Coordenadas : 40 ° 29′N 127 ° 12′E / 40.483 ° N 127.200 ° E
La batalla del embalse de Chosin , también conocida como la campaña del embalse de Chosin o la batalla del lago Jangjin (en coreano : 장진호 전투 ; Hanja : 長 津 湖 戰 鬪; RR : Jangjinho jeontu ; MR : Changjinho chŏnt'u ), fue una batalla importante en la Guerra de Corea . [c] El nombre "Chosin" se deriva de la pronunciación japonesa " Chōshin " , en lugar de la pronunciación coreana. [10]
Batalla del embalse de Chosin | |||||||||
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Parte de la Guerra de Corea | |||||||||
Una columna de la Primera División de Infantería de Marina de los EE. UU. Se mueve a través de las líneas chinas durante su fuga del depósito de Chosin con un tanque mediano M46 Patton. | |||||||||
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Beligerantes | |||||||||
Naciones Unidas ( UNC ) | República Popular China Corea del Norte | ||||||||
Comandantes y líderes | |||||||||
Douglas MacArthur Edward Almond Oliver P. Smith | Peng Dehuai Song Shilun | ||||||||
Unidades involucradas | |||||||||
ver el orden de batalla de la Batalla del embalse de Chosin | Ver el orden de batalla de la Batalla del embalse de Chosin | ||||||||
Fuerza | |||||||||
Nominal : 103,520 [1] Comprometidos : ~ 30,000 [2] | Nominal : 150.000 [3] Comprometidos : ~ 120.000 [4] | ||||||||
Bajas y perdidas | |||||||||
Fuentes estadounidenses : 1.029 muertos 4.894 desaparecidos 4.582 heridos 7.338 bajas fuera de combate [5] [a] 15 pérdidas de tanques [6] 17.843 Estimación china total : 13.900 [7] | Fuentes chinas : 19.202 bajas en combate 28.954 bajas en combate 48.156 en total [7] Estimaciones no oficiales : ~ 60.000 [8] [b] Estimación de la ONU : 29.800 bajas en combate 20.000+ bajas en combate [9] |
Las fuentes oficiales chinas se refieren a esta batalla como la parte oriental de la Campaña de la Segunda Fase (u Ofensiva) ( chino :第二 次 战役 东线; pinyin : Dì'èrcì Zhànyì Dōngxiàn ). La mitad occidental de la Campaña de la Segunda Fase resultó en una victoria china en la Batalla del Río Ch'ongch'on .
La batalla tuvo lugar aproximadamente un mes después de que la República Popular de China entró en el conflicto y envió al 9º Ejército [d] del Ejército Popular de Voluntarios (PVA) para infiltrarse en la parte noreste de Corea del Norte . El 27 de noviembre de 1950, la fuerza china sorprendió al X Cuerpo de Estados Unidos comandado por el mayor general Edward Almond en el área del embalse de Chosin. Pronto siguió una brutal batalla de 17 días en un clima helado. Entre el 27 de noviembre y el 13 de diciembre, alrededor de 120.000 [4] tropas chinas bajo el mando del general de división Oliver P. Smith rodearon y atacaron a 30.000 [2] soldados del Mando de las Naciones Unidas (más tarde apodados "Los Chosin Few") bajo el mando de Song Shilun , a quien Mao Zedong le había ordenado destruir las fuerzas de la ONU. No obstante, las fuerzas de la ONU pudieron escapar del cerco y realizar una retirada de combate al puerto de Hungnam , lo que infligió numerosas bajas a los chinos. Las unidades de la Infantería de Marina de los EE. UU. Fueron apoyadas en su retirada por la Fuerza de Tarea Faith del Ejército de los EE. UU. Hacia el este, que sufrió muchas bajas y todo el peso de la ofensiva china. La retirada del Octavo Ejército estadounidense del noroeste de Corea tras la Batalla del río Ch'ongch'on y la evacuación del X Cuerpo del puerto de Hungnam en el noreste de Corea marcaron la retirada completa de las tropas de la ONU de Corea del Norte.
Fondo
A mediados de octubre de 1950, después del exitoso aterrizaje en Inchon por parte del Cuerpo X de EE. UU. , La ruptura del Octavo Ejército del Perímetro de Pusan y la subsiguiente persecución y destrucción del Ejército Popular de Corea (KPA), la Guerra de Corea parecía haber terminado. . [11] Las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) avanzaron rápidamente hacia Corea del Norte con la intención de reunir a Corea del Norte y Corea del Sur antes de finales de 1950. [12] Corea del Norte está dividida por el centro por las intransitables montañas Taebaek , que separan a las fuerzas de la ONU. en dos grupos. [13] El Octavo Ejército de Estados Unidos avanzó hacia el norte a través de la costa occidental de la península de Corea, mientras que el I Cuerpo de la República de Corea (ROK) y el X Cuerpo de Estados Unidos avanzaron hacia el norte por la costa este. [13]
Al mismo tiempo, la República Popular China ingresó al conflicto luego de emitir varias advertencias a las Naciones Unidas. [14] El 19 de octubre de 1950, grandes formaciones de tropas chinas, denominadas Ejército Voluntario del Pueblo (PVA), cruzaron en secreto la frontera y entraron en Corea del Norte. [15] Una de las primeras unidades chinas en llegar al área del embalse de Chosin fue el 42º Cuerpo del PVA , y se le encomendó la tarea de detener los avances orientales de la ONU. [16] El 25 de octubre, el I Cuerpo de la República de Corea que avanzaba se puso en contacto con los chinos y se detuvo en el paso de Funchilin ( 40 ° 12′14 ″ N 127 ° 18′00 ″ E / 40.204 ° N 127.3 ° E / 40.204; 127,3), al sur del embalse de Chosin. [17] Después del desembarco en Wonsan , la 1ª División de Infantería de Marina de los EE. UU. Del X Cuerpo se enfrentó a la 124ª División PVA defensora el 2 de noviembre, y la batalla que siguió causó numerosas bajas entre los chinos. [18] El 6 de noviembre, el 42º Cuerpo del PVA ordenó una retirada hacia el norte con la intención de atraer a las fuerzas de la ONU al embalse de Chosin. [19] El 24 de noviembre, la 1.ª División de Infantería de Marina ocupó Sinhung-ni [e] ( 40 ° 33′25 ″ N 127 ° 16′12 ″ E / 40.557 ° N 127.27 ° E / 40,557; 127,27) en el lado este del embalse y Yudami-ni ( 40 ° 28′48 ″ N 127 ° 06′43 ″ E / 40,48 ° N 127,112 ° E / 40,48; 127.112) en el lado oeste del embalse. [20]
Ante los repentinos ataques de las fuerzas chinas en el sector del Octavo Ejército, el general Douglas MacArthur ordenó al Octavo Ejército que lanzara la Ofensiva Hogar por Navidad . [21] Para apoyar la ofensiva, MacArthur ordenó al X Cuerpo atacar al oeste desde el embalse de Chosin y cortar la vital línea de suministro de Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon. [22] [23] Como respuesta, el mayor general Edward M. Almond , comandante del Cuerpo X de Estados Unidos, formuló un plan el 21 de noviembre. Pidió a la 1ª División de Infantería de EE.UU. avanzar hacia el oeste a través de Yudami-ni, mientras que la 7ª División de Infantería de EE.UU. proporcionaría un equipo de combate de regimiento para proteger el flanco derecho en Sinhung-ni. La 3.ª División de Infantería de EE. UU. También protegería el flanco izquierdo al tiempo que proporcionaría seguridad en el área trasera. [24] Para entonces, el X Corps estaba delgado a lo largo de un frente de 400 millas. [20]
