no serious threat to the government in Luanda.[227] Within a week Pretoria, suffering from internal unrest and international sanctions, declared a State of Emergency.[228]
In 1985, UNITA claimed they had been targeted with chemical weapons, specifically organophosphates. The following year, UNITA reported being attacked three times with an unidentified greenish-yellow agent on three separate occasions resulting in victims suffering blindness or death. UNITA also claimed they were attacked by a brown agent which, resembling mustard gas. In 1988, a United Nations toxicologists certified that residue from both VX and sarin nerve agents had been discovered in plants, water, and soil where Cuban units were conducting operations against UNITA.[229][230]
Segunda intervención de Cuba
Escalation of the conflict
As a result of the South African Operation Askari in December 1983, which targeted People's Liberation Army of Namibia bases inside Angola, the USSR not only increased its aid to the MPLA but also took over the tactical and strategic leadership of FAPLA, deploying advisors right down to the battalion level,[231] and began planning a large-scale offensive against the UNITA-stronghold in southeastern Angola.
Soviet command did not include the Cuban forces in Angola.[232] Cuba's strategic opinions differed considerably from those of the Soviets and MPLA and Cuba strongly advised against an offensive in the southeast because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African intervention, which is what transpired.[37] A FAPLA-offensive in 1984 had already brought dismal results. Under Soviet leadership the FAPLA launched two more offensives in 1985 and 1986. The Cubans deny involvement in the 1985 operation but supported the offensive in 1986 despite many reservations, not providing ground forces but technical and air support. Apart from taking Cazombo in 1985, coming close to Mavinga and bringing UNITA close to defeat, both offensives ended in a complete failure and became a major embarrassment for the Soviets. Unlike the Cubans with ten years of experience in the African theatre, the Soviet leadership was inexperienced and relations between the two became strained. In addition, in March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev had become the new General Secretary with whom Castro had considerable disagreements. In both FAPLA-offensives South Africa, still controlling the lower reaches of southwestern Angola, intervened as soon as UNITA came into distress. In September 1985, the South African Air Force prevented the fall of Mavinga and the FAPLA-offensive ended at the Lomba River.[231]
After this debacle in 1985, the Soviets sent more equipment and advisors to Angola and immediately went about preparing another FAPLA-offensive in the following year. In the meantime UNITA received its first military aid from the U.S., which included surface-to-air Stinger missiles and BGM-71 TOW anti-tank-missiles. The U.S. sent supplies to UNITA and SADF through the reactivated Kamina Airbase in Zaire. The offensive starting in May 1986 already got off to a poor start and again with the help of the SADF UNITA managed to stop the advance by late August.[233]
Preparations went on their way for the next offensive in 1987, Operação Saudando Outubro and once more the Soviets upgraded the FAPLA's equipment including 150 T-55 and T-54B tanks and Mi-24 and Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters. Again they dismissed warnings of a South African intervention. Pretoria, taking notice of the massive military build-up around Cuito Cuanavale, warned UNITA and on 15 June authorized covert support. In spite of these preparations, on 27 July Castro proposed Cuba's participation in the negotiations, indicating that he was interested in curtailing its involvement in Angola. The Reagan administration declined.[234]
From the very start of the FAPLA-offensive it was clear to Pretoria that UNITA could not withstand the onslaught and on 4 August 1987 launched clandestine Operation Moduler, which engaged in the first fights nine days later. The FAPLA reached the northern banks of the Lomba River near Mavinga on 28 August and were expected by the SADF. In a series of bitter fights between 9 September and 7 October they prevented the FAPLA from crossing the river and stopped the offensive for a third time. The FAPLA suffered heavy losses and the Soviets withdrew their advisors from the scene, leaving FAPLA without senior leadership. On 29 September the SADF and UNITA launched an offensive aiming to destroy all FAPLA forces east of the Cuito River. On 3 October they attacked and annihilated a FAPLA battalion on the southern banks of the Lomba River and two days later FAPLA started its retreat to Cuito Cuanavale.[235] The SADF and UNITA pursued the retreating FAPLA units and started the siege of Cuito Cuanavale on 14 October with long-range shelling by 155-mm artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km.
