La reforma económica china o reforma y apertura ; conocido en Occidente como la Apertura de China es el programa de reformas económicas denominado " Socialismo con características chinas " y " economía de mercado socialista " en la República Popular China (PRC). Lideradas por el líder supremo Deng Xiaoping , a menudo acreditado como el "Arquitecto General", las reformas fueron lanzadas por reformistas dentro del Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) el 18 de diciembre de 1978 durante el período " Boluan Fanzheng ". [1] [2] [3] [4]Las reformas se estancaron después de las protestas de la Plaza de Tiananmen de 1989 , pero revivieron después de la gira por el sur de Deng Xiaoping en 1992. En 2010, China superó a Japón como la segunda economía más grande del mundo . [5] [6]
Reforma económica china | |||||||
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Chino simplificado | 改革 开放 | ||||||
Chino tradicional | 改革 開放 | ||||||
Significado literal | la reforma y apertura | ||||||
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Antes de las reformas, la economía china estaba dominada por la propiedad estatal y la planificación central. De 1950 a 1973, el PIB real per cápita chino creció a una tasa de 2,9% anual en promedio, [ cita requerida ] aunque con grandes fluctuaciones derivadas del Gran Salto Adelante y la Revolución Cultural . Esto lo colocó cerca del centro de las naciones asiáticas durante el mismo período, [7] con países capitalistas vecinos como Japón , Corea del Sur y la República de China de su rival Chiang Kai-shek , superando la tasa de crecimiento de la República Popular China. [8] A partir de 1970, la economía entró en un período de estancamiento, [9] y después de la muerte del presidente del PCCh, Mao Zedong , la dirección del Partido Comunista recurrió a reformas orientadas al mercado para salvar la economía en crisis. [10]
Las autoridades del Partido Comunista llevaron a cabo las reformas del mercado en dos etapas. La primera etapa, a fines de la década de 1970 y principios de la de 1980, implicó la descolectivización de la agricultura , la apertura del país a la inversión extranjera y el permiso para que los empresarios iniciaran negocios . Sin embargo, un gran porcentaje de industrias siguió siendo de propiedad estatal. La segunda etapa de la reforma, a fines de los años ochenta y noventa, implicó la privatización y la subcontratación de gran parte de la industria estatal. El levantamiento de los controles de precios en 1985 [11] fue una reforma importante, y pronto siguió el levantamiento de las políticas y regulaciones proteccionistas , aunque persistieron los monopolios estatales en sectores como la banca y el petróleo . En 2001, China se incorporó a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC). El sector privado creció notablemente, representando hasta el 70 por ciento del producto interno bruto de China en 2005. [12] Desde 1978 hasta 2013, se produjo un crecimiento sin precedentes, con un crecimiento de la economía del 9,5 por ciento anual. El conservador Hu Jintao 's administración regulada y controlada la economía en mayor medida después de 2005, revirtiendo algunas reformas. [13] Por otro lado, Deng lanzó un conjunto paralelo de reformas políticas en 1980, pero finalmente terminó en 1989 debido a las protestas de la Plaza de Tiananmen .
El éxito de las políticas económicas de China y la forma de su implementación dieron como resultado cambios inmensos en la sociedad china en los últimos 40 años, incluida una reducción considerable de la pobreza, mientras que tanto los ingresos medios como la desigualdad de ingresos han aumentado, lo que ha provocado una reacción violenta liderada por la Nueva Izquierda . En la escena académica, los académicos han debatido la razón del éxito de la economía china de "doble vía" y la han comparado con los intentos de reformar el socialismo en el Bloque del Este y la Unión Soviética ; así como al crecimiento de otras economías en desarrollo. Además, esta serie de reformas ha llevado al ascenso de China como potencia mundial y un cambio de intereses geopolíticos internacionales a favor de ella sobre Taiwán . Sin embargo, la corrupción , la burbuja inmobiliaria , la contaminación y la crisis demográfica se encuentran entre los problemas de desarrollo más graves. [14] [15] Además, la manipulación de los datos económicos por parte del gobierno chino, como informar cifras del PIB infladas y otras cifras falsas, también es una preocupación importante. [16] [17] [18]
Se ha dicho que la era de la reforma terminó durante el liderazgo del actual secretario general del PCCh, Xi Jinping , [19] [20] [21] quien generalmente se opone a las reformas y ha hecho retroceder muchas de las reformas de la era Deng [22] [23] [24] ya que el Partido Comunista reafirma el control sobre diferentes aspectos de la sociedad china, incluida la economía. [25] [26] En 2018, el sinólogo Minxin Pei argumentó que la economía china es actualmente la menos abierta desde que comenzó la era de reformas en la década de 1980. [27] Esta des-liberalización es vista por un comentarista de Hong Kong como parte del tema de la actual guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China , [26] en la que Estados Unidos alega que el gobierno chino está otorgando ventajas competitivas injustas y discriminatorias al estado chino. -empresas propias y privadas. [28] [29]
Curso de reformas
Origen
En septiembre de 1976, murió Mao Zedong , y en octubre, Hua Guofeng junto con Ye Jianying y Wang Dongxing arrestaron a la Banda de los Cuatro , poniendo fin a la Revolución Cultural .
