La Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965 es una pieza histórica de la legislación federal en los Estados Unidos que prohíbe la discriminación racial en la votación . [7] [8] Fue promulgada por el presidente Lyndon B. Johnson durante el apogeo del movimiento de derechos civiles el 6 de agosto de 1965, y el Congreso posteriormente enmendó la ley cinco veces para ampliar sus protecciones. [7] Diseñado para hacer cumplir los derechos de voto garantizados por las Enmiendas Decimocuarta y Decimoquinta de laConstitución de los Estados Unidos , la ley buscaba asegurar el derecho al voto de las minorías raciales en todo el país, especialmente en el sur . Según el Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos , se considera que la Ley es la legislación federal sobre derechos civiles más eficaz jamás promulgada en el país. [9] También es "una de las leyes de derechos civiles de mayor alcance en la historia de Estados Unidos". [10]
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| Título largo | Una ley para hacer cumplir la decimoquinta enmienda de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos y para otros fines. |
|---|---|
| Siglas (coloquial) | VRA |
| Apodos | Ley de derechos de voto |
| Promulgado por | el 89 ° Congreso de los Estados Unidos |
| Eficaz | 6 de agosto de 1965 |
| Citas | |
| Ley Pública | 89-110 |
| Estatutos en general | 79 Stat. 437 |
| Codificación | |
| Títulos modificados | Título 52 — Votación y elecciones |
| Secciones de la USC creadas | |
| Historia legislativa | |
| |
| Enmiendas importantes | |
| |
| Casos de la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos | |
| |
La ley contiene numerosas disposiciones que regulan las elecciones. Las "disposiciones generales" de la ley brindan protecciones a nivel nacional para los derechos de voto. La Sección 2 es una disposición general que prohíbe a todos los gobiernos estatales y locales imponer cualquier ley de votación que resulte en discriminación contra las minorías raciales o lingüísticas. Otras disposiciones generales prohíben específicamente las pruebas de alfabetización y dispositivos similares que históricamente se utilizaron para privar de derechos a las minorías raciales. La ley también contiene "disposiciones especiales" que se aplican sólo a determinadas jurisdicciones. Una disposición especial fundamental es el requisito de autorización previa de la Sección 5, que prohíbe a ciertas jurisdicciones implementar cualquier cambio que afecte la votación sin recibir la aprobación previa del fiscal general de EE. UU. O del Tribunal de Distrito de EE. UU. Para DC de que el cambio no discrimina a las minorías protegidas. [11] Otra disposición especial requiere que las jurisdicciones que contienen poblaciones de minorías lingüísticas significativas proporcionen boletas bilingües y otros materiales electorales.
La Sección 5 y la mayoría de las demás disposiciones especiales se aplican a las jurisdicciones abarcadas por la "fórmula de cobertura" prescrita en la Sección 4 (b). La fórmula de cobertura fue diseñada originalmente para abarcar jurisdicciones que participaron en una discriminación atroz en el voto en 1965, y el Congreso actualizó la fórmula en 1970 y 1975. En el condado de Shelby v. Holder (2013), la Corte Suprema de EE. UU. Anuló la fórmula de cobertura por inconstitucional. razonamiento de que ya no respondía a las condiciones actuales. [12] El tribunal no derogó la Sección 5, pero sin una fórmula de cobertura, la Sección 5 no se puede hacer cumplir. [13] Las jurisdicciones que anteriormente habían sido cubiertas por la fórmula de cobertura aumentaron masivamente la tasa de purgas de registros de votantes después de la decisión de Shelby. [14]
La investigación muestra que la Ley aumentó de manera exitosa y masiva la participación y el registro de votantes, en particular entre los negros. [15] [16] La ley también se ha relacionado con resultados concretos, como una mayor provisión de bienes públicos (como educación pública) para áreas con mayor proporción de población negra, y más miembros del Congreso que votan por leyes relacionadas con los derechos civiles. [17] [18]
Fondo
Como se ratificó inicialmente, la Constitución de los Estados Unidos otorgó a cada estado total discreción para determinar las calificaciones de votante de sus residentes. [19] [20] : 50 Después de la Guerra Civil , las tres Enmiendas de Reconstrucción fueron ratificadas y limitaron esta discreción. La Decimotercera Enmienda (1865) prohíbe la esclavitud "excepto como castigo por un delito"; la Decimocuarta Enmienda (1868) otorga la ciudadanía a cualquier persona "nacida o naturalizada en los Estados Unidos" y garantiza a todas las personas el debido proceso y los mismos derechos de protección ; y la Decimoquinta Enmienda (1870) establece que "[e] l derecho de los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos a votar no será negado o restringido por los Estados Unidos o por ningún Estado por motivos de raza, color o condición previa de servidumbre. " Estas Enmiendas también facultan al Congreso para hacer cumplir sus disposiciones a través de "legislación apropiada". [21]
Para hacer cumplir las Enmiendas de Reconstrucción, el Congreso aprobó las Leyes de Ejecución en la década de 1870. Los actos tipificaron como delito la obstrucción del derecho al voto de los ciudadanos y preveían la supervisión federal del proceso electoral, incluido el registro de votantes . [22] : 310 Sin embargo, en 1875 la Corte Suprema derogó partes de la legislación por inconstitucional en Estados Unidos contra Cruikshank y Estados Unidos contra Reese . [23] : 97 Después de que terminó la Era de la Reconstrucción en 1877, la aplicación de estas leyes se volvió errática y, en 1894, el Congreso derogó la mayoría de sus disposiciones. [22] : 310