Cuito Cuanavale, only a village, was important to FAPLA as a forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola and considered an important gateway to UNITA's headquarters in the southeast. With UNITA and the South Africans on the counter-attack, the town and base and possibly all of Cuando Cubango were now under threat, as was FAPLA's planned advance southwards against UNITA; on 15 November Luanda requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. Castro approved the Cuban intervention, Operation Maniobra XXXI Anniversario on the same day, retaking the initiative from the Soviets. As in 1975, Cuba again did not inform the USSR in advance of its decision to intervene.[236] For the second time Cuba dispatched a large contingent of troops and arms across the ocean: 15,000 troops and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Although not responsible for the dismal situation of the FAPLA Cuba felt impelled to intervene in order to prevent a total disaster for the MPLA. In Castro's view, a UNITA and South African victory would have meant the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best MPLA military formations.
Around mid-January Castro let the MPLA know that he was taking charge and the first Cuban enforcements were deployed at Cuito Cuanavale.[237] The Cubans' initial priority was saving Cuito Cuanavale, but while enforcements were arriving at the besieged garrison they made preparations for a second front in Lubango, where the SADF had been operating unhindered for where years.[37][238][239] By early November, the SADF and UNITA had cornered FAPLA units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them.[240] On 25 November the UN Security Council demanded the SADF's unconditional withdrawal from Angola by 10 December, but the U.S. ensured that there were no repercussions for South Africa. U.S. Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria's ambassador: "The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to the MPLA. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds."[241] Through December the situation for the besieged MPLA became critical as SADF-UNITA tightened the noose around Cuito Cuanavale. Observers expected it to fall into South African hands soon, and UNITA prematurely announced the town had been taken.[39]
Starting 21 December the South Africans planned the final operation to "pick off" the five FAPLA brigades which were still to the east of the Cuito river "before moving in to occupy the town if the conditions were favourable".[242] From mid-January to the end of February SADF-UNITA launched six major assaults on FAPLA positions east of the Cuito river, none of which delivered tangible results. Although the first attack on 13 January 1988 was successful, spelling near disaster for a FAPLA brigade, they were unable to continue and retreated to the starting positions. After a month the SADF was ready for the second assault on 14 February. Again it withdrew after successfully driving FAPLA-Cuban units off the Chambinga high ground. Narrowly escaping catastrophe the FAPLA units east of the Cuito River withdrew to the Tumpo (river) triangle, a smaller area, ideally suited to defence. On 19 February the SADF-UNITA suffered a first major setback when a third assault against a FAPLA battalion north of the Dala river was repelled; they were unable to reach FAPLA's forward positions and had to withdraw. In the following days the Cubans stepped up their air attacks against South African positions. On 25 February the FAPLA-Cubans repelled a fourth assault and the SADF had to retreat to their positions east of the Tumpo River. The failure of this attack "proved a turning point of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, boosting FAPLA's flagging morale and bringing the South African advance to a standstill."[243] A fifth attempt was beaten back on 29 February, delivering the SADF a third consecutive defeat. After some more preparation the South Africans and UNITA launched their last and fourth unsuccessful attack on 23 March. As SADF-Colonel Jan Breytenbach wrote, the South African assault "was brought to a grinding and definite halt" by the combined Cuban and FAPLA forces.[84][238][240]
Eventually Cuban troop strength in Angola increased to about 55,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south. Due to the international arms embargo since 1977, South Africa's aging air force was outclassed by the sophisticated Soviet-supplied air defence system and air-strike capabilities fielded by the MPLA, and it was unable to uphold the air supremacy it had enjoyed for years; its loss in turn proved to be critical to the outcome of the battle on the ground.[244]