Las reformas económicas comenzaron durante el período " Boluan Fanzheng ", especialmente después de que Deng Xiaoping y sus aliados reformistas subieron al poder con Deng reemplazando a Hua Guofeng como el líder supremo de China en diciembre de 1978. Cuando Deng asumió el poder, había un amplio apoyo entre los élite para las reformas económicas. Como líder de facto , las políticas de Deng enfrentaron la oposición de los conservadores del partido, pero tuvieron un gran éxito en aumentar la riqueza del país.
1979-1984
En 1979, Deng Xiaoping enfatizó el objetivo de las " Cuatro Modernizaciones " y propuso además la idea de " xiaokang ", o " sociedad moderadamente próspera ". [30] [31] [32] Los logros de Lee Kuan Yew para crear una superpotencia económica en Singapur tuvieron un profundo efecto en el liderazgo comunista en China. Los líderes de China hicieron un gran esfuerzo, especialmente bajo Deng Xiaoping, para emular sus políticas de crecimiento económico, espíritu empresarial y sutil supresión de la disidencia. A lo largo de los años, más de 22.000 funcionarios chinos fueron enviados a Singapur para estudiar sus métodos. [33]
Las primeras reformas de Deng comenzaron en la agricultura , un sector mal administrado durante mucho tiempo por el Partido Comunista Chino. A fines de la década de 1970, los suministros y la producción de alimentos se habían vuelto tan deficientes que los funcionarios del gobierno advirtieron que China estaba a punto de repetir el " desastre de 1959 ", las hambrunas que mataron a decenas de millones durante el Gran Salto Adelante . [34] Deng respondió descolectivizando la agricultura y haciendo hincapié en el sistema de responsabilidad familiar , que dividía la tierra de las comunas populares en parcelas privadas. Con la nueva política, los campesinos pudieron ejercer un control formal de sus tierras siempre que vendieran una parte contratada de sus cultivos al gobierno. [35] Esta medida aumentó la producción agrícola en un 25 por ciento entre 1975 y 1985, sentando un precedente para la privatización de otras partes de la economía. [35] El enfoque de abajo hacia arriba de las reformas promovidas por Deng, en contraste con el enfoque de arriba hacia abajo de la Perestroika en la Unión Soviética, se considera un factor importante que contribuye al éxito de la transición económica de China. [36]
También se implementaron reformas en la industria urbana para aumentar la productividad. Se introdujo un sistema de precio dual, en el que (reforma de las empresas estatales de 1979) se permitió a las industrias estatales vender cualquier producción por encima de la cuota del plan, y los productos básicos se vendieron a precios de mercado y del plan, lo que permitió a los ciudadanos evitar la escasez. de la era maoísta. Además, la adopción del Sistema de Responsabilidad Industrial en la década de 1980 promueve aún más el desarrollo de empresas de propiedad estatal al permitir que individuos o grupos administren la empresa por contrato. A las empresas privadas se les permitió operar por primera vez desde la toma de poder comunista, y gradualmente comenzaron a representar un mayor porcentaje de la producción industrial. [37] También se incrementó la flexibilidad de precios, expandiendo el sector de servicios. [38]
Al mismo tiempo, en diciembre de 1978, Deng anunció una nueva política, la Política de Puertas Abiertas , para abrir la puerta a empresas extranjeras que quisieran establecerse en China. [39] [40] Por primera vez desde la era del Kuomintang , el país se abrió a la inversión extranjera . Deng creó una serie de Zonas Económicas Especiales , incluidas Shenzhen , Zhuhai y Xiamen , para la inversión extranjera que estaban relativamente libres de las regulaciones e intervenciones burocráticas que obstaculizaban el crecimiento económico. Estas regiones se convirtieron en motores de crecimiento de la economía nacional. [38] El 31 de enero de 1979, se fundó la Zona Industrial Shekou de Shenzhen, convirtiéndose en la primera área experimental en China en "abrirse". [41] [42] Bajo el liderazgo de Yuan Geng , el "modelo Shekou" de desarrollo se formó gradualmente, encarnado en su famoso lema El tiempo es dinero, la eficiencia es vida , que luego se extendió ampliamente a otras partes de China. [41] [43] En enero de 1984, Deng Xiaoping realizó su primera gira de inspección a Shenzhen y Zhuhai, elogiando la " Velocidad de Shenzhen " del desarrollo, así como el éxito de las zonas económicas especiales. [44] [45]
