Las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (en francés : Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo [FARDC]) es la organización estatal responsable de la defensa de la República Democrática del Congo . Las FARDC se reconstruyeron de manera irregular como parte del proceso de paz que siguió al final de la Segunda Guerra del Congo en julio de 2003.
Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo | |
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Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo | |
Fundado | 30 de junio de 1960 |
Ramas de servicios | Fuerzas Terrestres Fuerza Aérea Armada |
Sede | Campamento militar coronel Tshatshi , Kinshasa |
Liderazgo | |
presidente | Félix Tshisekedi |
Ministro de Defensa y Veteranos | Crispin Atama Tabe |
Jefe de Estado Mayor | General del ejército Celestin Mbala Munsense |
Mano de obra | |
Edad militar | En 2008, hay "casi 20.000" soldados que tienen más de 60 años. [1] |
Personal activo | 134,250 [2] |
Gastos | |
Presupuesto | US $ 93,5 millones (2004 est.) |
Porcentaje del PIB | 1,34 (2016 est.) [3] |
Industria | |
Proveedores nacionales | Al menos una planta de municiones en Likasi . [4] |
proveedores extranjeros | China [5] Ucrania [5] Israel [5] Estados Unidos [5] Francia [5] |
Artículos relacionados | |
Rangos | Rangos militares |
La mayoría de los miembros de las FARDC son fuerzas terrestres, pero también tiene una pequeña fuerza aérea y una marina aún más pequeña. En 2010-2011, los tres servicios pueden haber contado entre 144.000 y 159.000 empleados. [6] Además, existe una fuerza presidencial llamada Guardia Republicana , pero ni ella ni la Policía Nacional Congoleña (PNC) forman parte de las Fuerzas Armadas.
El gobierno de la capital , Kinshasa , las Naciones Unidas , la Unión Europea y socios bilaterales que incluyen a Angola , Sudáfrica y Bélgica están intentando crear una fuerza viable con la capacidad de proporcionar estabilidad y seguridad a la República Democrática del Congo. Sin embargo, este proceso se ve obstaculizado por la corrupción [7] , la coordinación inadecuada de los donantes y la competencia entre los donantes. [8] Las diversas unidades militares ahora agrupadas bajo la bandera de las FARDC son algunas de las más inestables de África después de años de guerra y falta de financiación.
Para ayudar al nuevo gobierno, desde febrero de 2000 las Naciones Unidas cuentan con la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (ahora llamada MONUSCO ), que actualmente cuenta con más de 16.000 efectivos de mantenimiento de la paz en el país. Sus tareas principales son proporcionar seguridad en áreas clave, como Kivu del Sur y Kivu del Norte en el este, y ayudar al gobierno en la reconstrucción. Los grupos rebeldes extranjeros también se encuentran en el Congo, como lo han estado durante la mayor parte del último medio siglo. El más importante son las Fuerzas Democráticas para la Liberación de Ruanda (FDLR), contra las que combatían las tropas de Laurent Nkunda , pero también están presentes otros grupos más pequeños como el Ejército de Resistencia del Señor anti-Uganda . [9]
La personalidad jurídica de las FARDC se estableció en los artículos 118 y 188 de la Constitución de Transición. Posteriormente, las disposiciones de los artículos 187 a 192 de la Constitución de 2006 la sustituyeron. La Ley 04/023, de 12 de noviembre de 2004, establece la Organización General de la Defensa y Las fuerzas armadas. [10] A mediados de 2010, el Parlamento congoleño estaba debatiendo una nueva ley de defensa, designada provisionalmente como Ley Orgánica 130.
Historia
Fondo
Las primeras tropas congoleñas organizadas, conocidas como Force Publique , se crearon en 1888 cuando el rey Leopoldo II de Bélgica , que tenía el Estado Libre del Congo como propiedad privada, ordenó a su Secretario del Interior que creara fuerzas militares y policiales para el estado. [11] En 1908, bajo presión internacional, Leopold cedió la administración de la colonia al gobierno de Bélgica como el Congo Belga . Permaneció bajo el mando de un cuerpo de oficiales belgas hasta la independencia de la colonia en 1960. A lo largo de 1916 y 1917, la Fuerza Pública entró en combate en Camerún e invadió y conquistó con éxito áreas de África Oriental Alemana , en particular la actual Ruanda , durante La Primera Guerra Mundial. Los elementos de la Fuerza Pública también se utilizaron para formar unidades coloniales belgas que lucharon en la Campaña de África Oriental durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. [ cita requerida ]
Independencia y revuelta
Al independizarse el 30 de junio de 1960, el ejército sufrió un dramático déficit de líderes capacitados, particularmente en el cuerpo de oficiales. Esto se debía a que la Force Publique siempre había sido ejercida únicamente por belgas u otros blancos expatriados. El Gobierno belga no hizo ningún esfuerzo por capacitar a los oficiales comisionados congoleños hasta el final del período colonial y, en 1958, solo 23 cadetes africanos habían sido admitidos incluso en la escuela secundaria militar. [12] El rango más alto disponible para los congoleños era el de ayudante , que solo cuatro soldados lograron antes de la independencia. [13] [a] Aunque 14 cadetes congoleños se inscribieron en la Real Academia Militar de Bruselas en mayo, no estaban programados para graduarse como subtenientes hasta 1963. [15] Las acciones desacertadas de los oficiales belgas llevaron a un alistamiento de filas ' rebelión del 5 de julio de 1960, que ayudó a desencadenar la crisis del Congo . El teniente general Émile Janssens , comandante de la Fuerza Pública , escribió durante una reunión de soldados que "Antes de la independencia = después de la independencia", vertiendo agua fría sobre los deseos de los soldados de un aumento inmediato de su estatus. [12]
El historiador Louis-François Vanderstraeten dice que en la mañana del 8 de julio de 1960, después de una noche en la que se perdió todo el control sobre los soldados, numerosos ministros llegaron a Camp Leopold con el objetivo de calmar la situación. [16] Tanto el primer ministro Patrice Lumumba como el presidente Joseph Kasa-Vubu finalmente llegaron, y los soldados escucharon a Kasa-Vubu "religiosamente". Después de su discurso, Kasa-Vubu y los ministros presentes se retiraron al comedor del campamento para escuchar a una delegación de los soldados. Vanderstraeten dice que, según Joseph Ileo , sus demandas ( revendicaciones ) incluían lo siguiente:
- que la cartera de defensa no se entregue al primer ministro
- que el nombre Force Publique se cambie a Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC)
- y que el comandante en jefe y el jefe de personal no deben ser necesariamente belgas
A las "laboriosas" discusiones que siguieron a continuación se les dio posteriormente, retrospectivamente, la etiqueta de "consejo ministerial extraordinario". [17] Gérard-Libois escribe que "... la reunión especial del consejo de ministros tomó medidas para la africanización inmediata del cuerpo de oficiales y nombró a Victor Lundula , que nació en Kasai y era burgomaestre de Jadotville , como Comandante en -Jefe del ANC; coronel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu como jefe de estado mayor; y el belga, coronel Henniquiau, como asesor principal del ANC ". [18] Por lo tanto, el general Janssens fue destituido. Tanto Lundula como Mobutu eran ex sargentos de la Fuerza Pública .
El 8 y el 9 de julio de 1960, se invitó a los soldados a nombrar oficiales negros, y "el mando del ejército pasó de forma segura a manos de ex sargentos", ya que los soldados en general eligieron a los soldados del ejército congoleño más educados y de mayor rango como sus nuevos oficiales. [19] La mayoría de los oficiales belgas fueron retenidos como asesores de la nueva jerarquía congoleña, y la calma volvió a las dos guarniciones principales en Leopoldville y Thysville . [20] La Fuerza Pública pasó a llamarse Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), [21] o Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales Congoleñas. Sin embargo, en Katanga, los oficiales belgas resistieron la africanización del ejército.
Hubo un motín de Force Publique en Camp Massart, en Elizabethville, el 9 de julio de 1960; [22] cinco o siete europeos murieron. [23] La revuelta del ejército y los rumores resultantes provocaron un pánico severo en todo el país, y Bélgica envió tropas y el Grupo de Trabajo naval 218.2 para proteger a sus ciudadanos. [b] Las tropas belgas intervinieron en Elisabethville y Luluabourg (10 de julio), Matadi (11 de julio), Leopoldville (13 de julio) y otros lugares. [22] Hubo sospechas inmediatas de que Bélgica planeaba volver a apoderarse de su antigua colonia mientras lo hacía. Un gran número de colonos belgas huyó del país. Al mismo tiempo, el 11 de julio, Moise Tshombe declaró la independencia de la provincia de Katanga en el sureste, con el apoyo de los administradores y soldados belgas restantes.
El 14 de julio de 1960, en respuesta a las solicitudes del primer ministro Lumumba, el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU adoptó la Resolución 143 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas . Este pidió a Bélgica que retire sus tropas y que la ONU proporcione asistencia militar a las fuerzas congoleñas para permitirles "cumplir plenamente con sus tareas". Lumumba exigió que Bélgica retirara sus tropas de inmediato, amenazando con buscar ayuda de la Unión Soviética si no se marchaban en dos días. La ONU reaccionó rápidamente y estableció la Operación de las Naciones Unidas en el Congo (ONUC). Las primeras tropas de la ONU llegaron al día siguiente, pero hubo un desacuerdo instantáneo entre Lumumba y la ONU sobre el mandato de la nueva fuerza . Debido a que el ejército congoleño había estado en desorden desde el motín, Lumumba quería utilizar las tropas de la ONU para someter a Katanga por la fuerza. Lumumba se sintió extremadamente frustrado por la falta de voluntad de la ONU de usar la fuerza contra Tshombe y su secesión. [25] Canceló una reunión programada con el secretario general Dag Hammarskjöld el 14 de agosto y en su lugar escribió una serie de cartas enojadas. [26] Para Hammarskjöld, la secesión de Katanga era un asunto interno congoleño y la ONU tenía prohibido intervenir por el artículo 2 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas . Los desacuerdos sobre lo que la fuerza de la ONU podía y no podía hacer continuaron durante su despliegue.
Un total de 3.500 soldados de la ONUC habían llegado al Congo el 20 de julio de 1960. [27] El primer contingente de fuerzas belgas había abandonado Leopoldville el 16 de julio tras la llegada de las tropas de las Naciones Unidas. Tras recibir garantías de que llegarían contingentes de la Fuerza en número suficiente, las autoridades belgas acordaron retirar todas sus fuerzas de la zona de Leopoldville antes del 23 de julio. Las últimas tropas belgas abandonaron el país el 23 de julio, mientras las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas seguían desplegándose en todo el Congo. Continuó la construcción de la ONUC, aumentando su número de efectivos a más de 8.000 el 25 de julio ya más de 11.000 el 31 de julio de 1960. El 27 de julio se acordó un acuerdo básico entre las Naciones Unidas y el Gobierno congoleño sobre el funcionamiento de la Fuerza. El 9 de agosto, Albert Kalonji proclamó la independencia de Kasai del Sur .
