El incidente del derribo de Black Hawk de 1994 , a veces denominado Incidente de Black Hawk , fue un incidente de fuego amigo sobre el norte de Irak que ocurrió el 14 de abril de 1994 durante la Operación Proporcionar Confort (OPC). Los pilotos de dos Estados Unidos de la Fuerza Aérea (USAF) -F 15 aviones de combate , que opera bajo el control de un USAF Sistema de alerta y control aerotransportado avión (AWACS), identificados erróneamente dos ejército de Estados Unidos UH-60 Halcón Negro helicópteros como iraquí Mil Mi- 24Helicópteros "traseros". Los pilotos del F-15 dispararon y destruyeron ambos helicópteros, matando a los 26 militares y civiles a bordo, incluido personal de Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Francia, Turquía y la comunidad kurda .
Incidente del derribo de Black Hawk en 1994 | |||||||
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Parte de la operación Brindar comodidad a las zonas de exclusión aérea iraquíes | |||||||
Personal militar estadounidense inspecciona los restos de uno de los dos UH-60 Black Hawks estadounidenses derribados en el incidente del derribo de Black Hawk en 1994 en el norte de Irak. | |||||||
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Una investigación posterior de la USAF culpó del accidente a varios factores. Los pilotos del F-15 fueron acusados de identificar erróneamente a los helicópteros como hostiles. Además, se culpó a los miembros de la tripulación de la aeronave AWACS por su inacción al no ejercer el control adecuado y por no intervenir en la situación. Además, los sistemas de identificación amigo o enemigo (IFF) no habían funcionado para identificar los helicópteros a los pilotos del F-15. Además, los líderes de la USAF no habían logrado integrar adecuadamente las operaciones de helicópteros del Ejército de los EE. UU. En las operaciones aéreas generales de la OPC. Como resultado de la investigación, varios oficiales de la USAF recibieron disciplina administrativa, pero solo uno, Jim Wang, un miembro de la tripulación de AWACS, fue juzgado por un consejo de guerra, en el que fue absuelto.
Como resultado de las quejas de los familiares de las víctimas y otras personas de que el ejército no responsabilizaba a su personal, el Senado y la Cámara de los Estados Unidos llevaron a cabo sus propias investigaciones sobre el derribo y la respuesta del ejército estadounidense. Además, Ronald R. Fogleman , el nuevo jefe de personal de la USAF , realizó su propia revisión de las acciones tomadas por la USAF contra los oficiales involucrados en el incidente.
La investigación de Fogleman llevó a que varios de los oficiales involucrados en el incidente recibieran más disciplina administrativa. Posteriormente, el Departamento de Defensa de los EE. UU. (DoD) rechazó las citaciones del Senado de los EE. UU. Para que cuatro oficiales de la USAF fueran entrevistados para la investigación del Senado, que nunca se hizo pública. La investigación de la Cámara de Representantes de los Estados Unidos, realizada en parte por la Oficina de Responsabilidad del Gobierno (GAO), encontró que los sistemas judiciales y de investigación militar habían operado principalmente según lo diseñado, pero también señaló que el Departamento de Defensa había negado el acceso a testigos clave.
Fondo
El 7 de abril de 1991, Irak aceptó las condiciones y resoluciones de alto el fuego de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), poniendo así oficialmente fin a la Guerra del Golfo . Este mismo día, un gran esfuerzo humanitario multinacional y de múltiples agencias bajo la autoridad de la Resolución No. 688 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU comenzó a ayudar a los aproximadamente 500.000 refugiados kurdos que habían huido de las fuerzas militares iraquíes hacia las colinas del norte de Irak. El 18 de abril de 1991, John Shalikashvili tomó el mando de la operación dirigida por Estados Unidos para garantizar la seguridad de las operaciones de socorro de la ONU y los refugiados kurdos, denominada Operación Proporcionar Confort (OPC). [1]
La OPC tuvo lugar en una zona del norte de Irak por encima del paralelo 36 . Esta área, de aproximadamente 160 por 70 kilómetros (99 por 43 millas) de tamaño, fue designada como zona de seguridad de "exclusión aérea" por las fuerzas de la coalición de la ONU, impuesta por un grupo de trabajo combinado (CTF) de patrullas diarias de aviones armados de las naciones participantes. incluidos el Reino Unido, Francia, Turquía y los Estados Unidos. El ejército de los Estados Unidos tenía la tarea de ayudar a las agencias de ayuda civil a construir comunidades e instalaciones para los kurdos en el norte de Irak. Durante los siguientes tres años, se llevaron a cabo 27.000 vuelos de la coalición de ala fija y 1.400 helicópteros en la zona para apoyar las operaciones humanitarias sin interferencia de aviones iraquíes u otras unidades militares. [2]
En abril de 1994, el OPC fue comandado por el general de brigada de la USAF, Jeffrey Pilkington. Las fuerzas aéreas combinadas de la OPC fueron comandadas por el coronel Curtis H. Emery, USAF. El coronel Douglas J. Richardson, USAF, era el director de operaciones de las fuerzas aéreas combinadas. [3]
Incidente
El 14 de abril de 1994, a las 07:36 hora local, un avión USAF E-3 AWACS del 963d Airborne Air Control Squadron (con base en la Base de la Fuerza Aérea Tinker , Oklahoma ) partió de la Base Aérea Incirlik (AB), Turquía en apoyo de OPC. El AWACS, con su tripulación de 19 miembros bajo el mando de la tripulación de la misión del Mayor Lawrence Tracy, debía proporcionar advertencia de amenazas aéreas y control aéreo para todos los aviones OPC durante su tiempo en vuelo. La tripulación del AWACS informó sobre la estación en su órbita de vigilancia asignada a una altitud de 32.000 pies (9.750 m) ubicada dentro de Turquía, justo al norte de la frontera norte de Irak a las 08:45. Ese día, el clima era agradable y claro en el norte de Irak. [4]
A las 08:22, dos helicópteros UH-60 Black Hawk del Ejército de los EE. UU. Del 6. ° Batallón, 159 ° Regimiento de Aviación (con base en Giebelstadt , Alemania), llamado Eagle Flight, partieron de Diyarbakır , cerca de la Base Aérea de Pirinçlik , Turquía, y se dirigieron al centro de coordinación militar de OPC. (MCC) ubicado a 150 millas (240 km) de distancia en Zakhu , Irak. Ambos helicópteros estaban equipados con tanques de combustible externos de 230 galones estadounidenses (870 L) en esponjas montadas al lado de cada puerta lateral con cada tanque adornado con grandes banderas estadounidenses . Además de las banderas en los tanques de combustible, cada helicóptero estaba marcado con banderas estadounidenses en cada puerta lateral, en la nariz y en la panza. El Black Hawk líder fue pilotado por el capitán del ejército estadounidense Patrick McKenna, comandante del destacamento Eagle Flight de seis helicópteros. [5]