Además del propio Deng Xiaoping, importantes reformistas de alto rango que ayudaron a llevar a cabo las reformas incluyen a Hu Yaobang , entonces secretario general del Partido Comunista Chino , y Zhao Ziyang , entonces primer ministro de la República Popular China . [46] [47] Otros líderes que favorecieron las reformas de Deng incluyen a Xi Zhongxun (el padre de Xi Jinping ), Wan Li , Hu Qili y otros. [48] [49] [50] Otro líder influyente fue Chen Yun , considerado por algunos como la segunda persona más poderosa de China después de Deng con una ideología más conservadora de las reformas. [51] [52] [53] Aunque a Deng Xiaoping se le atribuye el mérito de ser el arquitecto de las reformas económicas modernas de China, Chen participó más directamente en los detalles de su planificación y construcción, y lideró una fuerza que se opuso a muchas de las reformas del lado de Deng. . [52] [54] Las dos partes lucharon por la dirección general de las reformas hasta que Chen murió en 1995. [52] [53] [54] Una característica clave de las ideas de Chen fue utilizar el mercado para asignar recursos, dentro del alcance de un plan general. Algunas reformas de principios de la década de 1980 fueron, en efecto, la implementación de un programa que Chen había esbozado a mediados de la década de 1950. Chen llamó a esto la "economía de jaula de pájaros (鸟笼 经济 / 鳥籠 經濟)". [55] [56] Según Chen, "la jaula es el plan, y puede ser grande o pequeña. Pero dentro de la jaula el pájaro [la economía] es libre de volar como quiera". [52] [56] Chen y algunos otros líderes conservadores, incluido Li Xiannian, nunca visitaron Shenzhen , la principal zona económica especial defendida por Deng. [56]
1984-1993
Durante este período, las políticas de Deng Xiaoping continuaron más allá de las reformas iniciales. Los controles sobre las empresas privadas y la intervención gubernamental siguieron disminuyendo, sobre todo en el sector agroalimentario, que experimentó una relajación de los controles de precios en 1985, [11] y se produjo una privatización en pequeña escala de empresas estatales que se había vuelto inviable. Un acontecimiento notable fue la descentralización del control estatal, que dejó a los líderes provinciales locales para experimentar formas de aumentar el crecimiento económico y privatizar el sector estatal. [59] Las empresas de municipios y aldeas , empresas de propiedad nominal de los gobiernos locales pero en la práctica privadas, comenzaron a ganar cuota de mercado a expensas del sector estatal. [60] Con la ayuda de Yuan Geng , el primer banco comercial por acciones en China, el Banco de Comerciantes de China y la primera compañía de seguros por acciones en China, Ping An Insurance , se establecieron en Shekou . En mayo de 1984, catorce ciudades costeras de China, incluidas Shanghai , Guangzhou y Tianjin, fueron denominadas " Ciudades costeras abiertas (沿海 开放 城市)". [ cita requerida ]
Por otro lado, los ancianos conservadores liderados por Chen Yun pidieron lograr un equilibrio entre una economía de mercado demasiado laissez-faire y retener el control estatal sobre áreas clave de la economía. Chen Yun ayudó a preservar la economía al evitar políticas que hubieran dañado los intereses de grupos de intereses especiales en la burocracia gubernamental. [61] La corrupción y el aumento de la inflación aumentaron el descontento, contribuyendo a las protestas de la Plaza Tiananmen de 1989 y una reacción conservadora después de ese evento que derrocó a varios reformadores clave y amenazó con revertir muchas de las reformas de Deng. [62] Sin embargo, Deng mantuvo sus reformas y en 1992, afirmó la necesidad de continuar las reformas en su gira por el sur . [61] También reabrió la Bolsa de Valores de Shanghai en noviembre de 1990, que fue cerrada por Mao 40 años antes, mientras que la Bolsa de Valores de Shenzhen se fundó en diciembre de 1990. [ cita requerida ]
Aunque la economía creció rápidamente durante este período, aumentaron los problemas económicos en el ineficiente sector estatal . Las grandes pérdidas tuvieron que compensarse con los ingresos estatales y actuaron como un drenaje para la economía. [63] La inflación se volvió problemática en 1985, 1988 y 1992. [62] Las privatizaciones comenzaron a acelerarse después de 1992, y el sector privado creció como porcentaje del PIB. El gobierno de China expandió lentamente el reconocimiento de la economía privada, primero como un "complemento" del sector estatal (1988) y luego como un "componente importante" (1999) de la economía socialista de mercado . [64]
1993-2005
En la década de 1990, Deng permitió que se llevaran a cabo muchas reformas radicales. Al principio, Chen apoyó a Deng, llevó a cabo e implementó muchas de las reformas influyentes que enriquecieron a una generación de chinos. Pero más tarde, Chen se dio cuenta de que el estado aún necesitaba una participación activa en el mercado para evitar que el sector privado se volviera indomable. La crítica de Chen a las reformas económicas posteriores de Deng fue muy influyente dentro del Partido Comunista y se reflejó en las políticas de los líderes de China después de Deng. Las teorías de Chen respaldaron los esfuerzos de Jiang Zemin y Hu Jintao por usar el poder estatal para establecer límites para el funcionamiento del mercado y mediar en el daño que el capitalismo puede hacer a quienes tienen dificultades para beneficiarse del libre mercado. La noción de Chen del PCCh como "partido gobernante" fue fundamental para la redefinición del papel del Partido en las Tres Representaciones de Jiang Zemin . En 2005, con motivo del centenario del nacimiento de Chen, la prensa del Partido publicó, a lo largo de varias semanas, las actas de un simposio en el que se discutían las contribuciones de Chen a la historia, la teoría y la práctica del PCCh. [61]