Cuito Cuanavale was the major battle site between Cuban, Angolan, Namibian and South African forces. It was the biggest battle on African soil since World War II and in its course just under 10,000 soldiers were killed. Cuban planes and 1,500 Cuban soldiers had reinforced the MPLA at Cuito. After the failed assault on 23 March 1988, the SADF withdrew leaving a 1,500-man "holding force" behind and securing their retreat with one of the most heavily mined areas in the world. Cuito Cuanavale continued to be bombarded from a distance of 30 to 40 km.[237][245]
Western front
In the meantime, on 10 March 1988, when the defence of Cuito Cuanavale after three failed SADF attacks was secure, Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO units advanced from Lubango to the southwest. The first South African resistance was encountered near Calueque on 15 March, followed by three months of bloody clashes as the Cubans progressed towards the Namibian border. By the end of May Cuba had two divisions in southwestern Angola. By June they constructed two forward airbases at Cahama and Xangongo with which Cuban air power could be projected into Namibia. All of southern Angola was covered by a radar network and SA-8 air defence ending South African air superiority.[246]
On 26 May 1988, the chief of the SADF announced, "heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border". The remaining SADF forces at Cuito Cuanavale were now in danger of being closed in. On 8 June 1988 the SADF called up 140,000 men of the reserves (Citizen Force), giving an indication of how serious the situation had become.[39] The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on 26 June that Cuban MiG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SAAF. He added, "the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety" in South Africa.[240]
In June 1988 the Cubans prepared to advance on Calueque starting from Xangongo and Tchipa. In case of serious South African counterattacks, Castro gave orders to be ready to destroy the Ruacana reservoirs and transformers and attack South African bases in Namibia. The offensive started from Xangongo on 24 June immediately clashing with the SADF en route to Cuamato. Although the SADF was driven off, the FAPLA-Cubans retreated to their base. On 26 July 1989 the SADF shelled Tchipa (Techipa) with long-range artillery and Castro gave orders for the immediate advance on Calueque and an air strike against the SADF camps and military installations around Calueque. After a clash with a FAPLA-Cuban advance group on 27 June the SADF retreated towards Calueque under bombardment from Cuban planes and crossed the border into Namibia that same afternoon. By then, Cuban MiG-23s had carried out the attacks on the SADF positions around the Calueque dam, 11 km north of the Namibian border, also damaging the bridge and hydroelectric installations.[237] The major force of the Cubans, still on the way, never saw action and returned to Tchipa. With the retreat of the SADF into Namibia on 27 June the hostilities ceased.[247]
The CIA reported that "Cuba's successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria's air defences" highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after the Cuban air strike, the SADF destroyed the nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, "to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend."[248] The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle "involved serious risks" withdrew.[249] Five days later Pretoria ordered a combat group still operational in southeastern Angola to scale back to avoid any more casualties, effectively withdrawing from all fighting, and a SADF division was deployed in defence of Namibia's northern border.[250]
Cuba y el Acuerdo de los Tres Poderes
The negotiations and accords until 1988 had all been bilateral, either between MPLA and the U.S., MPLA and South Africa or the U.S. and South Africa. Luanda refused any direct contact with UNITA, instead looking for direct talks with Savimbi's sponsors in Pretoria and Washington. The negotiations usually took place in third countries and were mediated by third countries. The U.S., although clandestinely supporting the UNITA,[251] often acted as a mediator itself. From 1986, the Soviet Union expressed its interest in a political solution. It was increasingly included in consultations but never directly involved in the negotiations. Endeavours for a settlement had intensified after the fighting in southern Angola broke out in 1987. It was agreed, that this time only governments were to take part in the negotiations, which excluded participation by UNITA.
