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Marchioness after the collision, showing the upper saloon completely missing
Marquesa , varada en la orilla norte del río Támesis después de haber sido levantada del lecho del río.

El desastre de la marquesa fue una colisión entre dos barcos en el río Támesis en Londres en la madrugada del 20 de agosto de 1989, que resultó en la muerte de 51 personas. El vapor de placer Marchioness se hundió después de ser golpeado dos veces por la draga Bowbelle alrededor de la 1:46 am, entre el puente ferroviario de Cannon Street y el puente Southwark .

La marquesa había sido contratada por la noche para una fiesta de cumpleaños y tenía alrededor de 130 personas a bordo, cuatro de las cuales eran miembros de la tripulación y el personal del bar. Ambos barcos se dirigían río abajo, contra la marea, y el Bowbelle viajaba más rápido que el barco más pequeño. Aunque se desconocen los caminos exactos tomados por los barcos, la serie precisa de eventos y sus ubicaciones, la investigación posterior consideró probable que Bowbelle golpeara a Marchioness por la retaguardia, lo que hizo que esta última girara hacia el puerto, donde fue golpeada nuevamente. luego empujó a lo largo, dando vueltas y ser empujado bajo Bowbelle ' arco de s. La marquesa tardó treinta segundos en hundirse; Se encontraron 24 cadáveres dentro del barco cuando fue levantado.

Una investigación de la División de Investigación de Accidentes Marítimos (MAIB) culpó a la falta de vigías, pero su informe fue criticado por las familias de las víctimas, ya que la MAIB no había entrevistado a nadie sobre Marchioness o Bowbelle , sino que se basó en entrevistas policiales. El gobierno se negó a realizar una investigación, a pesar de la presión de las familias. Douglas Henderson, el capitán de Bowbelle , fue acusado de no tener un vigía efectivo en el barco, pero dos casos en su contra terminaron con un jurado colgado . Henderson no había emitido una llamada de auxilio después de la colisión y no desplegó ni los aros salvavidas ni la balsa salvavidas.. Una acusación privada por homicidio involuntario contra cuatro directores de South Coast Shipping Company, los propietarios de Bowbelle y homicidio corporativo contra la empresa fue desestimada por falta de pruebas.

Una investigación formal en 2000 concluyó que "La causa básica de la colisión es clara. La vigilancia de ambos buques fue deficiente. Ninguna nave vio a la otra a tiempo para tomar medidas para evitar la colisión". [1] Las críticas también se dirigieron a los propietarios de ambos barcos, así como al Departamento de Transporte y la Autoridad del Puerto de Londres . La colisión y los informes posteriores llevaron a un aumento de las medidas de seguridad en el Támesis y se instalaron cuatro nuevas estaciones de botes salvavidas en el río.

Antecedentes [ editar ]

Marquesa [ editar ]

El barco de recreo Marchioness fue construido en 1923 por los Salter Brothers de Oxford para Joseph Mears , un hombre de negocios cuyos intereses incluían correr lanchas de recreo en el río Támesis . [2] Tenía 85,5 pies (26,1 m) de largo y 14,5 pies (4,4 m) en la viga , y medía 46,19 toneladas brutas . Pasó la mayor parte de su vida en el Támesis, incluso cuando fue requisada durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial por el Servicio de Emergencias del Thames Hospital, cuando estaba estacionada en Dagenham . Su servicio incluyó ser uno de los pequeños barcos que ayudaron en la evacuación de Dunkerque de 1940 . [2][3] [4] Marchioness fue vendida a Thames Launches en 1945, cuando la compañía de Mears se cerró. Fue comprada por Tidal Cruises Ltd en 1978 y las obras superiores fueron reconstruidas para formar un salón superior e inferior. El nuevo salón superior obstruía la visión desde la caseta del timón , [2] [3] y, según estableció la investigación posterior, faltaban salidas de emergencia de fácil acceso, particularmente desde las cubiertas inferiores. [5] La marquesa tenía siete balsas salvavidas, cada una de las cuales podía sostener a veinte personas, y sietearos salvavidas, cada una de las cuales podía sostener a dos personas. [6] Registrada en Londres, tenía licencia para transportar 165 pasajeros. [7]Desde principios de la década de los setenta se incrementó el número de embarcaciones para fiestas nocturnas o nocturnas y discotecas, y Marchioness formaba parte de este mercado. [8]

La marquesa llevaba una tripulación de dos personas: su capitán era Stephen Faldo; el compañero era Andrew McGowan. La noche de su hundimiento, también llevaba a dos miembros del personal del bar. [9] [10] Faldo y McGowan tenían una sociedad comercial, Top Bar Enterprises, que proporcionó al personal del bar y bebida para la fiesta. [11] Faldo tenía 29 años en el momento del hundimiento. Había comenzado a trabajar en el Támesis a la edad de 17 años y había obtenido su licencia completa de waterman fluvial en junio de 1984. Comenzó a trabajar en Tidal Cruises en 1986 y se convirtió en el capitán permanente de Marchioness en 1987. [12] [13]Se había olvidado de renovar su licencia de fluvial en el período previo a la noche de la colisión, y técnicamente no tenía derecho a capitanear el barco esa noche. Una investigación posterior consideró que la falta de licencia era "un punto menor porque sin duda estaba calificado para hacerlo y podría haber renovado su licencia pagando 50 peniques". [14] McGowan, de 21 años, se convirtió en aprendiz de un barquero en junio de 1986. En febrero de 1988 había completado cursos en la Autoridad del Puerto de Londres para cartas y marinería, y obtuvo su licencia de aprendiz en mayo de 1988; se unió a Marchioness como miembro de la tripulación casi al mismo tiempo. [13] [15]

Bowbelle [ editar ]

La draga de agregados Bowbelle

La draga de agregados Bowbelle fue lanzada en 1964 por Ailsa Shipbuilding Company de Troon , Escocia. Tenía 262 pies (79,9 m) de largo y 45 pies (13,8 m) en la viga; su tonelaje de peso muerto fue de 1.850 toneladas largas (1.880 t) [16] y midió 1.474,72 toneladas brutas. Bowbelle fue uno de los seis barcos "Bow" propiedad de East Coast Aggregates Limited; fueron administrados por South Coast Shipping Company Limited. [a] East Coast Aggregates Limited (ECA) formaba parte del mayor RMC Group , una empresa de productos de hormigón . [18] Bowbelle Tenía una tripulación de nueve: un capitán, dos compañeros, tres ingenieros, dos marineros capaces y un cocinero. El capitán del barco, Douglas Henderson, de 31 años, [19] realizó un aprendizaje en aguas profundas hasta 1978 y se unió a ECA en noviembre de 1987, cuando se convirtió en segundo oficial en Bowsprite . En mayo de 1989 se convirtió en el maestro de Bowbelle . [20]