Los estados del sur en general buscaron privar de sus derechos a las minorías raciales durante y después de la Reconstrucción. De 1868 a 1888, el fraude electoral y la violencia en todo el sur suprimieron el voto afroamericano . [24] De 1888 a 1908, los estados del sur legalizaron la privación de derechos al promulgar leyes Jim Crow ; modificaron sus constituciones y aprobaron leyes para imponer varias restricciones de voto, incluidas pruebas de alfabetización , impuestos electorales , requisitos de propiedad de propiedad, pruebas de carácter moral, requisitos de que los solicitantes de registro de votantes interpreten documentos particulares y cláusulas de abuelo que permitían votar a personas que de otro modo no serían elegibles sus abuelos votaron (lo que excluyó a muchos afroamericanos cuyos abuelos habían sido esclavos o no eran elegibles). [22] [24] Durante este período, la Corte Suprema en general mantuvo los esfuerzos para discriminar a las minorías raciales. En Giles v. Harris (1903), el tribunal sostuvo que, independientemente de la Decimoquinta Enmienda, el poder judicial no tenía el poder de remediación para obligar a los estados a registrar a las minorías raciales para votar. [23] : 100
Antes de la promulgación de la Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965, hubo varios esfuerzos para detener la privación del derecho al voto de los votantes negros por parte de los estados del sur [7] . Además de las pruebas de alfabetización y los impuestos electorales antes mencionados, se utilizaron otras restricciones burocráticas para negarles el derecho al voto. Los afroamericanos también "corrían riesgo de acoso, intimidación, represalias económicas y violencia física cuando intentaban registrarse o votar. Como resultado, muy pocos afroamericanos eran votantes registrados y tenían muy poco, si es que tenían alguno, poder político, ya sea a nivel local o nacionalmente." [25] En la década de 1950, el Movimiento de Derechos Civiles aumentó la presión sobre el gobierno federal para proteger los derechos de voto de las minorías raciales. En 1957, el Congreso aprobó la primera legislación de derechos civiles desde la Reconstrucción: la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1957 . Esta legislación autorizó al fiscal general a demandar por medidas cautelares en nombre de personas cuyos derechos de la Decimoquinta Enmienda fueron denegados, creó la División de Derechos Civiles dentro del Departamento de Justicia para hacer cumplir los derechos civiles a través de litigios y creó la Comisión de Derechos Civiles para investigar los derechos de voto. privaciones. Se promulgaron más protecciones en la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1960 , que permitió a los tribunales federales nombrar árbitros para llevar a cabo el registro de votantes en jurisdicciones que participaban en la discriminación electoral contra las minorías raciales. [9]
Si bien estos actos ayudaron a empoderar a los tribunales para remediar las violaciones de los derechos de voto federales, las estrictas normas legales dificultaron que el Departamento de Justicia prosiguiera con éxito el litigio. Por ejemplo, para ganar una demanda por discriminación contra un estado que mantuvo una prueba de alfabetización, el Departamento necesitaba demostrar que las solicitudes de registro de votantes rechazadas de las minorías raciales eran comparables a las solicitudes aceptadas de los blancos. Esto implicó comparar miles de solicitudes en cada uno de los condados del estado en un proceso que podría durar meses. Los esfuerzos del Departamento se vieron obstaculizados aún más por la resistencia de los funcionarios electorales locales, que afirmarían haber perdido los registros de registro de votantes de las minorías raciales, eliminar a las minorías raciales registradas de los registros electorales y dimitir para que cesara el registro de votantes. Además, el Departamento a menudo tuvo que apelar las demandas varias veces antes de que el poder judicial brindara alivio porque muchos jueces de los tribunales de distrito federal se oponían al sufragio de las minorías raciales. Por lo tanto, entre 1957 y 1964, la tasa de registro de votantes afroamericanos en el Sur aumentó solo marginalmente a pesar de que el Departamento litigó 71 demandas por derechos de voto. [23] : 514 Los esfuerzos para detener la privación del derecho al voto por parte de los estados del sur habían logrado solo un éxito modesto en general y en algunas áreas habían demostrado ser casi completamente ineficaces, porque "los esfuerzos del Departamento de Justicia para eliminar las prácticas electorales discriminatorias mediante litigios sobre un caso por- caso no había tenido éxito en la apertura del proceso de registro; tan pronto como se comprobara que una práctica o procedimiento discriminatorio era inconstitucional y se prohibía, se sustituiría por uno nuevo y el litigio tendría que comenzar de nuevo ". [7]