Durante el período crucial de julio-agosto de 1960, Mobutu construyó "su" ejército nacional canalizando la ayuda extranjera a las unidades leales a él, exiliando las unidades no confiables a áreas remotas y absorbiendo o dispersando ejércitos rivales. Ató a oficiales individuales a él controlando su ascenso y el flujo de dinero para las nóminas. Los investigadores que trabajaron desde la década de 1990 han concluido que el dinero fue canalizado directamente al ejército por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos , la ONU y Bélgica. [28] [29] A pesar de esto, en septiembre de 1960, después de la división del país en cuatro direcciones, había cuatro fuerzas armadas separadas: el propio ANC de Mobotu, con unos 12.000, la Policía de Kasai del Sur, leal a Albert Kalonji (3.000 o menos ), la Gendarmería de Katanga, que formaba parte del régimen de Moise Tshombe (por un total de unos 10.000), y el ANC disidente de Stanleyville, leal a Antoine Gizenga (unos 8.000). [30]
En agosto de 1960, debido al rechazo de las solicitudes de asistencia de la ONU para reprimir las revueltas de Kasai del Sur y Katanga, el gobierno de Lumumba decidió solicitar ayuda soviética. De Witte escribe que "Leopoldville pidió a la Unión Soviética aviones, camiones, armas y equipo ... Poco después, el 22 o 23 de agosto, unos 1.000 soldados partieron hacia Kasai". [31] El 26-27 de agosto, el ANC se apoderó de Bakwanga , la capital de Albert Kalonji en Kasai del Sur, sin una resistencia seria y, según de Witte, "en los dos días siguientes puso temporalmente fin a la secesión de Kasai". [31]
En este punto, el Estudio de País de la Biblioteca del Congreso para el Congo dice que el 5 de septiembre de 1960: [32] "Kasavubu también nombró a Mobutu como jefe del ANC. Joseph Ileo fue elegido como el nuevo primer ministro y comenzó a tratar de formar un Lumumba y su gabinete respondieron acusando a Kasa-Vubu de alta traición y votaron a favor de su destitución. El Parlamento se negó a confirmar la destitución de Lumumba o Kasavubu y trató de lograr una reconciliación entre ellos. Después de una semana de estancamiento, Mobutu anunció el 14 de septiembre que asumió el poder hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1960 , con el fin de "neutralizar" tanto a Kasavubu como a Lumumba ". Mobutu formó el Colegio de Comisionados Generales , un gobierno tecnocrático de graduados universitarios.
A principios de enero de 1961, las unidades del ANC leales a Lumumba invadieron el norte de Katanga para apoyar una revuelta de miembros de la tribu baluba contra el régimen secesionista de Tshombe. [33] El 23 de enero de 1961, Kasa-Vubu ascendió a Mobutu a general de división; De Witte sostiene que se trató de un movimiento político, "destinado a fortalecer al ejército, el único apoyo del presidente y la posición de Mobutu dentro del ejército". [34]
La Resolución 161 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, de 21 de febrero de 1961, pedía la retirada de los oficiales belgas de los puestos de mando en el ANC y la formación de nuevos oficiales congoleños con ayuda de la ONU. La ONUC hizo varios intentos para volver a capacitar al ANC desde agosto de 1960 hasta junio de 1963, a menudo retrasados por cambios políticos. [35] Sin embargo, en marzo de 1963, después de la visita del coronel Michael Greene del ejército de los Estados Unidos y el resultante "Plan Greene", el patrón de asistencia militar acordada bilateralmente a varios componentes militares congoleños, en lugar de un solo esfuerzo unificado, fue ya tomando forma. [36]
A principios de 1964, estalló una nueva crisis cuando los rebeldes congoleños que se hacían llamar " Simba " (Swahili para "León") se rebelaron contra el gobierno. Fueron dirigidos por Pierre Mulele , Gaston Soumialot y Christophe Gbenye , ex miembros del Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) de Gizenga . La rebelión afectó a las provincias de Kivu y del Este (Orientale). En agosto habían capturado Stanleyville y establecido allí un gobierno rebelde. A medida que se extendió el movimiento rebelde, la disciplina se volvió más difícil de mantener y los actos de violencia y terror aumentaron. Miles de congoleños fueron ejecutados, incluidos funcionarios gubernamentales, líderes políticos de partidos de oposición, policías provinciales y locales, maestros de escuela y otros que se cree que estaban occidentalizados. Muchas de las ejecuciones se llevaron a cabo con extrema crueldad, frente a un monumento a Lumumba en Stanleyville. [37] Tshombe decidió utilizar mercenarios extranjeros y el ANC para reprimir la rebelión. Mike Hoare fue contratado para crear el 5 Commando ANC de habla inglesa en Kamina , con la ayuda de un oficial belga, el coronel Frederic Vanderwalle, mientras que el 6 Commando ANC era de habla francesa y originalmente estaba bajo el mando de un coronel del ejército belga , Lamouline. [38] En agosto de 1964, los mercenarios, con la ayuda de otras tropas del ANC, avanzaban contra la rebelión de Simba. Por temor a la derrota, los rebeldes comenzaron a tomar rehenes de la población blanca local en las áreas bajo su control. Estos rehenes fueron rescatados en lanzamientos aéreos belgas (Operaciones Dragon Rouge y Dragon Noir ) sobre Stanleyville y Paulis transportados por aviones estadounidenses. La operación coincidió con la llegada de unidades mercenarias (aparentemente incluida la 5ª Brigada Mecanizada formada apresuradamente) a Stanleyville, que fue rápidamente capturada. Se necesitó hasta fin de año para sofocar por completo las áreas restantes de rebelión.
Después de cinco años de turbulencias, en 1965 Mobutu utilizó su puesto como Jefe de Estado Mayor del ANC para tomar el poder en el golpe de Estado de 1965 en la República Democrática del Congo . Aunque Mobutu logró tomar el poder, su posición pronto se vio amenazada por los motines de Stanleyville , también conocidos como motines de los mercenarios, que finalmente fueron reprimidos. [39]
Por regla general, desde entonces, las Fuerzas Armadas no han intervenido en la política como un cuerpo, más bien han sido sacudidas y volcadas como hombres ambiciosos han sacudido al país. En realidad, el problema más grande ha sido el mal uso y, a veces, el abuso del ejército y la policía por parte de líderes políticos y étnicos. [40]
El 16 de mayo de 1968 se formó una brigada de paracaidistas de dos regimientos (cada uno de tres batallones) que finalmente iba a crecer en tamaño a una división completa. [41]
Zaire 1971–1997
El país pasó a llamarse Zaire en 1971 y, en consecuencia, el ejército se denominó Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ). En 1971, la fuerza del ejército consistía en el 1er Groupement en Kananga , con un batallón de guardias, dos batallones de infantería y un batallón de gendarmería adjunto, y el 2do Groupement ( Kinshasa ), el 3er Groupement ( Kisangani ), el 4to Groupement ( Lubumbashi ), el quinto grupo ( Bukavu ), el sexto grupo ( Mbandaka ) y el séptimo grupo ( Boma ). Cada uno era del tamaño de una brigada y estaba comandado por generales envejecidos que no habían tenido entrenamiento militar y, a menudo, no tenían mucha experiencia positiva, ya que eran suboficiales en la Fuerza Pública belga. [42] A finales de la década de 1970, el número de agrupaciones llegó a nueve, una por región administrativa. [43] La división de paracaídas (Division des Troupes Aéroportées Renforcées de Choc, DITRAC) operaba de forma semiindependiente del resto del ejército.
En julio de 1972 se retiraron varios de los generales envejecidos que comandaban las agrupaciones . Général d'armée Louis Bobozo , y Generaux de Corps d'Armée Nyamaseko Mata Bokongo, Nzoigba Yeu Ngoli, Muke Massaku , Ingila Grima, Itambo Kambala Wa Mukina, Tshinyama Mpemba, y el general de división Yossa Yi Ayira, habiendo sido el último comandante de la base de Kamina, se retiraron todos el 25 de julio de 1972. [44] Asumiendo como comandante en jefe militar, ahora titulado Capitán General, fue recientemente ascendido el General de División Bumba Moaso , ex comandante de la división de paracaídas.
