La muerte de Elaine Herzberg (2 de agosto de 1968 - 18 de marzo de 2018) fue el primer caso registrado de muerte de un peatón que involucró a un automóvil autónomo , luego de una colisión que ocurrió en la noche del 18 de marzo de 2018. una bicicleta a través de una carretera de cuatro carriles en Tempe, Arizona , Estados Unidos, cuando fue atropellada por un vehículo de prueba de Uber , que operaba en modo de conducción autónoma con un conductor de respaldo de seguridad humana sentado en el asiento del conductor. Herzberg fue llevada al hospital local donde murió a causa de sus heridas. [2] [3] [4]
Elaine Herzberg | |
---|---|
Nació | Elaine Marie Wood 2 de agosto de 1968 Phoenix, Arizona , EE. UU. [1] |
Fallecido | 18 de marzo de 2018 Tempe, Arizona , Estados Unidos | (49 años)
Lugar de enterramiento | Phoenix, Arizona [1] |
Nacionalidad | americano |
Educación | Escuela secundaria Apache Junction , Apache Junction, Arizona [1] |
Conocido por | Primer peatón asesinado por un automóvil autónomo |
Esposos) | Mike Herzberg (hasta su muerte); Rolf Erich Ziemann (hasta la muerte de Elaine) [1] |
Tras el incidente fatal, Uber suspendió las pruebas de vehículos autónomos en Arizona, [5] donde dichas pruebas habían sido sancionadas desde agosto de 2016. [6] Uber decidió no renovar su permiso para probar vehículos autónomos en California cuando expiró. a finales de marzo de 2018. [7]
Herzberg fue el primer peatón asesinado por un automóvil autónomo; [8] [9] un conductor había sido asesinado por un automóvil semiautónomo casi dos años antes. [10] No fue asesinada por un automóvil autónomo ( nivel 4 de SAE ) porque ese automóvil requería un conductor de seguridad con una licencia de conducir válida para operar y no había sido autorizado para operar sin que alguien lo viera. Un reportero de The Washington Post comparó el destino de Herzberg con el de Bridget Driscoll , quien, en el Reino Unido en 1896, fue la primera peatón en ser asesinada por un automóvil. [11] El incidente de Arizona ha magnificado la importancia de los sistemas de prevención de colisiones para vehículos autónomos. [12]
Resumen de colisión
Herzberg cruzaba Mill Avenue (norte) de oeste a este, aproximadamente 110 m (360 pies) al sur de la intersección con Curry Road, fuera del cruce peatonal designado, [13] [14] cerca de la autopista Red Mountain . Estaba empujando una bicicleta cargada con bolsas de la compra, [2] y había cruzado al menos dos carriles de tráfico cuando fue atropellada [5] aproximadamente a las 9:58 pm MST ( UTC − 07: 00 ) [13] por un prototipo de Uber. automóvil autónomo basado en un Volvo XC90 , que viajaba hacia el norte por Mill. [15] [16] El vehículo había estado operando en modo autónomo [17] desde las 9:39 pm, diecinueve minutos antes de que golpeara y matara a Herzberg. [13] La conductora de respaldo de seguridad humana del automóvil, la Sra. Rafaela Vásquez, [2] no intervino a tiempo para evitar la colisión. [18] La telemetría del vehículo obtenida después del choque mostró que el operador humano respondió moviendo el volante menos de un segundo antes del impacto, y accionó los frenos menos de un segundo después del impacto. [13]
Causa investigación
La oficina del fiscal de distrito del condado se recusó de la investigación, debido a una asociación conjunta previa con Uber que promocionaba sus servicios como alternativa a conducir bajo los efectos del alcohol. [19]
Los relatos del accidente han sido contradictorios en términos del límite de velocidad en el lugar del accidente. [20] [21] Según la policía de Tempe, el automóvil viajaba en una zona de 35 mph (56 km / h), pero esto se contradice con un límite de velocidad de 45 mph (72 km / h). [22]
La Junta Nacional de Seguridad en el Transporte (NTSB) envió un equipo de investigadores federales para recopilar datos de los instrumentos del vehículo y examinar la condición del vehículo junto con las acciones tomadas por el conductor de seguridad. [23] Sus hallazgos preliminares fueron corroborados por múltiples registradores de datos de eventos y demostraron que el vehículo viajaba a 43 millas por hora (69 km / h) cuando Herzberg fue detectado por primera vez 6 segundos (378 pies (115 m)) antes del impacto; durante 4,7 segundos, el sistema de conducción automática no infirió que fuera necesario un frenado de emergencia. [13] Un vehículo que viaja a 43 mph (69 km / h) generalmente puede detenerse dentro de los 89 pies (27 m) una vez que se aplican los frenos. [24] La máquina necesitaba estar a 1,3 segundos (82 pies (25 m)) de distancia antes de discernir que se requería un frenado de emergencia, mientras que al menos esa distancia era necesaria para detenerse. [25] El sistema no se comportó correctamente. [13] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] Una distancia total de frenado de 76 pies en sí misma implicaría una velocidad segura por debajo de 25 mph (40 km / h). [31] La intervención humana seguía siendo legalmente necesaria. La percepción de la computadora - el tiempo de reacción habría sido un factor limitante de velocidad si la tecnología hubiera sido superior a los humanos en situaciones ambiguas; [32] sin embargo, la naciente tecnología de frenado computarizado se desactivó el día del accidente, y el tiempo aparente de percepción-reacción (alarma) de la máquina de 4,7 segundos [13] permitió que el automóvil se desplazara 250 pies (76 m). El video publicado por la policía el 21 de marzo mostró que el conductor de seguridad no estaba mirando la carretera momentos antes de que el vehículo chocara contra Herzberg. [3] [33]
Ambiente
La jefa de policía de Tempe, Sylvia Moir, fue citada diciendo que la colisión era "inevitable" según la investigación policial inicial, que incluyó una revisión del video capturado por una cámara a bordo. [34] Moir culpó a Herzberg por cruzar la calle de manera insegura: "Es peligroso cruzar las carreteras en la hora de la tarde cuando hay cruces peatonales bien iluminados y gestionados". [35] Según Uber, los conductores de seguridad fueron entrenados para mantener sus manos muy cerca del volante todo el tiempo mientras conducían el vehículo para que estuvieran listos para tomar el control rápidamente si fuera necesario. [36]
El conductor dijo que fue como un destello, la persona salió frente a ellos. Su [ sic ] primera alerta de la colisión fue el sonido de la colisión. [...] está muy claro que habría sido difícil evitar esta colisión en cualquier tipo de modo (autónomo o impulsado por humanos) en función de cómo ella vino de las sombras directamente a la carretera.