Sorprendido por el desembarco marina en Wonsan, [25] Partido Comunista Chino presidente Mao Zedong llamado a la destrucción inmediata de la República de Corea División de Capital , República de Corea tercera división de infantería , 1ra División de Marina de Estados Unidos, y la séptima división de infantería de Estados Unidos en un telégrafo al comandante [f ] Song Shilun del 9º Ejército del PVA el 31 de octubre. [26] Bajo las órdenes urgentes de Mao, el 9º Ejército fue trasladado rápidamente a Corea del Norte el 10 de noviembre. [27] Sin ser detectado por la inteligencia de la ONU, [28] el 9º Ejército entró silenciosamente en el área del embalse de Chosin el 17 de noviembre, y el 20º Cuerpo del 9º Ejército relevó al 42º Cuerpo cerca de Yudami-ni. [19]
Preludio
Ubicación, terreno y clima
El embalse de Chosin es un lago artificial ubicado en el noreste de la península de Corea. [29] El nombre Chosin es la pronunciación japonesa del topónimo coreano Changjin , y el nombre se quedó debido a los mapas japoneses obsoletos utilizados por las fuerzas de la ONU. [30] El enfoque principal de la batalla fue alrededor del camino de 78 millas (126 km) de largo que conecta Hungnam y el embalse de Chosin, [31] que sirvió como la única ruta de retirada para las fuerzas de la ONU. [32] A través de estos caminos, Yudami-ni y Sinhung-ni, [e] ubicados en el lado oeste y este del embalse respectivamente, están conectados en Hagaru-ri (ahora Changjin-ŭp) ( 40 ° 23′02 ″ N 127 ° 14′56 ″ E / 40,3838 ° N 127,249 ° E / 40,3838; 127.249). Desde allí, la carretera pasa por Koto-ri ( 40 ° 17′02 ″ N 127 ° 18′00 ″ E / 40.284 ° N 127.3 ° E / 40,284; 127,3) y finalmente conduce al puerto de Hungnam. [33] El área alrededor del embalse de Chosin estaba escasamente poblada. [34]
La batalla se libró en algunos de los terrenos más accidentados durante algunas de las condiciones climáticas invernales más duras de la Guerra de Corea. [2] La carretera se creó atravesando el terreno montañoso de Corea, con empinadas subidas y bajadas. Picos dominantes, como el paso de Funchilin y el paso de Toktong ( 40 ° 23′38 ″ N 127 ° 09′40 ″ E / 40.3938 ° N 127.161 ° E / 40,3938; 127.161), pasan por alto toda la longitud de la carretera. La calidad de la carretera era mala y en algunos lugares se redujo a un camino de grava de un solo carril. [33] El 14 de noviembre de 1950, un frente frío de Siberia descendió sobre el embalse de Chosin, y la temperatura se hundió, según las estimaciones, a tan solo -36 ° F (-38 ° C). [35] El clima frío estuvo acompañado de tierra congelada, creando un peligro considerable de bajas por congelamiento , carreteras heladas y fallas de armamento. Los suministros médicos se congelaron; las jeringas de morfina tenían que descongelarse en la boca de un médico antes de que pudieran inyectarse; El plasma sanguíneo congelado era inútil en el campo de batalla. Incluso cortarse la ropa para tratar una herida corría el riesgo de gangrena y congelación. Las baterías utilizadas para los Jeeps y las radios no funcionaban correctamente en la temperatura y se agotaron rápidamente. [36] La lubricación de las armas se gelificó y las inutilizó en la batalla. Del mismo modo, los resortes de los percutores no golpearían con la fuerza suficiente para disparar la ronda o se atascarían. [37]
Fuerzas y estrategias
Aunque la 1.ª División de Infantería de Marina aterrizó en Wonsan como parte del Cuerpo X de los Estados Unidos de Almond, Almond y el General de División Oliver P. Smith de la 1.ª División de Infantería de Marina compartieron un desprecio mutuo que se remontaba a una reunión antes del desembarco en Inchon, [38 ] cuando Almond había hablado de lo fáciles que son los aterrizajes anfibios a pesar de que nunca había estado involucrado en uno. [39] Smith creía que había un gran número de fuerzas chinas en Corea del Norte a pesar de que el cuartel general superior en Tokio decía lo contrario, [39] : 428 pero Almond sintió que Smith era demasiado cauteloso. [39] : 434 La desconfianza mutua entre los comandantes hizo que Smith frenara el avance de la 1ª División de Infantería de Marina hacia el Embalse de Chosin en violación de las instrucciones de Almond. [39] : 429 Smith estableció puntos de suministro y aeródromos en el camino en Hagaru-ri y Koto-ri. [39] : 433–4
Mientras el US X Corps avanzaba hacia el embalse, los chinos formularon su estrategia, basada en sus experiencias en la Guerra Civil China . [40] Partiendo de la suposición de que sólo una ligera presencia de la ONU estaría en el embalse, el 9º Ejército chino destruyó primero las guarniciones de la ONU en Yudami-ni y Sinhung-ni, luego empujó hacia Hagaru-ri. [40] Creyendo que la mayor parte del Cuerpo X de Estados Unidos se movería para rescatar las unidades destruidas, el 9º Ejército bloquearía y atraparía a las principales fuerzas de la ONU en la carretera entre Hagaru-ri y Hungnam. [40] El 9º Ejército inicialmente comprometió ocho [41] divisiones para la batalla, [42] con la mayoría de las fuerzas concentradas en Yudami-ni y Sinhung-ni. [40]
La falla en el plan chino fue la falta de inteligencia precisa sobre las fuerzas de la ONU. [43] A pesar de que el Cuerpo X de EE. UU. Se extendía sobre el noreste de Corea, el lento avance de la Infantería de Marina permitió que el grueso de la 1ª División de Infantería de Marina de EE . UU., Incluidos los 5 , 7 y 11 de Infantería de Marina , se concentrara en Yudami-ni. [39] : 435 [44] Además, el estratégicamente importante Hagaru-ri, donde se estaba construyendo un aeródromo habilitado para C-47 y un vertedero de suministros, [45] no era una prioridad para los chinos a pesar de ser ligeramente defendido por el 1er. y 7º de Infantería de Marina. [46] Sólo el Equipo de Combate de Regimiento 31 (RCT-31), un equipo de combate de regimiento formado apresuradamente y de escasa fuerza de la 7ª División de Infantería de EE. UU., Estaba escasamente distribuido a lo largo de la orilla oriental del embalse. [47] Esas unidades sufrirían más tarde la peor parte de los asaltos chinos. En cuanto a las fuerzas de la ONU, la 1.a División de Infantería de Marina tenía una fuerza efectiva de 25.473 hombres al comienzo de la batalla, [48] y fue reforzada por el Comando 41 (Independiente) de la unidad 41 de los Royal Marines británicos y el equivalente a dos regimientos de las Divisiones de Infantería 3 y 7 del Ejército. [2] Las fuerzas de la ONU tenían una fuerza combinada de unos 30.000 hombres durante el curso de la batalla. [2] las fuerzas de la ONU en Chosin también fueron apoyados por una de las mayores concentraciones de poder aéreo durante la Guerra de Corea, [49] ya que la primera marina ala de aviones estacionados en Yonpo campo de aviación y cinco portaaviones de la Marina de los Estados Unidos Grupo de Trabajo 77 eran capaz de lanzar 230 salidas diarias para proporcionar apoyo aéreo cercano durante la batalla, [49] mientras que el Comando de Carga de Combate del Lejano Oriente de la Fuerza Aérea de EE. UU. en Japón alcanzó la capacidad de lanzar 250 toneladas de suministros por día para reabastecer a las fuerzas de la ONU atrapadas. [50]