Aunque Deng murió en 1997, las reformas continuaron bajo sus sucesores elegidos cuidadosamente, Jiang Zemin y Zhu Rongji , quienes fueron ardientes reformadores que también siguieron el consejo de Chen Yun de mantener firmes las reformas y mantener al estado a cargo de áreas clave. En 1997 y 1998 se produjo una privatización a gran escala , en la que todas las empresas estatales, excepto algunos grandes monopolios, fueron liquidadas y sus activos vendidos a inversores privados. Entre 2001 y 2004, el número de empresas estatales disminuyó en un 48 por ciento. [60] Durante el mismo período, Jiang y Zhu también redujeron aranceles , barreras comerciales y regulaciones ; reformó el sistema bancario; desmanteló gran parte del sistema de bienestar social de la era Mao; obligó al ejército chino (EPL) a desprenderse de las empresas militares; [65] reducción de la inflación; y se unió a la Organización Mundial del Comercio . Estos movimientos provocaron el descontento entre algunos grupos, especialmente los trabajadores despedidos de empresas estatales que habían sido privatizadas. [66]
El sector privado nacional superó por primera vez el 50% del PIB en 2005 y se ha expandido aún más desde entonces. También en 2005, China pudo superar a Japón como la economía más grande de Asia. [67] Sin embargo, aún permanecían algunos monopolios estatales, como el del petróleo y la banca. [68]
2005-2012
Hu Jintao y su administración conservadora comenzaron a revertir algunas de las reformas de Deng Xiaoping en 2005. Los observadores señalan que el gobierno adoptó políticas más igualitarias y populistas. [69] Aumentó los subsidios y el control sobre el sector de la salud, [70] detuvo la privatización, [13] y adoptó una política monetaria laxa, que condujo a la formación de una burbuja inmobiliaria al estilo estadounidense en la que los precios inmobiliarios se triplicaron. [71] El sector estatal privilegiado fue el principal receptor de la inversión gubernamental, que bajo la nueva administración promovió el surgimiento de grandes "campeones nacionales" que podían competir con las grandes corporaciones extranjeras. [13] China finalmente superaría a la economía de Japón en 2010. [72]
2012-presente
Bajo el secretario general del Partido, Xi Jinping, y su administración , el PCCh ha buscado numerosas reformas. Algunas de ellas tenían un mayor control sobre las empresas estatales y privadas, al menos 288 empresas han revisado sus estatutos corporativos para permitir al Partido Comunista una mayor influencia en la gestión empresarial y reflejar la línea del partido. [22] Esta tendencia también incluye a las empresas que cotizan en Hong Kong , que tradicionalmente han minimizado sus vínculos con los partidos, pero ahora están "redactando nuevos estatutos para establecer formalmente comités de partidos que antes existían sólo a nivel de grupo". [73] En otras dimensiones, según Ray Dalio , la era Xi también ha estado marcada por la apertura económica, una mayor toma de decisiones orientada al mercado y la interrupción del apoyo a las empresas estatales mal administradas. [74]
El 21 de julio de 2020, el secretario general del Partido Comunista de China, Xi Jinping, pronunció un discurso ante un grupo de líderes empresariales públicos y privados en el foro de empresarios en Beijing. Xi enfatizó que "debemos formar gradualmente un nuevo patrón de desarrollo con la circulación interna doméstica como el cuerpo principal y las circulaciones duales nacionales e internacionales promoviéndose mutuamente". [75] [se necesita una mejor fuente ] Desde entonces, "circulación interna" se convirtió en una palabra de moda en China. A algunos chinos les preocupa que el énfasis de la “circulación interna” indique el regreso al aislamiento de la década de 1960 y el fin de la reforma económica china. [ cita requerida ]
En septiembre de 2020, el PCCh anunció que fortalecería el trabajo del Frente Unido en el sector privado mediante el establecimiento de más comités de partido en las federaciones regionales de industria y comercio (FIC) y organizando un enlace especial entre la FIC y el PCCh. [76]
La era de Xi Jinping tenía objetivos económicos considerablemente diferentes, en línea con dos campañas, Made in China 2025 y China Standards 2035, que buscaban escalar y desplazar el dominio de Estados Unidos en varios sectores de alta tecnología. [74] Esto se suma a una búsqueda más agresiva de políticas comerciales, en línea con una perspectiva que ve a China avanzar hacia un papel más activo en la redacción de las reglas del comercio.
Efectos de las reformas
Economic performance
After three decades of reform, China's economy experienced one of the world's biggest booms. Agriculture and light industry have largely been privatized, while the state still retains control over some heavy industries. Despite the dominance of state ownership in finance, telecommunications, petroleum and other important sectors of the economy, private entrepreneurs continue to expand into sectors formerly reserved for public enterprise. Prices have also been liberalized.[77]