From the start of the negotiations in 1981, the Cubans had not asked and were not asked to participate and the Americans did not have it in mind to include them. Castro signalled interest to the U.S. in July 1987 while preparations for the FAPLA offensive against UNITA were under way. He let the Americans know that negotiations including the Cubans would be much more promising. But it was not until January 1988 that U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia but not the US embargo against Cuba.[37] The Cuban government joined negotiations on 28 January 1988. They conceded that their withdrawal had to include all troops in Angola including the 5,000 they had in mind to keep in the north and in Cabinda for protection of the oil fields. Yet, U.S. support for UNITA was going to be continued and was not to be an issue at the discussions.[252]
The U.S. continued its two-track policy, mediating between Luanda and Pretoria as well as providing aid to UNITA through Kamina airbase in Zaire.[253] The Reagan administration's first priority was to get the Cubans out of Angola. In its terminology, by supporting UNITA the U.S. was conducting "low-intensity-warfare". According to a western diplomat in Luanda, the U.S. "first wanted to get the Cubans out and afterwards wanted to ask the South Africans to kindly retreat from Namibia".[84] David Albright reported that South African officials believe that Armscor's preparations for a nuclear test at Vastrap were discovered by Soviet or Western intelligence agencies, and that this discovery led to increased pressure on Cuba and the Soviet Union to withdraw from Angola.[254]
Crocker had initially been unable to convince anyone in Europe of his linkage concept, which tied Namibian independence to Cuban withdrawal. On the contrary, the European Union was ready to help with Angolan reconstruction.
Pretoria had walked out of the negotiations two years before and it was necessary to get South Africa back to the table. On 16 March 1988, the South African Business Day reported that Pretoria was "offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon." After much coaxing the South African government joined negotiations in Cairo on 3 May 1988 expecting Resolution 435 to be modified. Defence Minister Malan and President P.W. Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only "if Russia and its proxies did the same." They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia.
In July 1987, Cuba and Angola had offered to speed up Cuban withdrawal. 20,000 troops stationed south of the 13th parallel could be sent home within two instead of three years on the condition that the SADF retreated from Angola, that U.S. and South African support for UNITA was terminated, that Angola's sovereignty was respected and UN Resolution 435 was implemented. Botha flatly rejected any move before the Cubans withdrew from Angola. In order to "torpedo" the initiatives, Malan "innocently" suggested direct negotiations with Moscow so that the Angola conflict could be solved after the example of Afghanistan. The Kremlin responded mockingly that Angola and Afghanistan hardly had more in common than the initial letters in their name.[84] Thus, the timeframe of withdrawal remained the biggest obstacle for a settlement. Chester Crocker proposed a tighter timeframe of total withdrawal within three years which the Angolans rejected.[255]
It was only after the battle at Cuito Cuanavale that the Botha government showed a real interest in peace negotiations.[191] The Cuban military strategy in southern Angola in 1988 brought urgency to the negotiations. After stopping the SADF counter offensive at Cuito Cuanavale and opening a second front to the west, the Cubans in Angola had raised the stakes and reversed the situation on the ground. In fact, the U.S. wondered whether the Cubans would stop their advance at the Namibian border.[256] The heavy loss of life at Calueque sparked outrage in South Africa and it ordered an immediate retrenchment. The SADF forces remaining in eastern Angola were instructed to avoid further casualties. After the bloody clashes on 27 June, the SADF on 13 July set up 10 Division in defence of northern Namibia, in case the Cubans attempted an invasion.[250] Thus, Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation, responded to South African demands: "The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees... is over… South Africa is acting as though it was a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield."[37][257] Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that the talks had taken place "against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border.... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic."[258]