Un gran número de países apoyaron a las FAZ a principios de la década de 1970. Trescientos miembros del personal belga se desempeñaban como oficiales de estado mayor y asesores en todo el Ministerio de Defensa, los italianos apoyaban a la Fuerza Aérea, los estadounidenses ayudaban con el transporte y las comunicaciones, los israelíes con el entrenamiento de las fuerzas aerotransportadas y había asesores británicos con los ingenieros. [45] En 1972, la organización política patrocinada por el estado, el Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), resolvió en un congreso del partido formar células activistas en cada unidad militar. La decisión causó consternación entre el cuerpo de oficiales, ya que el ejército había sido apolítico (e incluso antipolítico) desde antes de la independencia. [46]
El 11 de junio de 1975, varios militares fueron detenidos en lo que se conoció como golpe de Estado. Entre los detenidos se encontraban el General Daniel Katsuva wa Katsuvira, Jefe de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Terrestres; Utshudi Wembolenga, Comandante de la 2ª Región Militar de Kalemie ; Fallu Sumbu, agregado militar de Zaire en Washington, coronel Mudiayi wa Mudiayi, agregado militar de Zaire en París, agregado militar en Bruselas, comandante de batallón de paracomando y varios otros. [47] El régimen alegó que estos oficiales y otros (incluido el secrétaire particulier de Mobutu ) habían planeado el asesinato de Mobutu, alta traición y revelación de secretos militares, entre otros delitos. El presunto golpe fue investigado por una comisión revolucionaria encabezada por Boyenge Mosambay Singa, entonces jefe de la Gendarmería. En un escrito de 1988, Michael Schatzberg dijo que los detalles completos del golpe aún no habían surgido. [48] Meitho, escribiendo muchos años después, dice que los oficiales fueron acusados de intentar elevar al poder al secretario particular de Mobutu , el coronel Omba Pene Djunga, de Kasai. [49]
A fines de 1975, Mobutu, en un intento por instalar un gobierno a favor de Kinshasa en Angola y frustrar el impulso por el poder del Movimiento Popular Marxista para la Liberación de Angola (MPLA), desplegó vehículos blindados FAZ, paracaidistas y tres batallones de infantería para Angola en apoyo del Frente de Liberación Nacional de Angola (FNLA). [50] El 10 de noviembre de 1975, una fuerza anticomunista compuesta por 1.500 combatientes del FNLA, 100 soldados portugueses angoleños y dos batallones FAZ pasó cerca de la ciudad de Quifangondo, a solo 30 kilómetros (19 millas) al norte de Luanda , al amanecer del 10 de noviembre. La fuerza, apoyada por aviones sudafricanos y tres piezas de artillería de 140 mm, [51] marchó en una sola línea a lo largo del río Bengo para enfrentarse a una fuerza cubana de 800 efectivos a través del río. Así comenzó la Batalla de Quifangondo . Los cubanos y combatientes del MPLA bombardearon al FNLA con mortero y cohetes de 122 mm, destruyendo la mayoría de los vehículos blindados del FNLA y seis Jeeps que portaban cohetes antitanques en la primera hora de combate. [52]
El apoyo de Mobutu a la política del FNLA fracasó cuando el MPLA ganó en Angola. El MPLA, entonces, actuando aparentemente al menos como el Frente de Liberación Nacional Congoleña , ocupó la provincia de Katanga , en el sureste de Zaire , entonces conocida como Shaba, en marzo de 1977, enfrentándose a poca resistencia de las FAZ. Esta invasión se conoce a veces como Shaba I . Mobutu tuvo que solicitar asistencia, que fue proporcionada por Marruecos en forma de tropas regulares que expulsaron al MPLA y sus asesores cubanos de Katanga. También fueron importantes los pilotos egipcios que volaron el avión de combate Mirage 5 de Zaire . [53] La humillación de este episodio provocó disturbios civiles en Zaire a principios de 1978, que las FAZ tuvieron que sofocar. [54]
El pobre desempeño de las fuerzas armadas de Zaire durante Shaba I demostró debilidades crónicas. [32] Un problema era que algunos de los soldados zaireños en la zona no habían recibido pago durante períodos prolongados. Los oficiales superiores a menudo se quedaban con el dinero destinado a los soldados, lo que representa un liderazgo superior generalmente inepto y de mala reputación en las FAZ. Como resultado, muchos soldados simplemente desertaron en lugar de luchar. Otros se quedaron con sus unidades pero fueron ineficaces. Durante los meses posteriores a la invasión de Shaba, Mobutu buscó soluciones a los problemas militares que habían contribuido al pésimo desempeño del ejército. Implementó reformas radicales de la estructura de mando, incluidos los despidos masivos de oficiales de alto rango. Fusionó el Estado Mayor Militar con su propio Estado Mayor Presidencial y se designó nuevamente jefe de Estado Mayor, además de los cargos de ministro de Defensa y comandante supremo que ya ocupaba. También redistribuyó sus fuerzas por todo el país en lugar de mantenerlas cerca de Kinshasa, como había sido el caso anteriormente. La División de Kamanyola , en ese momento considerada la mejor formación del ejército y considerada la del presidente, fue asignada permanentemente a Shaba . Además de estos cambios, la fuerza del ejército se redujo en un 25 por ciento. Además, los aliados de Zaire proporcionaron una gran afluencia de equipo militar, y asesores belgas, franceses y estadounidenses ayudaron en la reconstrucción y reentrenamiento de la fuerza.
Despite these improvements, a second invasion by the former Katangan gendarmerie, known as Shaba II in May–June 1978, was only dispersed with the despatch of the French 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment and a battalion of the Belgian Paracommando Regiment. Kamanyola Division units collapsed almost immediately. French units fought the Battle of Kolwezi to recapture the town from the FLNC. The U.S. provided logistical assistance.[32]
In July 1975, according to the IISS Military Balance, the FAZ included 14 infantry battalions, seven "Guard" battalions, and seven other infantry battalions variously designated as "parachute" (or possibly "commando"; probably the units of the parachute brigade originally formed in 1968). There were also an armoured car regiment and a mechanised infantry battalion. Organisationally, the army was made up of the parachute division and the seven groupements.[55] In addition to these units, a tank battalion was reported to have formed by 1979.[56]
In January 1979 General de Division Mosambaye Singa Boyenge was named as both military region commander and Region Commissioner for Shaba.[57]
In 1984, a militarised police force, the Civil Guard, was formed.[58] It was eventually commanded by Général d'armée Kpama Baramoto Kata.
Thomas Turner wrote in the mid-1990s that "[m]ajor acts of violence, such as the killings that followed the "Kasongo uprising" in Bandundu Region in 1978, the killings of diamond miners in Kasai-Oriental Region in 1979, and, more recently, the massacre of students in Lubumbashi in 1990, continued to intimidate the population."[59]
Formation | Location | Size | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
Special Presidential Division | Kinshasa | 5,200 | Five battalions, 'appears combat ready' |
Kamanyola Division | Shaba | 4,100 | 14th Bde only combat ready formation |
31st Parachute Brigade | Kinshasa/Kamina | 3,800 | See State Dept 1978KINSHA06951 (1978). 'High state of combat readiness' |
32nd Parachute Brigade | Kinshasa | 1,000 | Still forming, to be deployed to Kitona. Separate 2008 French source says the brigade was never fully established.[61] |
1st Armoured Brigade | Mbanza-Ngungu | 1,300 | Only 30 of apx 100 tanks operational |
41st Commando Brigade | Kisangani | 1,200 | Three battalions deployed along Eastern borders |
13th Infantry Brigade | Kalemie | 1,500 | 'One of the most neglected units in the Zairean ground forces.' |
21st Infantry Brigade | Around Lubumbashi | 1,700 | See State Dept 1979LUBUMB01982 (1979). 'Modest combat capability' |
22nd Light Infantry Brigade | Kamina base | 2,500 | 'Role undefined' |
The authors of the Library of Congress Country Study on Zaire commented in 1992–93 that:
"The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory has traditionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and the presence or absence of foreign advisers and technicians.[32] A considerable portion of military equipment is not operational, primarily as a result of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and theft. For example, the tanks of the 1st Armoured Brigade often have a nonoperational rate approaching 70 to 80 percent. After a visit by a Chinese technical team in 1985, most of the tanks operated, but such an improved status generally has not lasted long beyond the departure of the visiting team. Several factors complicate maintenance in Zairian units. Maintenance personnel often lack the training necessary to maintain modern military equipment. Moreover, the wide variety of military equipment and the staggering array of spare parts necessary to maintain it not only clog the logistic network but also are expensive.
The most important factor that negatively affects maintenance is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive, resulting in the theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment to supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spare parts and equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better part of their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American maintenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a free lunch to the work force was a good, sometimes the only, technique to motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty day.
The army's logistics corps [was tasked].. to provide logistic support and conduct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for the FAZ. But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and logistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the corps is understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to accomplish its mission. It is organised into three battalions assigned to Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Kamina, but only the battalion at Kamina is adequately staffed; the others are little more than skeleton" units.
The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in 1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire ceased following the end of the Cold War and Mobutu deliberately allowed the military's condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on power.[62] Protesting low wages and lack of pay, paratroopers began looting Kinshasa in September 1991 and were only stopped after intervention by French ('Operation Baumier') and Belgian ('Operation Blue Beam')[63] forces.
In 1993, according to the Library of Congress Country Studies,[32] the 25,000-member FAZ ground forces consisted of one infantry division (with three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three parachute battalions and one support battalion); one special forces (commando/counterinsurgency) brigade; the Special Presidential Division; one independent armoured brigade; and two independent infantry brigades (each with three infantry battalions, one support battalion). These units were deployed throughout the country, with the main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately half the force). The Kamanyola Division, consisting of three infantry brigades operated generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st Infantry Brigade was located in Lubumbashi; the 13th Infantry Brigade was deployed throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one battalion of the 31st Airborne Brigade stayed at Kamina. The other main concentration of forces was in and around Kinshasa: the 31st Airborne Brigade was deployed at N'djili Airport on the outskirts of the capital; the Special Presidential Division (DSP) resided adjacent to the presidential compound; and the 1st Armoured Brigade was at Mbanza-Ngungu (in Bas-Congo, approximately 120 kilometres (75 mi) southwest of Kinshasa). Finally the 41st Commando Brigade was at Kisangani.
This superficially impressive list of units overstates the actual capability of the armed forces at the time. Apart from privileged formations such as the Presidential Division and the 31st Airborne Brigade, most units were poorly trained, divided and so badly paid that they regularly resorted to looting. What operational abilities the armed forces had were gradually destroyed by politicisation of the forces, tribalisation, and division of the forces, included purges of suspectedly disloyal groups, intended to allow Mobutu to divide and rule.[64] All this occurred against the background of increasing deterioration of state structures under the kleptocratic Mobutu regime.