A las 09:21, los Black Hawks informaron su entrada a la zona de exclusión aérea por radio en la frecuencia en ruta al controlador en ruta del AWACS, el teniente Joseph Halcli, y luego aterrizaron seis minutos después en el MCC. Halcli y su oficial superior, el Capitán Jim Wang, director senior de la AWACS, agregaron etiquetas de "helicóptero amigable" a sus visores de radar , notaron que ambos helicópteros mostraban señales de identificación de amigo o enemigo (IFF) Modo I y Modo II, y luego suspendieron el símbolos de radar después de que los Black Hawks desaparecieron de sus visores al aterrizar en el MCC a las 09:24. Aunque los helicópteros graznaban (señalaban) el código IFF Modo I incorrecto para la zona de exclusión aérea (llamada Área Táctica de Responsabilidad o TAOR), ni Wang ni Halcli informaron a los pilotos de Black Hawk de eso (ambos helicópteros, sin embargo, graznaban los códigos correctos del Modo II). Wang y Halcli también descuidaron ordenar a los Black Hawks que comenzaran a usar la frecuencia de radio TAOR en lugar de la frecuencia en ruta. [6]
En el MCC, los Black Hawks recogieron a 16 miembros del equipo de liderazgo de la coalición Provide Comfort de la ONU, incluidos cuatro civiles kurdos, un civil católico-caldeo , tres oficiales militares turcos, dos británicos y uno francés, además de cinco oficiales militares y civiles estadounidenses. A las 09:54, los helicópteros partieron del MCC hacia Erbil , Irak, una distancia de 120 millas (190 km). Los Black Hawks informaron su salida, ruta de vuelo y destinos por radio, lo que fue reconocido por Halcli. Halcli luego reinició la pista amiga del helicóptero en su alcance. Dos de los pasajeros del Black Hawk eran el coronel Jerry Thompson, ejército de los Estados Unidos, comandante del MCC, y su reemplazo, el coronel Richard Mulhern, del ejército de los Estados Unidos. En Arbil y más tarde en Salah ad Din, Irak, Thompson planeó presentar a Mulhern a dos prominentes líderes kurdos, Masoud Barzani y Jalal Talabani , así como a representantes de la ONU. Halcli colocó etiquetas en la pantalla de su radar para mostrar la pista de los dos Black Hawks y notificó a Wang del movimiento de los helicópteros. Además de la pantalla de Halcli, los símbolos de helicópteros amistosos eran visibles en las pantallas de radar de Wang, Tracy y el comandante de la USAF Doug Martin. Martin era el elemento de comando aerotransportado "Duke" o "ACE" en el AWACS, lo que significa que era un miembro calificado de la tripulación asignado a la tripulación para garantizar que todos los mandatos de enfrentamiento (combate) se cumplieran y ejecutaran según lo escrito en las políticas de OPC. [7]
De camino a Arbil, a las 10:12, los Black Hawks entraron en terreno montañoso y sus datos de radar desaparecieron de los visores del AWACS. El Capitán Dierdre Bell, un oficial de vigilancia aérea en el AWACS, notó que el radar de los Black Hawks y los retornos IFF habían desaparecido y envió una "flecha de atención" electrónica al alcance de Wang. Wang no tomó ninguna medida y la gran flecha verde parpadeante desapareció automáticamente de su pantalla después de un minuto. [8]
Mientras tanto, a las 09:35, dos aviones de combate F-15C de la USAF del 53º Escuadrón de Cazas , piloteados por el Capitán Eric Wickson y el Teniente Coronel Randy W. May, partieron de Incirlik AB. Su misión era realizar un barrido de combate inicial del TAOR para despejar el área de cualquier avión hostil antes de la entrada de las fuerzas de la coalición. La orden de tarea aérea (ATO) que se suponía que enumeraría todas las misiones de aviones de la coalición programadas para ese día y que los dos pilotos revisaron antes del despegue, mencionaba que los helicópteros Black Hawk del Ejército de los EE. UU. Estarían operando en el TAOR, pero no enumeraba los horarios ni las rutas de despegue. o la duración de los vuelos para ellos. A las 10:15, Wickson llamó por radio a Martin por el AWACS y le preguntó si tenía alguna información que transmitirles, a lo que Martin respondió negativamente. [9]
A las 10:20, Wickson, el líder de vuelo del F-15C, informó que ingresó al norte de Irak al controlador AWACS responsable del tráfico aéreo dentro del TAOR, el teniente de la USAF Ricky Wilson. La frecuencia TAOR que usaban los F-15 era diferente de la frecuencia en ruta que usaban los dos Black Hawks. Wilson, sin embargo, estaba monitoreando ambas frecuencias y pudo ver a ambos Black Hawks en su alcance de radar antes de que desaparecieran a las 10:12. Wilson y los otros miembros de la tripulación del AWACS, muchos de los cuales estaban monitoreando la frecuencia de radio de los F-15, no informaron a los F-15 que los Black Hawks estaban operando actualmente en el TAOR. A las 10:21, Wilson, creyendo que los Black Hawks habían aterrizado nuevamente, le preguntó a Wang si podía dejar caer los símbolos de helicópteros amistosos desde los visores del AWACS y Wang aprobó la solicitud. Un instructor de la tripulación de AWACS, el capitán Mark Cathy, que estaba en la misión de ayudar a la tripulación de AWACS y supervisar a Wilson en esta, su primera misión en el TAOR, se había retirado a la parte trasera del avión a las 10:00 para tomar una siesta. [10]
A las 10:22, Wickson, que volaba a 27.000 pies (8.230 m), informó de un contacto de radar en una aeronave que volaba a baja altura y se movía lentamente a 40 millas (64 km) al sureste de su posición actual. Wilson reconoció el informe de Wickson con una respuesta "clara", lo que significa que no tenía contactos de radar en esa área. Desconocido para los dos pilotos del F-15, los aviones no identificados eran los dos Black Hawks del Ejército de EE. UU. Contrariamente al procedimiento estándar, ni Tracy ni Wang hablaron en este punto para solicitar que los miembros de la tripulación del AWACS intenten identificar los contactos de radar de los F-15. [11]
Luego, ambos pilotos del F-15 interrogaron electrónicamente al objetivo del radar con sus sistemas IFF a bordo a través de dos modos diferentes (Modo I y Modo IV). Sus sistemas IFF respondieron negativamente al intento de identificar el contacto en el Modo I. El Modo IV dio momentáneamente una respuesta positiva, pero luego respondió negativamente y los F-15 se movieron para interceptar la aeronave no identificada. Los retornos intermitentes IFF Mode I y Mode II de los Black Hawks ahora comenzaron a mostrarse en los visores de Wilson y otros miembros de la tripulación AWACS y los símbolos de helicópteros amistosos reaparecieron en el visor de Wang. Después de acercarse a 20 millas (32 km) de los contactos del radar, a las 10:25 los F-15 volvieron a informar del contacto al AWACS y Wilson esta vez respondió que ahora tenía un contacto por radar en esa ubicación informada. Aunque el radar intermitente Black Hawk y los retornos IFF ahora constantes en los osciloscopios AWACS estaban en la misma ubicación que los contactos no identificados que estaban siendo rastreados por los F-15, ninguno de los controladores de AWACS advirtió a Wickson o May que los contactos que estaban rastreando podrían ser amigables. helicópteros. [12]