El Congreso respondió a la discriminación desenfrenada contra las minorías raciales en lugares públicos y servicios gubernamentales al aprobar la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964 . La ley incluyó algunas protecciones de los derechos de voto; requirió que los registradores administraran igualmente pruebas de alfabetización por escrito a cada votante y aceptaran solicitudes que contenían errores menores, y creó una presunción refutable de que las personas con una educación de sexto grado estaban suficientemente alfabetizadas para votar. [20] : 97 [26] [27] Sin embargo, a pesar del cabildeo de los líderes de derechos civiles, la ley no prohibió la mayoría de las formas de discriminación en el voto. [28] : 253 El presidente Lyndon B. Johnson reconoció esto, y poco después de las elecciones de 1964 en las que los demócratas obtuvieron mayorías abrumadoras en ambas cámaras del Congreso, ordenó en privado al fiscal general Nicholas Katzenbach que redactara "la ley de derecho al voto más maldita y dura que haya lata". [20] : 48–50 Sin embargo, Johnson no presionó públicamente por la legislación en ese momento; sus asesores le advirtieron de los costos políticos de perseguir enérgicamente un proyecto de ley de derechos de voto tan poco después de que el Congreso aprobara la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964, y Johnson estaba preocupado de que defender los derechos de voto pondría en peligro sus reformas de la Gran Sociedad al enfurecer a los demócratas del sur en el Congreso. [20] : 47–48, 50–52
Después de las elecciones de 1964, las organizaciones de derechos civiles como la Conferencia de Liderazgo Cristiano del Sur (SCLC) y el Comité Coordinador Estudiantil No Violento (SNCC) presionaron por una acción federal para proteger los derechos de voto de las minorías raciales. [28] : 254-255 Sus esfuerzos culminaron en protestas en Alabama , particularmente en la ciudad de Selma , donde la fuerza policial del sheriff del condado Jim Clark resistió violentamente los esfuerzos de registro de votantes afroamericanos. Hablando sobre el impulso de los derechos de voto en Selma, James Forman de SNCC dijo:
Nuestra estrategia, como de costumbre, fue obligar al gobierno de los EE. UU. A intervenir en caso de que hubiera arrestos, y si no intervenían, esa inacción probaría una vez más que el gobierno no estaba de nuestro lado y, por lo tanto, intensificaría el desarrollo de una conciencia de masas entre negros. Nuestro lema para esta campaña fue " Un hombre, un voto ". [28] : 255
En enero de 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. , James Bevel , [29] [30] y otros líderes de derechos civiles organizaron varias manifestaciones pacíficas en Selma , que fueron violentamente atacadas por policías y contramanifestantes blancos. Durante enero y febrero, estas protestas recibieron cobertura de los medios nacionales y llamaron la atención sobre el tema del derecho al voto. King y otros manifestantes fueron arrestados durante una marcha el 1 de febrero por violar una ordenanza contra el desfile ; esto inspiró marchas similares en los días siguientes, provocando el arresto de cientos más. [28] : 259–261 El 4 de febrero, el líder de derechos civiles Malcolm X pronunció un discurso militante en Selma en el que dijo que muchos afroamericanos no apoyaban el enfoque no violento de King; [28] : 262 más tarde dijo en privado que quería asustar a los blancos para que apoyaran a King. [20] : 69 Al día siguiente, King fue liberado y apareció en The New York Times una carta que escribió sobre los derechos de voto, "Letter From A Selma Jail" . [28] : 262
Con la nación prestando cada vez más atención a Selma y los derechos de voto, el presidente Johnson revocó su decisión de retrasar la legislación sobre el derecho de voto, y el 6 de febrero anunció que enviaría una propuesta al Congreso. [20] : 69 Sin embargo, no reveló el contenido de la propuesta ni cuándo se presentaría al Congreso. [28] : 264
El 18 de febrero en Marion, Alabama , la policía estatal interrumpió violentamente una marcha nocturna por el derecho al voto durante la cual el oficial James Bonard Fowler disparó y mató al joven manifestante afroamericano Jimmie Lee Jackson , que estaba desarmado y protegía a su madre. [28] : 265 [31] Estimulados por este evento, y en el inicio de Bevel, [28] : 267 [29] [30] [32] : 81–86 el 7 de marzo SCLC y SNCC comenzaron el primero de Selma a las marchas de Montgomery , en las que los residentes de Selma tenían la intención de marchar a la capital de Alabama, Montgomery , para resaltar los problemas del derecho al voto y presentar sus quejas al gobernador George Wallace . En la primera marcha, la policía estatal y del condado detuvo a los manifestantes a caballo en el puente Edmund Pettus, cerca de Selma. La policía lanzó gases lacrimógenos a la multitud y pisoteó a los manifestantes. Las imágenes televisadas de la escena, que se conocieron como "Domingo sangriento" , generaron indignación en todo el país. [23] : 515 Se llevó a cabo una segunda marcha el 9 de marzo, que se conoció como "Martes de cambio" . Esa noche, tres ministros unitarios blancos que participaron en la marcha fueron atacados en la calle y golpeados con palos por cuatro miembros del Ku Klux Klan . [33] El peor herido fue el reverendo James Reeb de Boston , quien murió el jueves 11 de marzo. [34]
A raíz de los eventos en Selma, el presidente Johnson, al dirigirse a una sesión conjunta televisada del Congreso el 15 de marzo, pidió a los legisladores que promulguen una legislación expansiva sobre el derecho al voto. Concluyó su discurso con las palabras " superaremos ", un himno importante del movimiento de derechos civiles. [28] : 278 [35] La Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965 se presentó en el Congreso dos días después, mientras que los líderes de los derechos civiles, ahora bajo la protección de las tropas federales, encabezaron una marcha de 25.000 personas desde Selma a Montgomery. [23] : 516 [28] : 279, 282