China's economic growth since the reform has been very rapid, exceeding the East Asian Tigers. Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China's GDP has risen tenfold.[78] The increase in total factor productivity (TFP) was the most important factor, with productivity accounting for 40.1% of the GDP increase, compared with a decline of 13.2% for the period 1957 to 1978—the height of Maoist policies. For the period 1978–2005, Chinese GDP per capita increased from 2.7% to 15.7% of U.S. GDP per capita, and from 53.7% to 188.5% of Indian GDP per capita. Per capita incomes grew at 6.6% a year.[79] Average wages rose sixfold between 1978 and 2005,[80] while absolute poverty declined from 41% of the population to 5% from 1978 to 2001.[81] Some scholars believed that China's economic growth has been understated, due to large sectors of the economy not being counted.[82]
Impact on world growth
China is widely seen as an engine of world and regional growth.[83] Surges in Chinese demand account for 50, 44 and 66 percent of export growth of the Hong Kong SAR of China, Japan and Taiwan respectively, and China's trade deficit with the rest of East Asia helped to revive the economies of Japan and Southeast Asia.[83] Asian leaders view China's economic growth as an "engine of growth for all Asia".[84]
Effect on inequality
The economic reforms have increased inequality dramatically within China. Despite rapid economic growth which has virtually eliminated poverty in urban China and reduced it greatly in rural regions and the fact that living standards for everyone in China have drastically increased in comparison to the pre-reform era, the Gini coefficient of China is estimated to be above 0.45, comparable to some Latin American countries and the United States.[85]
Increased inequality is attributed to the disappearance of the welfare state and differences between coastal and interior provinces, the latter being burdened by a larger state sector.[86] Some Western scholars have suggested that reviving the welfare state and instituting a re-distributive income tax system is needed to relieve inequality,[87] while some Chinese economists have suggested that privatizing state monopolies and distributing the proceeds to the population can reduce inequality.[88]
Reformas en sectores específicos
Agriculture
During the pre-reform period, Chinese agricultural performance was extremely poor and food shortages were common.[89] After Deng Xiaoping implemented the household responsibility system, agricultural output increased by 8.2% a year, compared with 2.7% in the pre-reform period, despite a decrease in the area of land used.[89] Food prices fell nearly 50%, while agricultural incomes rose.[90]
A more fundamental transformation was the economy's growing adoption of cash crops instead of just growing rice and grain.[90] Vegetable and meat production increased to the point that Chinese agricultural production was adding the equivalent of California's vegetable industry every two years. Growth in the sector slowed after 1984, with agriculture falling from 40% of GDP to 16%; however, increases in agricultural productivity allowed workers to be released for work in industry and services, while simultaneously increasing agricultural production.[91] Trade in agriculture was also liberalized and China became an exporter of food, a great contrast to its previous famines and shortages.[92]
Industry
In the pre-reform period, industry was largely stagnant and the socialist system presented few incentives for improvements in quality and productivity. With the introduction of the dual-price system and greater autonomy for enterprise managers, productivity increased greatly in the early 1980s.[93] Foreign enterprises and newly formed Township and Village Enterprises, owned by local government and often de facto private firms, competed successfully with state-owned enterprises. By the 1990s, large-scale privatizations reduced the market share of both the Township and Village Enterprises and state-owned enterprises and increased the private sector's market share. The state sector's share of industrial output dropped from 81% in 1980 to 15% in 2005.[94] Foreign capital controls much of Chinese industry and plays an important role.[60]
From virtually an industrial backwater in 1978, China is now the world's biggest producer of concrete, steel, ships and textiles, and has the world's largest automobile market. Chinese steel output quadrupled between 1980 and 2000, and from 2000 to 2006 rose from 128.5 million tons to 418.8 million tons, one-third of global production.[95] Labor productivity at some Chinese steel firms exceeds Western productivity.[95] From 1975 to 1992, China's automobile production rose from 139,800 to 1.1 million, rising to 9.35 million in 2008.[96] Light industries such as textiles saw an even greater increase, due to reduced government interference. Chinese textile exports increased from 4.6% of world exports in 1980 to 24.1% in 2005. Textile output increased 18-fold over the same period.[97]