Los dos F-15 ahora iniciaron un pase de identificación visual (VID) del contacto. El pase VID implicó violar una de las reglas de participación de OPC , que prohibía que los aviones de combate operaran por debajo de los 10,000 pies (3,050 m) sobre el suelo. En ese momento, los dos Black Hawks habían entrado en un valle profundo y navegaban a una velocidad de 130 nudos (150 mph; 240 km / h) a unos 200 pies (60 m) sobre el suelo. El pase VID de Wickson se realizó a una velocidad de aproximadamente 450 nudos (520 mph; 830 km / h), 500 pies (150 m) arriba y 1000 pies (300 m) a la izquierda de los helicópteros. A las 10:28 Wickson informó "Tally two Hinds" y luego pasó a los dos Black Hawks. [13] "Hind" es la designación de la OTAN para el helicóptero Mil Mi-24 , un helicóptero que operaban los ejércitos iraquí y sirio y que generalmente se configuraba con armamento en pequeñas alas laterales. [14] Wilson respondió con "Copia, Hinds" y le preguntó a Wang, "Señor, ¿está escuchando esto?" Wang respondió, "Afirmativo", pero no ofreció más orientación ni comentarios. [15]
Luego, May realizó su propio pase VID a unos 500 m (1.500 pies) por encima de los helicópteros e informó: "Tally 2". [16] May luego declaró a una junta de investigación de accidentes de la USAF que su llamada "Tally 2" significaba que vio dos helicópteros, pero no significaba que estaba confirmando la identificación de Wickson de ellos como Hinds. [17] Ninguno de los pilotos del F-15 había sido informado de que los Black Hawks del ejército de EE. UU. Que participaban en OPC a menudo llevaban tanques de combustible auxiliares montados en alas ni tampoco habían recibido instrucciones sobre el esquema de pintura que usaban los helicópteros iraquíes Hind, marrón claro y bronceado del desierto, que era diferente del color verde oscuro utilizado por los Black Hawks. Wickson dijo más tarde: "Cuando lo miré, no tenía ninguna duda de que era un Hindú ... El Black Hawk ni siquiera se me pasó por la cabeza". [18]
Siguiendo sus pases de VID, Wickson y May volvieron en círculos detrás de los helicópteros aproximadamente a 10 millas (16 km). Debido a que los aviones de varias naciones a veces operaban sin previo aviso en el área del norte de Irak, las reglas de combate de la OPC requerían que los pilotos del F-15 intentaran verificar la nacionalidad de los helicópteros. En cambio, a las 10:28, Wickson notificó al AWACS que él y May estaban "comprometidos" y le ordenó a May que se "armara caliente". [19] A las 10:30, Wickson disparó un misil AIM-120 AMRAAM al helicóptero de seguimiento desde un rango de aproximadamente 4 millas náuticas (10 km). El misil golpeó y destruyó el helicóptero que lo seguía siete segundos después ( 36 ° 46'N 44 ° 05'E / 36.767 ° N 44.083 ° E / 36,767; 44.083). En respuesta, el Black Hawk líder, pilotado por McKenna, giró inmediatamente a la izquierda y se lanzó en picada para bajar la altitud en un aparente intento de evadir el ataque inesperado. Aproximadamente 20 segundos después, May disparó un misil AIM-9 Sidewinder al helicóptero líder desde un rango de aproximadamente 1.5 millas náuticas (2.8 km), golpeándolo y derribándolo también aproximadamente 1.2 millas (2 km) al noreste del helicóptero de seguimiento ( 36 ° 55'N 43 ° 30'E / 36.917 ° N 43.500 ° E / 36,917; 43.500). Las 26 personas a bordo de los dos Black Hawks murieron. Después de sobrevolar los restos de los dos helicópteros que yacían en llamas en el suelo, May le comunicó por radio a Wickson: "Ponles un tenedor, ya está". [20]
Investigación de accidentes de la Fuerza Aérea
By 13:15 local time, Kurdish civilians notified the MCC they had witnessed the two Black Hawks being shot down 40 miles (64 km) north of Arbil and that there were no survivors. The news was quickly picked up by the media and broadcast by CNN.[21]
Within hours, U.S. President Bill Clinton was briefed on the shootdown and called the heads of government of the United Kingdom and France, John Major and François Mitterrand, to express regret and sympathy for the deaths of their citizens in the incident. Clinton appeared a few hours later in a televised news conference in which he said he had directed the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to lead an inquiry into the accident. Clinton further stated, "We will get the facts, and we will make them available to the American people and to the people of Britain, France, and Turkey, our partners in Operation Provide Comfort."[22]
General Robert C. Oaks, USAF, Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe, immediately appointed an Air Force Regulation (AFR) 110-14 accident investigation board composed of a board president, eleven board members from the USAF and U.S. Army, three associate members from France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, four legal advisers, and thirteen technical advisers. The board president was Major General James G. Andrus, USAF. An AFR 110-14 investigation's findings are publicly released and the testimony of witnesses in the investigation can be used against them in military disciplinary proceedings. For this reason, after serious mishaps the USAF usually also conducts a separate safety investigation, in which the results are not publicly released and witness testimony is immune from prosecution. In this case, however, for unknown reasons the USAF decided not to conduct a safety investigation.[23]
After interviewing 137 witnesses and conducting numerous tests, the 27-volume, 3,630-page AFR 110-14 investigation report was publicly released on 13 July 1994, although some report's details had been leaked to the media by unknown defense officials two weeks earlier.[24] The board made seven general findings about what they believed caused the shootdown to occur:
- 1. Wickson misidentified the Black Hawk helicopters and May failed to notify Wickson that he had been unable to confirm the identity of the helicopters.
- 2. The IFF transponders on the F-15s and/or the Black Hawks did not operate correctly for unknown reasons.
- 3. Misunderstandings existed throughout the OPC forces as to how coalition air operations procedures and responsibilities applied to MCC helicopter operations.
- 4. The AWACS crew commander, Lawrence Tracy, was not currently qualified in accordance with USAF regulations and he and the other AWACS crewmembers committed mistakes. [25]
- 5. OPC personnel in general were not properly trained in the rules of engagement for the northern Iraq no fly zone.
- 6. The Black Hawks were not equipped with more modern radios which would have allowed them to communicate with the F-15s.