The Cubans were the driving force behind the negotiations in the final phase beginning in July 1988. The MPLA allies, first wanting to maintain the status quo after the successes in the south, had to be persuaded to continue. Worried that the fighting in Cunene escalated into an all-out war, Crocker achieved a first breakthrough in New York on 13 July. The Cubans replaced Jorge Risquet by the more conciliatory Carlos Aldana Escalante and agreed in general to withdraw from Angola in turn for Namibian independence. (See also Tripartite Accord (Angola) for Botha's account of his coming to an understanding with Risquet, as documented in the 2007 French documentary Cuba, an African Odyssey.) Cuba's calculations were simple: Once the South Africans were out of Namibia and Resolution 435 was implemented, Pretoria would be without a safe base to operate from and to destabilize the MPLA government. The Luanda government could hold off UNITA without Cuban help. Cuba also figured that SWAPO, their regional ally, would pipe the tune in Namibia.[191]
In the "New York Principles" the parties agreed to settle their differences through negotiations. The following round of talks in Cape Verde, 22–23 July 1988, only produced a commitment to set up a Joint Monitoring Commission which was to oversee the withdrawals. On 5 August, the three parties signed the "Geneva Protocol" laying out South African withdrawal from Angola starting 10 August and to be completed 1 September. By then Cubans and the MPLA were to agree on Cuban troop withdrawal. On 10 September a tripartite peace settlement was to be signed and Resolution 435 was to be implemented on 1 November.[259] A ceasefire came into effect on 8 August 1988.[260] Pretoria pulled its remaining forces out of Angola by 30 August 1988. Cuban and SWAPO forces moved away from the southern border. By then, a formula for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola had not been found as there was still a gap of 41 months between the Cuban and South African proposal and it took another five rounds of talks between August and October 1988 to find a settlement. The negotiations were interrupted to await the outcome of the U.S. elections in which George H. W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan on 8 November 1988. In the meantime, a FAPLA offensive was under way and UNITA was close to collapse threatening another South African intervention and putting Cuban forces in Angola on alert. Yet, Pretoria did not have in mind to endanger the talks and refrained from interference.
It was only after the U.S. elections that the parties agreed on a timetable for the Cubans. On 22 December 1988, one month before Reagan's second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the Three Powers Accord in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Cuba agreed to an overall time frame of 30 months and to withdraw within 27 months after implementation of Resolution 435. The timetable agreed upon provided for the following steps:
- until 1 April 1989: withdrawal of 3,000 Cuban troops (3 months)
- 1 April 1989: Implementation of Resolution 435 and start of 27-month time frame for total withdrawal
- 1 August 1989: all Cuban troops moved north of 15th parallel (7 months)
- 31 October 1989: all Cuban troops moved north of 13th parallel (10 months)
- 1 November 1989: free elections in Namibia and 50% of all Cuban troops withdrawn from Angola
- 1 April 1990: 66% of all Cuban troops withdrawn (15 months)
- 1 October 1990: 76% of all Cuban troops withdrawn (21 months)
- 1 July 1991: Cuban withdrawal completed (30 months)[261]
The accord ended 13 years of Cuban military presence in Angola which was finalized one month early on 25 May 1991, when General Samuel Rodiles Planas boarded the aircraft that took him back to the island.[262] At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo) and Ethiopia.
Secuelas
Cuban intervention had a substantial impact on Southern Africa, especially in defending the MPLA's control over large parts of Angola as well as helping secure Namibia's independence. On 26 July 1991, on occasion of the celebrations of the 38th anniversary of the start of the Cuban Revolution, Nelson Mandela delivered a speech in Havana praising Cuba for its role in Angola:
The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character - We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defence of one of us - The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation![263]
Cuban intervention was also criticized, with Dr. Peter Hammond, a South African missionary linked to Frontline Fellowship,[264] recalling:
There were over 50,000 Cuban troops in the country. The communists had attacked and destroyed many churches. MiG-23s and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gun ships were terrorising villagers in Angola. I documented numerous atrocities, including the strafing of villages, schools and churches.[265]
In a national ceremony on 7 December 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. According to Cuban government figures, during all of the Cuban foreign intervention missions carried out in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola on 25 May 1991, a total of 2,289 Cubans were killed. Other analysts have noted that of 36,000 Cuban troops committed to fighting in Angola from 1975 to 1979, combat deaths were close to 5,000 in number.[266]
Free elections in Namibia were held in November 1989 with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote in spite of Pretoria's attempts to swing the elections in favor of other parties.[267][268] (see Martti Ahtisaari and History of Namibia). Namibia gained independence in March 1990.