Aunque el 9º Ejército era una de las formaciones de élite de China, compuesta por veteranos y ex prisioneros de guerra de la Campaña Huaihai , [40] varias deficiencias obstaculizaron su capacidad durante la batalla. Inicialmente, el 9º Ejército estaba destinado a ser equipado en Manchuria durante noviembre, pero Mao repentinamente lo ordenó en Corea antes de que eso sucediera. [51] Como resultado, el 9º Ejército casi no tenía ropa de invierno para el duro invierno coreano. [52] De manera similar, la mala logística obligó al 9º Ejército a abandonar la artillería pesada, [3] [53] mientras trabajaba con poca comida y municiones. [52] La escasez de alimentos obligó al 9º Ejército a colocar inicialmente un tercio de su fuerza lejos del embalse de Chosin en reserva, [54] y estalló el hambre y la exposición entre las unidades chinas, ya que la búsqueda de comida no era una opción en los escasamente poblados área. [52] Al final de la batalla, más tropas chinas habían muerto por el frío que por el combate y los ataques aéreos. [55]
La fuerza china se estima generalmente en 120,000 [4] tropas para la batalla, [56] ya que el 9º Ejército estaba compuesto por 12 divisiones con una fuerza de 10,000 hombres por división. [57] Antes de llegar a Corea, el 9º Ejército también fue reforzado. Cada uno de sus tres cuerpos ahora tenía cuatro divisiones en lugar de las tres regulares. La infantería de dos divisiones nacionalistas anteriormente liberadas (rindidas) fue absorbida [58] para fortalecer a cada compañía de infantería. Algunas empresas tenían aproximadamente 150 hombres, [59] pero otras empresas se reforzaron con más de 200 hombres. [60] Sin embargo, el desgaste debido a los ataques aéreos de la ONU, la mala logística y el clima frío también habían afectado al 9º Ejército en su intento de llegar al campo de batalla. El día que el 9º Ejército entró en Corea, por ejemplo, la congelación causó inmediatamente 700 bajas mientras que la mayoría de sus vehículos de transporte fueron destruidos por los ataques aéreos de la ONU. [3] De hecho, durante el curso de la batalla, los prisioneros de guerra chinos informaron que la mayoría de las divisiones del 9º Ejército se habían debilitado, sumando entre 6.500 y 7.000 hombres por división. [61] Estos factores, más las incertidumbres sobre el orden de batalla chino en fuentes occidentales, [g] también habían llevado a algunos historiadores a revisar la fuerza china hasta un mínimo de 60.000 durante el curso de la batalla. [2]
Finalmente, se desplegaron las 12 divisiones chinas del 9º Ejército, aunque las Divisiones 78 y 88 del 26º Cuerpo del PVA no se pusieron en contacto con las fuerzas de la ONU durante el curso de la batalla. [62] Ocho divisiones de los Cuerpos 20 y 27 del PVA sirvieron como la principal fuerza de ataque. [41] Cuatro divisiones del 26º Cuerpo del PVA inicialmente se mantuvieron en reserva y se desplegaron después de que el 20 y el 27º Cuerpo agotaran toda su fuerza disponible. [63]
Batalla
En la noche del 27 de noviembre, los Cuerpos 20 y 27 del 9º Ejército del PVA lanzaron múltiples ataques y emboscadas a lo largo de la carretera entre el embalse de Chosin y Kot'o-ri. En Yudam-ni, los infantes de marina 5, 7 y 11 fueron rodeados y atacados por las Divisiones 79 y 89 del PVA , y la 59 División atacó la carretera entre Yudam-ni y Hagaru-ri para cortar la comunicación. Del mismo modo, RCT-31 fue aislado y emboscado en Sinhung-ni por las divisiones 80 y 81 del PVA . En Hagaru-ri, el cuartel general de mando de la 1ª División de Infantería de Marina fue atacado por la 58ª División del PVA . Finalmente, la 60ª División del PVA rodeó a elementos del 1º de Infantería de Marina en Kot'o-ri desde el norte. [40] Cogidas por sorpresa, las fuerzas de la ONU fueron aisladas en Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri y Kot'o-ri el 28 de noviembre. [64]
Acciones en Yudam-ni
Siguiendo las instrucciones de Almond, Smith ordenó al 5º de Infantería de Marina que atacara al oeste hacia Mupyong-ni el 27 de noviembre. [66] El ataque pronto fue detenido por la 89ª División del PVA y obligó a los Marines a excavar en las crestas que rodean Yudam-ni. [67] [68] Cuando llegó la noche, tres regimientos chinos de la 79ª División atacaron las crestas al norte y noroeste de Yudam-ni, con la esperanza de aniquilar la guarnición de un solo golpe. [69] Pronto se desarrollaron combates a corta distancia cuando los atacantes se infiltraron en las posiciones de los Marines, [70] pero el 5º y el 7º Marines mantuvieron la línea mientras infligían muchas bajas a los chinos. [71] [72] Cuando amaneció el 28 de noviembre, los chinos y los estadounidenses quedaron atrapados en un punto muerto alrededor del perímetro de Yudam-ni. [73]
Mientras la batalla estaba en curso en Yudam-ni, la 59.a División de PVA bloqueó el camino entre Yudam-ni y Hagaru-ri atacando a las empresas defensoras Charlie y Fox de la 7ma Infantería de Marina. [74] El exitoso asalto obligó a la Compañía Charlie a retirarse a Yudam-ni, lo que dejó a la Compañía Fox comandada por el Capitán William E. Barber aislada en una colina con vista al Paso Toktong, un paso vital que controlaba la carretera. [75] El 29 de noviembre, varios esfuerzos del 7º de Infantería de Marina no lograron rescatar a la Compañía Fox, a pesar de infligir muchas bajas a los chinos. [76] Ayudada por la artillería de los cazas Hagaru-ri y Marine Corsair , Fox Company logró resistir durante cinco días mientras soportaba constantes ataques de la 59ª División PVA. [77]