Buques de ECA, incluido Bowbelle , habían estado involucrados anteriormente en accidentes en el Támesis. [21] En julio de 1981 hubo una colisión entre Bowtrader y la lancha de pasajeros Pride of Greenwich ; tres meses después, Bowtrader estuvo involucrado en una colisión con Hurlingham , otro crucero de placer propiedad de Tidal Cruises. [22] Bowbelle chocó con el puente ferroviario de Cannon Street en mayo de 1982 [21] y, al mes siguiente, estuvo a punto de chocar con un barco de pasajeros. [23]

En el momento de la colisión con Marchioness , Bowbelle transportaba agregado y fue recortado en la popa; [b] esto, junto con el equipo de dragado, limitó la visión hacia adelante desde el puente . [17] El 19 de agosto de 1989 Henderson visitó varios bares durante un período de tres horas y media y bebió seis pintas (3,4 l; 120 imp fl oz) de cerveza. Regresó al barco a las 6:00 pm para comer y dormir un poco; [25] uno de los miembros de la compañía del barco, Terence Blayney, quien actuó como vigía de proa esa noche, estaba con Henderson y bebió siete pintas durante el mismo período. [26]

Jonathan Phang y Antonio de Vasconcellos [ editar ]

La marquesa fue contratada para una fiesta para la noche del 19 al 20 de agosto de 1989. Fue organizada por Jonathan Phang , un agente fotográfico, para celebrar el cumpleaños 26 de Antonio de Vasconcellos, quien trabajaba en un banco mercantil . Ambos eran buenos amigos y socios comerciales en una agencia fotográfica. Phang pagó £ 695 para alquilar el barco de 1:00 am a 6:00 am, con extra por el alquiler de la discoteca, comida y bebidas. Muchos de los asistentes a la fiesta también tenían veintitantos años; algunos eran exalumnos y otros trabajaban en moda, periodismo, modelaje y finanzas. [27] [28] El plan era que la marquesa bajara río abajo desde Embankment Pier cerca de la estación de tren de Charing Cross.hasta Tower Bridge , luego de regreso a Charing Cross para aterrizar algunos de los pasajeros. Marchioness luego viajaría a Greenwich antes de regresar nuevamente a Charing Cross, llegando a las 5:45 am. [29]

20 de agosto de 1989 [ editar ]

0:00 a. M. - 7:00 a. M. [ Editar ]

Mapa de rutas y puntos

La noche del 19 al 20 de agosto de 1989 fue clara; eran tres días después de la luna llena y había buena visibilidad. [30] Había un viento insignificante. [31] Era una marea de primavera , registrada como una de las más altas del año y el río estaba a media marea en el momento de la colisión; corría río arriba a una velocidad de tres nudos . [32] [33] Hay varias versiones de los caminos que tomaron las embarcaciones en la aproximación al puente de Southwark y más allá, y no hay acuerdo sobre el momento en que las dos embarcaciones chocaron. [C]Gran parte de la evidencia recopilada en investigaciones posteriores fue inconsistente y cualquier descripción de las acciones de los barcos se basa en velocidades promedio y posiciones probables. [29] [35]

A la 1:12 am Bowbelle dejó su puesto en el muelle Nine Elms cerca de la central eléctrica de Battersea y comunicó su traslado por radio VHF al Thames Navigation Service (TNS), con sede en Woolwich . Informó que pasó el puente Vauxhall a la 1:20 am y el puente Waterloo a la 1:35 am. De acuerdo con el procedimiento habitual, TNS por radio a todo el tráfico fluvial a las 1:15 am y las 01:45 am, informándoles de Bowbelle ' conducto aguas abajo s. [29] [36] Bowbelle ' velocidad media s era aproximadamente 5,5 nudos (6,3 mph; 10.2 km / h) sobre el suelo. [37] [d]

Se suponía que la marquesa saldría de Embankment Pier a la 1:00 am, pero se retrasó hasta la 1:25 am. No se hizo un recuento del número de pasajeros, pero el número aceptado a bordo es 130 [38] o 131. [29] Faldo estaba en la timonera, donde permaneció hasta la colisión. Al dirigirse río abajo, justo antes del puente Blackfriars , Marchioness pasó junto a su hermana, el crucero de recreo Hurlingham, que también organizaba una discoteca esa noche y también se dirigía en la misma dirección. Marquesa ' velocidad media s estaba alrededor de 3,2 nudos (3,7 mph; 5.9 km / h) sobre el suelo. [39] [e]Pasó por el arco central del puente de Blackfriars; en este punto, estaba aproximadamente a 1 ⁄ 2 milla (0,80 km) frente a Bowbelle . [40] En algún momento después del puente de Blackfriars, Bowbelle adelantó a Hurlingham y se dirigió hacia el arco central del puente de Southwark. La marquesa también pasó por el arco central, pero probablemente hacia el lado sur. [41]

El lado de babor de Marchioness , que muestra el punto del segundo impacto de Bowbelle . La tablas de madera en la parte superior era el suelo del salón superior, que fue estafado por Bowbelle ' ancla s.

Cuando Bowbelle estaba a menos de 160 pies (50 m) de Marchioness , la embarcación más pequeña se vio afectada por las fuerzas de interacción: el agua fue empujada por delante del gran barco. [42] Alrededor de las 1:46 de la mañana, justo después de marquesa pasa por debajo del puente de Southwark, que fue golpeada dos veces por Bowbelle ' arco de s. El primer impacto fue de 20 pies (6,1 m) de marquesa ' popa s, que tuvo el efecto de convertir el vaso más pequeño a puerto. El segundo impacto se produjo a 10 m (33 pies) de la popa y provocó que la embarcación de recreo girara alrededor de la proa del Bowbelle y la volcara de costado, probablemente en un ángulo de 120 °. [43] La superestructura superior deMarquesa fue arrancada por Bowbelle ' ancla s. [44] El salón inferior se inundó rápidamente y las luces se apagaron. El peso y el impulso de Bowbelle empujaron a la marquesa bajo el agua y se hundió, la popa primero, a los 30 segundos de ser golpeada. [29] [45] McGowan había sido arrojado desde el bote al agua, pero volvió a subir a bordo para atar la puerta del lado de babor, que conducía a la pista de baile, para permitir que varias personas escaparan. [46] Un testigo presencial del accidente, Keith Fawkes-Underwood, que vio el incidente desde la orilla sur del Támesis , informó:

La barcaza chocó con el barco de recreo y lo golpeó en su centro y luego lo montó, empujándolo bajo el agua como un barco de juguete. En cuestión de unos 20 segundos, la embarcación de recreo había desaparecido por completo debajo del agua. [47]

De las 130 personas a bordo de la marquesa , 79 sobrevivieron y 51 murieron. Entre los muertos estaban de Vasconcellos y Faldo. [f] Nadie en Bowbelle resultó herido. [10] [50] El barco se hundió tan rápido que la mayoría de las personas no pudieron localizar o usar las balsas, boyas o chalecos salvavidas. [51] La supervivencia de los de Marchioness dependía en parte de su ubicación dentro de la embarcación. Se sabía que 41 personas habían estado en la cubierta de proa y la timonera, de las cuales 9 murieron y 32 sobrevivieron, una tasa de supervivencia del 78%. De las 13 personas que se sabe que estuvieron en el salón inferior, 9 murieron y 4 sobrevivieron (una tasa de supervivencia del 31%). [52] Uno de los del salón inferior que sobrevivió fue Iain Philpott, quien dijo en su declaración a la policía:

Recuerdo que me di la vuelta para dirigirme hacia las ventanas para escapar del bote, el agua comenzó a entrar al bote por la ventana, supe en este punto que el bote se iba a hundir. En cuestión de segundos se apagaron las luces generales, todo estaba a oscuras ... Entonces fui arrojado hacia adelante por una pared de agua, todo el bote se llenó de agua instantáneamente ... Cuando salí a la superficie estaba a cierta distancia de la Marquesa que estaba parcialmente sumergido. [53]

Hurlingham estaba entre 45 y 60 metros (150-200 pies) de distancia de la colisión, [31] y los que estaban a bordo estaban en la mejor posición para ser testigos presenciales. [54] George Williams, el capitán del barco, hizo una llamada por radio VHF a la División de Thames del Servicio de Policía Metropolitana , con sede en Wapping : "Policía de Woolwich, Policía de Wapping, Policía de Wapping, Emergencia, barco de recreo hundido, Cannon Street Puente ferroviario, toda la ayuda de emergencia por favor ". [55] La llamada también fue atendida por el TNS, que escuchó mal la ubicación como Battersea Bridge; La División del Támesis solo escuchó parte de la llamada, por lo que TNS les informó que la policía debería estar presente en Battersea Bridge. [31][55] [56]

Vista aérea, desde la orilla sur, de Cannon Street Railway Bridge (más cercano a la cámara) y Southwark Bridge. El Puente del Milenio , visible en la parte superior de la imagen, no estaba en pie en el momento del accidente.

Después de chocar con Marchioness , Bowbelle chocó contra uno de los muelles del puente de Cannon Street y llamó por radio a TNS a la 1:48 am para corregir la referencia inexacta al puente de Battersea; a la 1:49 am, Henderson informó a TNS:

Tengo que ponerme en marcha ahora y salir a través de puentes. Creo que he chocado con una embarcación de recreo. Se ha hundido. Me estoy alejando de los puentes ahora. Me distrajeron las luces intermitentes de otra embarcación de recreo. Mi embarcación se dirigía hacia el exterior, acercándose al puente de Cannon Street y, bueno, perdí la tercera clase, um y no lo sé después de eso, realmente no puedo decir nada más, señor. Encima. [57]

Después de la transmisión de radio, Bowbelle viajó río abajo hasta Gallions Reach , donde echó el ancla. Su tripulación no desplegó los aros salvavidas del barco, los dispositivos de flotación o el bote salvavidas y no participó en los intentos de rescatar a los supervivientes. [58] [59] Todos los barcos en el área recibieron instrucciones de ir al área para ayudar con el rescate. [60] Hurlingham ya estaba en la escena, y los pasajeros y la tripulación arrojaron aros salvavidas y ayudas de flotabilidad a los que estaban en el agua. Muchos de los de Marchioness fueron arrastrados a jaulas de recolección de madera flotante , y Hurlinghamrecogió a varios supervivientes: los pasajeros subieron a las jaulas para ayudar a la gente a salir del agua. Luego, la embarcación dejó caer a todos los pasajeros y 28 sobrevivientes en el cercano muelle de la policía de Waterloo (ahora la estación de botes salvavidas Tower) antes de llevar a los miembros de los servicios de emergencia al lugar de la colisión. [61] [62] El muelle de la policía de Waterloo se utilizó como punto de aterrizaje para todas las víctimas y los primeros en responder de los servicios de emergencia establecieron un punto de tratamiento y procesamiento allí. [63] Lanchas policiales rescataron a más de la mitad de los sobrevivientes del río; algunos llegaron ellos mismos a la orilla del río. [63]

Less than half an hour after Marchioness was hit, a major incident was declared with an incident room at New Scotland Yard. The police's body recovery team were also deployed, and the first body arrived at Wapping Police Station—where the Thames Division were based—at 6:50 am.[63] The station acted as a holding area for bodies before they were taken to the mortuary in Westminster.[64]

7:00 am – 0:00 am[edit]

Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, returned home early from her holiday in Austria to be briefed by Michael Portillo, the Minister of State for Transport. His senior in the department, the Secretary of State for Transport Cecil Parkinson, also returned home early in response.[65] Portillo announced that an investigation would be made by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), but that no decision had yet been made as to whether to hold a public inquiry.[13] Within 24 hours of the collision, the decision was made that there would be no public inquiry, and that the MAIB investigation would be sufficient.[66]

A Port of London (PLA) hydrographic surveyor located the wreckage of Marchioness and, during the late afternoon of 20 August, work began on lifting the vessel. The bodies of 24 party-goers were found on board, 12 of them in the lower saloon.[52][63][67] The wreckage was moored against the north bank of the Thames.[68]

While the lifting operation was progressing, police arrested and interviewed Henderson and Kenneth Noble, Bowbelle's second mate who was at the wheel for the collision. Both men were breathalysed;[13] the police announced soon afterwards that alcohol was not a cause of the collision.[69]

Inquests and inquiries[edit]

Looking upstream to Cannon Street railway bridge, scene of the disaster

1989 to 1997[edit]

On the day following the collision Paul Knapman, the coroner for the City of Westminster, opened and adjourned the inquest into the deaths.[13] In the days after the collision, bodies were still being found and recovered from the water.[g] To help with the identification process, Knapman opted to use several methods, including dental records, identification of personal items and clothing descriptions from descriptions provided by the families, and fingerprints. As part of their approach, Knapman decided that:

With those bodies which were not recovered from the Marchioness and which would be likely to surface only when putrification and bloating meant that they would float, the following would apply:

a. Visual identification would be unreliable, perhaps impossible, and cause distress for relatives so that it should not be used: and
b. In circumstances where it was impossible to take adequate fingerprints from the bodies without removing the hands of those bodies to the Fingerprint Laboratory, those hands should be removed.[72]

During the post-mortem examinations, 25 pairs of hands were removed; no written records were kept of the removal.[73][74] No guidelines were issued over which hands should be removed and no individual was given responsibility for making the decision. The majority were identified through other means—visual identification of the face, or through identification of clothing or personal items, and only four of the victims were identified through their fingerprints.[75] Families of the victims later complained that they were not told in a timely fashion that bodies had been recovered, that some were denied access to view the bodies of their relatives,[h] and were not told of the processes that would be used—including that the hands would be removed. One family was shown the body of the wrong person, then given the right body, but without the hands; these were sent on later with apologies, and a request not to tell other parents about the need to remove them as this was a 'one-off' mistake.[77][78][i]

On 24 August Marchioness was taken from her mooring near Southwark Bridge, and towed downstream to Greenwich, where she was broken up.[80]

The MAIB issued an interim report towards the end of August, with recommendations as to increasing safety on the Thames. These included a requirement that vessels over 130 ft (40 m) had to have a forward lookout in contact with the bridge by radio, and tighter controls on the passage of vessels along the upper Thames.[81] Their investigation continued with a reconstruction of the events on the night of 16–17 September; Bowbelle took part, and a PLA launch was used as a stand-in for Marchioness. This was later criticised by Brian Toft, a disaster and risk-management expert commissioned by the Marchioness Action Group (MAG), as being unsatisfactory. Toft identified that there were several problems, including no second pleasure cruiser, no fare-paying passengers and no disco lights or music included in the re-enactment.[82]

In October 1989 the companies behind Bowbelle and Marchioness agreed to pay up to £6 million in compensation to the families of the victims, without either company admitting any liability for the crash.[83] The sum offered was under a calderbank condition that the offer stood to be withdrawn if a judge awarded a lower amount.[84] A week later a report was compiled for Allan Green, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), which recommended that criminal charges should not be brought against Henderson.[83]

That December, Knapman met the DPP to discuss the progress of the inquests. Green agreed that the first part of the inquest should go ahead—dealing with the causes of death—irrespective of the other investigations of the police and the possibility of later criminal charges. A second part of the inquest—establishing the responsibility of the crash and making safety recommendations—would be discussed at a later stage.[85] When Knapman re-opened the inquest on 23 April 1990, he was critical of the DPP for taking eight months to decide on whether to bring criminal charges against anyone, which meant that a full inquest could not take place in case it prejudiced any future trial.[86] The inquest was, in effect, a series of what the legal scholar Hazel Hartley calls "mini inquests", one each for each of the 51 bodies.[87]

On 26 April the DPP stepped in to stop the inquest, stating that charges would now be brought against Henderson.[88] Because of his decision to stop the inquest, the information on how the collision occurred, who was to blame or what could be done to ensure it could not be repeated, was not considered.[89] Henderson was charged under the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 for failing to have an effective lookout on the vessel.[88] The case against him opened on 4 April 1991 at the Old Bailey[90] and ran to 14 April. The jury failed to reach a decision;[91] the DPP decided that a retrial would be in the public interest.[92] This took place between 17 and 31 July the same year; it again ended with a hung jury.[93][94]

At the end of July 1991 Ivor Glogg, the husband of one of the victims, began a private prosecution for manslaughter against four directors of South Coast Shipping Company, the owners of Bowbelle, and corporate manslaughter against the South Coast Shipping Company.[95][96] Two weeks later the Transport Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, took the decision to publish the MAIB Report, repeating that because an appropriate body had undertaken an investigation, there was no requirement to have a public inquiry. Families of the victims were angry with the move, pointing out that Rifkind had delayed publication of the report on the basis that publication could prejudice the case against Henderson, but that the publication could now jeopardise Glogg's private prosecution.[97] The DPP demanded that Glogg hand over the papers for the case, stating he would take it over, then drop it; Glogg refused to comply, stating that it was out of the remit of the DPP, and that it was for a magistrates' court to decide if the case was adequate. The DPP withdrew and allowed Glogg's case to proceed.[98][99] The case was dismissed after the magistrate stated that there was insufficient evidence.[100]

Simplified version of the incident, according to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch investigation. (Not to scale)[101]

The MAIB report considered that Marchioness had altered her course to port, which put her in line with Bowbelle's path.[102] The report concluded that:

18.3  ... no one in either vessel was aware of the other's presence until very shortly before the collision. No one on the bridge of BOWBELLE was aware of MARCHIONESS until the collision occurred.

The immediate cause of the casualty was therefore failure of look-out in each vessel.

18.4  The principal contributory factors were that:

visibility from the wheelhouse of each vessel was seriously restricted;
both vessels were using the middle part of the fairway and the centre arches of the bridges across the river;
clear instructions were not given to the forward look-out in BOWBELLE.[103]

The families of the victims criticised the MAIB report. They pointed out that the investigation had not directly interviewed anyone on Marchioness or Bowbelle, but relied on the police interviews; they stated that there were errors in methodology, approach and fact within the report. Toft provided a critique of the MAIB's work and concluded that:

The inconsistencies, contradictions, confusions, conjecture, erroneous conclusions, missing and inappropriate recommendations as well as epistemological, ontological and methodological problems, created by the then current maritime safety culture ... raises serious doubts as to the objectivity of the investigation, the validity of the findings, the judgement of the Department of Transport in holding an inquiry of this type, and as a result whether or not all the appropriate lessons were uncovered during the MAIB's inquiry into this tragedy.[104]

The report was handed to Rifkind, who again declined to open a public inquiry, but commissioned a private one—the Hayes Report, published in July 1992—that looked at health and safety on the Thames, rather than the sinking of Marchioness.[105][106][j]