The situation in Angola was anything but settled and the country continued to be ravaged by civil war for more than a decade. The MPLA won the 1992 election, however eight opposition parties rejected the 1992 election as rigged. UNITA sent peace negotiators to the capital, where the MPLA murdered them, along with thousands of UNITA members. Savimbi was still ready to continue the elections. The MPLA then massacred tens of thousands of UNITA voters nationwide,[269] in an event known as the Halloween Massacre. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms, financed with the sale of blood diamonds. The civil war ended in 2002 after Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle.
Ver también
- South African Border War
- Angolan Civil War
- Mallin, Jay (1987). Cuba in Angola. Coral Gables, Fla.: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. OCLC 17560083.
Referencias
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- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Secretary of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 20 December 1975
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: "Informe", p. 11
- ^ Márquez, Gabriel García in: Operation Carlota, New Left Review I/101-102, January–April 1977
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Quotations from Kissinger, NSC meeting, 7 April 1976, p. 13, NSAd, NSC Meeting Minutes, box 2, GRFL
- ^ Newsweek, 10 May 1976, p. 51
- ^ George, p. 96
- ^ a b Gleijeses, p. 325
- ^ George, p. 93
- ^ George, p. 94
- ^ Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 215
- ^ George, pp. 94–96
- ^ Observer, 7 December 1975, p. 11
- ^ Times, 11 December 1975, p. 7
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 154–173; quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 203–18
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 186–201
- ^ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8, 28 December 1975, E3 (quoting Botha)
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa's Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar,1989, p. 55
- ^ Rand Daily Mail, 16 January
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Secretary of State to all American Republic Diplomatic posts, 20 December 1975, NSA
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 260–263; quoting: de Villers Dirk and Johanna in: PW-A biography of South Africa's President PW Botha, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1984, pp. 266–269
- ^ George, p. 107
- ^ George, p. 105
- ^ George, p. 106
- ^ Gleijeses, pp. 337, 341, also quoting: See the pessimistic reports of Generals André van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Viljoen in Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 259, 261, 264 and: World (Johannesburg), 3 December 1975, p. 1: Quotations from Admiral H. H. Biermann
- ^ Thom, William in: Angola's 1975-76 Civil War, Autumn 1998, 1-44, p. 31
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Botha, P. W., 27 January 1976, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, col. 114
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: CIA, National Intelligence Daily, 8 January 1976
- ^ a b George, p. 112
- ^ Washington Post, 4 February 1976, p. 1
- ^ a b c Time: Recognition, Not Control, 1 March 1976
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, 25 March 1976, cols. 3916-17
- ^ a b Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, 25 February 2002
- ^ a b George, p. 114
- ^ George, p. 113
- ^ afrol News, 6. Dec. 2005 / Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- ^ García Márquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, 1976, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Matthews, Herbert in: Forward with Fidel Castro, Anywhere, New York Times, 4 March 1976, p. 31
- ^ a b Scholtz, Leopold, Stellenbosch University, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2006: The Namibian Border War
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 78
- ^ George
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- ^ a b George, p. 158
- ^ Hurst, Ryan (15 July 2009). "Angolan Civil War (1975-2002)". Retrieved 25 May 2020.
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- ^ George, pp. 158–162
- ^ Gleijeses, p. 392
- ^ George, pp. 115–119
- ^ Library of Congress Country Data: Angola, Foreign Influences
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies
- ^ a b Library of Congress Country Studies
- ^ Gleijeses quoting George, pp. 129–131
- ^ Sulc, Lawrence. "Communists coming clean about their past atrocities." HUMAN EVENTS, (13 October 1990): 12.
- ^ Ramaer, J. C. SOVIET COMMUNISM: THE ESSENTIALS. Second Edition. Translated by G. E. Luton. Stichting Vrijheid, Vrede, Verdediging (Belgium), 1986.
- ^ Georges A. Fauriol and Eva Loser. Cuba: The International Dimension, 1990. p. 164.