Historia legislativa
Los esfuerzos para eliminar las prácticas electorales discriminatorias mediante litigios caso por caso por parte del Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos no han tenido éxito y las leyes federales contra la discriminación existentes no fueron suficientes para superar la resistencia de los funcionarios estatales a la aplicación de la 15a Enmienda. Con este telón de fondo, el Congreso llegó a la conclusión de que era necesario un nuevo proyecto de ley federal integral para romper el control de la privación del derecho al voto estatal. [7] La Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos explicó esto en Carolina del Sur v. Katzenbach (1966) con las siguientes palabras:
En los últimos años, el Congreso ha tratado repetidamente de hacer frente al problema facilitando litigios caso por caso contra la discriminación en el voto. La Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1957 autorizó al Fiscal General a solicitar medidas cautelares contra la interferencia pública y privada con el derecho al voto por motivos raciales. El perfeccionamiento de las enmiendas en la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1960 permitió la unión de Estados como partidos acusados, le dio al Fiscal General acceso a los registros de votación locales y autorizó a los tribunales a registrar votantes en áreas de discriminación sistemática. El Título I de la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964 aceleró la audiencia de casos de votación ante tribunales de tres jueces y prohibió algunas de las tácticas utilizadas para descalificar a los negros de votar en las elecciones federales. A pesar de los serios esfuerzos del Departamento de Justicia y de muchos jueces federales, estas nuevas leyes han hecho poco para solucionar el problema de la discriminación en el voto. [...] La legislación anterior ha resultado ineficaz por varias razones. Las demandas de votación son inusualmente onerosas de preparar, a veces requieren hasta 6,000 horas-hombre dedicadas a revisar los registros de registro en preparación para el juicio. El litigio ha sido extremadamente lento, en parte debido a las amplias oportunidades de demora que ofrecen los funcionarios electorales y otras personas involucradas en los procedimientos. Incluso cuando finalmente se han obtenido decisiones favorables, algunos de los estados afectados simplemente han cambiado a dispositivos discriminatorios no cubiertos por los decretos federales, o han promulgado nuevas pruebas difíciles diseñadas para prolongar la disparidad existente entre el registro de blancos y negros. Alternativamente, ciertos funcionarios locales han desafiado y eludido las órdenes judiciales o simplemente han cerrado sus oficinas de registro para congelar las listas de votantes. La disposición de la ley de 1960 que autoriza el registro por parte de funcionarios federales ha tenido poco impacto en la mala administración local, debido a sus complejidades procesales. [36]
En South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), la Corte Suprema también sostuvo que el Congreso tenía el poder de aprobar la Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965 bajo sus Poderes de Ejecución derivados de la Decimoquinta Enmienda:
El Congreso ejerció su autoridad bajo la Decimoquinta Enmienda de una manera inventiva cuando promulgó la Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965. Primero: la medida prescribe remedios para la discriminación en el voto que entran en vigencia sin necesidad de adjudicación previa. Esta fue claramente una respuesta legítima al problema, para el cual hay un amplio precedente en otras disposiciones constitucionales. Véase Katzenbach v. McClung , 379 US 294, 379 US 302-304; Estados Unidos contra Darby , 312 US 100, 312 US 120-121. El Congreso había descubierto que los litigios caso por caso eran inadecuados para combatir la discriminación generalizada y persistente en la votación, debido a la excesiva cantidad de tiempo y energía necesarios para superar las tácticas obstruccionistas que invariablemente se encuentran en estos juicios. Después de soportar casi un siglo de resistencia sistemática a la Decimoquinta Enmienda, el Congreso bien podría decidir trasladar la ventaja del tiempo y la inercia de los perpetradores del mal a sus víctimas. [...] Segundo: la ley limita intencionalmente estos recursos a un pequeño número de estados y subdivisiones políticas que, en la mayoría de los casos, eran familiares al Congreso por su nombre. Este también era un método permisible para abordar el problema. El Congreso se había enterado de que actualmente se produce una discriminación sustancial en el voto en ciertas partes del país, y no conocía forma de predecir con precisión si el mal podría extenderse a otras partes en el futuro. De manera legislativa aceptable, el Congreso decidió limitar su atención a las áreas geográficas donde la acción inmediata parecía necesaria. Véase McGowan v. Maryland , 366 US 420, 366 US 427; Salsburg contra Maryland, 346 Estados Unidos 545, 346 Estados Unidos 550-554. La doctrina de la igualdad de los Estados, invocada por Carolina del Sur, no impide este enfoque, porque esa doctrina se aplica únicamente a los términos en los que los Estados son admitidos en la Unión y no a los remedios para los males locales que han aparecido posteriormente. Ver Coyle v. Smith , 221 US 559, y los casos allí citados. [37]
Factura original
Senado