In 1992 the families of the victims became aware that the hands had been removed from many of the bodies.[107] In March that year an account in The Mail on Sunday, "Cover up!", was published;[k] when Knapman met the two journalists to deny the accusation of a cover-up, he advised them not to base reports on what Margaret Lockwood-Croft, the mother of one of the victims, said: he described her as "unhinged". He also showed them photographs of the victims, without discussing the matter with the families.[108] In July, Knapman informed the families that the inquests—suspended since April 1990 because of the case against Henderson—would not be recommenced. The families tried to apply for a judicial review on the basis that "the use of the word 'unhinged' and reference to a number of 'mentally unwell' relatives betrayed an attitude of hostility, however unconscious, towards ... members of the Marchioness Action Group".[109] Initially turned down by High Court, the Court of Appeal then found in favour of the group to allow an appeal. In June 1994 Knapman and his assistant were stood down and replaced by another coroner, John Burton. He was initially dismissive of the concerns of the MAG, accused their solicitor of trying to mislead the Court of Appeal and indicated that he was inclined not to grant any further inquests. Burton was told that another judicial review would be applied for if he refused to hold the inquests, and he subsequently announced that they would go ahead.[110]

The resumed inquest took place in March and April 1995.[111] When questioned about the MAIB report, Captain James de Coverley—one of the report's authors—withdrew the suggestion that Marchioness had steered to port in the last moments before the crash, saying it had never been his intention that the text could be understood that way. In summing up, Burton instructed the coroner's jury that a verdict of unlawful killing could not be applied to anyone who had already been cleared by a court. The jury retired for four hours and returned a verdict of unlawful killing. Burton asked them "Did you understand my Direction?", although the decision stood.[111]

1997 to 2001[edit]

Following the 1997 election, which brought the Labour Party to power, the MAG petitioned John Prescott, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Deputy Prime Minister, to open an inquest. In August 1999 he instructed Lord Justice Clarke to undertake a non-statutory inquiry into safety on the Thames.[112] Clarke reported in February 2000, concluding:

I was asked to advise
whether there is a case for a further investigation or inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the MARCHIONESS disaster and its causes on 20th August 1989.
My answer to that question is yes.[113]
Simplified version of the incident, according to the Clarke Inquiry (not to scale)[114]

Prescott accepted the recommendation and the public inquest took place in October and November 2000, with Clarke chairing proceedings; the report was published in March 2001.[112] Clarke concluded that "The basic cause of the collision is clear. It was poor lookout on both vessels. Neither vessel saw the other in time to take action to avoid the collision."[1] The underlying causes on why neither vessel saw the other were that Henderson did not ensure a proper lookout on Bowbelle; that Blayney the lookout was not equipped with suitable radio equipment to inform his captain; that Faldo had not set up a lookout system on Marchioness, nor did he keep a lookout aft himself.[115] Focusing on Henderson, Clarke wrote "We cannot stress too strongly how much we deprecate Captain Henderson's conduct in drinking so much alcohol before returning to his vessel as master";[116] Clarke added "but we do not think that it is shown on the balance of probabilities that Captain Henderson would have acted differently if he had not consumed the alcohol or had the amount of sleep which he had".[117] The captain was also criticised for his actions after the collision, when he did not broadcast a mayday call and did not deploy either the lifebuoys or life raft, in contravention of section 422 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.[118] Clarke also found that the owners and managers of the vessels held some blame. For Bowbelle, the owners "must bear their share of responsibility for the collision for failing properly to instruct their masters and crews and for failing thereafter to monitor them";[119] the owners of Marchioness gave no instructions about all-round lookouts; and failed to adequately instruct, supervise or monitor their boats' captains.[120]

Clarke also allotted blame to the Department of Transport, who, he said, were "well aware of the problems posed by the limited visibility from the steering positions on both types of vessel" yet failed to deal with the problem. The PLA also failed to act in this regard, and should have issued instructions for the placement of lookouts on such vessels.[121] Clarke found that because no individual's actions could be ascertained as the single cause of the collision, a manslaughter charge would be bound to fail.[122]

Compensation[edit]

Memorial plaque on the south bank of the Thames

English law provides no compensation for fatal accidents, other than for funeral expenses, unless financial dependency at the time of death can be proved. In most cases, the families of the Marchioness victims received little more than the cost of the funeral. Louise Christian, the human rights solicitor who acted for the families of the victims, wrote that "When young unmarried people die in circumstances of gross negligence as here, death comes cheap and the boat owners and their insurance companies suffer little in the way of financial penalties".[123]

Civil claims for compensation were brought on behalf of the victims' families; the amounts received ranged between £3,000 and £190,000. Eileen Dallaglio, the mother of Francesca Dallaglio, one of the victims, reported that she had been awarded £45,000. After the costs of having to go to the Court of Appeal to obtain damages, and the bills for the memorial and funeral service, she was left with £312.14.[124] According to Irwin Mitchell, the solicitors who represented the families, the amounts were "modest" because many of those killed were young, without dependants and had no established careers.[125] Under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, damages were only paid to certain categories of people, and were based on the economic loss to the victim.[126]

Aftermath[edit]

Tower Lifeboat Station, London

After recommendations made in the Clarke report relating to the improvement of river safety, the government asked the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the PLA and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) to work together to set up a dedicated search and rescue service for the Thames. In January 2001 the RNLI agreed to set up four lifeboat stations—at Gravesend, Tower, Chiswick and Teddington—which were opened in January the following year.[127][128]

Following the report, Prescott ordered the MCA to conduct a competency review into the actions and behaviour of Henderson. This took place in December 2001. The MCA picked up on something that had been raised during the Clarke inquiry: that Henderson had forged certificates and testimonials of his service from 1985–1986. They stated that they "deplored" the forgeries, which Henderson had used to gain his Master's Licence.[129] The MCA concluded that he should be allowed to keep his master's certificate as he met all the service and medical fitness requirements; they stated that the agency "accepted that events which occurred in 1986 have no practical relevance on his current fitness".[129]

Memorial in Southwark Cathedral

In 2001 the Royal Humane Society made nineteen bravery awards to people involved in rescuing the victims of the collision, many of whom were passengers on Hurlingham. Eight policemen on duty that night were given the Metropolitan Police Commissioner's High Commendation.[130]

Following the Clarke report and a subsequent review of emergency planning procedures, the government introduced the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 that provided a coherent framework and guidance for emergency planning and response.[78] Clarke's recommendations to examine the coroner system were a major factor in the overhaul of the system that resulted in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.[131]

The events surrounding the sinking of Marchioness have been examined or depicted on television several times, including a documentary on Channel 4's Dispatches in December 1994,[132] a drama-documentary in the BBC Two series Disaster in March 1999[133] and a 2009 documentary focusing on Jonathan Phang.[134] A drama about the events surrounding the disaster was scheduled for broadcast on ITV in late 2007. Some of the victims' families requested that the programme should not be broadcast, although some thought it positive that it was going to be shown. Speaking at the Edinburgh International Television Festival that August, the former ITV Director of Drama Nick Elliot confirmed that the drama would not be shown "in its present form"; it has since been shown on French television.[135][136]

In September 1989 a black granite memorial stone was uncovered in the nave of Southwark Cathedral, about 400 ft (120 m) from the site of the collision. The stone lists the names and ages of those who died.[137] Memorial services have been held at the cathedral on anniversaries of the sinking.[62][138]

Bowbelle was sold in 1992 to Sealsands Maritime, operating out of Kingstown, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; she was renamed Billo. Four years later she was sold to Antonio Pereira & Filhos of Funchal, Madeira, who named the vessel Bom Rei. She broke in two and sank off Madeira the same year with the loss of one crew member.[16][139][140]

See also[edit]

  • List of disasters in Great Britain and Ireland by death toll
  • SS Californian, another ship that was subject to a controversial MAIB report around the same time as the Marchioness, in early 1992.