Después de las grandes pérdidas sufridas por la 79.a División del PVA en Yudam-ni, el cuartel general del 9. ° Ejército se dio cuenta de que la mayor parte de la 1.ª División de Infantería de Marina estaba estacionada en Yudam-ni, con una fuerza de guarnición que era el doble de la estimación inicial. [78] Creyendo que cualquier otro asalto sería inútil, Song Shilun ordenó al 9º Ejército que cambiara sus ataques principales hacia Sinhung-ni y Hagaru-ri, [78] dejando solo a Yudam-ni del 28 al 30 de noviembre. [79] Al mismo tiempo, el Octavo Ejército de EE. UU. En el frente occidental de Corea se vio obligado a retirarse por completo en la Batalla del río Ch'ongch'on , y MacArthur ordenó a Almond que retirara al X Cuerpo de EE. UU. Al puerto de Hungnam. [80] Siguiendo las instrucciones de Almond y Smith, el teniente coronel Raymond L. Murray y el coronel Homer L. Litzenberg , comandantes del 5º y 7º de Infantería de Marina, respectivamente, emitieron una orden conjunta para escapar de Yudam-ni a Hagaru-ri. el 30 de noviembre. [81] Enfrentado a una dura lucha entre las divisiones chinas que bloquean y los marines en retirada, Smith comentó: "¡Retírate, diablos! No nos estamos retirando, solo estamos avanzando en una dirección diferente". [82]
Para la fuga, los marines formaron un convoy con un solo tanque Sherman M4A3 como líder. El plan era tener al 3.er Batallón, 5.º de Infantería de Marina (3/5) como vanguardia del convoy, con tres batallones cubriendo la retaguardia. Al mismo tiempo, el 1er Batallón, 7mo Marines (1/7) atacaría hacia la Compañía Fox para abrir la carretera en Toktong Pass. [83] Para iniciar la fuga, el 3er Batallón, el 7º de Infantería de Marina (3/7) tuvo que atacar primero al sur y capturar las colinas 1542 y 1419 para cubrir el camino de los ataques chinos. [84] La fuga se llevó a cabo bajo la cubierta aérea de la 1ª Marine Air Wing. [85]
En la mañana del 1 de diciembre, 3/7 infantes de marina se enfrentaron al 175 ° Regimiento PVA de la 59.a División en Hills 1542 ( 40 ° 26′06 ″ N 127 ° 06′25 ″ E / 40.435 ° N 127.107 ° E / 40,435; 127.107) y 1419 ( 40 ° 25′41 ″ N 127 ° 08′06 ″ E / 40.428°N 127.135°E / 40.428; 127.135). The Chinese defenders soon forced the Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks[86] when the convoy passed 3/7's position by the afternoon.[84] With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni, while the 89th Division rushed south towards Kot'o-ri.[87] The Chinese struck at night, and the ferocity of the fighting forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks.[88] The fighting lasted well into the morning of 2 December until all the Marines had managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.[88]
At the same time, 1/7 Marines also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on 1 December. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield.[89] As night approached, 1/7 finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road.[90] Relying on the element of surprise, they managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road.[91] On the morning of 2 December, a joint attack by Fox Company and 1/7 secured the Toktong Pass, thus opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.[92]
Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still had to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties on 3/5 Marines.[93] Although strong air cover suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and roadblocks slowed the retreat to a crawl, while inflicting numerous casualties.[94] Despite those difficulties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of 3 December, with the withdrawal completed on 4 December.[95]
East of the reservoir
RCT-31, later known as "Task Force Faith," was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin, with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the Pyungnyuri Inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni ( 40°26′N 127°17′E / 40.43°N 127.28°E / 40.43; 127.28) south of Sinhung-ni.[96] Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment,[78] the task force was actually understrength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.[96]
On the night of 27 November, three regiments from the 80th Division attacked the northern hills ( 40°29′20″N 127°15′32″E / 40.489°N 127.259°E / 40.489; 127.259) and the inlet,[97] completely surprising the defenders.[98] The ensuing battle inflicted heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, to the north of Sinhung-ni,[99] while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, were almost overrun at the Pyungnyuri Inlet.[100] The Chinese also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221 ( 40°26′56″N 127°16′05″E / 40.449°N 127.268°E / 40.449; 127.268),[101] an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni.[102] As the night's fighting ended, RCT-31 was separated into three elements.[103]
Believing that the defenders had been completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceeded to loot the US positions for food and clothing.[104] As morning came on 28 November, the 3/31st Infantry counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the surprised Chinese back in a complete rout.[104][105] In the afternoon, Almond flew into the Sinhung-ni perimeter of RCT-31, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack north and deal with whatever "remnants" of Chinese forces that were in their way. Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Stars to three of Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., the commander of the 1/32nd Infantry, threw his medal into the snow.[106]
On the night of 28 November, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with four regiments.[107] At the inlet, the Chinese assault became a disaster as communications broke down, while devastating fire from the M16 and M19 anti-aircraft (AA) guns attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion swept the Chinese ranks.[108][109][h] In the aftermath of the fighting, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had fewer than 600 soldiers.[110] The attacks by PVA 240th Regiment, on the other hand, forced Maclean to order a retreat from the northern hills towards Sinhung-ni.[111] On 29 November, the 1st Battalion managed to break through the Chinese blockade and reached the Sinhung-ni perimeter, but Maclean was lost when he mistook some Chinese soldiers for American.[112][i] The Chinese finally stopped their attacks on the night of 29 November, while waiting for fresh reinforcements.[113]