- 7. The shootdown "was caused by a chain of events which began with the breakdown of clear guidance from the Provide Comfort Combined Task Force to its component organizations." [26]
The board report stated that, "There is no indication that the AWACS Senior Director (Wang), the Mission Crew Commander (Tracy) and/or the DUKE (Martin) made any radio calls throughout the intercept, or that they issued any guidance to either the AWACS crew or the F-15 pilots."[27] Although the OPC ROE did task the AWACS with controlling and monitoring helicopter operations in the TAOR, the board found that the AWACS crew believed they had no responsibility for controlling U.S. Army Black Hawks or ensuring that other coalition aircraft were aware of Black Hawks operating in the TAOR. When questioned by board investigators as to who was responsible for tracking the helicopters, Tracy said, "I cannot tell you that. I honestly don't know."[28] When Wang was asked the same question by the investigators, he replied, "No one is responsible."[29] When the investigators asked Martin what action he took when the F-15s called a visual identification on two Hind helicopters, Martin stated, "I did nothing."[30]
The board found that combined OPC forces, led by Pilkington, Emery, Richardson, and other USAF officers, had failed to integrate helicopters into aircraft operations in the TAOR. An Eagle Flight officer later testified he had been told by the CTF's chief of staff, a USAF officer, that the army Black Hawk unit was not considered to be part of OPC. Thus, the CTF staff, under the direction of Colonel James Rusty O'Brien, USAF, had not tried to coordinate the U.S. Army Black Hawk missions into the daily ATOs. In fact, neither O'Brien nor his predecessors had established any type of procedure for communicating information on Black Hawk missions to the Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC). The MCC commander, Colonel Thompson, had personally called O'Brien on the night of 13 April to tell him about the next day's Black Hawk mission into northern Iraq, a mission specifically and personally approved by Pilkington earlier that day. O'Brien or his staff apparently did not attempt to communicate specific information on this mission to the AWACS or F-15 fighter units at Incirlik, the CFAC, the ground-based mission director, or to the "Duke" on board the AWACS.[31]
For reasons that USAF officers were unable to explain, two versions of each day's ATO were published, one for the USAF units at Incirlik, and another for the Eagle Flight unit at Pirinclik. The ATO version sent to Eagle Flight, for unknown reasons, gave a wrong IFF Mode I code for the TAOR. Although army Black Hawks had been operating for almost two years in the TAOR while squawking a wrong code and observed doing so by numerous AWACS crews, no one ever told them they were using a wrong code. On the day of the shootdown, the F-15s had interrogated the Black Hawks on two different IFF Modes (Mode I and Mode IV). The first responded negatively because the Black Hawks were squawking the wrong code. The second mode responded negatively for technical reasons the investigation was unable to conclusively determine.[32]
The board did not investigate whether any USAF institutional factors, such as a lack of crew resource management training for the involved aircrews, might have been a factor.[33] Also, the board did not attempt to determine if Wickson and May had violated any of the existing OPC rules of engagement as defined by the ATO or other written instructions.[34]
The United States Secretary of Defense, William Perry, later summarized the "errors, omissions, and failures" contributing to the accident as, "The F-15 pilots misidentified the Black Hawks, the AWACS crew failed to intervene, Eagle Flight and their operations were not integrated into the Task Force, and the IFF systems failed."[35] General Shalikashvili, now serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added: "There were a shocking number of instances where people failed to do their job properly."[36]
Actions taken
On 8 September 1994 the DoD announced the actions it would take in response to the investigation's findings. May was charged with 26 counts of negligent homicide by military legal authorities. Martin, Tracy, Wang, Halcli, and Wilson were charged with dereliction of duty. All of those charged faced an Article 32 hearing in which it would be decided if they should be tried by court-martial or the matter disposed of otherwise. Martin, Tracy, Wang, Halcli, and Wilson faced a joint Article 32 hearing while May's hearing was separate. Wickson was not charged. Although not explicitly stated by USAF leaders, it appears Wickson was not charged but May was because Wickson had testified that he was sure of his identification of the two Black Hawks as hostile Hinds, while May had stated that he was not sure of Wickson's identification but had allowed the engagement to proceed anyway.[37]
Martin and Halcli waived their right to an Article 32 hearing, meaning their cases could move immediately to court-martial or administrative action. Wickson was given immunity by USAF Lieutenant General Eugene Santarelli, commander of the 17th Air Force, to testify at the hearings. The AWACS crew members' hearing, which began on 19 October 1994 at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma was an open hearing and presided over by Colonel William Colwell, USAF, under the legal jurisdiction of Lieutenant General Stephen Croker, USAF, commander of the 8th Air Force. May's hearing, beginning on 7 November 1994 at Sembach Air Base, Germany was a closed hearing and presided over by Colonel Edward M. Starr, USAF, under the legal jurisdiction of Santarelli. Pilkington, Emery, Richardson, and O'Brien declined requests to testify at either hearing.[38]
On 17 November 1994 the USAF announced that Colwell had recommended to Croker that Wang face court-martial and that Halcli receive nonjudicial administrative action on the dereliction of duty charges. Colwell recommended the formal dereliction of duty charges be dropped against the other AWACS crew members, but that they could still face nonjudicial action. Croker accepted Colwell's recommendation and ordered Wang to face court-martial and dismissed the criminal charges against the other AWACS crew members except Halcli, who was offered Article 15 action.[39]
At his hearing, May changed his testimony from what he gave to the accident investigation board, stating that he had positively identified the two helicopters as Iraqi Hinds. Brigadier General John R. Dallager, an F-15 pilot and Wickson's and May's wing commander (52nd Fighter Wing) and regimental court-martial 303 inquiry officer, said he found May's errors in the shootdown "reasonable."[40] Starr recommended the charges against May be dropped, stating that he found May's testimony believable.[41] On 27 December 1994 the USAF announced that Santarelli, an F-15 pilot, had dismissed the charges against May and had decided not to pursue criminal disciplinary actions against any other OPC personnel under his legal jurisdiction, including Wickson, Pilkington, Emery, Richardson, and O'Brien. In January 1995 a USAF flying board returned Wickson and May, who had been grounded since the incident, to flying status. Subsequently, Wickson was transferred to Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, to undergo instructor pilot training with a follow-on assignment to Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi.[42]
The USAF later announced the administrative actions taken against the other personnel involved in the shootdown. Pilkington, Emery, and Richardson received letters of admonishment. Martin, May, O'Brien, Tracy, Wickson, and Wilson received letters of reprimand. Halcli accepted an Article 15 action which resulted in his receiving a letter of reprimand. The personnel involved were allowed to petition for the removal of the letters from their records at a future time. The reprimands were placed in "unfavorable information files" for each individual and were normally removed after two years. General George Joulwan, U.S. Army, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, removed Pilkington as commander of OPC but the USAF retained him as commander of the 86th Airlift Wing at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. O'Brien and Emery were transferred to staff positions at the Pentagon. Richardson was transferred to a staff position at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.[43] Emery had been promoted to brigadier general on 15 July 1994 and his promotion was allowed to stand.[44]
Wang's court-martial
Wang's court-martial took place, beginning on 2 June 1995, at Tinker Air Force Base. Wang was tried on three counts of dereliction of duty. Most of the personnel involved in the incident, except May, were called to testify, including the AWACS crew members, Wickson, and Pilkington. Most of the 40 witnesses testified with a grant of immunity.[45]