Notes and references[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Of the five other vessels, Bowbelle and Bowtrader regularly travelled along the upper Thames; a third vessel, Bowsprite, had previously navigated the same waters, but sank in July 1988.[17]
  2. ^ A vessel's trim is the difference between the draughts fore and aft. Bowbelle was trimmed down at the stern, which meant the bow was higher, thus reducing the forward visibility.[24]
  3. ^ Positions given by eye-witnesses vary from west of Southwark Bridge to near Cannon Street Bridge, although the weight of reports put the collision between the two bridges, in the middle of the river.[34]
  4. ^ 5.5 knots over the ground, against a tide of 3 knots (3.5 mph; 5.6 km/h), equates to a speed of 8.5 knots (9.8 mph; 15.7 km/h) through the water.[37]
  5. ^ 3.2 knots over the ground, against a tide of 3 knots (3.5 mph; 5.6 km/h), equates to a speed of 6.5 knots (7.5 mph; 12.0 km/h) through the water.[37]
  6. ^ The youngest victim was 19-year-old ballerina Francesca Dallaglio, the sister of the former England rugby captain Lawrence.[48] Faldo's son, Jeff Brazier, appeared in reality television programmes, and was married to the Big Brother contestant Jade Goody.[49]
  7. ^ Most bodies were recovered between 20 and 23 August. The last body to be recovered was that of de Vasconcellos, which was located on 1 September.[70][71]
  8. ^ Margaret Lockwood-Croft, the mother of one of the victims, was later shown police photographs of some of the victims: in her opinion the bodies were still acceptable to be viewed and had not decomposed too far to make recognition difficult.[76]
  9. ^ The hands of one of the victims were lost by the coroner's office, and only found four years later, wrapped in plastic at the back of a fridge.[79]
  10. ^ The Hayes Report was written by John Hayes, the secretary general of the Law Society.[106]
  11. ^ The article was Wigmore, Bill; Allen, Denna (22 March 1992). "Cover Up! An Awful Truth Brings New Grief to the Mother of a Marchioness Victim". The Mail on Sunday. p. 8.

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Clarke 2001a, p. 367.
  2. ^ a b c Plummer 1989, p. 7.
  3. ^ a b MAIB Report 1989; Part 2, p. 8.
  4. ^ Plummer 1990, p. 119.
  5. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 257.
  6. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 3, pp. 24–25.
  7. ^ Clarke 2001b, Annex E, p. 1.
  8. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 1, pp. 135, 204.
  9. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 1, pp. 13, 18.
  10. ^ a b Walker & Mallett 2011, p. 128.
  11. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 1, p. 127.
  12. ^ Clarke 2001b, Annex E, p. 13.
  13. ^ a b c d e Parry 1989b, p. 1.
  14. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 13.
  15. ^ Clarke 2001b, Annex E, pp. 13–14.
  16. ^ a b Bowbelle, ship 6413235.
  17. ^ a b Clarke 2001a, p. 9.
  18. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 9–10.
  19. ^ Chaudhary 1991, p. 3.
  20. ^ Clarke 2001b, Annex D, p. 10.
  21. ^ a b Donovan 1990, p. 8.
  22. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 141–142.
  23. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 148.
  24. ^ Cooper 1995, p. 4.
  25. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 108.
  26. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 257.
  27. ^ Leathley 1989, p. 2.
  28. ^ Stacey & King 1989, p. 2.
  29. ^ a b c d e Hartley 2001, p. 222.
  30. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 221.
  31. ^ a b c Walker & Mallett 2011, p. 129.
  32. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 14.
  33. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 2, p. 9.
  34. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 41–42.
  35. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 22–23.
  36. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 1, p. 3.
  37. ^ a b c Clarke 2001a, p. 23.
  38. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 278.
  39. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 18, 24, 46.
  40. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 24–25.
  41. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 25.
  42. ^ Molland 2008, p. 591.
  43. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 33–34, 58, 254.
  44. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 1, pp. 4–5.
  45. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 254.
  46. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 290.
  47. ^ Fawkes-Underwood, statement to police, quoted in Clarke 2001a, p. 256
  48. ^ Nikkhah 2011.
  49. ^ Gilbert 2011.
  50. ^ Parry 1989a, p. 1.
  51. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 51.
  52. ^ a b Clarke 2001b, Annex S, p. 4.
  53. ^ Iain Philpott, statement to police, quoted in Clarke 2001a, p. 255
  54. ^ Ryan 1996, p. 114.
  55. ^ a b Clarke 2001a, p. 280.
  56. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 3, p. 24.
  57. ^ Transcript of radio transmission from Bowbelle, 1:49 am, quoted in Clarke 2001b, Annex G, pp. 16–17
  58. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 269–270.
  59. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 4, p. 38.
  60. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 281.
  61. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 289.
  62. ^ a b "Marchioness Victims Remembered 25 Years on at Service". BBC News.
  63. ^ a b c d Walker & Mallett 2011, p. 130.
  64. ^ Walker & Mallett 2011, p. 131.
  65. ^ Perera 1989, p. 3.
  66. ^ Hartley 2002, p. 33.
  67. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 45.
  68. ^ King 1989, p. 2.
  69. ^ Parry 1989c, p. 1.
  70. ^ Non-statutory Inquiry: Chronology 2000, p. 25.
  71. ^ Foley 2011, p. 152.
  72. ^ Non-statutory Inquiry: Chronology 2000, p. 2.
  73. ^ Hartley 2001, pp. 249, 349.
  74. ^ Clarke 2000, p. 76.
  75. ^ Walker & Mallett 2011, p. 133.
  76. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 349.
  77. ^ Hartley 2001, pp. 245–246.
  78. ^ a b Davis 2013, p. 516.
  79. ^ "Marchioness Hands 'Lost for Years'". BBC News.
  80. ^ Parry 1989d, p. 3.
  81. ^ "Report calls for Thames Lookouts". The Guardian.
  82. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 232.
  83. ^ a b Sapstead 1989, p. 1.
  84. ^ Wallis 1999.
  85. ^ Sapstead 1990, p. 5.
  86. ^ Souster 1990a, p. 3.
  87. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 251.
  88. ^ a b Souster 1990b, p. 5.
  89. ^ Hartley 2001, pp. 251–252.
  90. ^ Jenkins 1991a, p. 2.
  91. ^ Clancy 1991, p. 2.
  92. ^ Jenkins 1991b, p. 3.
  93. ^ "Captain 'Failed'". The Times.
  94. ^ Jenkins 1991c, p. 3.
  95. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 242.
  96. ^ Daniel & Myers 1991, p. 2.
  97. ^ Katz 1991, p. 5.
  98. ^ "DPP Refused Private Evidence in Boat Manslaughter Case" The Guardian.
  99. ^ Campbell 1991, p. 3.
  100. ^ Dyer 1992, p. 3.
  101. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Annexes, p. 54.
  102. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 5, p. 46.
  103. ^ MAIB Report 1989; Part 5, pp. 45–46.
  104. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 231.
  105. ^ Hartley 2002, p. 35.
  106. ^ a b Butcher 2010.
  107. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 252.
  108. ^ Hartley 2001, pp. 252–253.
  109. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 253.
  110. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 255.
  111. ^ a b Johnson 1995, p. 7.
  112. ^ a b Taylor 2001, p. 3.
  113. ^ Clarke 2000, p. 94.
  114. ^ Clarke 2001b, Annex I, p. 6.
  115. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 373–376.
  116. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 109.
  117. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 110.
  118. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 384.
  119. ^ Clarke 2001a, p. 378.
  120. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 378–380.
  121. ^ Clarke 2001a, pp. 380–382.
  122. ^ Gibson 2011, p. 77.
  123. ^ Christian 1995.
  124. ^ Herbert 2001, p. 9.
  125. ^ "Marchioness Riverboat Disaster: 20 August 1989". Irwin Mitchell.
  126. ^ Harpwood 2005, p. 440.
  127. ^ Fresco 2001, p. 9.
  128. ^ Lister 2002, p. 9.
  129. ^ a b "Bowbelle Skipper Keeps his Licence". BBC News.
  130. ^ France 2001, p. 23.
  131. ^ Eyre & Dix 2014, p. 162.
  132. ^ Hartley 2001, p. 245.
  133. ^ "Disaster". BBC Genome.
  134. ^ "The Marchioness: a Survivor's Story". BBC Genome.
  135. ^ Martin 2007.
  136. ^ Billson 2008.
  137. ^ Ezard 1989, p. 3.
  138. ^ "Marchioness Boat Disaster Marked". BBC News.
  139. ^ "Bowbelle Sinks". The Times.
  140. ^ Ecott 2009.