While RCT-31 was under siege, Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni, an impossible order for Smith to implement.[114] Only the 31st Tank Company tried to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221 from Hudong-ni,[115] but without infantry support, the two armored attacks on 28 and 29 November were stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults.[116] By 30 November, the US forces evacuated Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.[117]
On 30 November, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into Sinhung-ni and met with Faith, who by now had assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to bring along.[118] On the same day, parts of the PVA 94th Division[j] and the rest of the 81st Division[119]arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division.[113] By midnight, six[120] Chinese regiments renewed their attacks, and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn.[121] Again, the 57th Battalion's AA guns held the Chinese at bay,[122] but the shell supplies were running desperately low.[123] On the day of 1 December, Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.[123]
The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide air cover on 1 December.[124] As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the Sudong-ni perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces,[125] with three other regiments closing in.[126] Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and US troops.[127] The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company,[126] allowing the convoy to advance.[128] As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks.[128] Chinese fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide.[129] Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon.[130] Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column.[131] As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by a Chinese grenade and subsequently died of his wounds.[132] The convoy managed to fight past the first roadblock, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks.[133] Out of the original 2,500 soldiers, about 1,050 managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and only 385 survivors were deemed able-bodied.[12]:339 The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.[134]
Actions at Hagaru-ri
To support the Marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. Smith and 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri.[64] With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marines, the rest of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from both the Army and the Marine Corps.[12]:322
The original Chinese plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of 27 November, but the division became lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps it used.[135] It was not until the dawn of 28 November that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri.[135] Meanwhile, from the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri noticed the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1), predicted the Chinese attack would come on the night of 28 November.[136] Almost everyone, including rear support units with little combat training, was pressed into service on the front line due to the manpower shortage,[137] and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.[138]
It was not long before the PVA 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter, while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on the northern perimeter.[139] Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was overwhelmed, with the Chinese opening several gaps in the defenses and reaching the rear areas.[140] The resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the Chinese soldiers, who began looting food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation.[12]:324 The defending Americans managed to destroy the Chinese forces in counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close.[137] When the fighting stopped, the Chinese had only gained the East Hill ( 40°23′13″N 127°15′32″E / 40.387°N 127.259°E / 40.387; 127.259) on the northern perimeter.[137] Another attack was planned for the night of 29 November, but air raids by VMF-542 broke up the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.[141]
Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, on November 29, Smith ordered Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller of the First Marine Regiment to assemble a task force to be sent north from Kot'o-ri to open the road south of Hagaru-ri.[142][143] A task force was formed with 921 troops from 41 Royal Marines Commando, G Company of the 1st Marines and B Company of the 31st Infantry.[144][145] It was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Commando.[144] On the afternoon of 29 November, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri, while under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division.[146][147] The task force's harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley".[148] As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized,[149] and a destroyed truck in the convoy later split the task force into two segments.[150] Although the lead segment fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of 29 November, the rear segment was destroyed.[12]:327 Despite suffering 162 dead and missing and 159 wounded, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defense at Hagaru-ri.[145][151]
As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni on 30 November,[152] the garrisons attempted to recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed, despite the destruction of a Chinese company.[153][154] When darkness settled, the PVA 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last-ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri.[155] The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill giving way.[156] As the Chinese tried to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.[157]
By 1 December, the PVA 58th Division was virtually destroyed,[158] with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army.[159][160] Much to the frustration of Song Shilun, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the Marines broke out of Yudam-ni.[7] The airfield was opened to traffic on 1 December, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and wounded.[161] With the Marines at Yudam-ni completing their withdrawal on 4 December, the trapped UN forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.