Mobutu's overthrow and after
Much of the origins of the recent conflict in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo stems from the turmoil following the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which then led to the Great Lakes refugee crisis. Within the largest refugee camps, beginning in Goma in Nord-Kivu, were Rwandan Hutu fighters, who were eventually organised into the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda, who launched repeated attacks into Rwanda. Rwanda eventually backed Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his quickly organised Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in invading Zaire, aiming to stop the attacks on Rwanda in the process of toppling Mobutu's government. When the militias rebelled, backed by Rwanda, the FAZ, weakened as is noted above, proved incapable of mastering the situation and preventing the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997.[65] Elements of the Mobutu-loyal FAZ managed to retreat into northern Congo, and from there into Sudan while attempting to escape the AFDL. Allying themselves with the Sudanese government which was fighting its own civil war at the time, these FAZ troops were destroyed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army during Operation Thunderbolt near Yei in March 1997.[66]
When Kabila took power in 1997, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so the name of the national army changed once again, to the Forces armées congolaises (FAC). Tanzania sent six hundred military advisors to train Kabila's new army in May 1997. (Prunier says that the instructors were still at the Kitona base when the Second Congo War broke out, and had to be quickly returned to Tanzania. Prunier said "South African aircraft carried out the evacuation after a personal conversation between President Mkapa and not-yet-president Thabo Mbeki.[67][68] Command over the armed forces in the first few months of Kabila's rule was vague. Gérard Prunier writes that "there was no minister of defence, no known chief of staff, and no ranks; all officers were Cuban-style 'commanders' called 'Ignace', 'Bosco', Jonathan', or 'James', who occupied connecting suites at the Intercontinental Hotel and had presidential list cell-phone numbers. None spoke French or Lingala, but all spoke Kinyarwanda, Swahili, and, quite often, English." On being asked by Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman what was the actual army command structure apart from himself, Kabila answered 'We are not going to expose ourselves and risk being destroyed by showing ourselves openly... . We are careful so that the true masters of the army are not known. It is strategic. Please, let us drop the matter.'[69][70] Kabila's new Forces armées congolaises were riven with internal tensions. The new FAC had Banyamulenge fighters from South Kivu, kadogo child soldiers from various eastern tribes, such as Thierry Nindaga, Safari Rwekoze, etc... [the mostly] Lunda Katangese Tigers of the former FNLC, and former FAZ personnel.[71] Mixing these disparate and formerly warring elements together led to mutiny. On 23 February 1998, a mostly Banyamulenge unit mutiniued at Bukavu after its officers tried to disperse the soldiers into different units spread all around the Congo.[71][72] By mid-1998, formations on the outbreak of the Second Congo War included the Tanzanian-supported 50th Brigade, headquartered at Camp Kokolo in Kinshasa,[73] and the 10th Brigade – one of the best and largest units in the army – stationed in Goma, as well as the 12th Brigade in Bukavu. The declaration of the 10th Brigade's commander, former DSP officer Jean-Pierre Ondekane, on 2 August 1998 that he no longer recognised Kabila as the state's president was one of the factors in the beginning of the Second Congo War.[74]
According to Jane's, the FAC performed poorly throughout the Second Congo War and "demonstrated little skill or recognisable military doctrine".[75] At the outbreak of the war in 1998 the Army was ineffective and the DRC Government was forced to rely on assistance from Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As well as providing expeditionary forces, these countries unsuccessfully attempted to retrain the DRC Army. North Korea and Tanzania also provided assistance with training. During the first year of the war the Allied forces defeated the Rwandan force which had landed in Bas-Congo and the rebel forces south-west of Kinshasa and eventually halted the rebel and Rwandan offensive in the east of the DRC. These successes contributed to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was signed in July 1999.[76] Following the Lusaka Agreement, in mid-August 1999 President Kabila issued a decree dividing the country into eight military regions. The first military region, Congolese state television reported, would consist of the two Kivu provinces, Orientale Province would form the second region, and Maniema and Kasai-Oriental provinces the third. Katanga and Équateur would fall under the fourth and fifth regions, respectively, while Kasai-Occidental and Bandundu would form the sixth region. Kinshasa and Bas-Congo would form the seventh and eighth regions, respectively.[77] In November 1999 the Government attempted to form a 20,000-strong paramilitary force designated the People's Defence Forces. This force was intended to support the FAC and national police but never became effective.[78]
1999–present
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was not successful in ending the war, and fighting resumed in September 1999. The FAC's performance continued to be poor and both the major offensives the Government launched in 2000 ended in costly defeats.[79] President Kabila's mismanagement was an important factor behind the FAC's poor performance, with soldiers frequently going unpaid and unfed while the Government purchased advanced weaponry which could not be operated or maintained. The defeats in 2000 are believed to have been the cause of President Kabila's assassination in January 2001.[78] Following the assassination, Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency and was eventually successful in negotiating an end to the war in 2002–2003.
The December 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement devoted Chapter VII to the armed forces.[80] It stipulated that the armed forces chief of staff, and the chiefs of the army, air force, and navy were not to come from the same warring faction. The new "national, restructured and integrated" army would be made up from Kabila's government forces (the FAC), the RCD, and the MLC. Also stipulated in VII(b) was that the RCD-N, RCD-ML, and the Mai-Mai would become part of the new armed forces. An intermediate mechanism for physical identification of the soldiers, and their origin, date of enrolment, and unit was also called for (VII(c)). It also provided for the creation of a Conseil Superieur de la Defense (Superior Defence Council) which would declare states of siege or war and give advice on security sector reform, disarmament/demobilization, and national defence policy.
A decision on which factions were to name chiefs of staff and military regional commanders was announced on 19 August 2003 as the first move in military reform, superimposed on top of the various groups of fighters, government and former rebels.[81] Kabila was able to name the armed forces chief of staff, Lieutenant General Liwanga Mata, who previously served as navy chief of staff under Laurent Kabila. Kabila was able to name the air force commander (John Numbi), the RCD-Goma received the Land Force commander's position (Sylvain Buki) and the MLC the navy (Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa). Three military regional commanders were nominated by the former Kinshasa government, two commanders each by the RCD-Goma and the MLC, and one region commander each by the RCD-K/ML and RCD-N. However these appointments were announced for Kabila's Forces armées congolaises (FAC), not the later FARDC. Another report however says that the military region commanders were only nominated in January 2004, and that the troop deployment on the ground did not change substantially until the year afterward.
On 24 January 2004, a decree created the Structure Militaire d'Intégration (SMI, Military Integration Structure). Together with the SMI, CONADER also was designated to manage the combined tronc commun DDR element and military reform programme. The first post-Sun City military law appears to have been passed on 12 November 2004, which formally created the new national Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Included in this law was article 45, which recognised the incorporation of a number of armed groups into the FARDC, including the former government army Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), ex-FAZ personnel also known as former President Mobutu's 'les tigres', the RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N, MLC, the Mai-Mai, as well as other government-determined military and paramilitary groups.
Turner writes that the two most prominent opponents of military integration (brassage) were Colonel Jules Mutebusi, a Munyamulenge from South Kivu, and Laurent Nkunda, a Rwandaphone Tutsi who Turner says was allegedly from Rutshuru in North Kivu. In May–June 2004 Mutebusi led a revolt against his superiors from Kinshasa in South Kivu.[82] Nkunda began his long series of revolts against central authority by helping Mutebusi in May–June 2004. In November 2004 a Rwandan government force entered North Kivu to attack the FDLR, and, it seems, reinforced and resupplied RCD-Goma (ANC) at the same time. Mutebutsi and Nkunda were seemingly supported by both the Rwandan government, the FARDC regional commander, General Obed Rwisbasira,[83] and the RCD-Goma governor of North Kivu, Eugene Serufuli. Neither government figure did anything to prevent Nkunda's march south to Bukavu with his military force. In mid-December, civilians at Kanyabayonga, Buramba, and Nyabiondo in North Kivu were killed, tortured, and raped, seemingly deliberately targeted on ethic grounds (the victims came almost exclusively from the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups). Kabila despatched 10,000 government troops to the east in response, launching an operation 11 December that was called "Operation Bima".[84] Its only major success was the capture of Walikale from RCD-Goma (ANC) troops.
There was another major personnel reshuffle on 12 June 2007. FARDC chief General Kisempia Sungilanga Lombe was replaced with General Dieudonne Kayembe Mbandankulu.[85] General Gabriel Amisi Kumba retained his post as Land Forces commander. John Numbi, a trusted member of Kabila's inner circle, was shifted from air force commander to Police Inspector General. U.S. diplomats reported that the former Naval Forces Commander Maj. General Amuli Bahigua (ex-MLC) became the FARDC's Chief of Operations; former FARDC Intelligence Chief General Didier Etumba (ex-FAC) was promoted to vice admiral and appointed Commander of Naval Forces; Maj. General Rigobert Massamba (ex-FAC), a former commander of the Kitona air base, was appointed as Air Forces Commander; and Brig. General Jean-Claude Kifwa, commander of the Republican Guard, was appointed as a regional military commander.[86]
Due to significant delays in the DDR and integration process, of the eighteen brigades, only seventeen have been declared operational, over two and a half years after the initial target date. Responding to the situation, the Congolese Minister of Defence presented a new defence reform master plan to the international community in February 2008. Essentially the three force tiers all had their readiness dates pushed back: the first, territorial forces, to 2008–12, the mobile force to 2008–10, and the main defence force to 2015.
Much of the east of the country remains insecure, however. In the far northeast this is due primarily to the Ituri conflict. In the area around Lake Kivu, primarily in North Kivu, fighting continues among the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and between the government FARDC and Laurent Nkunda's troops, with all groups greatly exacerbating the issues of internal refugees in the area of Goma, the consequent food shortages, and loss of infrastructure from the years of conflict.[87] In 2009, several United Nations officials stated that the army is a major problem, largely due to corruption that results in food and pay meant for soldiers being diverted and a military structure top-heavy with colonels, many of whom are former warlords.[88] In a 2009 report itemizing FARDC abuses, Human Rights Watch urged the UN to stop supporting government offensives against eastern rebels until the abuses ceased.[89]
Caty Clement wrote in 2009:[90]
"One of the most notable [FARDC corruption] schemes was known as 'Opération Retour' (Operation Return). Senior officers ordered the soldiers' pay to be sent from Kinshasa to the commanders in the field, who took their cut and returned the remainder to their commander in Kinshasa instead of paying the soldiers. To ensure that foot soldiers would be paid their due, in late 2005, EUSEC suggested separating the chain of command from the chain of payment. The former remained within Congolese hands, while the EU mission delivered salaries directly to the newly 'integrated' brigades. Although efficient in the short term, this solution raises the question of sustainability and ownership in the long term. Once soldiers' pay could no longer be siphoned off via 'Opération Retour', however, two other budgetary lines, the 'fonds de ménage' and logistical support to the brigades, were soon diverted."
In 2010, thirty FARDC officers were given scholarships to study in Russian military academies. This is part of a greater effort by Russia to help improve the FARDC. A new military attaché and other advisers from Russia visited the DRC.[91]
On 22 November 2012, Gabriel Amisi Kumba was suspended from his position in the Forces Terrestres by president Joseph Kabila due to an inquiry into his alleged role in the sale of arms to various rebel groups in the eastern part of the country, which may have implicated the rebel group M23.[92] In December 2012 it was reported that members of Army units in the north east of the country are often not paid due to corruption, and these units rarely counter attacks made against villages by the Lord's Resistance Army.[93]
The FARDC deployed 850 soldiers and 150 PNC police officers as part of an international force in the Central African Republic, which the DRC borders to the north. The country had been in a state of civil war since 2012, when the president was ousted by rebel groups. The DRC was urged by French president François Hollande to keep its troops in CAR.[94]
In July 2014, the Congolese army carried out a joint operation with UN troops in the Masisi and Walikale territories of the North Kivu province. In the process, they liberated over 20 villages and a mine from the control of two rebel groups, the Mai Mai Cheka and the Alliance for the Sovereign and Patriotic Congo.[95]
The UN published a report in October 2017 announcing that the FARDC no longer employed child soldiers but was still listed under militaries that committed sexual violations against children.[96]
Troops operating with MONUSCO in North Kivu were attacked by likely rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces on 8 December 2017. After a protracted firefight the troops suffered 5 dead along with 14 dead among the UN force.[97]
Organización actual
The President Félix Tshisekedi is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defence, formally Ministers of Defence and Veterans (Ancien Combattants) is Crispin Atama Tabe, who succeeded former minister Aimé Ngoy Mukena.
The Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp in the Kinshasa suburb of Ngaliema hosts the defence department and the Chiefs of Staff central command headquarters of the FARDC. Jane's data from 2002 appears inaccurate; there is at least one ammunition plant in Katanga.[98]
Below the Chief of Staff, the current organisation of the FARDC is not fully clear. There is known to be a Military Intelligence branch – Service du Renseignement militaire (SRM), the former DEMIAP. The FARDC is known to be broken up into the Land Forces (Forces Terrestres), Navy and Air Force. The Land Forces are distributed around ten military regions, up from the previous eight, following the ten provinces of the country. There is also a training command, the Groupement des Écoles Supérieurs Militaires (GESM) or Group of Higher Military Schools, which, in January 2010, was under the command of Major General Marcellin Lukama.[99] The Navy and Air Forces are composed of various groupments (see below). There is also a central logistics base.
It should be made clear also that Joseph Kabila does not trust the military; the Republican Guard is the only component he trusts. Major General John Numbi, former Air Force chief, now inspector general of police, ran a parallel chain of command in the east to direct the 2009 Eastern Congo offensive, Operation Umoja Wetu; the regular chain of command was by-passed. Previously Numbi negotiated the agreement to carry out the mixage process with Laurent Nkunda.[100] Commenting on a proposed vote of no confidence in the Minister of Defence in September 2012, Baoudin Amba Wetshi of lecongolais.cd described Ntolo as a "scapegoat". Wetshi said that all key military and security questions were handled in total secrecy by the President and other civil and military personalities trusted by him, such as John Numbi, Gabriel Amisi Kumba ('Tango Four'), Delphin Kahimbi, and others such as Kalev Mutond and Pierre Lumbi Okongo.[101]
Arms and Inter-forces Services
- Signals
- Engineering
- Health Service
- Physical Education and Sports
- Military Chaplains
- Military Justice
- Administration
- Logistics
- Intelligence and Security
- Military Band
- Veterinary and Agricultural Service
- Military Police
- Civic, Patriotic Education and Social Actions
- Communication and Information
General Secretariat for Defence and Veterans Affairs
The General Secretariat for Defence: is headed by a General Officer (Secretary General for Defence). He oversees the following departments:
- Human Resources Department
- Directorate of Studies, Planning and Military Cooperation
- Budget and Finance Department
- Directorate of Penitentiary Administration
- Directorate of General Services
- IT Department
Military Justice
Military Justice is an independent institution under the judiciary, responsible for upholding the law and strengthening order and discipline within the Armed Forces.
General Inspectorate
The General Inspectorate includes the following people:
- Inspector General
- Two Assistant Inspectors General
- College of Inspectors
- College of Advisers
- Administrative Secretariat
- Administrative, logistics and services unit
Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff
The available information on armed forces' Chiefs of Staff is incomplete and sometimes contradictory. In addition to armed forces chiefs of staff, in 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Malila was listed as Army Chief of Staff.[102]
Command structure in January 2005
Virtually all officers have now changed positions, but this list gives an outline of the structure in January 2005.[103] Despite the planned subdivision of the country into more numerous provinces, the actual splitting of the former provinces has not taken place.
- FARDC chief of staff: Major General Sungilanga Kisempia (PPRD)
- FARDC land forces chief of staff: General Sylvain Buki (RCD-G).[104] Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba appears to have been appointed to the position in August 2006, and retained this position during the personnel reshuffle of 12 June 2007. In November 2012 he was succeeded by François Olenga.[105]
- FARDC navy chief of staff: General Major Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa (MLC) (Commander of the Kimia II operation in 2009)[106]
- FARDC air force chief of staff: Brigadier General Jean Bitanihirwa Kamara (MLC). Military training at the Ecole de formation d'officiers (EFO), Kananga, and other courses while in the FAZ. Brigade commander in the MLC, then named in August 2003 "chef d'etat-major en second" of the FARDC air force.[107]
- 1st Military Region/Bandundu: Brigadier General Moustapha Mukiza (MLC)[108]
- 2nd Military Region/Bas-Congo: Unknown. General Jean Mankoma 2009.
- 3rd Military Region/Equateur: Brigadier-General Mulubi Bin Muhemedi (PPRD)
- 4th Military Region/Kasai-Occidental: Brigadier-General Sindani Kasereka (RCD-K/ML)
- 5th Military Region/Kasai Oriental: General Rwabisira Obeid (RCD)
- 6th Military Region/Katanga: Brigadier-General Nzambe Alengbia (MLC) – 62nd, 63rd, and 67th Brigades in Katanga have committed numerous acts of sexual violence against women.[109]
- 7th Military Region/Maniema: Brigadier-General Widi Mbulu Divioka (RCD-N)
- 8th Military Region/North Kivu: General Gabriel Amisi Kumba (RCD). General Amisi, a.k.a. "Tango Fort" now appears to be Chief of Staff of the Land Forces. Brig. Gen. Vainqueur Mayala was Commander 8th MR in September 2008[110]
- 9th Military Region/Province Orientale: Major-General Bulenda Padiri (Mayi–Mayi)
- 10th Military Region/South Kivu: Major Mbuja Mabe (PPRD). General Pacifique Masunzu, in 2010. Region included 112th Brigade on Minembwe plateuxes. This grouping was "an almost exclusively Banyamulenge brigade under the direct command of the 10th Military Region, [which] consider[ed] General Masunzu as its leader."[111]
Updates to command structure in 2014
In September 2014, President Kabila reshuffled the command structure and in addition to military regions created three new 'defence zones' which would be subordinated directly to the general staff. The defence zones essentially created a new layer between the general staff and the provincial commanders. The military regions themselves were reorganised and do not correspond with the ones that existed prior to the reshuffle.[112][113] New commanders of branches were also appointed:[114] A Congolese military analyst based in Brussels, Jean-Jacques Wondo, provided an outline of the updated command structure of the FARDC following the shake up of the high command:[115][116][117]
- Chief of General Staff: Army Gen. Didier Etumba
- Deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. Bayiba Dieudonné Amuli
- Deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Celestin Mbala Munsense
- Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Prosper Nabiola
- Chief of intelligence: Brig. Gen. Tage Tage
- Chief of administration: Constantin Claude Ilunga Kabangu
- Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Lutuna Charles Shabani
- Land Forces Chief of Staff: Gen. Dieudonné Banze
- Land Forces deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Maj. Gen. Kiama Vainqueur Mayala
- Land Forces deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Muyumb Obed Wibatira
- Navy Chief of Staff: Vice Adm. Rombault Mbuayama
- Navy deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Rear Adm. Jean-Marie Valentin Linguma Mata Linguma (Vice Adm. from 2018)[118]
- Navy deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Rear Adm. Bruno Mayanga Muena
- Air Force Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. Numbi Ngoie (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
- Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence: Brig. Gen. Maurice René Diasuka Diakiyana (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
- Air Force deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics: Brig. Gen. Jean-Paul Nganguele Mutali (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
Regional commanders:
- 1st Defence Zone (Bas Congo, Bandundu, Equatuer, and Kinshasa): Brig. Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba
- 11th Military Region (Bandundu Province): Brig Gen. Dieudonné Kiamata Mutupeke
- 12th Military Region (Bas-Congo Province): Brig Gen. Jonas Padiri Muhizi (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
- 13th Military Region (Equatuer Province): Brig. Gen. Luboya Kashama Johnny (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
- 14th Military Region (Kinshasa): Brig. Gen. Camille Bombele Luwala
- 2nd Defence Zone (Kasai and Katanga): Maj. Gen. Jean Claude Kifwa
- 21st Military Region (Kasai-Oriental and Kasai Occidental Provinces): Brig. Gen. Fall Jikabwe
- 22nd Military Region (Katanga Province): Brig. Gen. Philémon Yav (Maj. Gen. from 2018)[118]
- 3rd Defence Zone (Kivu, Maneima, and Katanga): Maj. Gen. Leon Mush ale Tsipamba
- 31st Military Region (Bas-Uele and Tshopo Districts): Brig. Gen. Bertin Baseka Kamangala
- 32nd Military Region (Haut-Uele and Ituri Districts): Brig. Gen. Jean-Pierre Bongwangela
- 33rd Military Region (Maneima and South Kivu Provinces): Brig. Gen. Gaetan Kakudji Bobo
- 34th Military Region (North Kivu Province): Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Lombe
Reshuffle in 2018
The following changes were announced in July 2018.[118]
- Chief of the General Staff: Lt. Gen. Celestin Mbala Munsense (Army Gen. from 2019)[119]
- Deputy Chief of Staff for operations and intelligence: Lt. Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba
- Deputy Chief of Staff for administration and logistics: Maj. Gen. Jean-Pierre Bongwangela
- Chief of operations: Maj. Gen. Daniel Kashale
- Chief of intelligence: Maj. Gen. Delphin Kahimbi Kasabwe
- Chief of administration: Maj. Gen. Jean-Luc Yav
- Chief of logistics: Brig. Gen. Kalala Kilumba
Fuerzas Terrestres
Circa 2008–09, the land forces were made up of about 14 integrated brigades of fighters from all the former warring factions who went through a brassage integration process (see next paragraph) and a limited number of non-integrated brigades that remain solely made up of single factions (the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)'s Armée national congolaise, the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the ex-RCD KML, the ex-Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the armed groups of the Ituri conflict (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri (FRPI), and the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI)), and the Mai-Mai).[120]
It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), "..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for brassage" [the military integration process].[121]
The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the military integration process as its first of three stages.[122] The process consisted firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they were sent to orientation centres, run by CONADER, where fighters took the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who chose demobilisation received an initial cash payment of US$110. Those who chose to stay within the FARDC were then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course, which aimed to build integrated formations out of factional fighters previously heavily divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The centres were spread out around the country at Kitona, Kamina, Kisangani, Rumangabo and Nyaleke (within the Virunga National Park) in Nord-Kivu, and Luberizi (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated. There were three sequential buildup stages in the 2005 plan. Following the first 18 integrated brigades, the second goal was the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010, when MONUC was hoped to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.
In February 2008, then Defence Minister Chikez Diemu described the reform plan at the time as:[123]
"The short term, 2008–2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008–2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015–2020, with a Principal Defence Force." Diemu added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. "The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions."
Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general Laurent Nkunda. A hastily negotiated verbal agreement in Rwanda saw three government FAC brigades integrated with Nkunda's former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades in what was called mixage. Mixage brought multiple factions into composite brigades, but without the 45-day retraining provided by brassage, and it seems that actually, the process was limited to exchanging battalions between the FAC and Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. Due to Nkunda's troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively gained control of all five brigades, which was not the intention of the DRC central government.[124][page needed] However, after Nkunda used the mixage brigades to fight the FDLR, strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that "by 30 August [2007] Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories" (of North Kivu).[125]
Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes[126] and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.[127]
The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops.[128] The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic."[129] A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over a 100 men)."[130]
A number of outside donor countries are also carrying out separate training programmes for various parts of the Forces du Terrestres (Land Forces). The People's Republic of China has trained Congolese troops at Kamina in Katanga from at least 2004 to 2009,[131] and the Belgian government is training at least one "rapid reaction" battalion. When Kabila visited U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington D.C., he also asked the U.S. Government to train a battalion, and as a result, a private contractor, Protection Strategies Incorporated, started training a FARDC battalion at Camp Base, Kisangani, in February 2010.[132] The company was supervised by United States Special Operations Command Africa. Three years later, the battalion broke and ran in the face of M23, raping women and young girls, looting, and carrying out arbitrary executions.[133] The various international training programmes are not well integrated.
Equipment
Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past.[134] The figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2014.[135] Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.[136]
- Main Battle Tanks: 12–17 x Type 59 (dropped from 30 listed in 2007), 32 x T-55, 100 x T 72. Thirty T-55s and 100 T-72 were listed in 2007, thus little new information has reached the IISS in the intervening seven years.
- Light tanks: 10 PT-76; 30 Type 62 (serviceability in doubt). "40+" Type 62s were listed by the Military Balance in 2007.
- Reconnaissance vehicles: Up to 17 Panhard AML-60, 14 AML-90 armoured cars, 19 EE-9 Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2.
- Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 20 BMP-1 (number reported unchanged since 2007).
- Armoured Personnel Carriers: IISS reports tracked vehicles include 3 BTR-50, 6 MT-LB, wheeled vehicles including 30-70 BTR-60; 58 Panhard M3 (serviceability in doubt), 7 TH 390 Fahd.
- Artillery: 16 2S1 and 2S3 self-propelled; 119 towed field guns, including 77 122 mm howitzer 2A18 130 mm D-30/M-1938/Type-60; 57 MRL, including 24 Type 81; 528+ mortars, 81 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm, 120 mm.
In addition to these 2014 figures, in March 2010, it was reported that the DRC's land forces had ordered US$80 million worth of military equipment from Ukraine which included 20 T-72 main battle tanks, 100 trucks and various small arms.[137] Tanks have been used in the Kivus in the 2005–09 period.
In February 2014, Ukraine revealed that it had achieved the first export order for the T-64 tank to the DRC Land Forces for 50 T-64BV-1s.[138]
In June 2015 it was reported that Georgia had sold 12 of its Didgori-2 to the DRC for $4 million. The vehicles were specifically designed for reconnaissance and special operations. Two of the vehicles are a recently developed conversion to serve for medical field evacuation.[139][140]
The United Nations confirmed in 2011, both from sources in the Congolese military and from officials of the Commission nationale de contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre et de réduction de la violence armée, that the ammunition plant called Afridex in Likasi, Katanga Province, manufactures ammunition for small arms and light weapons.[4]
Republican Guard
In addition to the other land forces, President Joseph Kabila also has a Republican Guard presidential force (Garde Républicaine or GR), formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but of the Head of State.[141] Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005 President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and "repealed any previous provisions contrary" to that decree. The GR, more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000 to 15,000 in January 2007), has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies in the vicinity of its bases.
In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, Joseph Kabila has deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit.[142] At the beginning of 2007[update] there were Guards deployed in the central prison of Kinshasa, N'djili Airport, Bukavu, Kisangani, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Matadi, and Moanda, where they appear to answer to no local commander and have caused trouble with MONUC troops there.[141]
The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but in January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as having been integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.[141]
Up until June 2016, the GR comprised three brigades, the 10th Brigade at Camp Tshatshi and the 11th at Camp Kimbembe, both in Kinshasa, and the 13th Brigade at Camp Simi Simi in Kisangani.[143] It was reorganised on the basis of eight fighting regiments, the 14th Security and Honor Regiment, an artillery regiment, and a command brigade/regiment from that time.
Other forces active in the country
There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) on 31 March 2017 had a strength of over 18,316 peacekeepers (including 16,215 military personnel) and is tasked with assisting Congolese authorities to maintain security.[144] The UN and foreign military aid missions, the most prominent being EUSEC RD Congo,[145] are attempting to assist the Congolese in rebuilding the armed forces, with major efforts being made in trying to assure regular payment of salaries to armed forces personnel and also in military justice. Retired Canadian Lieutenant General Marc Caron also served for a time as Security Sector Reform advisor to the head of MONUC.[146]
Groups of anti-Rwandan government rebels like the FDLR, and other foreign fighters remain inside the DRC.[9] The FDLR which is the greatest concern, was some 6,000 strong, in July 2007. By late 2010 the FDLR's strength however was estimated at 2,500.[147] The other groups are smaller: the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces in the remote area of Mt Rwenzori, and the Burundian Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu—Forces Nationales de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL).
Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities.[148] There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, says National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children. Obligatory civil service administered through the armed forces was also proposed under the Mobutu regime during the "radicalisation" programme of December 1974 – January 1975; the FAZ was opposed to the measure and the plan "took several months to die."[149]
Fuerza Aerea
All military aircraft in the DRC are operated by the Air Force. Jane's World Air Forces states that the Air Force has an estimated strength of 1,800 personnel and is organised into two Air Groups. These Groups command five wings and nine squadrons, of which not all are operational. 1 Air Group is located at Kinshasa and consists of Liaison Wing, Training Wing and Logistical Wing and has a strength of five squadrons. 2 Tactical Air Group is located at Kaminia and consists of Pursuit and Attack Wing and Tactical Transport Wing and has a strength of four squadrons. Foreign private military companies have reportedly been contracted to provide the DRC's aerial reconnaissance capability using small propeller aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment. Jane's states that National Air Force of Angola fighter aircraft would be made available to defend Kinshasa if it came under attack.[150]
Like the other services, the Congolese Air Force is not capable of carrying out its responsibilities. Few of the Air Force's aircraft are currently flyable or capable of being restored to service and it is unclear whether the Air Force is capable of maintaining even unsophisticated aircraft. Moreover, Jane's states that the Air Force's Ecole de Pilotage is 'in near total disarray' though Belgium has offered to restart the Air Force's pilot training program.[151]
In 2018 the IISS estimated that the Air Force numbered 2250 (p457); the 2020 edition carried the same number, unchanged.
Before the downfall of Mobutu, a small navy operated on the Congo river. One of its installations was at the village of N'dangi near the presidential residence in Gbadolite. The port at N'dangi was the base for several patrol boats, helicopters and the presidential yacht.[152] The 2002 edition of Jane's Sentinel described the Navy as being "in a state of near total disarray" and stated that it did not conduct any training or have operating procedures.[153] The Navy shares the same discipline problems as the other services. It was initially placed under command of the MLC when the transition began, so the current situation is uncertain.
The 2007 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships states that the Navy is organised into four commands, based at Matadi, near the coast; the capital Kinshasa, further up the Congo river; Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika; and Goma, on Lake Kivu.[154] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 2007 edition of the Military Balance, confirms the bases listed in Jane's and adds a fifth base at Boma, a coastal city near Matadi. Various sources also refer to numbered Naval Regions. Operations of the 1st Naval Region have been reported in Kalemie,[155] the 4th near the northern city of Mbandaka,[156] and the 5th at Goma.[157]
The IISS lists the Navy at 1,000 personnel and a total of eight patrol craft, of which only one is operational, a Shanghai II Type 062 class gunboat designated "102". There are five other 062s as well as two Swiftships which are not currently operational, though some may be restored to service in the future. According to Jane's, the Navy also operates barges and small craft armed with machine guns.[158]
As of 2012, the Navy on paper consisted of about 6,700 personnel and up to 23 patrol craft. In reality there was probably around 1,000 service members, and only 8 of the boats were 50 ft in length or larger, the sole operational vessel being a Shanghai II Type 062 class gunboat. The service maintains bases in Kinshasa, Boma, Matadi, Boma, and on Lake Tanganyika.[159] The IISS repeated the same 6,700 figure in 2018 (p457) and the 2020 edition carried the same number, unchanged.
Notas
- ^ Willame states that 10 adjutants were nominated before shortly independence due to intense political pressure.[14]
- ^ Task Group 218.2 under Capitaine de vaisseau Petitjean, comprised nine vessels: the troop transport A957 Kamina, the Algerine-class F901 Lecointe, F903 Dufour, F904 De Brouwer and F905 Demoor, and the vedettes Semois, Rupel, Dender, and Ourthe.[24]
Referencias
- ^ Colin Robinson, "Army reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003–2009", Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 23, Number 3, 1 July 2012, p. 480.
- ^ IISS Military Balance 2020, p. 457.
- ^ "Congo, Democratic Republic of the". United States Central Intelligence Agency. 26 January 2018. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
- ^ a b United Nations, Final Report of the Group of Experts, 2011, S/2011/738, 2 December 2011, p. 148.
- ^ a b c d e Wondo, Jean-Jacques (23 May 2018). Joseph Kabila continues to over-equip his regime militarily for the upcoming political deadlines – JJ Wondo. Desc-wondo.
- ^ IISS Military Balance 2011, p419,
- ^ Ian Johnston (ed.), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Center for International Cooperation – Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 62.
- ^ A. AUGÉ and P. KLAOUSEN, eds, Réformer les armées africaines. En quête d'une nouvelle stratégie Paris: Karthala, 2010. ISBN 978-2-8111-0340-8, pp. 120–122.
- ^ a b International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No. 128, 5 July 2007.
- ^ In French, "Loi No 04/023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant Organisation Générale de defence et des forces armées."
- ^ Meditz & Merrill 1993, p. 282–285.
- ^ a b Meditz & Merrill 1993, p. 285.
- ^ Kanza 1994, p. 192.
- ^ Willame 1972, p. 62.
- ^ Young 1966, p. 35.
- ^ Vanderstraeten 1985.
- ^ Vanderstraeten 1985, p. 236.
- ^ Libois 1966, p. 95.
- ^ Jean-Claude Williame in Kitchen, ed, Footnotes to the Congo Story, New York: Walker & Co., 1967, pp. 166–167.
- ^ DeWitte & Wright 2002, p. 7.
- ^ Vanderstraeten 1985, p. 235–260.
- ^ a b DeWitte & Wright 2002, p. 212.
- ^ Libois 1966, p. 96.
- ^ Vanderstraeten, 1983, 93–94.
- ^ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, (ABC-CLIO: 1999), p. 54 ISBN 0-87436-892-8.