- Jefa Sylvia Moir, Policía de Tempe , entrevista con San Francisco Chronicle , 19 de marzo de 2018 [35]
La policía de Tempe publicó un video el 21 de marzo que muestra imágenes grabadas por dos cámaras a bordo: una que mira hacia adelante y otra que captura las acciones del conductor de seguridad. El video que mira hacia adelante muestra que el automóvil autónomo viajaba por el carril de la extrema derecha cuando chocó contra Herzberg. El video que mira al conductor muestra que el conductor de seguridad estaba mirando hacia abajo antes de la colisión. [5] El operador de Uber es responsable de intervenir y tomar el control manual cuando sea necesario, así como de monitorear los mensajes de diagnóstico, que se muestran en una pantalla en la consola central. En una entrevista realizada después del accidente con NTSB, la conductora declaró que estaba monitoreando la consola central en el momento de la colisión. [13]
Después de que se publicó el video de Uber, la periodista Carolyn Said notó que la explicación policial del camino de Herzberg significaba que ya había cruzado dos carriles de tráfico antes de ser atropellada por el vehículo autónomo. [5] El teatro Marquee y el lago Tempe Town están al oeste de Mill Avenue, y los peatones comúnmente cruzan la mitad de la calle sin desviarse hacia el norte hasta el cruce de peatones en Curry. [16] Según los informes del Phoenix New Times , Mill Avenue contiene lo que parece ser un camino pavimentado con ladrillos en la mediana entre los carriles hacia el norte y hacia el sur; [16] sin embargo, las señales colocadas prohíben a los peatones cruzar en ese lugar. [37] Cuando el segundo de los puentes de Mill Avenue sobre el lago de la ciudad se agregó en 1994 para el tráfico en dirección norte, el cruce en forma de X en la mediana se instaló para acomodar el posible cierre de uno de los dos puentes de carretera. El propósito de esta estructura pavimentada con ladrillos es simplemente desviar los automóviles de un lado a otro si un puente está cerrado al tráfico, y aunque puede parecer un paso de peatones para peatones, de hecho es una calzada temporal con bordillos verticales y advertencia. señales.
Problemas de software
Michael Ramsey, un experto en automóviles autónomos de Gartner , describió el video como que muestra "una falla total del sistema para reconocer a una persona que se ve claramente y que es visible desde una distancia considerable en el encuadre. Uber tiene que explicar seriamente por qué esta persona no fue vista y por qué el sistema no se activó ". [5]
James Arrowood, un abogado especializado en automóviles sin conductor en Arizona, especuló incorrectamente que el software pudo haber decidido continuar después de asumir que Herzberg cedería el paso . [18] La ley de Arizona (ARS 28-793) [38] establece que los peatones que cruzan la calle fuera de un paso de peatones deben ceder el paso a los automóviles. [16] Según Arrowood, "La computadora toma una decisión. Dice: 'Oye, este objeto se mueve 10 o 15 pies a mi izquierda, ¿me muevo o no?' (Podría ser) programado, tengo un derecho de paso, suponiendo que todo lo que se esté moviendo cederá el paso ". [18] El informe preliminar de la NTSB, sin embargo, señaló que el software ordenó al coche que frenara 1,3 segundos antes de la colisión.
Un video tomado de la cámara del tablero del vehículo mostró al conductor de seguridad mirando hacia abajo, lejos de la carretera. También parecía que las manos del conductor no estaban suspendidas sobre el volante, que es lo que se les indica a los conductores que deben hacer para que puedan retomar rápidamente el control del automóvil. Uber pasó de dos empleados en cada automóvil a uno. Los empleados emparejados habían estado dividiendo las tareas: una lista para asumir el control si fallaba el sistema autónomo y otra para vigilar lo que detectaban las computadoras. La segunda persona era responsable de realizar un seguimiento del rendimiento del sistema y de etiquetar los datos en una computadora portátil. Kallman, el portavoz de Uber, dijo que la segunda persona estaba en el automóvil por tareas puramente relacionadas con los datos, no por seguridad. Cuando Uber se mudó a un solo operador, algunos empleados expresaron preocupaciones de seguridad a los gerentes, según dos personas familiarizadas con las operaciones de Uber. Les preocupaba que ir solos les hiciera más difícil permanecer alerta durante las horas de conducción monótona.