During the trial, evidence was presented that Wang often had trouble staying awake during AWACS missions. In fact, the problem was considered serious enough that the military had referred Wang to medical authorities to be checked for narcolepsy. Wang had also previously failed two check rides.[46]
Pilkington, an F-16 pilot, testified that as commander of OPC he had sent numerous aircrew members, the majority of them F-15 pilots, back to their home bases for violating OPC rules or procedures or for displaying a lack of good judgment. In response to questions on the F-15 pilot's actions resulting in the shootdown, Pilkington stated, "I don't understand and I will probably never understand Wickson's mindset." When asked if Wickson and May violated OPC rules of engagement in the incident, Pilkington responded, "Yes." AWACS crew members added in their testimonies that once Wickson and May visually identified the helicopters as hostile, all responsibility for the shootdown passed to the F-15 pilots.[47]
Frank Spinner, Wang's civilian attorney, argued that USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak, a career fighter pilot, had made clear that he did not want Wickson and May punished for their actions in the shootdown. Cited as evidence for this was a Los Angeles Times report, published also in the European Stars and Stripes newspaper on 18 June 1994 that said McPeak "strongly opposed" court-martial action for Wickson or May. Pilkington stated that he had heard rumors McPeak had said something to that effect, but could not confirm if they were true or not.[48]
On 20 June 1995 the USAF announced a "nullification" verdict by Wang's 10-member court-martial jury, effectively acquitting Wang of the charges. Nullification is not a finding of innocence, but instead it is a refusal to convict on the stated charges. After the verdict, Wang stated, "I want to say the fight is nowhere near over for me. I want a congressional hearing or investigation into why I was the only person charged."[49] Major General Nolan Sklute, the USAF's top legal officer, stated, "An incident like this does not necessarily mean that the conduct of all those involved rises to the level of criminal culpability. I'm satisfied with the handling of the case."[50] Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall added, "The Black Hawk helicopters were downed as a result of a tragic series of errors and unfortunate events involving numerous people. The mishap was not the result of any one individual's actions; the conduct of numerous officers and the system itself contributed."[51]
Investigaciones y acciones adicionales
On 17 July 1995, U.S. Senator William Roth, chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, authorized a Senate investigation into the incident, primarily in response to complaints from family members of the shootdown victims that it appeared the U.S. military was not holding anyone seriously accountable for the shootdown.[52] Also in response to complaints about the DoD's response to the incident, the U.S. House of Representatives' Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel scheduled a hearing on the incident for 3 August 1995 to examine the accident investigation and the judicial actions that followed. In addition, on 24 July the DoD ordered the USAF to reexamine the disciplinary and administrative actions for the personnel involved in the shootdown and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the corrective actions taken against those involved and determine whether further action was necessary. Widnall requested that the new USAF chief of staff, Ronald R. Fogleman begin his own review of accountability for the incident.[53]
The House Committee on National Security hearing on 3 August was presided over by Congressman Bob Dornan and lasted one day. At the hearing, Pilkington and Andrus explained how the USAF accident investigation was conducted and emphasized that Wickson and May violated the OPC rules of engagement by conducting a VID pass of the Black Hawks that was inadequate to determine the helicopter's national origin. Andrus stated, "Sir, as a pilot, I would have made another pass. You would never fire until you know what you are shooting at." Retired USAF colonel and pilot Jerry Cox expressed concern to the Committee with the F-15 pilots for not taking responsibility for their actions.[54]
On 10 August 1995 Fogleman spoke at a press conference at the Pentagon in which he announced the conclusions reached by his review into the accountability of USAF personnel involved in the shootdown incident. He said his investigation found that not all the performance evaluations for the individuals involved in the shootdown reflected the fact that they had received administrative action related to the incident.[55] Fogleman stated,
"The fact that the conduct of some individuals did not give rise to criminal prosecution or conviction should not end the inquiry into the appropriateness of their actions. Air Force standards require that people display the extraordinary discipline, judgment, and training that their duties require and that the American people expect."[56]
Fogleman then announced that he had directed that Wickson, May, Wang, Halcli, and Wilson be disqualified from aviation service duties for at least three years. Also, Fogleman wrote and placed "letters of evaluation" in the permanent personnel files of Wickson, May, Wang, Halcli, Wilson, Pilkington, and Emery that said each had failed "to meet Air Force standards in job knowledge, judgment and leadership". In addition, a military decoration awarded to O'Brien for his service during OPC was rescinded. A videotape in which Fogleman described his actions related to the incident and his views on standards and accountability was distributed throughout the USAF and all USAF officers, senior non-commissioned officers, and Senior Executive Service civilians were ordered to view it.[57] Fogleman further stated that he had found that the military justice system had "worked as it was designed to work".[58]
Senate investigation
Beginning in September 1995 and continuing for more than one year, Roth's Senate inquiry into the shootdown, led by Eric Thorson, investigated the incident. Thorson later stated his belief that the USAF accident investigation report and subsequent proceedings had been manipulated in order to avoid holding Wickson and May accountable for their actions. Thorson also stated that he believed Starr had submitted an inaccurate and misleading report on May's Article 32 hearing to the USAF commanding officers, including Dallager and Santarelli. With regard to the AWACS personnel, Thorson added: "We know some of the AWACS crew were incompetent beyond belief, and there is more than adequate evidence to conclude that several crewmembers were grossly negligent."[59]
In August 1996, Roth's investigation board asked the DoD to produce the last four witnesses it wished to interview: Santarelli, Starr, Dallager, and Colonel C. G. Mangin. Mangin was Santarelli's legal adviser during the Wickson and May inquiry. The DoD refused the request to provide access to the four officers. A short time later, John White, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, wrote a letter to Roth in which he asked that those four officers not be deposed.[60]
After further refusals from the USAF and DoD to provide the four officers for interview, Roth's committee gave the DoD and USAF until 14:30 on 31 October 1996 to provide the officers. The deadline passed without the officers appearing before the board. The next day the board sent senate subpoenas directly to the USAF headquarters office at the Pentagon, which refused to accept them. After learning that the Senate was now planning to individually serve the four subpoenas directly to the four officers, the associate chief of the Air Force litigation division accepted the subpoenas.[61]
On 13 November 1996, the day the first subpoenaed USAF officer was scheduled to appear, the DoD delivered a letter to Roth, signed by its general counsel, Judith Miller, saying the DoD believed the subpoenas were invalid because they were issued "after the adjournment of sine die of the 104th Congress" and was therefore not going to honor the subpoenas by providing the four officers for interview. Roth replied to the DoD that only the Senate's legal counsel could determine the validity of congressional subpoenas because of the "separation of powers" principle in the U.S. Constitution and thus, the subpoenas were valid. The DoD, on 20 November in another letter signed by Miller again refused to produce the witnesses. Roth, whose committee chairmanship was scheduled to end the next month, was told by the U.S. Department of Justice that the U.S. Attorney General, Janet Reno, would not support him if he chose to take the dispute with the DoD to court. Also, many of Roth's senate colleagues, including John McCain, were asking him to "back off". Thus, Roth decided to drop the matter and continue preparing the report without the testimony of Santarelli, Dallager, Starr, and Mangin. For the first time in U.S. history, the DoD had refused to comply with a U.S. Senate subpoena.[62]