La Ley de Derechos Electorales de 1965 se presentó en el Congreso el 17 de marzo de 1965, como S. 1564, y fue patrocinada conjuntamente por el líder de la mayoría del Senado Mike Mansfield (D-MT) y el líder de la minoría del Senado Everett Dirksen (R-IL), ambos de los cuales había trabajado con el Fiscal General Katzenbach para redactar el lenguaje del proyecto de ley. [38] A pesar de que los demócratas tenían dos tercios de los escaños en ambas cámaras del Congreso después de las elecciones del Senado 1964 , [20] : 49 Johnson preocupados de que los demócratas del sur podría obstruir la legislación, ya que se habían opuesto a otros esfuerzos por los derechos civiles. Reclutó a Dirksen para que le ayudara a obtener el apoyo de los republicanos . Dirksen originalmente no tenía la intención de apoyar la legislación sobre el derecho al voto tan pronto después de apoyar la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964, pero expresó su disposición a aceptar una legislación "revolucionaria" después de enterarse de la violencia policial contra los manifestantes en Selma el Domingo Sangriento. [20] : 95–96 Dado el papel clave de Dirksen en ayudar a Katzenbach a redactar la legislación, se conoció informalmente como el proyecto de ley "Dirksenbach". [20] : 96 Después de que Mansfield y Dirksen presentaron el proyecto de ley, 64 senadores adicionales acordaron copatrocinarlo, [20] : 150 con un total de 46 copatrocinadores demócratas y 20 republicanos. [39]
El proyecto de ley contenía varias disposiciones especiales dirigidas a ciertos gobiernos estatales y locales: una "fórmula de cobertura" que determinaba qué jurisdicciones estaban sujetas a otras disposiciones especiales de la Ley ("jurisdicciones cubiertas"); un requisito de "autorización previa" que prohibía a las jurisdicciones cubiertas implementar cambios en sus procedimientos de votación sin antes recibir la aprobación del fiscal general de EE. UU. o del Tribunal de Distrito de EE. UU. para DC de que los cambios no eran discriminatorios; y la suspensión de "pruebas o dispositivos", como pruebas de alfabetización, en las jurisdicciones cubiertas. El proyecto de ley también autorizó la asignación de examinadores federales para registrar a los votantes, y de observadores federales para monitorear las elecciones, a jurisdicciones cubiertas que se descubrió que habían incurrido en discriminación atroz. El proyecto de ley establece que estas disposiciones especiales expiran después de cinco años. [22] : 319–320 [23] : 520, 524 [40] : 5–6
El alcance de la fórmula de cobertura fue un tema de polémico debate en el Congreso. La fórmula de cobertura alcanzó una jurisdicción si (1) la jurisdicción mantuvo una "prueba o dispositivo" el 1 de noviembre de 1964 y (2) menos del 50 por ciento de los residentes en edad de votar de la jurisdicción estaban registrados para votar el 1 de noviembre de 1964 o emitió su voto en las elecciones presidenciales de noviembre de 1964. [22] : 317 Esta fórmula llegó a pocas jurisdicciones fuera del Sur Profundo . Para apaciguar a los legisladores que sintieron que el proyecto de ley se dirigía injustamente a las jurisdicciones del sur, el proyecto de ley incluía una prohibición general de la discriminación racial en la votación que se aplicaba en todo el país. [41] : 1352 El proyecto de ley también incluía disposiciones que permitían a una jurisdicción cubierta "rescatar" la cobertura probando en un tribunal federal que no había utilizado una "prueba o dispositivo" con un propósito discriminatorio o con un efecto discriminatorio durante los 5 años antes de su solicitud de rescate. [40] : 6 Además, el proyecto de ley incluía una disposición de "libertad bajo fianza" en virtud de la cual los tribunales federales podían someter a las jurisdicciones discriminatorias no cubiertas a los recursos contenidos en las disposiciones especiales. [42] [43] : 2006-2007
El proyecto de ley fue considerado por primera vez por el Comité Judicial del Senado , cuyo presidente, el senador James Eastland (D-MS), se opuso a la legislación con varios otros senadores del sur en el comité. Para evitar que el proyecto de ley muera en comité, Mansfield propuso una moción para requerir que el Comité Judicial informe el proyecto de ley fuera del comité antes del 9 de abril, que el Senado aprobó por abrumadora mayoría con una votación de 67 a 13. [20] : 150 [39] Durante la consideración del proyecto de ley por parte del comité, el senador Ted Kennedy (D-MA) dirigió un esfuerzo para enmendar el proyecto de ley para prohibir los impuestos de capitación. Aunque la Vigésima Cuarta Enmienda, que prohibió el uso de impuestos electorales en las elecciones federales, fue ratificada un año antes, la administración de Johnson y los patrocinadores del proyecto de ley no incluyeron una disposición en el proyecto de ley de derechos de voto que prohíbe los impuestos electorales en las elecciones estatales porque temían a los tribunales. revocaría la legislación por inconstitucional. [23] : 521 [28] : 285 Además, al excluir los impuestos electorales de la definición de "pruebas o dispositivos", la fórmula de cobertura no llegó a Texas o Arkansas , mitigando la oposición de las influyentes delegaciones del Congreso de esos dos estados . [23] : 521 No obstante, con el apoyo de los miembros liberales del comité, la enmienda de Kennedy para prohibir los impuestos electorales fue aprobada por un voto de 9 a 4. En respuesta, Dirksen ofreció una enmienda que eximía de la fórmula de cobertura a cualquier estado que tuviera al menos el 60 por ciento de sus residentes elegibles registrados para votar o que tuviera una participación electoral que supere el promedio nacional en la elección presidencial anterior. Esta enmienda, que efectivamente eximió a todos los estados de la cobertura excepto Mississippi , fue aprobada durante una reunión del comité en la que tres miembros liberales estuvieron ausentes. Dirksen ofreció retirar la enmienda si se eliminaba la prohibición del impuesto de capitación. En última instancia, el proyecto de ley se informó fuera de la comisión el 9 de abril por una votación de 12 a 4 sin una recomendación. [20] : 152-153