- ^ Hobbs, Nicole, "The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960" (2014). Harvey M. Applebaum '59 Award. Archived 17 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ United Nations (1960). "Questions relating to the Situation in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)" (PDF). United Nations. United Nations. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 May 2006. Retrieved 29 December 2016.
- ^ For CIA see David N. Gibbs, 'Secrecy and International Relations,' Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 2, 1995, pp. 213—228. Archived 9 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine, 18 March 2012, and for UN and Belgium, De Witte.
- ^ DeWitte & Wright 2002, pp. 24–25, 27–28.
- ^ Gordon McDonald et al, U.S. Army Area Handbook for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) [issued by the Foreign Area Studies Division of American University], June 1962, p. 620. For more on the separating armed units, see Jean-Claude Willame, Patrimonialism and political change in the Congo, Stanford University Press, 1972, 64–72, and Congo 1960: la sécession du Sud-Kasaï.
- ^ a b DeWitte & Wright 2002, p. 16.
- ^ a b c d e Meditz & Merrill 1993.
- ^ Air Combat Information Group.
- ^ DeWitte & Wright 2002, p. 127.
- ^ House, Arthur (1978). The UN in the Congo: The Civilian Operations. Washington DC: University Press of America. pp. 145–155. ISBN 0-8191-0516-3.
- ^ House, 1978, 153–154, drawing upon United Nations Secretariat, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General, June 1962 to June 1963, UN document A/5501, 14–15.
- ^ M. Crawford Young (1966). "Post-Independence Politics in the Congo". Transition (26): 34–41. JSTOR 2934325. Post-Independence Politics in the Congo, M. Crawford Young, Transition, No. 26 (1966), pp. 34–41.
- ^ Dave Renton, David Seddon, Leo Zeilig, "The Congo: Plunder And Resistance", Zed Books, 2007, ISBN 1842774859, 105, and Mockler, 86–87, 89, 95.
- ^ Anthony Mockler, 'The New Mercenaries,' Corgi Books, 1985, ISBN 0-552-12558-X, p131-159.
- ^ Institute for Security Studies, Report On The Solidarity Workshop of Defence Officers from Souther|n African Countries and Members of the DRC Defence Force, Grand Hotel, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 17–19 May, 2004 Archived 23 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine, see "Introduction", retrieved May 2013.
- ^ Robinson 2021, p. 7.
- ^ Robinson 2021, p. 5.
- ^ Robinson 2021, p. 11.
- ^ Robinson 2021, pp. 5-6.
- ^ Robinson 2021, p. 6-7.
- ^ Young & Turner 1985, p. 69.
- ^ Jean-Jacques WONDO OMANYUNDU, DE LA FORCE PUBLIQUE AUX FARDC : ANATOMIE D'UNE ARMEE VIRTUELLE INTRAVERTIE ET PERVERTIE IIIème PARTIE, pp. 3–4.
- ^ Michael Schatzberg, The Dialetics of Oppression in Zaire, Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 108.
- ^ Kisukula Abeli Meitho, 'De Mobutu a Kabila,' 2001, 26.
- ^ Meredith, Martin (2005). The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair, a History of Fifty Years of Independence. p. 316.
- ^ Edward George (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Routledge. p. 89. ISBN 0-415-35015-8. Archived from the original on 10 May 2012. Retrieved 11 May 2008.
- ^ "CIA man Roberto: Burying the Last of Angola's 'Big Men'", 9 August 2007. Santiago Indy Media.
- ^ Meditz & Merrill 1993, p. 292–3.
- ^ John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, pp. 822–823.
- ^ Robinson 2021, p=11; IISS Military Balance 1975–76, p. 45.
- ^ John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, p. 823.
- ^ Ordonnance no.79-010 du 18 janvier 1979 portant nomination d'un Commandant de la premiere region militaire, Official Journal of Zaire, No. 3, 1 February 1979.
- ^ See Ordonnance-loi No. 84-036 du 28 Aout 1984 portant creation et organisation de la Garde Civile du Zaire, Agence Zaire Presse, 29 August 1984. See also Meitho 2001, 44–49.
- ^ Thomas Turner, Chapter 14: Flying High Above the Toads: Mobutu and Stalemated Democracy, in John F. Clark, David E. Gardinier, Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1997, 248, citing Diocese of Idiofa, "Le soulèvement dit Kasongo", La vie diocésaine d'Idiofa, no. 2 ( 1978):7; "Les massacres de Katekalayi et de Luamela (Kasai Oriental)", Politique africaine 2, no. 6 (1982):72–106; V. Digekisa Piluka, Le massacre de Lubumbashi: Zaïre 11–12 mai 1990: Dossier d'un témoin-accusé (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993.
- ^ Central Intelligence Agency, 'Zaire: The Military Under Mobutu (Deleted) Archived 24 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine', document created 1 November 1988, accessible via Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/ Archived 27 May 2010 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 4 June 2010
- ^ Jean-Pierre Chastenet (April 2008). "La 31e Brigade Parachutiste Zaïroise". Bulletin de liaison des Parachutistes Coloniaux et d'Infanterie de Marine (in French) (28): 31–36.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. p. 289.
- ^ Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, Zaire/DR Congo since 1980 Archived 30 July 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 2 September 2003, Air Combat Information Group. Retrieved August 2007.
- ^ Ebenga & N'Landu 2005, pp. 66–70,73–74.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289. A good military description of the 1996–97 war was written by William Thom: (1999) Congo-Zaire's 1996–97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence Archived 21 August 2006 at the Wayback Machine, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XIX No. 2, Fall 1999.
- ^ Prunier (2004), pp. 376–377.
- ^ Prunier interview with a French diplomat, Paris, January 2000. Prunier 2009 p.424
- ^ Prunier 2009, p. 199,424.
- ^ Prunier 2009, p. 150.
- ^ Colette Braeckman interview with Kabila in Le Soir, 31 October – 2 November 1997, at Prunier p. 150.
- ^ a b Prunier 2009, p. 176.
- ^ Prunier says 'on the causes of the mutiny, see Memorandum de la Communaute Banyamulenge a Son Excellence le President de la Republique Democratique du Congo, eut egard a la situation securitaire qui prevaut au Sud Kivu, Bukavu, 24 February 1998. Prunier 2009 footnote p. 416.
- ^ Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms Archived 26 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Vol. 11, No. 1 (A), February 1999. Jane's Defence Weekly, repeating a defence ministry announcement, reported it was conducting 'special security patrols' in Kinshasa as of 24 June 1998.
- ^ Herbert Weiss, War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi, 1998–1999, Nordic Africa Institute, 2000, p. 13. See web reference at [1] Archived 28 September 2008 at the Wayback Machine. See also OCHA/IRIN Archived 29 June 2010 at the Wayback Machine 20 August 1998
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002, p. 284.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. pp. 284–285.
- ^ "IRIN-CEA Update No. 737 for 17 August (19990817)". IRIN. 17 August 1999. Archived from the original on 27 June 2010. Retrieved 17 November 2009.
- ^ a b Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002, p. 289.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002, pp. 286–287.
- ^ See the copy at [2] Archived 9 November 2011 at the Wayback Machine. See also Caty Clement, "SSR in the DRC: Forward to the Past", in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), SSR in Challenging Environments, GC DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2009, 92.
- ^ "New military command for DR Congo". BBC News. 20 August 2003. Archived from the original on 11 October 2014. Retrieved 17 November 2009. Original decrees were Decrees no.17/2003 and 18/2003 of 19 August 2003.
- ^ Thomas Turner (2007). The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality. London and New York: Zed Books. pp. 96–101. ISBN 978-1-842776896.
- ^ Tutsi; military training in Rwanda; became RCD-Goma commander of North Kivu Military Region; named Brigadier General in FARDC 20 December 2003 and appointed commander of 8 MR North Kivu; moved to command 5 MR Kasai Oriental after DEcember 2004 events. Omosombo, Biographies des acteurs de la Transition, CEP-Africa Museum-CERDAC, 2006, 224.
- ^ Turner 2007, p. 131–132.
- ^ U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, 07KINSHASA655 Kabila Replaces Kisempia As Chief of Congolese Defense Forces, 13 June 2007 (UNCLAS/FOUO). See also 07KINSHASA534, Congolese Military Replaces Commander in North Kivu, 16 May 2007.
- ^ U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, 07KINSHASA671 Major Reshuffle of Military and Police Leadership, Friday 15 June 2007 (UNCLAS/FOUO).
- ^ Integrated Regional Information Networks (January 2008). "DR Congo Rising food prices". Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. 44 (11): 17623C–17624A.
- ^ Hochschild, Adam (13 August 2009). "Rape of the Congo". New York Review of Books Volume 56, Number 13. Archived from the original on 27 July 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2009.
- ^ "You Will Be Punished". Human Rights Watch. 13 December 2009. Archived from the original on 19 December 2009. Retrieved 14 December 2009.
- ^ Caty Clement, "EUSEC RD Congo", in Esra Bulut & Giovanni Grevi, European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 247.
- ^ "Russia gets involved in reform of the Congolese Armed Forces" Archived 2 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine, January 2010. Congo Planet.
- ^ "RDC : le président Kabila suspend le général major Amisi, le chef des forces terrestres" (in French). Radio Okapi. 22 November 2012. Archived from the original on 27 November 2012. Retrieved 22 November 2012.
- ^ Gettleman, Jeffrey (15 December 2012). "The World's Worst War". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 25 December 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2012.
- ^ "Hollande discusses Central Africa troop presence with DRC's Kabila in Paris" Archived 22 May 2014 at the Wayback Machine, RFI, 21 May 2014.
- ^ "Military Offensive Frees DRC Villages" Archived 6 August 2014 at the Wayback Machine, Voice of America, 28 July 2014.
- ^ Radio Okapi (7 October 2017). "Les Fardc lavées des accusations et rayées de la liste noire des Nations Unies". Digital Congo (in French). Kinshasa. Archived from the original on 8 October 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
- ^ McGuinness, Alan (8 December 2017). "Fourteen UN peacekeepers killed in Democratic Republic of Congo attack". Sky News website Archived 8 December 2017 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 9 December 2017.
- ^ The inaccurate assessment was located at Jane's Sentinel security assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002, p. 314. The Group of Experts has reported in 2011 about the ammunition plant; see footnote 1.
- ^ "CICR Bulletin, No. 1, 2010" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2010. This command was formed in accordance with Decret 106/2002 portant création d’un groupement des écoles supérieures militaires des Forces armées congolaises. (Présidence de la République) and is a reformation of a grouping with the same name that was active in the 1980s and potentially before. Claude Lambert, "L'Ecole de Formation d'Officiers 1969–1990", Militaria Belge 2007–08, Societe Royale des Amies du Musee de l'Armée, Brussels, 2008, pp. 267 onwards. For a brief biography of Lukama, seemingly under an alternate name, 'Max Musikani Lukama', see Jean Omasombo, RDC: Biography des acteurs de troiseme republique, Royal Museum of Central Africa, 2009, 152–153.