In January 1997 U.S. Senator Fred Thompson became chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and terminated the Black Hawk investigation. The senate investigation report was never publicly released. Asked in 2001 about the DoD's refusal to honor the Senate subpoenas, Thorson responded, "Basically they told the United States Senate to go to hell."[63]
GAO investigation
In September 1995 the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Personnel, chaired by Bob Dornan, requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct its own investigation into the shootdown incident. Specifically, the GAO was asked to determine if the USAF accident investigation board had met its objectives, if the subsequent military justice investigations had followed established guidelines, and if the DoD and/or USAF had improperly or unlawfully influenced these investigations.[64]
The GAO released its investigation report on 12 November 1997. The investigation determined that the USAF accident investigation was properly convened and met its assigned objectives. The GAO report, however, found that the USAF investigation had failed to note that Wickson and May neglected to report their contact with unidentified aircraft to the Duke (Martin) aboard the AWACS as required by the ROE. Furthermore, the USAF investigation report incorrectly stated that Martin had no authority to terminate the engagement when, in fact, he did. The GAO report added that the failure of Wickson and May to report their contact to Martin was indicative of a well-known, general lack of discipline among F-15 aircrews involved in OPC and this was not discussed in the USAF report.[65]
The GAO investigation also uncovered evidence that a rivalry between F-15 and F-16 pilots may have contributed to Wickson's and May's "urgency to engage hostile aircraft" but was not discussed in the USAF investigation.[66] During the GAO's investigation, USAF OPC officers confirmed that the rivalry between the F-15 and F-16 communities was particularly pronounced and intense partly due to the fact that F-16 aircraft had scored all the air-to-air combat kills in Iraq and Bosnia since the end of the Gulf War. Pilkington stated to the GAO that "the shootdown pilots' haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into the TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s and that if the F-15 pilots had involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed down, ruining the pilots' chances for a shootdown." The GAO concluded that if the evidence of a lack of mission discipline by Wickson and May had been included in the USAF report, such information "could have been useful in subsequent administrative and disciplinary actions."[67]
Another aspect the GAO investigation revealed was that the training F-15 pilots received for identifying helicopters was not adequate. Visual ID training was accomplished by reviewing slides on a 35mm projector. Helicopters made up only about 5% of the training slides and nearly all the pictures depicted helicopters from the ground looking up because the pictures were provided by the U.S. Army. Investigators also learned from interviewing other F-15 pilots that helicopter recognition was not regarded as an important skill within the F-15 pilot community because helicopters are not considered a threat to F-15s in air-to-air combat.[68]
The GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence by USAF leaders on the investigation or subsequent administrative and military justice actions. The GAO noted, however, that it was unable to obtain complete confirmation of this finding because the DoD denied the GAO request to interview key USAF officials including Santarelli, Dallager, Starr, and Mangin.[69]
Compensación
On 26 August 1994, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would pay U.S.$100,000 (ex gratia) in compensation to the families of each of the non-U.S. personnel killed in the incident. At this time, the U.S. government did not offer compensation to the families of the U.S. victims, citing the Feres precedent, which prevents lawsuits against the U.S. from injured service members or families of personnel killed due to military negligence. This was the first time the U.S. had offered compensation to the victims of a friendly fire incident.[70]
In 1998, Congressman Lamar S. Smith, chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, held hearings on the compensation issue. He questioned the DoD representatives as to why compensation had not also been offered to the U.S. family members. In November 1999 the U.S. Congress passed legislation authorizing payment of compensation to the families of the American Black Hawk victims.[71]
Secuelas
Five days after the shootdown, USAF OPC officials began including Black Hawk flight times in the daily ATO and included the correct IFF code in the ATO provided to Eagle Flight.[72] OPC officially ended on 31 December 1996. Over the six years of the operation, coalition participants flew a total of 62,000 fixed-wing and rotary-wing sorties. The Black Hawk shootdown was the only serious accident to occur during the operation.[73]
Wickson resigned and May retired from the USAF soon after Fogleman's investigation was complete.[74] Lawrence Tracy retired immediately after Wang's court-martial on an early (15-year) retirement option.[75] By May 2005, Jim Wang was still serving in the USAF, but he remained at the rank of captain, having been denied promotion.[76] Interviewed in 2005 about the shootdown, Tracy stated, "Jim (Wang) and all of us at first were held up as scapegoats. I think that was to cover up for the pilots. They had their fangs out. They wanted to kill something because it had been ages since an F-15 had shot anything down. We were held accountable for their actions."[77]
Andrus retired from the USAF in 1995, Pilkington in 1996, Emery in 1997, and Santarelli in 1998, all at the same rank they held at the time of the shootdown, except Emery, who retired as a brigadier general. Richardson was promoted to brigadier general on 1 July 1999 and retired on 1 September 2001. Dallager was appointed as superintendent of the USAF Academy in June 2000 and was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 August of the same year. Dallager's appointment and promotion were criticized by observers because of his involvement in the controversial shootdown after-actions and refusal to testify for the senate investigation. Dallager retired on 1 September 2003, but at the rank of major general.[78]
A monument to the 26 victims of the shootdown was constructed at Giebelstadt Army Airfield, Germany and dedicated on 14 April 1996. After U.S. military presence ceased at Giebelstadt, due to base closures, the monument was moved to Fort Rucker, Alabama on 10 March 2006, and rededicated on 14 April 2007.[79][80]
"The 53rd FS 'Tigers' never fully recovered from the dark blemish on their otherwise exemplary record. The only way the USAF could make the issue and the pain go away was by closing the unit. This was done on 10 March 1999, leaving USAFE with only one Eagle squadron for the next war in its theater."[81]
Notas
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 3–4, 27–29; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 143; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 78–81.
- ^ Schmitt, "Copter Deaths: Pentagon Finds Human Failure"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 7–8, 29–30; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 78–81.
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, p. 162; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 30. The other OPC co-commander was a Turkish military general officer.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 4, 46, 53–54; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 10–12, 51; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 104.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 76; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 81, 91, 103–04. Originally, four helicopters were planned for the mission, but Turkish military authorities would authorize only two (Hall). The helicopters' call signs were Chalk 1 and Chalk 2 and their tail numbers were #88-26060 and #87-26000 (Hall).
- ^ Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 6–21, 51; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 4, 55, 100–01; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 278–79. Six Eagle Flight helicopters were stationed at Pirinclik. This was Wang's 60th mission over OPC. The IFF systems in use by Provide Comfort coalition aircraft used four identification signals, modes I, II, III, and IV. Mode III was not used in the TAOR (Hall).