La telemetría registrada mostró que el sistema había detectado a Herzberg seis segundos antes del choque, y la clasificó primero como un objeto desconocido, luego como un vehículo y finalmente como una bicicleta, cada uno de los cuales tenía un camino predicho diferente de acuerdo con la lógica de autonomía. 1.3 segundos antes del impacto, el sistema determinó que se requería un frenado de emergencia, que normalmente lo realiza el operador del vehículo. Sin embargo, el sistema no fue diseñado para alertar al operador y no realizó una parada de emergencia por sí solo, ya que "las maniobras de frenado de emergencia no están habilitadas mientras el vehículo está bajo control de computadora, para reducir la posibilidad de un comportamiento errático del vehículo". según NTSB. [13]
Problemas con el sensor
Brad Templeton, quien brindó consultoría para el competidor de conducción autónoma Waymo , señaló que el automóvil estaba equipado con sensores avanzados, incluidos radar y LiDAR , que no se habrían visto afectados por la oscuridad. Templeton declaró: "Sé que la tecnología [de los sensores] es mejor que eso, así que creo que debe ser una falla de Uber". [5] Arrowood también reconoció problemas potenciales con los sensores: "Realmente lo que vamos a preguntar es, en qué punto deberían o podrían esos sensores reconocer el movimiento hacia la izquierda. Presumiblemente ella estaba en algún lugar en la oscuridad". [18]
En un evento de prensa realizado por Uber en Tempe en 2017, los conductores de seguridad promocionaron la tecnología de sensores y dijeron que eran efectivos para anticipar a los peatones imprudentes, especialmente en la oscuridad, deteniendo los vehículos autónomos antes de que el conductor de seguridad pudiera incluso ver a los peatones. Sin embargo, se requirió la intervención manual de los conductores de seguridad para evitar una colisión con otro vehículo en al menos un caso con un reportero de The Arizona Republic que lo acompañaba. [39]
Uber anunció que reemplazaría su flota autónoma basada en Ford Fusion con autos basados en el Volvo XC90 en agosto de 2016; los XC90 vendidos a Uber estarían preparados para recibir el hardware y software de control de vehículos de Uber, pero no incluirían ninguno de los sistemas avanzados de asistencia al conductor de Volvo . [40] Uber caracterizó el conjunto de sensores adjunto al Fusion como el modelo de "escritorio" y el adjunto al XC90 como el "portátil", con la esperanza de desarrollar el "teléfono inteligente" pronto. [41] Según Uber, la suite para el XC90 se desarrolló en aproximadamente cuatro meses. [42] El XC90 modificado por Uber incluía un solo sensor LiDAR montado en el techo y 10 sensores de radar, proporcionando una cobertura de 360 ° alrededor del vehículo. En comparación, el Fusion tenía siete sensores LiDAR (incluido uno montado en el techo) y siete sensores de radar. Según Velodyne , el proveedor de LiDAR de Uber, el sensor LiDAR único montado en el techo tiene un rango vertical estrecho que evita que detecte obstáculos cerca del suelo, creando un punto ciego alrededor del vehículo. Marta Hall, presidenta de Velodyne comentó "Si vas a evitar a los peatones, vas a necesitar tener un lidar lateral para ver a esos peatones y evitarlos, especialmente de noche". Sin embargo, el conjunto de sensores de radar aumentados podría detectar obstáculos en el punto ciego LiDAR. [43]
Distracción
El jueves 21 de junio, el Departamento de Policía de Tempe publicó un informe detallado junto con los medios capturados después de la colisión, incluida una grabación de audio de la llamada al 911 realizada por la conductora de seguridad, Rafaela Vásquez, y una entrevista inicial en la escena con un oficial que respondió. capturado por un video usado en el cuerpo . Después del accidente, la policía obtuvo órdenes de registro para los teléfonos celulares de Vasquez, así como registros de los servicios de transmisión de video Netflix , YouTube y Hulu . La investigación concluyó que debido a que los datos mostraban que estaba transmitiendo The Voice sobre Hulu en el momento de la colisión, y la cámara que miraba al conductor en el Volvo mostraba "su rostro parece reaccionar y mostrar una sonrisa o risa en varios momentos durante el tiempo. ella está mirando hacia abajo ", Vásquez puede haberse distraído de su trabajo principal de monitorear las condiciones de la carretera y los vehículos. [44] La policía de Tempe concluyó que el accidente era "totalmente evitable" [45] y culpó a Vásquez por su "indiferencia por la función de trabajo asignada para intervenir en una situación peligrosa". [44]
Los registros indican que la transmisión comenzó a las 9:16 p.m. y terminó a las 9:59 p.m. Según un examen del video capturado por la cámara que mira al conductor, Vásquez estaba mirando hacia su rodilla derecha 166 veces durante un total de 6 minutos, 47 segundos [44] durante los 21 minutos y 48 segundos anteriores al choque. [46] Justo antes del accidente, Vásquez estaba mirando su regazo durante 5,3 segundos; miró hacia arriba medio segundo antes del impacto. [45] [47] Vásquez declaró en su entrevista posterior al accidente con la NTSB que había estado monitoreando los mensajes del sistema en la consola central y que no usó ninguno de sus teléfonos celulares hasta que llamó al 911. [13] Según a una fuente de Uber no identificada, los conductores de seguridad no son responsables de monitorear los mensajes de diagnóstico. [48] Vásquez también dijo a los agentes de policía que respondieron que mantenía las manos cerca del volante en preparación para tomar el control si fuera necesario, lo que contradecía el video del conductor, que no mostraba sus manos cerca del volante. [44] La policía concluyó que, dadas las mismas condiciones, Herzberg habría sido visible para el 85% de los automovilistas a una distancia de 143 pies (44 m), 5,7 segundos antes de que el coche chocara contra Herzberg. Según el informe policial, Vásquez debería haber aplicado los frenos al menos 0,57 segundos antes, lo que le habría dado a Herzberg tiempo suficiente para pasar con seguridad frente al automóvil. [46]
El informe policial fue entregado a la Oficina del Fiscal del Condado de Yavapai para que revisara los posibles cargos de homicidio. [44] La Oficina del Fiscal del Condado de Maricopa se recusó del enjuiciamiento por un posible conflicto de intereses, ya que anteriormente había participado con Uber en una campaña de marzo de 2016 contra la conducción en estado de ebriedad. [49] El 4 de marzo de 2019, el fiscal del condado de Yavapai publicó una carta en la que indicaba que "no hay base para la responsabilidad penal" contra Uber Corporation; [50] [51] que los cargos potenciales contra el conductor deben ser investigados más a fondo por el Fiscal del Condado de Maricopa; y que el Departamento de Policía de Tempe debería analizar el caso para reunir pruebas adicionales.
Otros factores
Según el informe preliminar de la colisión difundido por la NTSB, Herzberg había dado positivo por metanfetamina y marihuana en una prueba de toxicología realizada tras la colisión. [13] La toxicología residual en sí misma no establece si ella estuvo bajo su influencia o cuándo, y por lo tanto un factor real. [52] Las facultades inhibidas pueden, hipotéticamente, influir en la capacidad relativa de uno para la autoconservación de último momento. Sin embargo, su mera presencia en la carretera a lo lejos en la distancia delante del automóvil fue el factor que invocó el deber de la máquina de frenar; [25] el deber legal común de evitar que ella y otros objetos sean generales y preexistentes. [27] [30]
On May 24, NTSB released a preliminary incident report, the news release saying that Herzberg "was dressed in dark clothing, did not look in the direction of the vehicle... crossed... in a section not directly illuminated by lighting... entered the roadway from a brick median, where signs...warn pedestrians to use a crosswalk... 360 feet north." Six seconds before impact, the vehicle was traveling 43 mph (69 km/h), and the system identified the woman and bicycle as an unknown object, next as a vehicle, then as a bicycle.[53] At 1.3 seconds before hitting the pedestrian and her bike, the system flagged the need for emergency braking, but it failed to do so, as the car hit Herzberg at 39 mph (63 km/h).[54]
The forward-looking Uber dashcam did not pick up Herzberg until approximately 1.4 seconds before the collision, suggesting (as the sheriff did) that the crash may have been completely unavoidable even if Vasquez hadn't been distracted in the seconds leading up to the crash.[55]
However, night-time video shot by other motorists in the days following the crash, plus their comments, suggest that the area may have been better illuminated than the dashcam footage, viewed in isolation would suggest. This raises the possibility that Herzberg's appearing so late in the Uber video could merely be an indication that the camera had insufficient sensitivity or was otherwise poorly calibrated for the environment and setting in which it was operating. If these crowd-sourced re-creations are indeed representative of the visibility conditions on the actual night that the accident occurred, then Herzberg would have been visible to Vasquez as soon as there was a clear sight line had Vasquez only been looking ahead, refuting the assertion that the accident was unavoidable.[56]
Complicating things even further, there is evidence that suggests the discrepancies in visibility between the dashcam footage and the civilian re-creation submissions are not at all invented or illusory, but are, instead, real phenomena whose progenitor is purported to be the set of severely under-powered headlights installed on the car Vasquez was monitoring.[56] While all of these potential scenarios will likely affect any charging decisions and/or other legal actions (if they materialize at all), none currently have any objective validation or otherwise meaningful support, especially in relation to one another.