Breakout
After a short rest, the breakout began on 6 December, with the 7th Marines as the vanguard of the retreating column, while the 5th Marines covered the rear.[162] At the same time, the much-delayed PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Divisions to relieve the 58th and 60th Divisions.[163] As the 7th Marines pushed aside the PVA 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marines took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th Division.[164][165] In a last effort to stop the breakout,[164] the customary Chinese night attack was launched, with the 76th and 77th Division striking the Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions.[159] The Marines repulsed the attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.[166]
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high ground surrounding the road. But as soon as the Marines pulled out, the 77th Division returned to the peaks and attacked the column.[167][168] Chaotic fighting broke out and the retreat was slowed to a crawl.[169] The Marine night fighters, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces,[168] and most of the blocking troops were eliminated.[170] On 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with little difficulty, with the last elements reaching Kot'o-ri that night.[12]:361
After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and 27th Corps to chase the escaping UN force, with the 20th Corps assigned to block the escape route.[170][171] But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions.[172] In desperation, Song Shilun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass, while blowing up the vital treadway bridge ( 40°13′55″N 127°17′46″E / 40.232°N 127.296°E / 40.232; 127.296), hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.[7][172] The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 ( 40°13′59″N 127°19′34″E / 40.233°N 127.326°E / 40.233; 127.326) blew up the original concrete bridge and two improvised replacements in succession, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable.[22]:137[173] In response, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on 9 December, though the defenders fought to the last man.[174] At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the treadway bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders who were already frozen in their foxholes.[12]:364
With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass, eight C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by the US 314th Troop Carrier Wing were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute.[175][176] The bridge, consisting of eight separate 18 ft (5.5 m) long, 2,900 lb (1,300 kg) sections, was dropped one section at a time, using a 48 ft (15 m) parachute on each section.[177] Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the US Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on 9 December, enabling UN forces to proceed.[178] Outmaneuvered, the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions combined had only 200 soldiers left.[179] The last UN forces left Funchilin Pass by 11 December.[180]
One of the last engagements during the withdrawal was an ambush at Sudong ( 40°10′12″N 127°19′26″E / 40.17°N 127.324°E / 40.17; 127.324) by the pursuing PVA 89th Division,[179] which Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty.[181] The trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on 11 December.[182]
Evacuation at Hungnam
By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, MacArthur had already ordered the evacuation of the US X Corps on 8 December in order to reinforce the US Eighth Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel.[22]:158–9[183] Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and the US 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions had also set up defensive positions around the port.[184] Some skirmishes broke out between the defending US 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry and the pursuing PVA 27th Corps,[185] but against the strong naval gun fire support provided by US Navy Task Force 90, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.[183][186]
In what US historians called the "greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history",[187] a 193-ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean refugees.[12]:367 One Victory ship, the SS Meredith Victory, evacuated 14,000 refugees by herself, despite being designed to carry only 12 passengers. The last UN unit left at 14:36 on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Chinese.[187] The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.[188]
Secuelas
Casualties
The US X Corps and the ROK I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties: 4,385 US Marines, 3,163 US Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 British Royal Marines.[189] The 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather, adding up to a total of 17,833 casualties.[190] Despite the losses, the US X Corps preserved much of its strength.[191] About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan,[12]:367 and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. Commanding General Smith was credited for saving the US X Corps from destruction,[39]:430 while the 1st Marine Division, 41 Royal Marines Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their tenacity during the battle.[192][193][194] Fourteen Marines, two soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname "The Chosin Few".[192][195] On 15 September 2010, the Veterans of the Korean War Chosin Reservoir Battle memorial was unveiled by the United States Marine Corps Commandant General James T. Conway at Camp Pendleton.[196]
The PVA 9th Army suffered 19,202 combat casualties, and 28,954 non-combat casualties were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and lack of food. Total casualties thus amounted to 48,156 - about one third of its total strength.[7] Outside of official channels, the estimation of Chinese casualties has been described as high as 60,000 by Patrick C. Roe, the chairman of Chosin Few Historical Committee, citing the number of replacements requested by 9th Army in the aftermath of the battle.[197] Regardless of the varying estimates, historian Yan Xue of PLA National Defence University noted that the 9th Army was put out of action for three months.[198] With the absence of 9th Army the Chinese order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions by December 31, 1950,[199] as opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on November 16, 1950.[200]
Operation Glory
During the battle, UN dead were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. Operation Glory took place from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.[201] After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in Honolulu, Hawaii). According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted from the Chinese and North Koreans during the operation, of which 858 proved to be correct.[202] The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns.[k] From 1990 to 1994, North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to 400 US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.[203] From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the Chinese border between 1996 and 2006.[204][205]
Outcome assessment
Roy E. Appleman, the author of US Army official history South to Naktong, North to Yalu, writes that both sides could claim victory: the PVA 9th Army ultimately held the battlefield, while X Corps held off the PVA 9th Army in a series of battles that enabled it to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit.[206] Allan R. Millett qualifies a Chinese "geographic victory" that ejected X Corps from North Korea with the fact that the Chinese failed to achieve the objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division, adding that the campaign gave the UN confidence that it could withstand the superior numbers of the Chinese forces.[207] The official Chinese history, published by PLA Academy of Military Science, states that despite the heavy casualties, the PVA 9th Army had earned its victory by successfully protecting the eastern flank of Chinese forces in Korea, while inflicting over 10,000 casualties to the UN forces.[208]
Eliot A. Cohen writes that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory which inflicted such heavy losses on the PVA 9th Army that it was put out of action until March 1951.[209] Paul M. Edwards, founder of the Center for the Study of the Korean War,[210] draws parallels between the battle at Chosin and the Dunkirk evacuation. He writes that the retreat from Chosin following a "massive strategic victory" by the Chinese has been represented as "a moment of heroic history" for the UN forces.[211] Appleman, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of a sea-borne evacuation to preserve the UN forces, asserting that X Corps had the strength to break out of the Chinese encirclement at Hungnam at the end of the battle.[212] Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledges X Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, and writes that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory."[213] Bruce Cumings simply refers to the battle as a "terrible defeat" for the Americans.[214]