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 6–22, 42, 51, 157; Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 4, 55, 100; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 105. Martin was a rated navigator with 2,000 flying hours, mainly in General Dynamics F-111 aircraft and had flown in the 1986 Bombing of Libya. The lead helicopter's crew and passengers included: Patrick McKenna (27), pilot; John Garrett (32), co-pilot; Jeffrey Colbert (22), crewman; Mark Ellner (21), crewman; Jerald Thompson (48), MCC commander; Richard Mulhern (43), new MCC commander; Paul Barclay (24), US Army special forces soldier; Barbara Schell (50), US State Department advisor; Harry Shapland, British military officer; Hikmet Alp, Turkish military officer; Salid Said, Kurdish representative; Barlas Gultepe, Turkish military officer; Bader Mikho, Kurdish representative; and Ahmad Mohammad, Kurdish representative (Hall, pp. 97–103). The trail helicopter's crew and passengers included: Michael Hall (28), pilot; Erik Mounsey (28), co-pilot; Cornelius Bass (22), crewman; Michael Robinson (23), crewman; Laura Piper (25), US Air Force officer; Benjamin Hodge (32); US Army intelligence specialist; Ricky Robinson (33), medic; Jonathan Swann, British military officer; Guy Demetz, French military officer; Ceyhun Civas, Turkish military officer; Abdulsatar Arab, Kurdish representative; Ghandi Hussein, Kurdish representative (Hall, pp. 93–97).
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 56, 101; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 23–24; Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down".
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 25; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 58–59, 83–86, 101. Randy May was the squadron commander of the 53rd with over 3,000 flying hours and had shot down an Iraqi Hind helicopter in northern Iraq near Kirkuk during the Gulf War. Wickson had over 1,300 flying hours with about 700 in F-15s and this was his 18th mission over OPC.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 4–6, 55, 60, 83–86, 101, 116; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 15–26, 51–52; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 106–07.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 4; Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 15–27, 52; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 4–6, 60, 102.
- ^ Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 278–79; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 26–29, 52–53, 217; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6, 60–62, 102, 118; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 4; Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?".
- ^ Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6, 60–63, 76, 102; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 29–30, 53; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 108–09.
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, p. 41; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 6.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 4; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6, 76, 102; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 30–31, 53, 211–16.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 4; Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6, 63, 76, 102; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 30–31, 53, 211–16; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 109.
- ^ GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 79–80; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 32, 53, 119; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6–7, 63, 102; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 109–10.
- ^ Schmitt, "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 6–7, 64; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 4–6; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 32–34, 53, 124–25, 139, 156; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 111–14, 162. Kurdish farmer Hadi Mohammed and his son Aziz witnessed the incident and reported that the trail helicopter was hit, "in the back and it turned one-quarter turn to the right then it rolled sideways to the left, and then it hit the ground. There was no fire in the inside, just on the outside back, and then it hit the ground and exploded and burned" (Hall, p. 112). Mohammed stated that the second missile "hit the second helicopter, it hit the blades on top, and the helicopter went down behind the hill and exploded and burned" (Hall, p. 114). Hall gives the crash coordinates as 36°46′N 44°06′E / 36.767°N 44.100°E / 36.767; 44.100 (Hall, p. 158).
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 48–49, 107; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 160. A Kurdish farmer, Mowfik Tahsin, videotaped the shootdown and some of the wreckage immediately afterwards (Hall, p. 114).
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 55–56.
- ^ GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 8–10; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 67–68, 117, 227; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 160.
- ^ Schmitt, "Copter Deaths: Pentagon Finds Human Failure"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 123–29; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 16; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 160.
- ^ The USAF AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Report Summary states that Tracy was not currently qualified because he had not flown the requisite three sorties during the prior three months. On 22 December 1993 Tracy was placed in "Duty-not-involving-flying" (DNIF) status and did not fly again until 23 February 1994 when he flew one sortie and was waivered to return to mission ready (MR) status. He did not fly another sortie until the 14 April 1994 mission in which the Black Hawks were shot down. During that time period, Tracy was incorrectly left in MR status and subsequently incorrectly designated as mission crew commander on 14 April.
- ^ GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 66–67; Piper, Friendly Fire, p. 128; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 281–82.
- ^ Weiner, "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down", Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 102.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 125.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 126.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 127.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 8, 142–61; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 42–43, 210. O'Brien's full title is, "Commander, Operations, Plans, and Policy" for OPC.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Schmitt, "Copter Deaths: Pentagon Finds Human Failure"; Snook, Friendly Fire, pp. 142–61; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 42; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 278–79. The USAF AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Report Summary says the possible reasons that the second mode (Mode IV) responded negatively included: Wickson and May selected the wrong interrogation crypto code (A or B), both F-15's interrogators malfunctioned, both Black Hawk IFF transponder crypto codes may have been loaded incorrectly, the close proximity of the two Black Hawks to each other may have "garbled" the IFF signals, and the mountainous terrain may have interfered with line-of-sight between the helicopters and the F-15s.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 10–13, 247.
- ^ GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 248.
- ^ Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 68.
- ^ Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq", Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft", Piper, Chain of Events, p. 130.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 151–54, 161; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 246.
- ^ Wickson did not request immunity. Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 246; Novak, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 161–63, 169–72, 177–83; Associated Press, "No Charges Likely Against F-15 Pilot"; Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?".
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 186–88, 196; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 246, 252.
- ^ Novak, Robert, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star", reported in Soldiers for the Truth; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 231.
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 183–84.
- ^ Associated Press, "No Charges Likely Against F-15 Pilot"; Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 186–88, 196, 201; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 246, 252; Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?".
- ^ Bacon, "DoD Press Briefing"; Schmitt, "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 132, 222, 240; Military Times, quoted at "Specialist Cornelius A. Bass".
- ^ Sklute, "DoD NewsBriefing"
- ^ Arana-Barradas, "Black hawk incident "tragic series of errors"; Chu Lin, "Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang"; Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq"; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 247; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 205–13; Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft".
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 161, 171.
- ^ Peterson, "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 214–15.
- ^ Novak, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star", reported in "Soldiers for Truth" and in Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 252; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 119.
- ^ Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 220–21.
- ^ Bacon, "DoD Press Briefing"; Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft"; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 221.
- ^ Arana-Barradas, "Black hawk incident "tragic series of errors".
- ^ Verhovek, "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft"; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 251; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 224.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; Schmitt, "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 224, 231–32; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 251.
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 70–71, 233–36; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 205–06. Others testifying at the hearing included Major General Stephan Silvasy, Jr., U.S. Army, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAF Major General Nolan Sklute, USAF Judge Advocate General, US Navy Rear Admiral James Lair, Director of Operations for the US Navy in Europe, US Army Captain Michael Nye, an Eagle Flight pilot, retired USAF colonel Jerry Cox, a former USAF pilot and journalist for the Military Times, and Frank J. Spinner, Wang's attorney (Hall).
- ^ Schmitt, "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots", GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 239–40.
- ^ Arana-Barradas, "Black hawk incident 'tragic series of errors'"; GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Schmitt, "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots"; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 240; Sklute, "DoD NewsBriefing".
- ^ Sklute, "DoD NewsBriefing".