El 22 de abril, el pleno del Senado comenzó a debatir el proyecto de ley. Dirksen habló primero en nombre del proyecto de ley y dijo que "se necesita legislación para que el mandato inequívoco de la Decimoquinta Enmienda ... se cumpla y se haga efectivo, y si la Declaración de Independencia debe ser verdaderamente significativa". [20] : 154 El senador Strom Thurmond (R-SC) replicó que el proyecto de ley conduciría al "despotismo y la tiranía", y el senador Sam Ervin (D-NC) argumentó que el proyecto de ley era inconstitucional porque privaba a los estados de su derecho en virtud del artículo I, Sección 2 de la Constitución para establecer las calificaciones de los votantes y porque las disposiciones especiales del proyecto de ley apuntaban solo a ciertas jurisdicciones. El 6 de mayo, Ervin ofreció una enmienda para abolir el disparador automático de la fórmula de cobertura y, en cambio, permitir que los jueces federales designen examinadores federales para administrar el registro de votantes. Esta enmienda fracasó abrumadoramente, con 42 demócratas y 22 republicanos votando en contra. [20] : 154-156 Después de un largo debate, la enmienda de Ted Kennedy para prohibir los impuestos electorales también falló 49-45 el 11 de mayo. [39] Sin embargo, el Senado acordó incluir una disposición que autoriza al fiscal general a demandar a cualquier jurisdicción, cubierta o no cubierto, para impugnar su uso de impuestos de capitación. [28] : 156-157 [40] : 2 Una enmienda ofrecida por el senador Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) para otorgar derechos a ciudadanos analfabetos de inglés que hayan obtenido al menos una educación de sexto grado en una escuela de habla no inglesa también pasó por 48-19. Los legisladores del sur ofrecieron una serie de enmiendas para debilitar el proyecto de ley, todas las cuales fracasaron. [20] : 159
El 25 de mayo, el Senado votó a favor de la clausura por una votación de 70 a 30, superando así la amenaza de obstrucción y limitando el debate adicional sobre el proyecto de ley. [44] El 26 de mayo, el Senado aprobó el proyecto de ley por 77-19 votos (demócratas 47-16, republicanos 30-2); sólo los senadores que representan a los estados del sur votaron en contra. [20] : 161 [45]
Cámara de los Representantes
Emanuel Celler (D-NY), presidente del Comité Judicial de la Cámara , presentó la Ley de Derechos Electorales en la Cámara de Representantes el 19 de marzo de 1965, como HR 6400. [39] El Comité Judicial de la Cámara fue el primer comité en considerar el proyecto de ley. . El republicano de mayor rango del comité, William McCulloch (R-OH), en general apoyó la expansión de los derechos de voto, pero se opuso tanto a la prohibición del impuesto electoral como a la fórmula de cobertura, y lideró la oposición al proyecto de ley en el comité. El comité aprobó finalmente el proyecto de ley el 12 de mayo, pero no presentó su informe del comité hasta junio 1. [20] : 162 El proyecto de ley incluía dos enmiendas de subcomité: una penalización por personas particulares que se interfirió con derecho a voto y la prohibición de todos los impuestos electorales. La prohibición del impuesto de capitación ganó el apoyo del presidente de la Cámara de Representantes, John McCormack . El proyecto de ley fue luego considerado por el Comité de Reglas , cuyo presidente, Howard W. Smith (D-VA), se opuso al proyecto de ley y retrasó su consideración hasta el 24 de junio, cuando Celler inició los procedimientos para que el proyecto de ley fuera dado de baja del comité. [39] Bajo la presión de los proponentes del proyecto de ley, Smith permitió que el proyecto de ley se publicara una semana después, y la Cámara en pleno comenzó a debatir el proyecto el 6 de julio. [20] : 163
Para derrotar la Ley de Derechos Electorales, McCulloch presentó un proyecto de ley alternativo, HR 7896. Le habría permitido al fiscal general nombrar registradores federales después de recibir 25 quejas graves de discriminación contra una jurisdicción, y habría impuesto una prohibición nacional de las pruebas de alfabetización para personas que pudieran demostrar que obtuvieron una educación de sexto grado. El proyecto de ley de McCulloch fue copatrocinado por el líder de la minoría de la Cámara de Representantes Gerald Ford (R-MI) y apoyado por los demócratas del sur como una alternativa a la Ley de Derechos Electorales. [20] : 162–164 La administración de Johnson vio HR 7896 como una seria amenaza para aprobar la Ley de Derechos Electorales. Sin embargo, el apoyo a la HR 7896 se disipó después de que William M. Tuck (D-VA) dijera públicamente que prefería la HR 7896 porque la Ley de Derechos Electorales garantizaría legítimamente que los afroamericanos pudieran votar. Su declaración alienó a la mayoría de los partidarios de HR 7896, y el proyecto de ley fracasó en el pleno de la Cámara por una votación de 171-248 el 9 de julio. [46] Más tarde esa noche, la Cámara aprobó la Ley de Derechos Electorales por una votación de 333-85 (Demócratas 221 -61, republicanos 112-24). [20] : 163-165 [39] [47]