This increase in production is largely the result of the removal of barriers to entry and increased competition; the number of industrial firms rose from 377,300 in 1980 to nearly 8 million in 1990 and 1996; the 2004 economic census, which excluded enterprises with annual sales below RMB 5 million, counted 1.33 million manufacturing firms, with Jiangsu and Zhejiang reporting more firms than the nationwide total for 1980.[98] Compared to other East Asian industrial growth spurts, China's industrial performance exceeded Japan's but remained behind South Korea and Taiwan's economies.[99]
Trade and foreign investment
Some scholars assert that China has maintained a high degree of openness that is unusual among the other large and populous nations,[dubious ] with competition from foreign goods in almost every sector of the economy. Foreign investment helped to greatly increase quality, knowledge and standards, especially in heavy industry. China's experience supports the assertion that globalization greatly increases wealth for poor countries.[98] Throughout the reform period, the government reduced tariffs and other trade barriers, with the overall tariff rate falling from 56% to 15%. By 2001, less than 40% of imports were subject to tariffs and only 9 percent of import were subject to licensing and import quotas. Even during the early reform era, protectionist policies were often circumvented by smuggling.[100] When China joined the WTO, it agreed to considerably harsher conditions than other developing countries.[101] Trade has increased from under 10% of GDP to 64% of GDP over the same period.[102] China is considered the most open large country; by 2005, China's average statutory tariff on industrial products was 8.9%. The average was 30.9% for Argentina, 27.0% for Brazil, 32.4% for India, and 36.9% for Indonesia.[103]
China's trade surplus is considered by some in the United States as threatening American jobs. In the 2000s, the Bush administration pursued protectionist policies such as tariffs and quotas to limit the import of Chinese goods. Some scholars argue that China's growing trade surplus is the result of industries in more developed Asian countries moving to China, and not a new phenomenon.[84] China's trade policy, which allows producers to avoid paying the Value Added Tax (VAT) for exports and undervaluation of the currency since 2002, has resulted in an overdeveloped export sector and distortion of the economy overall, a result that could hamper future growth.[104]
Foreign investment was also liberalized upon Deng's ascension. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were created in the early 1980s to attract foreign capital by exempting them from taxes and regulations. This experiment was successful and SEZs were expanded to cover the whole Chinese coast. Although FDI fell briefly after the 1989 student protests, it increased again to 160 billion by 2004.[105]
Services
In the 1990s, the financial sector was liberalized.[106] After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the service sector was considerably liberalized and foreign investment was allowed; restrictions on retail, wholesale and distribution ended.[107] Banking, financial services, insurance and telecommunications were also opened up to foreign investment.[108]
China's banking sector is dominated by four large state-owned banks, which are largely inefficient and monopolistic.[109] China's largest bank, ICBC, is the largest bank in the world. The financial sector is widely seen as a drag on the economy due to the inefficient state management.[110] Non-performing loans, mostly made to local governments and unprofitable state-owned enterprises for political purposes,[111] especially the political goal of keeping unemployment low, are a big drain on the financial system and economy, reaching over 22% of GDP by 2000, with a drop to 6.3% by 2006 due to government recapitalization of these banks. In 2006, the total amount of non-performing loans was estimated at $160 billion.[112] Observers recommend privatization of the banking system to solve this problem, a move that was partially carried out when the four banks were floated on the stock market.[113] China's financial markets, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, are relatively ineffective at raising capital, as they comprise only 11% of GDP.[114]
Due to the weakness of the banks, firms raise most of their capital through an informal, nonstandard financial sector developed during the 1980s and 1990s, consisting largely of underground businesses and private banks.[115] Internal finance is the most important method successful firms use to fund their activities.[115]
By the 1980s much emphasis was placed on the role of advertising in meeting the modernization goals being promoted by Deng. Lip service was still paid to old Maoist ideals of egalitarianism, but it did not inhibit the growth of consumerism.[116]
Government finances