While jaywalking can constitute the illegal preemptive of control of the roadway, it is not necessarily the proximate cause of an accident. Had Herzberg instead been a moose or a disabled school bus in legal control of the roadway, passengers of the self-driving car—which failed to assure a clear stopping distance within its radius of vision—may have been killed instead. Motor vehicle operators must always be watchful for children, animals, and other hazards which may encroach into the roadway.[29]
Coordinación con el gobierno estatal
Prior to the fatal incident, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey had encouraged Uber to enter the state.[6] He signed Executive Order 2015-09 on August 25, 2015, entitled "Self-Driving Vehicle Testing and Piloting in the State of Arizona; Self-Driving Vehicle Oversight Committee", establishing a welcoming attitude to autonomous vehicle testing.[57][58] According to Ducey's office, the committee, which consists of eight state employees appointed by the governor, has met twice since it was formed.[6]
In December 2016, Ducey had released a statement welcoming Uber's autonomous cars: "Arizona welcomes Uber self-driving cars with open arms and wide open roads. While California puts the brakes on innovation and change with more bureaucracy and more regulation, Arizona is paving the way for new technology and new businesses."[59] Emails between Uber and the office of the governor showed that Ducey was informed that the testing of self-driving vehicles would begin in August 2016, several months ahead of the official announcement welcoming Uber in December.[6] On March 1, 2018, Ducey signed Executive Order (XO) 2018-04, outlining regulations for autonomous vehicles. Notably, XO 2018-04 requires the company testing self-driving cars to provide a written statement that "the fully autonomous vehicle will achieve a minimal risk condition" if a failure occurs.[60]
Secuelas
After the collision that killed Herzberg, Uber ceased testing self-driving vehicles in all four cities (Tempe, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and Toronto) where it had deployed them.[5] On March 26, Governor Ducey sent a letter to Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi, suspending Uber's testing of self-driving cars in the state. In the letter, Ducey stated "As governor, my top priority is public safety. Improving public safety has always been the emphasis of Arizona's approach to autonomous vehicle testing, and my expectation is that public safety is also the top priority for all who operate this technology in the state of Arizona."[61] Uber also announced it would not renew its permit to test self-driving cars in California after the California Department of Motor Vehicles wrote to inform Uber that its permit would expire on March 31, and "any follow-up analysis or investigations from the recent crash in Arizona" would have to be addressed before the permit could be renewed.[7]
Legal woes for Uber were among the collision fallout. Herzberg's daughter retained the law firm Bellah Perez,[18] and together with the husband quickly reached an undisclosed settlement on March 28 while local and federal authorities continued their investigation.[62] Herzberg's mother, father, and son also retained legal counsel.[63] While a confidential settlement buried the liability issue, it suggested a sufficient legal cause of action. The abundance of event data recorders left few questions of fact for a jury to decide.[64] Although the Yavapai County Attorney declined to charge Uber with a criminal violation in 2019 for the death of Herzberg,[65] a Maricopa County grand jury indicted the safety driver on one count of negligent homicide in 2020.[66] Her trial is planned for February 2021.[67]
The incident caused some companies to temporarily cease road testing of self-driving vehicles. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has stated "We don't know that we would do anything different, but we should give ourselves time to see if we can learn from that incident."[68] Uber acknowledged that mistakes were made in its brash pursuit to ultimately create a safer driving environment.[32][69]
Later in the year, Uber issued a reflective 70-page safety report[32] in which Uber stated the potential for its self-driving cars to be safer than those driven by humans,[70] however some of their employees worry that Uber is taking shortcuts to hit internal milestones.[32] To be legal in all states[71] for private use, or anywhere at the commercial level,[29][30] the technology must hard code assured clear distance ahead driving.[27][28][72]
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the American Automobile Association had previously identified nighttime driving as an area for safety improvement.[73][74][75] This follows similar changes in attitudes against tolerating drunk driving, starting in the late 1970s through the 1990s,[76][77] and has occurred in concert with a cultural shift towards active lifestyles and multi-modal use of roadways which has been formally adopted by the National Association of City Transportation Officials.
After the collision that killed Herzberg on March 18, 2018, Uber returned their self-driving cars to the roads in public testing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on December 20, 2018. Uber said they received authorization from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Uber said they were also pursuing the same with cars on roads in San Francisco, California and Toronto, Ontario.[78][79]
Ver también
- Mary Ward, the first person known to have been killed by an automobile
- Bridget Driscoll, the first pedestrian death by automobile in Great Britain
- Henry H. Bliss, the first automobile death in the Americas
- Robert Williams, the first person known to be killed by a robot
- Thomas Selfridge, the first person to die in an airplane crash
Referencias
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- ^ a b c Will Pavia (March 21, 2018). "Driverless Uber car 'not to blame' for woman's death". The Times. Archived from the original on August 23, 2019. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
- ^ a b Wakabayashi, Daisuke (March 19, 2018). "Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam". The New York Times. Archived from the original on April 21, 2020. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
- ^ "Video shows moment of fatal Uber crash". BBC News. March 22, 2018. Archived from the original on November 30, 2018. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
- ^ a b c d e f g Said, Carolyn (March 21, 2018). "Video shows Uber robot car in fatal accident did not try to avoid woman". San Francisco Chronicle. Archived from the original on August 21, 2019. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ a b c d Harris, Mark (March 28, 2018). "Exclusive: Arizona governor and Uber kept self-driving program secret, emails reveal". The Guardian. Archived from the original on August 23, 2019. Retrieved March 29, 2018.