Comité de conferencia
Las cámaras nombraron un comité de conferencia para resolver las diferencias entre las versiones del proyecto de ley de la Cámara y el Senado. Un argumento importante se refería a las disposiciones del impuesto de capitación; la versión del Senado permitió al fiscal general demandar a los estados que usaban impuestos electorales para discriminar, mientras que la versión de la Cámara prohibió rotundamente todos los impuestos electorales. Inicialmente, los miembros del comité estaban estancados. Para ayudar a negociar un compromiso, el Procurador General Katzenbach redactó un texto legislativo que afirma explícitamente que los impuestos electorales eran inconstitucionales e instruyó al Departamento de Justicia a demandar a los estados que mantenían los impuestos electorales. Para calmar las preocupaciones de los miembros del comité liberal de que esta disposición no era lo suficientemente fuerte, Katzenbach contó con la ayuda de Martin Luther King Jr., quien dio su apoyo al compromiso. El respaldo de King puso fin al estancamiento, y el 29 de julio, el comité de la conferencia informó su versión fuera del comité. [20] : 166-167 La Cámara aprobó esta versión del informe de la conferencia del proyecto de ley el 3 de agosto por un voto de 328-74 (demócratas 217-54, republicanos 111-20), [48] y el Senado lo aprobó el 4 de agosto por una votación de 79-18 (demócratas 49-17, republicanos 30-1). [20] : 167 [49] [50] El 6 de agosto, el presidente Johnson firmó la ley con King, Rosa Parks , John Lewis y otros líderes de derechos civiles que asistieron a la ceremonia de firma. [20] : 168
Enmiendas
El Congreso promulgó importantes enmiendas a la Ley en 1970, 1975, 1982, 1992 y 2006. Cada enmienda coincidió con una expiración inminente de algunas o todas las disposiciones especiales de la Ley. Originalmente programado para expirar en 1970, el Congreso reautorizó repetidamente las disposiciones especiales en reconocimiento de la continua discriminación en el voto. [20] : 209–210 [40] : 6–8 El Congreso extendió la fórmula de cobertura y las disposiciones especiales vinculadas a ella, como el requisito de autorización previa de la Sección 5, durante cinco años en 1970, siete años en 1975 y 25 años en ambos 1982 y 2006. En 1970 y 1975, el Congreso también amplió el alcance de la fórmula de cobertura completándola con nuevas fechas de activación de 1968 y 1972. La cobertura se amplió aún más en 1975 cuando el Congreso amplió el significado de "pruebas o dispositivos" para abarcar cualquier jurisdicción que proporcionara información electoral únicamente en inglés, como las papeletas, si la jurisdicción tenía un grupo minoritario de un solo idioma que constituía más del cinco por ciento de la ciudadanos en edad de votar de la jurisdicción. Estas expansiones dieron cobertura a numerosas jurisdicciones, incluidas muchas fuera del Sur. [51] Para aliviar la carga de las disposiciones especiales reautorizadas, el Congreso liberalizó el procedimiento de rescate en 1982 al permitir que las jurisdicciones escapen de la cobertura cumpliendo con la Ley y actuando afirmativamente para expandir la participación política de las minorías . [23] : 523
Además de volver a autorizar las disposiciones especiales originales y ampliar la cobertura, el Congreso enmendó y agregó varias otras disposiciones a la ley. Por ejemplo, el Congreso amplió la prohibición original de "pruebas o dispositivos" para aplicarla en todo el país en 1970, y en 1975, el Congreso convirtió la prohibición en permanente. [40] : 6–9 Por separado, en 1975 el Congreso amplió el alcance de la Ley para proteger a las minorías lingüísticas de la discriminación en el voto. El Congreso definió la "minoría lingüística" en el sentido de "personas que son amerindios, asiáticoamericanos, nativos de Alaska o de ascendencia española". [52] El Congreso enmendó varias disposiciones, como el requisito de autorización previa y la prohibición general de la Sección 2 de las leyes de voto discriminatorias, para prohibir la discriminación contra las minorías lingüísticas. [53] : 199 El Congreso también promulgó un requisito de elección bilingüe en la Sección 203, que requiere que los funcionarios electorales en ciertas jurisdicciones con un gran número de minorías lingüísticas analfabetas del inglés proporcionen boletas e información de votación en el idioma del grupo minoritario lingüístico. Originalmente programado para expirar después de 10 años, el Congreso reautorizó la Sección 203 en 1982 por siete años, la expandió y reautorizó en 1992 por 15 años y la reautorizó en 2006 por 25 años. [54] : 19-21, 25, 49 Los requisitos electorales bilingües siguen siendo controvertidos, los proponentes argumentan que la asistencia bilingüe es necesaria para permitir que los ciudadanos recientemente naturalizados voten y los oponentes argumentan que los requisitos electorales bilingües constituyen mandatos costosos no financiados . [54] : 26