Sources[edit]

Books[edit]

  • Eyre, Anne; Dix, Pam (2014). Collective Conviction: The Story of Disaster Action. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. ISBN 978-1-78138-123-6.
  • Foley, Michael (2011). "The Marchioness". Disasters on the Thames. Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press. pp. 151–155. ISBN 978-0-7524-5843-4.
  • Harpwood, Vivienne (2005). Modern Tort Law. London: Cavendish Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85941-976-2.
  • Hartley, Hazel (2001). Exploring Sport & Leisure Disasters: A Socio-Legal Perspective. London: Cavendish Publishing. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-85941-650-1.
  • Molland, Anthony F. (2008). The Maritime Engineering Reference Book: A Guide to Ship Design, Construction and Operation. Oxford: Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-7506-8987-8.
  • Plummer, Russell (1990). The Ships That Saved an Army: A Comprehensive Record of the 1,300 'Little Ships' of Dunkirk. Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Patrick Stephens. ISBN 978-1-8526-0210-9.
  • Ryan, Mick (1996). Lobbying From Below: Inquest in Defence of Civil Liberties. London: Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 978-1-85728-256-6.
  • Walker, Graham; Mallett, Xanthé (2011). "The Marchioness Riverboat Disaster, August 20, 1989". In Black, Sue; Sunderland, Graham; Hackman, S. Lucinda; Mallett, Xanthé (eds.). Disaster Victim Identification: Experience and Practice. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. pp. 127–142. ISBN 978-1-4200-9412-1.

Reports[edit]

  • Clarke, Lord Justice (2000). Thames Safety Inquiry. Final Report by Lord Justice Clarke (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0-1014-5582-4.
  • Clarke, Lord Justice (2000). Non-statutory Inquiry: Chronology (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
  • Clarke, Lord Justice (2001a). Marchioness / Bowbelle: Formal Investigation under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Volume 1 – Report (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0-1170-2550-9.
  • Clarke, Lord Justice (2001b). Marchioness / Bowbelle: Formal Investigation under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Volume 2 – Appendices (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. ISBN 978-0-1170-2550-9.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, Part 1 (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, Part 2 (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, Part 3 (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, Part 4 (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on 20 August 1989, Part 5 (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.
  • Marine Accident Investigation Branch (1991). Report of the Investigation into the Collision Between the Passenger Launch Marchioness and MV Bowbelle with the Loss of Life on the River Thames on August 1989, Annexes (PDF). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 988045019.

Journals[edit]

  • Davis, Howard (April 2013). "Contextual Challenges for Crisis Support in the Immediate Aftermath of Major Incidents in the UK". The British Journal of Social Work. 43 (3): 504–521. doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcr197.
  • Gibson, Kevin (2011). "Toward an Intermediate Position on Corporate Moral Personhood". Journal of Business Ethics. 101 (S1): 71–81. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1174-5.
  • Hartley, Hazel J. (2002). "A Party on the River: The 1989 Marchioness Disaster—Regulation of Safety on the River Thames and the 'Political Economy' of Risk". World Leisure Journal. 44 (4): 30–43. doi:10.1080/04419057.2002.9674289.
  • Plummer, Russell (October 1989). "Thames Pleasure Boat Disaster". Ships Monthly. 24 (10): 7. OCLC 537997776.
  • Taylor, Tim (May 2001). ""Marchioness"/"Bowbelle": A Legal Odyssey". Shipping and Trade Law. 1 (5): 1–5. ISSN 2329-3179.