- ^ a b Carolyn Said (March 27, 2018). "Uber puts the brakes on testing robot cars in California after Arizona fatality". San Francisco Chronicle. Archived from the original on August 21, 2019. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
- ^ "Self-driving Uber kills Arizona woman in first fatal crash involving pedestrian". The Guardian. Archived from the original on July 26, 2019. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
- ^ "Uber halts self-driving car tests after death". BBC. Archived from the original on 28 March 2018.
- ^ Vlasic, Bill; Boudette, Neal E. (June 30, 2016). "Self-Driving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S. Says". The New York Times. Archived from the original on November 25, 2020. Retrieved December 11, 2018.
the driver of a Tesla Model S electric sedan was killed in an accident when the car was in self-driving mode
- ^ Kunkle, Fredrick (March 22, 2018). "Fatal crash with self-driving car was a first — like Bridget Driscoll's was 121 years ago with one of the first cars". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on January 10, 2019. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
- ^ Umar Zakir Abdul, Hamid; et al. (2018). "A review on threat assessment, path planning and path tracking strategies for collision avoidance systems of autonomous vehicles". International Journal of Vehicle Autonomous Systems. 14 (2). Archived from the original on March 31, 2021. Retrieved July 21, 2019.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "Preliminary Report – Highway – HWY18MH010" (PDF) (The information in this report is preliminary and will be supplemented or corrected during the course of the investigation). National Transportation Safety Board. May 24, 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on August 31, 2019. Retrieved May 26, 2018.
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- ^ See calculation method under Braking distance.
- ^ a b Isaac, Mike; Wakabayashi, Daisuke; Conger, Kate (August 19, 2018). "After Fatal Accident, Uber's Vision of Self-Driving Cars Begins to Blur" (print). The New York Times. p. B1. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on August 10, 2019. Retrieved August 25, 2018.
preliminary findings from federal regulators investigating the crash confirmed what many self-driving car experts suspected: Uber's self-driving car should have detected a pedestrian with enough time to stop, but it failed to do so.
- ^ Krishe, Tom; Billeaud, Jacques (June 22, 2018). "Uber driver streaming 'The Voice' just before fatal Arizona crash, report says". Chicago Tribune. Associated Press. ISSN 1085-6706. Archived from the original on May 7, 2019. Retrieved July 11, 2018.
"This crash would not have occurred if Vasquez would have been monitoring the vehicle and roadway conditions and was not distracted," the report says. A crash report also indicated that the self-driving vehicle was traveling too fast for the road conditions.
- ^ a b c Lawyers Cooperative Publishing. New York Jurisprudence. Automobiles and Other Vehicles. Miamisburg, OH: LEXIS Publishing. p. § 720. OCLC 321177421. Archived from the original on July 4, 2018. Retrieved July 11, 2018.
It is negligence as a matter of law to drive a motor vehicle at such a rate of speed that it cannot be stopped in time to avoid an obstruction discernible within the driver's length of vision ahead of him. This rule is known generally as the `assured clear distance ahead' rule * * * In application, the rule constantly changes as the motorist proceeds, and is measured at any moment by the distance between the motorist's vehicle and the limit of his vision ahead, or by the distance between the vehicle and any intermediate discernible static or forward-moving object in the street or highway ahead constituting an obstruction in his path. Such rule requires a motorist in the exercise of due care at all times to see, or to know from having seen, that the road is clear or apparently clear and safe for travel, a sufficient distance ahead to make it apparently safe to advance at the speed employed.
- ^ a b Leibowitz, Herschel W.; Owens, D. Alfred; Tyrrell, Richard A. (1998). "The assured clear distance ahead rule: implications for nighttime traffic safety and the law". Accident Analysis & Prevention. 30 (1): 93–99. doi:10.1016/S0001-4575(97)00067-5. PMID 9542549.
The assured clear distance ahead (ACDA) rule holds the operator of a motor vehicle responsible to avoid collision with any obstacle that might appear in the vehicle's path.
- ^ a b c "Section 2 – Driving Safely" (PDF). Commercial Driver License Manual 2005. United States Department of Transportation. July 2014. pp. 2–15, 2–19, 2–26, 13–1. Archived from the original on March 17, 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2018.
[pg 2-15] 2.6.4 – Speed and Distance Ahead: You should always be able to stop within the distance you can see ahead. Fog, rain, or other conditions may require that you slowdown to be able to stop in the distance you can see. ... [pg 2-19] 2.8.3 – Drivers Who Are Hazards: Vehicles may be partly hidden by blind intersections or alleys. If you only can see the rear or front end of a vehicle but not the driver, then he or she can't see you. Be alert because he/she may back out or enter into your lane. Always be prepared to stop. ... [pg 2-26] 2.11.4 – Vehicle Factors: Headlights. At night your headlights will usually be the main source of light for you to see by and for others to see you. You can't see nearly as much with your headlights as you see in the daytime. With low beams you can see ahead about 250 feet and with high beams about 350–500 feet. You must adjust your speed to keep your stopping distance within your sight distance. This means going slowly enough to be able to stop within the range of your headlights. ... [pg 13-1] 13.1.2 – Intersections As you approach an intersection: Check traffic thoroughly in all directions. Decelerate gently. Brake smoothly and, if necessary, change gears. If necessary, come to a complete stop (no coasting) behind any stop signs, signals, sidewalks, or stop lines maintaining a safe gap behind any vehicle in front of you. Your vehicle must not roll forward or backward. When driving through an intersection: Check traffic thoroughly in all directions. Decelerate and yield to any pedestrians and traffic in the intersection. Do not change lanes while proceeding through the intersection. Keep your hands on the wheel.
- ^ a b c "49 CFR 392.14 – Hazardous conditions; extreme caution". US Code of Federal Regulations. Archived from the original on September 1, 2019. Retrieved December 14, 2018.
Extreme caution in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated. Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point at which the safety of passengers is assured.