- ^ Domínguez, Jorge I. To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy, 1989. p. 158.
- ^ a b Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991.
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies
- ^ a b Library of Congress Country Studies
- ^ General Magnus Malan, South African Minister of Defence in the film Une Odyssée Africaine (France, 2006, 59 min) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ George, pp. 133–134
- ^ a b Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Part Two, pp. 46–54
- ^ George, p. 134
- ^ ODS Team. "ODS HOME PAGE" (PDF). un.org.
- ^ Bender, Gerald in: Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria tug-of-war, Third World Quarterly 11, January 1989, ISSN 0143-6597
- ^ ODS Team. "ODS HOME PAGE" (PDF). un.org.
- ^ ODS Team. "ODS HOME PAGE" (PDF). un.org.
- ^ George, p. 136
- ^ George, p. 139
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 101
- ^ George, pp. 171–179
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 102
- ^ George, pp. 142, 164–170
- ^ The Library of Congress, February 1989
- ^ "SADF OPERATION ASKARI (1983 - 1984)". archive.org. Archived from the original on 27 October 2009.
- ^ George, pp. 142, 184–185
- ^ George, pp. 142, 183–184
- ^ George, pp. 142, 188–190
- ^ Smith, p. 63
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 118
- ^ Smith, p. 61
- ^ George, pp. 142, 191
- ^ Hawk, Kathleen Dupes; Villella, Ron; Varona, Adolfo Leyva de (30 July 2014). Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days. University of Alabama Press. ISBN 978-0817318376. Retrieved 11 October 2014.
- ^ Helen E. Purkitt, Stephen F. Burgess: The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, Air University, Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama, 2001
- ^ a b Peter Vanneman (1990). Soviet strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's pragmatic approach. Hoover Press. p. 29. ISBN 0-8179-8901-3.
- ^ George, p. 183
- ^ George, pp. 192–199
- ^ George, p. 201
- ^ George, pp. 206–208
- ^ Saney, Isaac in: African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81–117
- ^ a b c Barber, Simon in: Castro explains, why Angola lost battle against the SADF, 27 July 1989
- ^ a b Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Part Two, p. 59
- ^ George, pp. 210–212
- ^ a b c Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, 11 July 2007
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, 5 December 1987, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ George, p. 214
- ^ George, p. 227
- ^ Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan (1989). War and society: the militarisation of South Africa. New Africa Books. p. 23. ISBN 0-86486-115-X.
- ^ George, p. 234
- ^ George, pp. 236–237
- ^ George, pp. 243–246
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: CIA, "South Africa-Angola-Cuba", 29 June 1988, Freedom of Information Act and CIA, "South Africa-Angola-Namibia", 1 July 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State) to Secretary of State, 13 May 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ a b George, p. 245
- ^ Giorgio Baravalle (2004). Rethink: Cause and Consequences of September 11. design.Method of Operation Lrd. p. 311. ISBN 0-9705768-6-2.
- ^ George, p. 221
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation. United States Policy Towards Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1030-3, p. 131
- ^ David Albright (July 1994). "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: 45.
- ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation. United States Policy Towards Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1030-3, p. 134
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: "Entrevista de Risquet con Chester Crocker, 26/6/88", ACC
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: "Actas das Conversaçôes Quadripartidas entre a RPA, Cuba, Estados Unidos de América e a Africa do Sul realizadas no Cairo de 24-26.06.988", Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana
- ^ Gleijeses quoting: Crocker to Secretary of State, 26 June 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ George, pp. 247–249
- ^ Alao, Abiodun. Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa, 1994. Pages XIX-XXI.
- ^ George, pp. 253–255
- ^ "Una efemérides pasada por alto | Havanaluanda". Havanaluanda.wordpress.com. Retrieved 18 August 2014.
- ^ Mandela, Nelson and Castro, Fidel: How Far We Slaves Have Come, New York: Pathfinder 1991, ISBN 087348729X, ISBN 978-0873487290
- ^ Freston, Paul (2004). Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge University Press. pp. 124–126. ISBN 9780521604291.