Patrick C. Roe, who served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Marine Regiment at Chosin,[215] asserts that X Corps directly allowed the Eighth Army to hold the south[l] and quoted MacArthur in corroborating his view.[m] Yu Bin, a historian and a former member of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, states that while the destruction of Task Force Faith[n] was viewed as the single greatest Chinese victory of the war, ultimately the PVA 9th Army had become "a giant hospital" while failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin as planned.[216] Zhang Renchu, whose 26th Corps was blamed for allowing the X Corps to escape,[7] had threatened suicide over the outcome, while Song Shilun offered to resign his post.[217]
The battle exacerbated inter-service hostility, the Marines blaming the US Army and its leadership for the failure.[218] The collapse of the army units fighting on the east of the reservoir was regarded as shameful, and for many years afterwards their role in the battle was largely ignored. Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952.[219][220]
The Marines evacuated from North Korea spent January and most of February 1951 rebuilding in the relatively secure South Korea, where they destroyed the well-respected but already weakened North Korean 10th Division in counter-guerrilla operations during the Second Battle of Wonju.[22]:227[221] The Marines returned to regular and heavy action on February 21 in Operation Killer.[222]
Wider effect on the war
The battle ended the UN force's expectation of total victory, including the capture of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula.[223] By the end of 1950, PVA/KPA forces had recaptured North Korea and pushed UN forces back south of the 38th parallel. Serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all US forces from the Korean peninsula and US military leaders made secret contingency plans to do so.[224] The disregard by Far Eastern Command under MacArthur of the initial warnings and diplomatic hints by the PVA almost led the entire UN army to disaster at Ch'ongch'on River and Chosin Reservoir and only after the formation and stabilization of a coherent UN defensive line under Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway did the "period of headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe" cease.[223]
On the other hand, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the UN Command to secure its position in South Korea, while losing North Korea. First, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, PVA commanders were persuaded by their victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on that they could "defeat American armed forces", and this led to "unrealistic expectations that the CPV [PVA] would work miracles."[225][39]:624–5 Second, the heavy casualties caused by sub-zero temperatures and combat, plus poor logistical support weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two were forced to disband,[226] With the absence of 12 out of 30 of Chinese divisions in Korea in early 1951, Roe says that the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.[227]
Legado
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir is regarded by some historians as the most brutal in modern warfare by violence, casualty rate, weather conditions, and endurance.[228] Over the course of fourteen days, 17 Medals of Honor (Army and Navy) and 78 Service Cross Medals (Army and Navy) were awarded, the second most as of 2020 after the Battle of the Bulge (20MOHs / 83SCMs).[229][230]
Veterans of the battle are colloquially referred to as the "Chosin Few" and symbolized by the "Star of Koto-ri".[230]
Namesakes and memorials
- Unknown year, "Chosin" nickname and "Against All Odds" motto, 32nd Infantry Regiment
- Unknown year, Battle of Chosin Reservoir Memorial, Veterans Memorial Park (Lawrence, Indiana)
- Unknown year, Chosin Reservoir Campaign Memorial (Ogden, Utah)
- 1989, Chosin Few Memorial, Forest Park (St. Louis, Missouri)
- 1991, USS Chosin
- 1999, “The March Out Of The Chosin”, Oak Ridge Cemetery (Springfield, Illinois)[231]
- 2010, Chosin Few Memorial, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton (Oceanside, California)[196]
- 2017, The Chosin Few Monument, Semper Fidelis Memorial Park, National Museum of the Marine Corps (Triangle, Virginia)
- 2017, Chosin Few Memorial Highway, 40-mile portion of Route 35 (Monmouth County, New Jersey)[232]
Películas y documentales
- This is Korea! (1951)
- Retreat, Hell! (1952)
- Hold Back the Night (1956)
- Chosin Reservoir - Epic of Endurance
- Chosin (2010)
- Task Force Faith (2014)
- Against the Odds, Bloody George at the Chosin Reservoir (2015)
- True War Stories, Frozen Chosin (2015)
- American Experience: The Battle of Chosin (2016)
Ver también
- History of the United States Army
- History of the United States Marine Corps
- History of the People's Liberation Army
Notas
Footnotes
- ^ The 1st Marine Division reported 604 killed, 114 dead of wounds, 192 missing, 3,485 wounded and 7,338 non-battle casualties. However, US X Corps disputed the number by only recording 393 killed, 2,152 wounded and 76 missing for the 1st Marine Division. This number is calculated by inserting the 1st Marine Division's casualty data into the X Corps' total casualty report. See Appleman 1990, pp. 345–347 and Montross & Canzona 1992, pp. 381–382.
- ^ This number is the total number of replacements requested by the 9th Army to reconstitute itself, which includes units that were not involved the fighting. See Roe 2000, p. 394.
- ^ "The difference between a very serious reverse and a total disaster was a near thing. The most crucial battle was in the northeast, at Chosin." See Roe 2000, p. 411
- ^ In Chinese military nomenclature, the term "army" (军) means corps, while the term "army group" (集团军) means army.
- ^ a b c The town of Sinhung-ni referred to in this article should not be confused with another identically named town located at south of Yudami-ni on the west side of Chosin Reservoir. See Appleman 1990, pp. 30, 32, 221, 376.
- ^ The Chinese military did not have military ranks during the 1950s.
- ^ "The third uncommitted division of the IX Army Group was the 90th, of the 27th Army. It may have been had in reserve somewhere in the Chosin area but never committed, or if elements of it were committed, they were never identified." See Appleman 1987, p. 353
- ^ RCT-31's anti-aircraft guns were from D Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Battalion, which was attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion during the entire battle. See Appleman 1990, p. 82.
- ^ Maclean's final fate is disputed between Chinese and US sources. Although both sides agreed that Maclean was shot numerous times while running towards the Chinese soldiers, Chinese sources claim that Maclean was shot dead on the spot, while UN POWs stated that Maclean later died from his wounds while being moved to a Chinese POW camp. See Guang 2007, p. 60 and Appleman 1990, p. 114.
- ^ Misidentified as the 90th Division by UN intelligence. See Guang 2007, p. 118.
- ^ 176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases, four were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; three were identified and two cases unconfirmed. See "DPMO White Paper, Punch Bowl 239". Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-27.
- ^ "Loss of the 1st Marine Division would have resulted in the loss of a substantial portion of X Corps. Instead, X Corps was withdrawn intact, while inflicting such damage upon the twelve divisions of the 9th Army that they were out of action until the last days of March. With the reinforcement by X Corps, and with the absence of nearly 40% of total Chinese strength, the Eighth Army was able to hold the south." See Roe 2000, pp. 411–2
- ^ "General MacArthur agreed that this was the decisive battle. In commenting on a study by the Marine Corps Board, he wrote: "The Marine Corps Board of Study rightfully points out that the campaign of the 1st Marine Division with attached Army elements in North Korea was 'largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom.'...""See Roe 2000, p. 412
- ^ Yu Bin states that it was the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division that was destroyed, reflecting the Chinese mis-identification of the composition of Task Force Faith.[78]
Citations
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 37.
- ^ a b c d e f Appleman 1990, p. 24.
- ^ a b c Xue & Li Part One 2000.
- ^ a b c 叶 2007, p. 259.
- ^ Appleman 1990, pp. 345–347.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 348.
- ^ a b c d e f Xue & Li Part Four 2000.
- ^ Roe 2000.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 352.
- ^ Down in the weeds: close air support in Korea. DIANE Publishing. ISBN 1428990178.
Fighting around the Choshin Reservoir*... *This was the Japanese name for the reservoir, the term being derived from the ruling "Chosŏn" dynasty, which ended just 13 years before the Japanese occupation beginning in 1910. The name American also rendered it as Chosin or Chosen. The proper Korean name is Changjin.
- ^ Millett, Allan R. (2009). "Korean War". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 29 December 2008. Retrieved 2009-02-04.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Alexander, Bevin R. (1986). Korea: The First War We Lost. New York, New York: Hippocrene Books. p. 312. ISBN 9780870521355.
- ^ a b Appleman 1990, p. 3.
- ^ Roe 2000, pp. 101–107.
- ^ Roe 2000, pp. 145–149.
- ^ Guang 2007, p. 46.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 5.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 7.