- ^ "VA. § 46.2-880. Tables of speed and stopping distances". Code of Virginia. State of Virginia. Archived from the original on July 7, 2018. Retrieved July 11, 2018.
an average baseline for motor vehicle stopping distances...for a vehicle in good condition and...on a level, dry stretch of highway, free from loose material.
- ^ a b c d Wakabayashi, Daisuke; Conger, Kate (December 5, 2018). "Uber's Self-Driving Cars Are Set to Return in a Downsized Test". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on August 31, 2019. Retrieved December 7, 2018.
The cars have reacted more slowly than human drivers and struggled to pass so-called track validation tests...Dara Khosrowshahi, the chief executive, acknowledged errors in Uber's earlier driverless car efforts. "We did screw up," he said in comments provided by Uber...as recently as a few weeks ago, the company's autonomous vehicle unit, Uber Advanced Technologies Group, or A.T.G., was still experiencing track testing "failures" on different versions of its software, according internal company emails. To match the reaction time of a human driver at 25 m.p.h., the cars needed to drive "20% slower than a human," Brandon Basso, a director at A.T.G., said in a Nov. 1 email. Even at slower speeds, the cars were passing only 82 percent of track tests, according to company documents...a test in early November ran Uber's vehicles through more than 70 categories at 25 m.p.h., they failed in 10 of them, including being slow to recognize another car that didn't yield.
- ^ Garcia, Uriel J.; Randazzo, Ryan (March 21, 2018). "Video shows moments before fatal Uber crash in Tempe". The Arizona Republic. Archived from the original on March 31, 2021. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
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- ^ a b c d e Coppola, Chris; Frank, BrieAnna J (June 21, 2018). "Report: Uber driver was watching 'The Voice' moments before fatal Tempe crash". AZ Central. USA Today. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
The documents indicate police are seeking manslaughter charges against Vasquez...."This crash would not have occurred if Vasquez would have been monitoring the vehicle and roadway conditions and was not distracted," the report says....A crash report indicated that the self-driving vehicle was traveling too fast for the road conditions.
- ^ a b Somerville, Heather; Shepardson, David (June 21, 2018). "Uber car's 'safety' driver streamed TV show before fatal crash: police". Reuters. Archived from the original on June 25, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- ^ a b Stern, Ray (June 21, 2018). "Self-Driving Uber Crash 'Avoidable,' Driver's Phone Playing Video Before Woman Struck". Phoenix New Times. Archived from the original on June 26, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- ^ Lee, Timothy B. (June 22, 2018). "Police: Uber driver was streaming Hulu just before fatal self-driving crash". ars Technica. Archived from the original on June 25, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- ^ Stern, Ray (May 24, 2018). "NTSB Report Suggests Uber's Backup Driver More at Fault Than Car in Fatal Crash". Phoenix New Times. Archived from the original on June 26, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- ^ Garcia, Uriel J. "Maricopa County Attorney's Office cites conflict in Tempe Uber death case". The Republic. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- ^ Buono, Bianca (March 5, 2019). "Yavapai County Attorney's Office concludes Uber is not criminally liable in last year's deadly crash involving a self-driving Uber vehicle in Tempe #12Newspic.twitter.com/wuzobbwZ3Q". @BiancaBuono. Archived from the original on March 15, 2019. Retrieved March 18, 2019.
- ^ "No criminal charges for Uber in Tempe death; police asked to further investigate operator". azcentral. Retrieved March 18, 2019.
- ^ Bichell, Rae Ellen (July 30, 2017). "Scientists Still Seek A Reliable DUI Test For Marijuana". All Things Considered. National Public Radio. Archived from the original on December 15, 2018. Retrieved December 14, 2018.
Though a blood test exists that can detect some of marijuana's components, there is no widely accepted, standardized amount in the breath or blood that gives police or courts or anyone else a good sense of who is impaired. ... "And it shocked everyone, including ourselves, that we could measure, in some of these individuals, THC in the blood for 30 days," says Marilyn Huestis, a toxicologist with the University of Maryland School of Medicine who recently retired from leading a lab at the National Institute on Drug Abuse. ... Conversely, another study showed that people who weren't regular consumers could smoke a joint right in front of researchers and yet show no evidence of cannabis in their blood. So, in addition to being invasive and cumbersome, the blood test can be misleading and a poor indicator of whatever is happening in the brain.
- ^ "Preliminary Report Released for Crash Involving Pedestrian, Uber Technologies, Inc., Test Vehicle". www.ntsb.gov. Archived from the original on September 5, 2018. Retrieved September 11, 2018.
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- ^ Tempe Police Department [@TempePolice] (March 21, 2018). "Tempe Police Vehicular Crimes Unit is actively investigating the details of this incident that occurred on March 18th. We will provide updated information regarding the investigation once it is available" (Tweet) – via Twitter.
- ^ a b Lee, Timothy B. (March 23, 2018). "Police chief said Uber victim "came from the shadows"—don't believe it". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on July 2, 2019. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- ^ Ducey, Douglas A. (August 25, 2015). "Self-Driving Vehicle Testing and Piloting in the State of Arizona; Self-Driving Vehicle Oversight Committee". Office of the Governor Doug Ducey. Archived from the original on March 27, 2018. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ Kang, Cecilia (November 11, 2017). "Where Self-Driving Cars Go to Learn". The New York Times. Archived from the original on March 27, 2018. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ "Governor Ducey Tells Uber 'CA May Not Want You, But AZ Does'" (Press release). Office of the Governor Doug Ducey. December 22, 2016. Archived from the original on March 27, 2018. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ Ducey, Douglas A. (August 25, 2015). "Advancing Autonomous Vehicle Testing and Operating; Prioritizing Public Safety". Office of the Governor Doug Ducey. Retrieved March 27, 2018.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Randazzo, Ryan (March 26, 2018). "Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey suspends testing of Uber self-driving cars". The Arizona Republic. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
- ^ Neuman, Scott (March 29, 2018). "Uber Reaches Settlement With Family Of Arizona Woman Killed By Driverless Car". National Public Radio. Archived from the original on March 29, 2018. Retrieved March 29, 2018.
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- ^ Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (Supreme Court of the United States October 31, 1927) ("In an action for negligence, the question of due care is not left to the jury when resolved by a clear standard of conduct which should be laid down by the courts ... If, at the last moment, [he] found himself in an emergency, it was his own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a stop.").