- ^ See for example CNDP, "Ban Ki-moon letter (English)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 July 2011. Retrieved 18 December 2009.
- ^ Baoudin Amba Wetshi, "Un bouc emissaire nomme Luba Ntambo" Archived 1 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, 19 September 2012.
- ^ Miami News, 18 June 1966, and Sydney Taylor (ed), The New Africans: A Guide to the Contemporary History of Emergent Africa and its Leaders, London: Paul Hamlyn/Reuters, 1967, pp. 95, 102.
- ^ Source is the Institute for Security Studies, at Democratic Republic of Congo Security Information (updated: 12 January 2005) Archived 26 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Still in post January 2006. Le Potential (Kinshasa), "Le chef d’état-major de la Force terrestre en visite éclair au centre de brassage de Rumangabo" Archived 30 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 7 January 2006.
- ^ Sud-Kivu : le nouveau commandant des forces terrestres appelle les FARDC à la discipline Archived 30 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine. Radio Okapi (26 November 2012).
- ^ Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2009/335), 30 June 2009, paragraph 3. For Bahigwa, see Omosombo, 2009, 25.
- ^ Omasombo, 2009, 41.
- ^ A Tutsi from South Kivu. Trained at the Ecole de formation d'officiers, Kananaga, and a major in the FAZ. Took part in the airborne arrival of troops at Kitona in August 1998. Moved from RCD to MLC, succeeded General Alengbia as commander of the Dongo brigade (Equateur). Sent by J.P. Bemba to the Central African Republic in 2002. Named commander of 1st Military Region in August 2003 and confirmed in the post in October 2006. Became base commander at Kitona June 2007. Omosombo, 2009, 200.
- ^ "Legal Submission from Human Rights Watch to Dr. Adolphe Onusumba, Minister of Defence, 21 July 2006" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 March 2016. Retrieved 8 June 2009 – via HRW "Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone".
- ^ "Rwanda: War Rages in DRC as Government Forces Seek FDLR Support". The New Times (Kigali). 21 September 2008. Archived from the original on 6 October 2012. Retrieved 9 November 2008.CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
- ^ As of ICG, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No. 128, 5 July 2007, pp. 13–14.
- ^ Reshuffle in the Congolese army – cui bono? Archived 5 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine. Suluhu.org. Published 28 September 2014. Retrieved 4 March 2018.
- ^ Reshaping the army Archived 15 December 2017 at the Wayback Machine. Africa Confidential, vol. 55. Published 26 September 2014. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
- ^ Joseph Kabila meets with security council Archived 2 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine Digital Congo. Published 5 November 2014. Retrieved 29 March 2015.
- ^ Commanders of defense zones and military zones as of September 2014 Archived 10 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ "List of general officers appointed to the heads of military units" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 January 2015. Retrieved 4 March 2018.
- ^ Général Etumba reconduit chef d’Etat major général Archived 5 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine. MediaCongo.net. Published 20 September 2014. Retrieved 4 March 2018.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Fardc: Joseph Kabila names Lieutenant-General Celestin Mbala Munsense General Staff Archived 20 August 2018 at the Wayback Machine. Digitalcongo.net. Published 16 July 2018. Retrieved 21 April 2019.
- ^ General Célestin Mbala renewed Chief of Staff of the FARDC. Digitalcongo.net, 22 May 2019
- ^ See Robinson 2012.
- ^ Garrett, Nicholas; Sergiou, Sylvia; Koen Vlassenroot (2008). "Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo". Journal of Eastern African Studies. Taylor and Francis. 3 (1): 9. doi:10.1080/17531050802682671. ISSN 1753-1063. S2CID 154957722.
- ^ International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report No. 104, 13 February 2006, 17–18.
- ^ "Report on the DRC SSR Roundtable talks: Kinshasa, 25–26 February 2008". SSR Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo. Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. 2008. Archived from the original on 30 July 2013. Retrieved 1 November 2008.
- ^ Henri Boshoff, The DDR Process in the DRC: A Never-ending Story, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 July 2007.
- ^ International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p. 13.
- ^ Amnesty International, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007". 25 January 2007. Archived from the original on 21 August 2007. Retrieved 13 July 2007.
- ^ Autesserre, Séverine (2008). "The Trouble With Congo". Foreign Affairs. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 87 (3): 104–105.
- ^ "FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC ::: 20/03/2006". Monuc.org. Archived from the original on 13 October 2007. Retrieved 29 September 2008.
- ^ "Only just staying in one piece". The Economist. 28 July 2007. p. 42. Retrieved 4 August 2007.
- ^ Hans Romkena De Vennhoop, Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC Archived 1 January 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Multi Country Demobilization and Recovery Program, April 2007, p. 32.
- ^ See Africa Confidential, "A multinational road to army reform", 24 July 2009, p. 9, and Reuters, "Factbox: International efforts at military reform in Congo", 23 December 2009.
- ^ Dalrymple, Nicole. "U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion". U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs. Archived from the original on 26 February 2011. Retrieved 3 August 2010. and Protection Strategies Incorporated What's New Archived 30 July 2010 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 3 August 2010. For Kabila request to Bush, see "Transcript". Archived from the original on 18 March 2012. Retrieved 3 September 2011.
- ^ Nichols, Michelle (8 May 2013). "Girls as young as six raped by Congolese soldiers in Minova – U.N." Reuters. Retrieved 10 October 2020.
- ^ Orbat.com's Concise World Armies 2005
- ^ IISS Military Balance 2014, p.432.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002, p. 291.
- ^ AFP: Ukraine to supply tanks, other weapons to DR.Congo Archived 26 February 2014 at the Wayback Machine. Google.com (16 March 2010). Retrieved 4 September 2013.
- ^ Ukraine to supply a total of 50 T-64BV1 main battle tanks to Democratic Republic of Congo Archived 3 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine – Armyrecognition.com, 13 February 2014.
- ^ "პირველად საქართველოს ისტორიაში ქართული ჯავშანტექნიკა საზღვარგარეთ გაიყიდა" [For the first time in the history of Georgia, Georgian armored vehicles were sold abroad]. 23 June 2015. Archived from the original on 5 July 2015. Retrieved 5 July 2015.
- ^ "Грузия поставила в Конго новые бронированные машины "Didgori"" [Georgia delivers new Didgori armoured vehicles to Congo]. 25 June 2015. Archived from the original on 1 July 2015. Retrieved 5 July 2015.
- ^ a b c Amnesty International, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army Archived 4 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007.
- ^ ICG February 2006 SSR report.
- ^ "La Garde Républicaine : une épée de Damoclès sur l'alternance démocratique en RDC – JJ Wondo –". RADIO AFRIKANA (in French). 16 December 2016. Archived from the original on 24 October 2017. Retrieved 24 October 2017.
- ^ "MONUSCO Facts and Figures – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". un.org. Archived from the original on 30 June 2017. Retrieved 10 October 2020.
- ^ "EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The Council of the European Union. Archived from the original on 19 August 2007. Retrieved 12 August 2007.
- ^ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, website.
- ^ MONUSCO, Over 1800 FDLR armed rebels surrender to MONUSCO in 2010 Archived 31 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine, 3 February 2011.
- ^ Ebenga & N'Landu 2005.
- ^ Young & Turner 1985, pp. 359–360.
- ^ Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25, 2007. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. pp. 134–135.
- ^ Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. 2007. p. 135.
- ^ L'Express, 22. December 2008, p. 13.
- ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group.
- ^ Saunders, Stephen (editor) (2007–2008). Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. p. 163.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
- ^ DanChurch Aid, Destruction of stockpiles in Kalemie Archived 29 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 2 May 2006.
- ^ Hilaire Kayembe, "Naufrage dans une rivière à Mbandaka" Archived 30 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Le Potential, 7 August 2006.
- ^ Human Rights Division / MONUC, Monthly Human Rights Assessment: April 2007 Archived 13 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine, 17 May 2007. The HR report stated a Goma student was shot by a soldier of the 5th Naval Region for refusing to hand over a cellphone.
- ^ Saunders, Stephen (editor). Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007–2008. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. p. 163.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
Bibliografía
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Otras lecturas
- Baaz, Maria E. and Stern, Maria (2013), "Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives: Negotiating Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)", Armed Forces & Society, 39, no. 4.
- Charlier, Thierry, "Défilé militaire à Kinshasa", in Raids magazine, no. 294, November 2010, pp. 46–47 ( ISSN 0769-4814)
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- Human Rights Watch, 'Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone: Sexual violence and military reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,' 16 July 2009
- Lefever, Ernest W. Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
- Lemarchand, René,The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 226–228. Concise general description of the FAZ in the 1990s.
- Lemarchand, René, "Forecasting the Future of the Military in Former Belgian Africa," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., Political Military Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, California: 1974), pp. 87–104
- Malan, Mark, 'U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement,' Refugees International, 2008
- McDonald, Gordon C. et al., Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa), Washington. Supt. of Docs., U.S. Government Print. Off. 1971. DA Pam 550–67.
- Meitho, Kisukula Abeli, 'La desintegration de l'armée congolaise de Mobutu a Kabila', L'Harmattan, Paris/Montreal, 2001, ISBN 2-7384-8693-2
- Meitho, Kisukula Abeli "Les armées du Congo-Zaire, un frein au developpement"
- Mockler, Anthony, The New Mercenaries, Corgi Books, 1985, ISBN 0-552-12558-X – covers mercenary units titularly part of the Armée National Congolaise in the 1960s
- Rouvez, Alain; Coco, Michael; Paddack, Jean-Paul (1994). Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. pp. 310–313. OCLC 624665994.
- Spittaels, Steven and Hilgert, Filip, Mapping Conflict Motives in the Eastern DRC, IPIS, Antwerp, 4 March 2008
- Tshiyembe, Mwayila, 'Le défi de l'armée républicaine en République Démocratique du Congo,' Editions L'Harmattan, 2005
- Turner, John W. A Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1998, ISBN 1-85409-128-X, further details of FAZ operations in the 1980s and onwards can be found in pages 221–225
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enlaces externos
- Thom, William G. (September 1999). "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence". Journal of Conflict Studies. 19 (2). ISSN 1715-5673.
- Loi Organique FARDC 2013
- German Foreign Ministry. "Pooling assistance for the Congo". Archived from the original on 20 February 2009. Retrieved 17 October 2020.