In the pre-reform era, government was funded by profits from state-owned enterprises, much like the Soviet Union.[117] As the state sector fell in importance and profitability, government revenues, especially that of the central government in Beijing, fell substantially and the government relied on a confused system of inventory taxes. Government revenues fell from 35% of GDP to 11% of GDP in the mid-1990s, excluding revenue from state-owned enterprises, with the central government's budget at just 3% of GDP.[118] The tax system was reformed in 1994 when inventory taxes were unified into a single VAT of 17% on all manufacturing, repair, and assembly activities and an excise tax on 11 items, with the VAT becoming the main income source, accounting for half of government revenue. The 1994 reform also increased the central government's share of revenues, increasing it to 9% of GDP.[119]
Estudios académicos
Reasons for success
Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain China's successful transition from a planned to a socialist market economy. This occurred despite unfavorable factors such as the troublesome legacies of socialism, considerable erosion of the work ethic, decades of anti-market propaganda, and the "lost generation" whose education disintegrated amid the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.[120]
One notable theory is that decentralization of state authority allowed local leaders to experiment with various ways to privatize the state sector and energize the economy.[59] Although Deng was not the originator of many of the reforms, he approved them. Another theory focuses on internal incentives within the Chinese government, in which officials presiding over areas of high economic growth were more likely to be promoted. This made local and provincial governments "hungry for investment," who competed to reduce regulations and barriers to investment to boost both economic growth and their careers. Such reforms were possible because Deng cultivated pro-market followers in the government.[121] Herman Kahn argued that Confucian ethic was playing a "similar but more spectacular role in the modernization of East Asia than the Protestant ethic played in Europe".[122]
Taken together, Yuen Yuen Ang argues in Foreign Affairs that political reforms took place with economic reforms under Deng, except the former did not take Western forms. She writes, "To be sure, Deng's reforms emphasized brute capital accumulation rather than holistic development, which led to environmental degradation, inequality, and other social problems. Still they undoubtedly kicked China's growth machine into gear by making the bureaucracy results oriented, fiercely competitive, and responsive to business needs, qualities that are normally associated with democracies." But this only applies to the Deng era. Ang notes that since 2012, when Xi Jinping took over, the new leader has reversed Deng's political reforms and limits to power, "just as political freedoms have become imperative for continued economic growth."[123]
China's success is also due to the export-led growth strategy used successfully by the Four Asian Tigers beginning with Japan in the 1960s–1970s and other newly industrialized countries.[124] In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).[125] As of 2006, over 400 of the Fortune 500 companies had entered the Chinese market, while at the same time a considerable number of Chinese companies had opened their markets outside of China.[126] Foreign aids to China, including those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, also played an important role.[127][128][129] Since the beginning of opening, China has received a significant amount of aid from major developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.[127][128] For instance, through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan had offered China various forms of assistance worth 3.65 trillion Yen as of 2018.[127][130] On the other hand, the assistance from the U.S. reached a total of US$556 million as of 2012, and has "helped Tibetan communities improve livelihoods, promote sustainable development and environmental conservation, and preserve cultural traditions...also supports targeted programs that strengthen cooperation on combatting the spread of HIV/AIDS and other pandemic and emerging diseases as well as rule of law programs."[127][129]
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and centrally planned economies in 1989 provided renewed impetus for China to further reform its economy through different policies in order to avoid a similar fate.[131] China also wanted to avoid the Russian ad-hoc experiments with market capitalism under Boris Yeltsin resulting in the rise of powerful oligarchs, corruption, and the loss of state revenue which exacerbated economic disparity.[132]
Comparison to other developing economies