- ^ Lee, Timothy B. (March 5, 2019). "Uber escapes criminal charges for 2018 self-driving death in Arizona". ars Technica. Archived from the original on September 16, 2020. Retrieved September 16, 2020.
- ^ Lee, Timothy B. (September 15, 2020). "Safety driver in 2018 Uber crash is charged with negligent homicide". ars Technica. Archived from the original on September 16, 2020. Retrieved September 16, 2020.
- ^ "Uber's self-driving operator charged over fatal crash". BBC. September 16, 2018. Archived from the original on October 31, 2020. Retrieved October 27, 2020.
- ^ "Jensen Huang on the Uber Tragedy and Why Nvidia Suspended Testing". IEEE Spectrum. March 30, 2018. Archived from the original on April 12, 2018. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- ^ Wakabayashi, Daisuke (March 23, 2018). "Uber's Self-Driving Cars Were Struggling Before Arizona Crash". The New York Times. Archived from the original on March 26, 2018. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
A video shot from the vehicle's dashboard camera showed the safety driver looking down, away from the road. It also appeared that the driver's hands were not hovering above the steering wheel, which is what drivers are instructed to do so they can quickly retake control of the car. ... Uber moved from two employees in every car to one. The paired employees had been splitting duties — one ready to take over if the autonomous system failed, and another to keep an eye on what the computers were detecting. The second person was responsible for keeping track of system performance as well as labeling data on a laptop computer. Mr. Kallman, the Uber spokesman, said the second person was in the car for purely data related tasks, not safety. ... When Uber moved to a single operator, some employees expressed safety concerns to managers, according to the two people familiar with Uber's operations. They were worried that going solo would make it harder to remain alert during hours of monotonous driving.
- ^ "Uber ATG Safety Report". Uber Advanced Technologies Group. Archived from the original on December 15, 2018. Retrieved December 11, 2018.
Self-driving vehicles hold the potential to drive more safely than a human driver. Computers can look in all directions at once, and they don't get distracted, fatigued, or impaired. (pg 13)
- ^ * "Code § 321.285 Speed restrictions". The State of Iowa. Archived from the original on September 27, 2013. Retrieved August 6, 2013.
Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway and of any other conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law.
- "§ 257.627 Speed limitations". The State of Michigan. Archived from the original on September 27, 2013. Retrieved August 6, 2013.
§ 257.627(1) A person operating a vehicle on a highway shall operate that vehicle at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway and of any other condition then existing. A person shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured, clear distance ahead.
- "Revised Code § 4511.21(A) Speed limits – assured clear distance". The State of Ohio. Archived from the original on July 7, 2013. Retrieved August 6, 2013.
§ 4511.21(A)(A) No person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the street or highway and any other conditions, and no person shall drive any motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
- "Oklahoma Statutes § 47-11-801". The State of Oklahoma. Archived from the original on September 27, 2013. Retrieved August 6, 2013.
A. Any person driving a vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and any other conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
- "§ 257.627 Speed limitations". The State of Michigan. Archived from the original on September 27, 2013. Retrieved August 6, 2013.
- ^
- Bove v. Beckman, 236 Cal. App. 2d 555 (California Appellate Court Aug 16, 1965) (""A person driving an automobile at 65 miles an hour on a highway on a dark night with his lights on low beam affording a forward vision of only about 100 feet was driving at a negligent and excessive speed which was inconsistent with any right of way that he might otherwise have had." (CA Reports Official Headnote #[8])"). See California Official Reports: Online Opinions
- Ruth v. Vroom, 245 Mich. 88 (Supreme Court of Michigan December 4, 1928) ("It is settled in this State that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an automobile at night at such speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance that objects can be seen ahead of it; and, if a driver's vision is obscured by the lights of an approaching car, it is his duty to slacken speed and have his car under such control that he can stop immediately if necessary. ... The rule adopted by this court does not raise merely a rebuttable presumption of negligence. It is a rule of safety. ... It is not enough that a driver be able to begin to stop within the range of his vision, or that he use diligence to stop after discerning an object. The rule makes no allowance for delay in action.").
- Gleason v. Lowe, 232 Mich. 300 (Supreme Court of Michigan October 1, 1925) ("...every man must operate his automobile so that he can stop it within the range of his vision, whether it be daylight or darkness. It makes no difference what may obscure his vision, whether it be a brick wall or the darkness of nightfall. ... He must ... be able to see where he is going, and if his range of vision is 50 feet, if he can see 50 feet ahead of him, he must regulate his speed so that he can stop in a distance of 50 feet; if he can see 20 feet ahead of him, he must regulate his speed so that he can stop within 20 feet, and so on.").
- Morris v. Jenrette Transport Co., 235 N.C. 568 (Supreme Court of North Carolina May 21, 1952) ("It is not enough that the driver of plaintiff's automobile be able to begin to stop within the range of his lights, or that he exercise due diligence after seeing defendants' truck on the highway. He should have so driven that he could and would discover it, perform the manual acts necessary to stop, and bring the automobile to a complete stop within the range of his lights. When blinded by the lights of the oncoming car so that he could not see the required distance ahead, it was the duty of the driver within such distance from the point of blinding to bring his automobile to such control that he could stop immediately, and if he could not then see, he should have stopped. In failing to so drive he was guilty of negligence which patently caused or contributed to the collision with defendants' truck, resulting in injury to plaintiff."...it was his duty to anticipate presence of others, [...] and hazards of the road, such as disabled vehicle, and, in the exercise of due care, to keep his automobile under such control as to be able to stop within the range of his lights").
- Demerest v. Travelers Insurance Company, 234 La. 1048, 234 La. 1040 (Supreme Court of Louisiana April 21, 1958) ("the jurisprudence of this state is that: "when visibility is materially impaired because of smoke, mist, dust, etc., a motorist should reduce his rate of speed to such extent and keep his car under such control as to reduce to a minimum the possibility of accident from collision; and as an extreme measure of safety, it is his duty, when visibility ahead is not possible or greatly obscured, to stop his car and remain at a standstill until conditions warrant going forward.").
- Lindquist v. Thierman, 216 Iowa 170 (Iowa Supreme Court May 15, 1933) ("it is evident that the words "within the assured clear distance ahead", as used in the statute, signify that the operator of the automobile, when driving at night as well as in the day, shall at all times be able to stop his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen ahead of it.").