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 243, 247–50; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 251.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 252; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 50–251; Novak, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star"
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 53–254.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 252; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 254–56.
- ^ CBS News, "'A Great Deal of Arrogance'"; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 262–63, Novak, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star"
- ^ GAO report; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 251; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 241–42; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 65.
- ^ GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 252–53; Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 65, Hall; Michael, My Son, pp. 274–82.
- ^ GAO, pp. 32–33, discussed in Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 96.
- ^ GAO, pp. 32–33, discussed in Snook, Friendly Fire, p. 96; Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 252–53; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 274–82.
- ^ Snook, "Friendly Fire", p. 96.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 252–53; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 251, 262; GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"; Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 274–82.
- ^ Diehl, Silent Knights, pp. 51, 245; Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 145–50; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 162. The US Government also paid $100 in compensation to Kurdish farmer Mohammed Amin Khorshid for damage to his onion field caused by the crash of one of the two helicopters (Hall, p. 162).
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, pp. 264, 269; Diehl, Silent Knights, p. 326.
- ^ Washington, "So, Who's to Blame?"; GAO, "Operation Provide Comfort"
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, p. 258.
- ^ Chu Lin, "Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang"; Piper, Chain of Events, p. 196; Hall, Michael, My Son, p. 276. Hall says May retired at the lower rank of major. Hall says he asked repeatedly for Wickson to contact him to discuss the shootdown but Wickson never responded (Hall, p. 304).
- ^ Piper, Chain of Events, p. 216.
- ^ Chu Lin, Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang. Hall states that after his court martial, Wang called the victims' family members and apologized.
- ^ Chu Lin, "Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang".
- ^ Novak, "Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star", USAF, Official biographies of Andrus, Croker, Dallager, Emery, Pilkington, Richardson, and Santarelli.
- ^ Eagle Flight Detachment Memorial Monument Friends Archived 14 April 2008 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Hall, Michael, My Son, pp. 212, 226. Four hundred people attended that dedication ceremony at Giebelstadt. A videoteleconference room at the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency at Kelly Field Annex was named in honor of Cornelius Bass on 26 March 1998 (Hall, p. 293).
- ^ Davies, Steve, and Dildy, Doug (2007). F-15 Eagle Engaged – The World's Most Successful Jet Fighter, Oxford, UK: Osprey, ISBN 978-1-84603-169-4, OCLC 148316605 p. 211.
Referencias
Black Hawk shootdown victims [1] |
1. Cornelius A. Bass, U.S. Army |
2. Jeffrey C. Colbert, U.S. Army |
3. Mark A. Ellner, U.S. Army |
4. John W. Garrett Jr., U.S. Army |
5. Michael A. Hall, U.S. Army |
6. Patrick M. McKenna, U.S. Army |
7. Erik S. Mounsey, U.S. Army |
8. Michael S. Robinson, U.S. Army |
9. Paul Barclay, U.S. Army |
10. Benjamin T. Hodge, U.S. Army |
11. Richard A. Mulhern, U.S. Army |
12. Ricky L. Robinson, U.S. Army |
13. Jerald L. Thompson, U.S. Army |
14. Laura A. Piper, U.S. Air Force |
15. Barbara L. Schell, U.S. State Dept |
16. Harry Shapland, UK |
17. Jonathan C. Swann, UK |
18. Guy Demetz, France |
19. Hikmet Alp, Turkey |
20. Ceyhun Civas, Turkey |
21. Barlas Gultepe, Turkey |
22. Abdulsatur Arab, Kurdish |
23. Ghandi Hussein, Kurdish |
24. Nader Mekho, Assyrian |
25. Salid Said, Kurdish |
26. Ahmad Mohamad, Kurdish |
Books
- Diehl, Alan E. (2003). Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups. Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1-57488-544-6.
- Hall, Allen L. (2002). Michael, My Son, and the Story of the Eagle Flight Detachment. New York: Vantage Press. ISBN 978-0-533-13789-3.
- Piper, Joan L. (2001). Chain of Events: The Government Cover-up of the Black Hawk Incident and the Friendly-fire Death of Lt. Laura Piper. Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-57488-344-2.
- Snook, Scott A. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton University Press.
Web
- Arana-Barradas, Louis A. (1996). "Black hawk incident "tragic series of errors"". Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- Bacon, Kenneth H. (1995). "DoD News Briefing: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD PA". DefenseLink. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
- CBS News (27 February 2001). "A Great Deal of Arrogance". CBS News. Retrieved 16 November 2007.
- Chu Lin, Sam (2005). "Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang". AsianWeek.com. Archived from the original on 17 January 2013. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- "Eagle Flight Detachment Memorial Monument Friends". 1994–2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- General Accounting Office (GAO) (1998). "Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident". Archived from the original on 2 March 2007. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
- Moran, Michael (2005). "Battling friendly fire: Military pins hopes on new technologies as fratricide proves a stubborn foe". NBC News. Retrieved 1 January 2008.
- Novak, Robert (2000). "Article 3: Past Fiasco dims General's new Third Star". Soldiers for the Truth. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
- Peterson, Iver (3 June 1995). "Court-Martial Begins in 'Friendly Fire' Deaths in Iraq" (Newspaper article). The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
- Schmitt, Eric (1 July 1994). "Copter Deaths: Pentagon Finds Human Failure" (Newspaper article). The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
- Schmitt, Eric (15 August 1995). "Chief of Air Force Grounds 5 Pilots" (Newspaper article). The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
- Sklute, Nolan (1995). "DoD NewsBriefing: Major General Nolan Sklute, AF/ SJA". DefenseLink. Archived from the original on 30 December 2006. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
- United States Air Force (1995). "Major General James G. Andrus". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (1996). "Lieutenant General Stephen B. Croker". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (2003). "Lieutenant General John R. Dallager". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (1997). "Brigadier General Curtis H. Emery". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (1996). "Brigadier General Jeffrey S. Pilkington". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (2000). "Brigadier General Douglas J. "Doug" Richardson". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- United States Air Force (1998). "Lieutenant General Eugene D. Santarelli". Air Force Link. Archived from the original on 19 March 2007. Retrieved 16 February 2007.
- Verhovek, Sam Howe (21 June 1995). "Air Force Officer Is Acquitted in Downing of Army Aircraft" (Newspaper article). The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
- Washington, Mark Thomas (3 July 1995). "So, Who's to Blame?". Time. Retrieved 1 March 2007.
- Weiner, Tim (15 April 1995). "Court-Martial Nears in Case of Helicopters Shot Down" (Newspaper article). The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
Otras lecturas
- General Accounting Office (November 2007). "Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 February 2008. Retrieved 22 January 2008.
- Kern, Tony T. (1999). Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot. McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing. ISBN 978-0-07-034927-8.
- Ladkin, Peter B.; Stuphorn, Jörn (2004). "Two Causal Analyses of the Black Hawk Shootdown during Operation Provide Comfort". Proc. Eighth Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS 2003), Canberra, Australia. CRPIT, Vol. 33.
- ^ Eagle Flight Detachment Memorial Monument Friends