News articles[edit]

  • Billson, Anne (21 November 2008). "History of a Sleeve Shocker". The Guardian.
  • "Bowbelle Sinks". The Times. 23 May 1996. p. 2.
  • "Bowbelle Skipper Keeps his Licence". BBC News. 3 December 2001.
  • Campbell, Duncan (13 August 1991). "DPP will let Marchioness case proceed". The Guardian. p. 3.
  • "Captain 'Failed'". The Times. 18 July 1991. p. 2.
  • Chaudhary, Vivek (4 April 1991). "Captain 'At Fault' Before Fatal Sinking". The Guardian. p. 3.
  • Clancy, Ray (15 April 1991). "Crown Seeks Bowbelle Case Retrial". The Times. p. 2.
  • Cooper, Glenda (8 April 1995). "Pleasure boat disaster on River Thames was 'A birthday voyage from celebration to tragedy'". The Independent. p. 4.
  • Daniel, John; Myers, Paul (1 August 1991). "Bowbelle Firm Faces Private Prosecution". The Guardian. p. 2.
  • Donovan, Patrick (17 August 1990). "Bowbelle 'Had a History of Accidents'". The Guardian. p. 8.
  • "DPP Refused Private Evidence in Boat Manslaughter Case". The Guardian. 7 August 1991. p. 3.
  • Dyer, Clare (22 June 1992). "Bereaved Husband Loses Private Case Over Marchioness Disaster". The Guardian. p. 3.
  • Ecott, Tim (9 August 2009). "Interview: 'I felt like it was time to let go. I couldn't be bothered fighting any more'". The Guardian.
  • Ezard, John (19 September 1989). "Marchioness Service Reflects Life's Ebb and Flow". The Guardian. p. 3.
  • France, Anthony (4 May 2001). "Honours for Marchioness Heroes at Last". The Evening Standard. p. 23.
  • Fresco, Adam (23 January 2001). "Life Boats to Rescue on Thames". The Times. p. 9.
  • Gilbert, Gerard (1 October 2011). "The boy done good: Jade Goody's ex Jeff Brazier on surviving reality TV". The Independent.
  • Herbert, Ian (18 August 2001). "'Marchioness' Victims Insulted Over Bigger Pay-Out for Captain's Family". The Independent. p. 9.
  • Jenkins, Lin (4 April 1991a). "Bowbelle Master 'Failed to Instruct Look-Out Properly'". The Times. p. 2.
  • Jenkins, Lin (20 April 1991b). "Bowbelle Master Disputes Decision to Seek a Retrial". The Times. p. 3.
  • Jenkins, Lin (1 August 1991c). "Bowbelle's Captain Cleared After Second Hung Jury". The Times. p. 3.
  • Johnson, Angella (8 April 1995). "Quest That Led Marchioness Relatives to New Start". The Guardian. p. 7.
  • Katz, Ian (15 August 1991). "Fury at Rifkind on Disaster Report". The Guardian. p. 5.
  • King, Geoff (22 August 1989). "Police Say Cruiser Carried Too Many". The Times. p. 2.
  • Leathley, Arthur (21 August 1989). "Invitation-only Party Organized by Friends". The Times. p. 2.
  • Lister, Sam (3 January 2002). "First Thames Lifeboats Launched". The Times. p. 9.
  • "Marchioness Boat Disaster Marked". BBC News. 20 August 2009.
  • "Marchioness Hands 'Lost for Years'". BBC News. 8 December 2000.
  • "Marchioness Victims Remembered 25 Years on at Service". BBC News. 20 August 2014.
  • Martin, Nicole (24 August 2007). "Marchioness Families Ask ITV to Drop Drama". The Daily Telegraph.
  • Nikkhah, Roya (20 February 2011). "Lawrence Dallaglio's guilt at using sister's death to improve his game". The Daily Telegraph.
  • Parry, Gareth (21 August 1989a). "60 Feared Drowned in Thames: Captain and Second Mate of Dredger are Arrested". The Guardian. p. 1.
  • Parry, Gareth (22 August 1989b). "Minister Orders River Shake-Up". The Guardian. p. 1.
  • Parry, Gareth (23 August 1989c). "Bowbelle Crew was Sober, Marchioness Inquest Told". The Guardian. p. 1.
  • Parry, Gareth (24 August 1989d). "Another 13 Marchioness Victims Found". The Guardian. p. 2.
  • Perera, Shyama (21 August 1989). "Thatcher Flies Back to Scene of Tragedy". The Guardian. p. 3.
  • "Report calls for Thames Lookouts". The Guardian. 1 September 1989. p. 25.
  • Sapstead, David (23 October 1989). "Report Clears Dredger Crew". The Times. p. 1.
  • Sapstead, David (27 April 1990). "Captain of Thames Dredger to Face Charge". The Times. p. 5.
  • Souster, Mark (24 April 1990a). "Thames Disaster Inquest Reopens Amid Criticism". The Times. p. 3.
  • Souster, Mark (27 April 1990b). "Captain of Thames Dredger to Face Charge". The Times. p. 5.
  • Stacey, Robin; King, Geoff (22 August 1989). "Fashion Industry Mourns Deaths on Party Cruiser". The Times. p. 2.
  • Wallis, Lynne (20 April 1999). "You can't always get what you want". The Independent.

Internet[edit]

  • "Bowbelle (6413235)". Miramar Ship Index. Retrieved 1 February 2019.
  • Butcher, Louise (15 June 2010). "Shipping: Safety on the River Thames and the Marchioness Disaster" (PDF). House of Commons Library. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 February 2019. Retrieved 15 February 2019.
  • Christian, Louise (12 April 1995). "Letter: Compensation for Loss of Young Lives". The Independent. Archived from the original on 2 February 2019.
  • "Disaster". BBC Genome. Retrieved 16 February 2019.
  • "The Marchioness: a Survivor's Story". BBC Genome. Retrieved 16 February 2019.
  • "Marchioness Riverboat Disaster: 20 August 1989". Irwin Mitchell. Archived from the original on 20 July 2008. Retrieved 6 February 2019.


External links[edit]

  • Marchioness-Bowbelle Formal Investigation Website In the UK Government Web Archive
  • "Marchioness/Bowbelle Non-Statutory Inquiry into identification of victims following major transport accidents". dft.gov.uk. Archived from the original on 4 November 2014.
  • Details of the memorial in Southwark Cathedral
  • Marchioness Action Group

Coordinates: 51°30′32″N 0°05′37″W / 51.5088°N 0.0936°W / 51.5088; -0.0936