- ^ Hammond, Peter,Reagan Saved Lives in Angola Archived 15 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, FrontLine Fellowship, accessed August 9, 2012.
- ^ John Hoyt Williams (1 August 1988). "Cuba: Havana's Military Machine". The Atlantic.
- ^ The Guardian, 26 July 1991
- ^ New York Times, 26.07.89: The United States has complained...., New York Times, 12.08.89: American Group Finds Obstacles To Free and Fair Vote in Namibia, New York Times, 03.11.89: Pretoria Playing Down Namibia 'Infiltration', New York Times, 28.11.89: South-West African Police became Pretoria's paramount armed presence..., New York Times, 29.07.91: $35 million to seven political parties...
- ^ National Society for Human Rights, Ending the Angolan Conflict, Windhoek, Namibia, 3 July 2000 (opposition parties, massacres); John Matthew, Letters, The Times, UK, 6 November 1992 (election observer); NSHR, Press Releases, 12 September 2000, 16 May 2001 (MPLA atrocities).
Bibliografía
- Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0786474707.
- George, Edward The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8
- Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2003 ISBN 0-8078-5464-6
- Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Otras lecturas
- Stockwell, John: In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, New York, USA: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978, ISBN 0-393-05705-4
- Minter, William: Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, Johannesburg, South Africa: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994
- Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay: The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, Boulder, Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1980
- Guimaraes, Fernando Andresen: The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, London, England: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, ISBN 0-312-17512-4
- Brittain, Victoria: Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War, London, England: Pluto Press, 1998, ISBN 0-7453-1252-7
- Wolfers, Michael: Angola in the Front Line, London: Zed Books, 1983, ISBN 978-0862321062
- Marcum, John A.: The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA and London, England: The MIT-Press, ISBN 0-262-13136-6
- James, W. Martin: A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990, New Brunswick, USA, and London, England: Transaction Publishers, 1992
- Spikes, Daniel, Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa, Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, 1993, ISBN 0-89950-888-X
- Ignatiev, Oleg: Secret Weapon in Africa, Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977
- Kitchen, Helen: Angola, Mozambique, and the West, Praeger, 1987
- ICAIC (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográficos)
- Gleijeses, Piero: Kuba in Afrika 1975–1991. In: Bernd Greiner /Christian Th. Müller / Dierk Walter (Hrsg.): Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg, 2006, ISBN
- Gleijeses, Piero, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988", Journal of Cold War Studies 8.4 (2006) 98-146 Copyright © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Departement Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Hamburg über den Krieg in Angola (Hamburg University)
- Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt zur Geschichte Angolas (German foreign ministry)
- Welt Online: Wie Castro die Revolution exportierte
- The National Security Archive: Secret Cuban Documents on Africa Involvement
- Saney, Isaac, "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid", Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81–117.
- Mandela, Nelson, & Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-87348-729-0
- Pazzanita, Anthony G., "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 29 No 1 (March 1991): pp. 83–114.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two: Repression and Resistance
- Crocker, Chester A., High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- Peter Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969–1994. Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1999.
- Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. ISBN 0-684-85571-2
- Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003
- Willem Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966–1989. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989
- Roger Ricardo Luis, Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale. Havana: Editora Politica, 1989
- Wright, George, The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Toward Angola Since 1945, London: Pluto Press, 1997 ISBN 978-0-7453-1030-5
- Castro, Fidel, Jorge Risquet, and Gabriel García Márquez, Changing the History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1989
- Polack, Peter, Last Hot Battle of the Cold War: South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War. Casemate, 2013. ISBN 978-1612001951.
enlaces externos
- CIA & Angolan Revolution 1975 Part 1 on YouTube
- CIA & Angolan Revolution 1975 Part 2 on YouTube
- John Stockwell on the CIA, Angola and Jonas Savimbi on YouTube
- South Africa: Cuba and the South African Anti-Apartheid Struggle by Nicole Sarmiento
- Village of the Living Dead: With the Cubans in Angola