- Page v. Mazzei, 213 Cal. 644 (Supreme Court of California 21 September 1931) ("Where a car has actually entered an intersection before the other approaches it, the driver of the first car has the right to assume that he will be given the right of way and be permitted to pass through the intersection without danger of collision. He has a right to assume that the driver of the other car will obey the law, slow down, and yield the right of way, if slowing down be necessary to prevent a collision. ( Keyes v. Hawley, 100 Cal. App. 53, 60 [279 Pac. 674].) Nor is a plaintiff required to yield the right of way to one a considerable distance away whose duty it is to slow down in crossing an intersection. See Official Reports Opinions Online").
- Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing Co., 189 Cal. 335 (Supreme Court of California July 27, 1922) ("[The basic speed law] is but a reiteration of the rule, in statutory form, which has always been in force without regard to a statutory promulgation to the effect that drivers or operators of vehicles, and more particularly motor vehicles, must be specially watchful in anticipation of the presence of others at places where other vehicles are constantly passing, and where men, women, and children are liable to be crossing, such as corners at the intersections of streets or other similar places or situations where people are likely to fail to observe an approaching automobile."). See Official Reports Opinions Online
- Whitelaw v. McGilliard, 179 Cal. 349 (Supreme Court of California December 4, 1918) ("The rule regarding right of way does not impose upon the person crossing the street the duty of assuming that the other will continue across an intersecting street without slowing down, as required by law. See Official Reports Opinions Online").
- Booth v. Columbia Casualty Company, 227 La. 932 (Supreme Court of Louisiana April 25, 1955) ("The plaintiff having pre-empted the intersection had the right to proceed and under the well settled jurisprudence the automobile which first enters an intersection has the right of way over an approaching automobile and the driver who does not respect this legal right of the automobile which first entered the intersection to proceed through in safety, is negligent, even though the car thereafter entering the intersection is being driven on a right of way street.").
- Fitts v. Marquis, 127 Me. 75 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine March 15, 1928) ("If a situation indicate collision, the driver, who can do so by the exercise of ordinary care, should avoid doing injury, though this involve that he waive his right of way. The supreme rule of the road is the rule of mutual forbearance.").
- ^ Varghese, Cherian; Shankar, Umesh (May 2007). "Passenger Vehicle Occupant Fatalities by Day and Night – A Contrast". National Center for Statistics and Analysis. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 4, 2016. Retrieved December 12, 2018.
The passenger vehicle occupant fatality rate at nighttime is about three times higher than the daytime rate. ...The data shows a higher percentage of passenger vehicle occupants killed in speeding-related crashes at nighttime.
- ^ National Center for Statistics and Analysis (July 2015). "Overview: 2013 data. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 812 169)" (PDF). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Archived (PDF) from the original on August 23, 2015. Retrieved December 13, 2018.
motor vehicle crashes in 2013 were the leading cause of death for children age 4 and every age from 16 to 24. ... An average of...one fatality every 16 minutes. ... The estimated economic cost of all motor vehicle traffic crashes in the United States in 2010 (the most recent year for which cost data is available) was $242 billion. ... When quality of life valuations are considered, the total value of societal harm from motor vehicle crashes in the United States in 2010 was an estimated $836 billion. ... Speeding is one of the most prevalent factors contributing to traffic crashes.
CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link) - ^ McKernan, Megan (May 13, 2015). "AAA Tests Shine High-Beam on Headlight Limitations". AAA Automotive Research Center. Archived from the original on March 6, 2019. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
AAA's test results suggest that halogen headlights, found in over 80 percent of vehicles on the road today, may fail to safely illuminate unlit roadways at speeds as low as 40 mph (64 km/h). ...high-beam settings on halogen headlights...may only provide enough light to safely stop at speeds of up to 48 mph, leaving drivers vulnerable at highway speeds...Additional testing found that while the advanced headlight technology found in HID and LED headlights illuminated dark roadways 25 percent further than their halogen counterparts, they still may fail to fully illuminate roadways at speeds greater than 45 mph (72 km/h). High-beam settings on these advanced headlights offered significant improvement over low-beam settings, lighting distances of up to 500 feet (equal to 55 mph). Despite the increase, even the most advanced headlights fall 60 percent short of the sight distance that the full light of day provides.
- ^ Leighton Walter Kille (October 5, 2014). "Transportation safety over time: Cars, planes, trains, walking, cycling". Harvard Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center and the Carnegie-Knight Initiative. Archived from the original on December 16, 2018. Retrieved December 13, 2018.
Since 1980 the average horsepower of U.S. cars more than doubled, and speed limits have risen significantly, greatly increasing the potential for damage, loss of life and injuries. ... "One might argue that transportation equipment, and in particular the motor vehicle, must be the most dangerous machines that we interact with on a daily basis," the researcher states. "The annual toll in motor vehicle crashes exceeds the deaths resulting from the next most dangerous mechanical device, firearms, by about 40%."
- ^ C.N. Kloeden; A.J. McLean; V.M. Moore; G. Ponte. "Travelling Speed and the Risk of Crash Involvement" (PDF). NHMRC Road Accident Research Unit, The University of Adelaide. p. 54. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 2, 2018. Retrieved December 16, 2018.
the relative risk of an injury crash when travelling at 65 km/h in a 60 km/h speed limit zone is similar to that associated with driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05 g/100mL. By strange coincidence, if the blood alcohol concentration is multiplied by 100, and the resulting number is added to 60 km/h, the risk of involvement in a casualty crash associated with that travelling speed is almost the same as the risk associated with the blood alcohol concentration. Hence, the risk is similar for 0.05 and 65, as noted; for 0.08 and 68; for .12 and 72, and so on...
- ^ "Uber Puts First Self-Driving Car Back on the Road Since Death". Transport Topics. December 22, 2018. Archived from the original on February 21, 2019. Retrieved February 23, 2019.
- ^ "Michael Laris, The Washington Post, December 20, 2018. "Nine months after deadly crash, Uber is testing self-driving cars again in Pittsburgh"". Archived from the original on February 23, 2019. Retrieved February 20, 2019.
enlaces externos
- NTSB investigation of Uber crash, Accident No. HWY18FH010
- Dashcam video related to accident, via BBC
- Davies, Alex (June 22, 2018). "The unavoidable folly of making humans train self-driving cars". Wired. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
- Video illustrating issue of speed and Sight Distance