- ^ a b Guang 2007, p. 47.
- ^ a b Appleman 1990, p. 8.
- ^ Appleman 1990, pp. 24,33.
- ^ a b c d Mossman, Billy (1990). Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War. Center of Military History, United States Army. p. 48. ISBN 9781410224705. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 11.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 14.
- ^ Roe, Patrick C. (August 1996). "The Chinese Failure at Chosin". Dallas, TX: Korean War Project. Retrieved 2010-01-22.
- ^ Guang 2007, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 21.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 35.
- ^ Russ 1999, p. 65.
- ^ Tucker et al. 2000, p. 108.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 32.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 29.
- ^ a b Appleman 1990, pp. 28–31.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. 25.
- ^ Appleman 1990, p. xi.
- ^ Duncan, James Carl (2013). Adventures of a Tennessean. Author House. p. 190. ISBN 9781481741576.
- ^ Tilstra, Russell C. (2014). The Battle Rifle: Development and Use Since World War II. McFarland. p. 192. ISBN 9781476615646.
- ^ Hammel 1994, p. 214.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Halberstam, David (2007). The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean War. New York, New York: Hyperion. p. 428. ISBN 9781401300524.
- ^ a b c d e f Guang 2007, p. 52.
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But a number of historians and some Marine veterans of Chosin now believe that the 1st Marine Division might have been destroyed had the poorly armed, ill-trained soldiers of Task Force Faith not bought time by keeping the Chinese from sweeping south.
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Referencias
- Alexander, Bevin R. (1986), Korea: The First War We Lost, New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, ISBN 978-0-87052-135-5
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has extra text (help) - Cohen, Eliot A. (2012), Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, ISBN 9781439135488
- Cumings, Bruce (2005), Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN 9780393347531
- Cunningham-Boothe, Ashley; Farrar, Peter (1989), British Forces in the Korean War, Leamington Spa, UK: British Korean Veterans Association, ISBN 978-0-9512622-0-7
- Edwards, Paul M. (2006), The Korean War, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 9780313332487
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- Daily, Edward L. (1999), MacArthur's X Corps in Korea: Inchon to the Yalu, 1950, Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, ISBN 978-1-56311-439-7
- Guang, Ting (光亭) (April 2007), Dong, Min Jie (董旻杰) (ed.), "Ice and Blood, Changjin Lake (冰血长津湖)", Der Strum (突击) Magazine Korean War Special Issue (in Chinese), Hohhot, Inner Mongolia: Inner Mongolian People's Publishing House (内蒙古人民出版社), ISBN 978-7-204-08166-0
- Halberstam, David (2007), The Coldest Winter – America and the Korean War, New York, New York: Hyperion, ISBN 978-1-4013-0052-4
- Hammel, Eric (1994), Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War, Novato, California: Presidio Press, ISBN 978-0-89141-527-5
- Hoare, James (1995), Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea, New York, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, ISBN 978-0-8108-7093-2
- Malkasian, Carter (2001), The Korean War 1950–1953, New York, New York: Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84176-282-1
- Millett, Allan R. (2010), The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came From the North, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 978-0-7006-1709-8
- Montross, Lynn; Canzona, Nicholas (1992), U.S. Marine Operations in Korea: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 3, Austin, Texas: Robert J. Speights, ISBN 978-0-944495-03-2
- Mossman, Billy C. (1990), Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, ISBN 978-1-4102-2470-5
- Roe, Patrick C. (2000), The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950, Novato, California: Presidio, ISBN 978-0-89141-703-3
- Russ, Martin (1999), Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950, New York, New York: Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-029259-6
- Ryan, Mark A.; Finkelstein, David M.; McDevitt, Michael A. (2003), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0765610876
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Otras lecturas
- Appleman, Roy (1987). East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950. 2. College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series. ISBN 978-0-89096-283-1.
- Appleman, Roy (1992). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. ISBN 978-0-16-035958-3. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- Chae, Han Kook; Chung, Suk Kyun; Yang, Yong Cho (2001). Yang, Hee Wan; Lim, Won Hyok; Sims, Thomas Lee; Sims, Laura Marie; Kim, Chong Gu; Millett, Allan R. (eds.). The Korean War. Volume II. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-7795-3.
|volume=
has extra text (help) - Cowart, Glenn C. (1992). Miracle In Korea: The Evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam Beachhead. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-87249-829-7.
- Drury, Bob; Clavin, Tom (2009). The Last Stand of Fox Company. New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 978-0-87113-993-1.
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony (1990). Official History: The British Part in the Korean War. Volume I. London, England: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630953-2.
|volume=
has extra text (help) - Fehrenbach, T.R. (1963). This Kind of War. Dulles, VA: Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-57488-259-9.
- Hayhurst, Fred (2001). Green Berets in Korea: The Story of 41 Independent Commando – Royal Marines. New York, NY: Vanguard Press. ISBN 978-1-903489-12-3.
- O'Donnell, Patrick K. (2010). Give Me Tomorrow: The Korean War's Greatest Untold Story – The Epic Stand of the Marines of George Company. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-81801-1.
- Owen, Joseph R. (2007). Colder Than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-416-6.
- Rasula, George A (2012). "The Changjin Journal - 75 illustrated chapters online". New York, NY: The New York Military Affairs Symposium. Retrieved 2013-06-11.
- Sides, Hampton (2018). On Desperate Ground: The Marines at The Reservoir, the Korean War's Greatest Battle. New York: Double Day. ISBN 978-0385541152.
- Simmons, Edwin H. (2002). Frozen Chosin (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6). Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps History Division. PCN 19000410000.
- Stanton, Shelby L. (1989). America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950. Novato, CA: Presidio. ISBN 978-0-89141-258-8.
- Taylor, George O. (July 2002). "The Forgotten War's Forgotten Task Force". Army Magazine. Washington, D.C.: Association of the United States Army. 52 (7): 43–48. ISSN 0004-2455. Archived from the original on 2011-10-05.
enlaces externos
Media related to Battle of Chosin Reservoir at Wikimedia Commons
- "Chosin Reservoir: Epic of Endurance". Korean War Educator. 2007-01-23. Retrieved 2007-12-16.
- Stewart, Richard W. (2000). The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention. United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 19-8. Retrieved 2007-01-10.
- Chosin Veterans website
- Changjin Journal
- Chosin, 2010 documentary movie by Brian Iglesias and Anton Sattler
- "The Battle of Chosin” (2016), produced for the PBS series,The American Experience