China's transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy has often been compared with economies in Eastern Europe that are undergoing a similar transition. China's performance has been praised for avoiding the major shocks and inflation that plagued the Eastern Bloc.[133] The Eastern bloc economies saw declines of 13% to 65% in GDP at the beginning of reforms, while Chinese growth has been very strong since the beginning of reform.[134] China also managed to avoid the hyperinflation of 200 to 1,000% that Eastern Europe experienced.[135] This success is attributed to the gradualist and decentralized approach of the Chinese government, which allowed market institutions to develop to the point where they could replace state planning. This contrasts with the "big bang" approach of Eastern Europe, where the state-owned sector was rapidly privatized with employee buyouts, but retained much of the earlier, inefficient management.[136] Other factors thought to account for the differences are the greater urbanization of the CIS economies and differences in social welfare and other institutions.[137] Another argument is that, in the Eastern European economies, political change is sometimes seen to have made gradualist reforms impossible, so the shocks and inflation were unavoidable.[138]
China's economic growth has been compared with other developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and India. GDP growth in China outstrips all other developing countries, with only India after 1990 coming close to China's experience.[139] Scholars believe that high rates of investments, especially increases in capital invested per worker, have contributed to China's superior economic performance.[139] China's relatively free economy, with less government intervention and regulation, is cited by scholars as an important factor in China's superior performance compared to other developing countries.[140]
Criticism and development issues
The government retains monopolies in several sectors, such as petroleum and banking. The recent reversal of some reforms have left some observers dubbing 2008 the "third anniversary of the end of reforms".[13] Nevertheless, observers[who?] believe that China's economy can continue growing at rates of 6–8 percent until 2025,[141] though a reduction in state intervention is considered by some to be necessary for sustained growth.[142] However, it has been reported over the years that the GDP figures and other economic data from the Chinese government may be inflated or manipulated otherwise.[16][17][18][143][144] Officials from central government have admitted that local economic statistics are sometimes falsified, in order to meet the economic growth targets for personal promotion of local officials, for example.[16][145]
Despite reducing poverty and increasing China's wealth, Deng's reforms have been criticized by the Chinese New Left for increasing inequality and allowing private entrepreneurs to purchase state assets at reduced prices. These accusations were especially intense during the Lang-Gu dispute, in which New Left academic Larry Lang accused entrepreneur Gu Sujung of usurping state assets, after which Gu was imprisoned.[146] The Hu-Wen Administration adopted some New Left policies, such as halting privatizations and increasing the state sector's importance in the economy, and Keynesian policies that have been criticized by some Chinese economists who advocate a policy of deregulation, tax cuts and privatization.[88]
Other criticisms focus on the effects of rapid industrialization on public health and the environment. However, scholars believe that public health issues are unlikely to become major obstacles to the growth of China's economy during the coming decades, and studies have shown that air quality and other environmental measures in China are better than those in developed countries, such as the United States and Japan, at the same level of development.[147]
The economic reforms were accompanied with a series of political reforms in the 1980s, supported by Deng Xiaoping. However, many of the planned political reforms ended after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.[148] Lack of political reform contributed to the serious corruption issue in China.[149] In addition, real state bubble, pollution and population crisis are among the most serious development issues in China.[14][15] For instance, China is the largest CO2 emitter in the world.[150]
On the other hand, since the late 1970s, Deng and other senior leaders including Chen Yun and Li Xiannian supported the "one-child policy" in order to cope with the overpopulation crisis.[151] But the 2010 census data showed that the population growth rate had remained very low,[152] and due to the financial pressure and other factors, many young couples choose to delay or even abandon the plan of raising a second child even though the Chinese government has largely relaxed the one-child policy in late 2015.[153][154][155] The population crisis threatens further economic development.[154][156]
Ver también
- Economy of China
- Boluan Fanzheng
- Deng Xiaoping Theory
- Go Out policy
- China's political reforms in 1980s
- Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour
- China Model/Beijing Consensus
Referencias
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