Varias de las enmiendas respondieron a fallos judiciales con los que el Congreso no estuvo de acuerdo. En 1982, el Congreso enmendó la Ley para revocar el caso de la Corte Suprema Mobile v. Bolden (1980), que sostuvo que la prohibición general de discriminación en el voto prescrita en la Sección 2 prohibía solo la discriminación intencional . El Congreso respondió ampliando la Sección 2 para prohibir explícitamente cualquier práctica de votación que tuviera un efecto discriminatorio , independientemente de si la práctica fue promulgada u operada con un propósito discriminatorio. La creación de esta "prueba de resultados" cambió la mayoría de los litigios de dilución de votos presentados bajo la Ley de juicios previos a la autorización a juicios de la Sección 2. [23] : 644–645 En 2006, el Congreso enmendó la ley para revocar dos casos de la Corte Suprema: Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (2000), [55] que interpretó el requisito de autorización previa de la Sección 5 para prohibir solo los cambios de votación que se promulgaron o mantenido con un propósito discriminatorio "regresivo" en lugar de cualquier propósito discriminatorio, y Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003), [56] que estableció una prueba más amplia para determinar si un plan de redistribución de distritos tenía un efecto inadmisible bajo la Sección 5 que evaluar solo si un grupo minoritario podría elegir a sus candidatos preferidos. [57] : 207–208 Desde que la Corte Suprema anuló la fórmula de cobertura por inconstitucional en el caso del condado de Shelby v. Holder (2013), se han presentado varios proyectos de ley en el Congreso para crear una nueva fórmula de cobertura y enmendar varias otras disposiciones; ninguno de estos proyectos de ley ha sido aprobado. [58] [59] [60]
Provisiones
La ley contiene dos tipos de disposiciones: "disposiciones generales", que se aplican a nivel nacional, y "disposiciones especiales", que se aplican sólo a ciertos estados y gobiernos locales. [61] : 1 La mayoría de las disposiciones están diseñadas para proteger los derechos de voto de las minorías raciales y lingüísticas. El término "minoría lingüística" significa "personas que son amerindios, asiáticoamericanos, nativos de Alaska o de ascendencia española". [52] Las disposiciones de la ley han sido teñidas por numerosas interpretaciones judiciales y enmiendas del Congreso.
Provisiones generales
Prohibición general de leyes de voto discriminatorias
La Sección 2 prohíbe a cualquier jurisdicción implementar una "calificación de voto o prerrequisito para votar, o estándar, práctica o procedimiento ... de una manera que resulte en una denegación o limitación del derecho ... de votar por motivos de raza". color o condición de minoría lingüística. [54] : 37 [62] La Sección 2 de la Ley de Derechos Electorales (VRA) contiene dos protecciones separadas contra la discriminación de votantes para las leyes que, en contraste con la Sección 5 de la VRA, ya están en vigor. [63] [64] La primera protección es la prohibición de la discriminación intencional basada en la raza o el color en la votación. La segunda protección es una prohibición de las prácticas electorales que resultan en la negación o la reducción del derecho al voto por motivos de raza o color. [63] [64] [65] Si la violación de la segunda protección es intencional, entonces esta violación también es una violación de la Decimoquinta Enmienda . [65] La Corte Suprema ha permitido que los demandantes privados demanden para hacer cumplir estas prohibiciones. [66] : 138 [67] En Mobile v. Bolden (1980), la Corte Suprema sostuvo que, tal como se promulgó originalmente en 1965, la Sección 2 simplemente reformuló la Decimoquinta Enmienda y, por lo tanto, prohibió solo las leyes de votación que se promulgaron o mantuvieron intencionalmente durante un finalidad discriminatoria. [68] : 60-61 [69] [63] [7] [70] En 1982, el Congreso enmendó la Sección 2 para crear una prueba de "resultados", [71] que prohíbe cualquier ley de votación que tenga un efecto discriminatorio independientemente de si la ley se promulgó o mantuvo intencionalmente con un propósito discriminatorio. [72] [73] : 3 [63] [7] [70] Las enmiendas de 1982 estipulaban que la prueba de resultados no garantiza a las minorías protegidas el derecho a una representación proporcional . [74] En Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos explicó con respecto a la enmienda de 1982 para la sección 2 que "la esencia de una afirmación de la Sección 2 es que una determinada ley, práctica o estructura electoral interactúa con condiciones históricas para causar una desigualdad en las oportunidades de que disfrutan los votantes blancos y negros para elegir a sus representantes preferidos ". [75] El Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos declaró que la sección 2 no es solo una prohibición permanente y de aplicación nacional contra la discriminación en la votación de cualquier norma, práctica o procedimiento de votación que resulte en la denegación o limitación del derecho de cualquier ciudadano a votar. por motivos de raza, color o membresía en un grupo minoritario lingüístico, pero también una prohibición para que los funcionarios estatales y locales adopten o mantengan leyes o procedimientos de votación que discriminen deliberadamente por motivos de raza, color o membresía en un grupo minoritario lingüístico . [75]
The United States Supreme Court expressed its views regarding Section 2 and its amendment from 1982 in Chisom v. Roemer (1991).[76] Under the amended statute, proof of intent is no longer required to prove a § 2 violation. Now plaintiffs can prevail under § 2 by demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on color or race. Congress not only incorporated the results test in the paragraph that formerly constituted the entire § 2, but also designated that paragraph as subsection (a) and added a new subsection (b) to make clear that an application of the results test requires an inquiry into "the totality of the circumstances." Section 2(a) adopts a results test, thus providing that proof of discriminatory intent is no longer necessary to establish any violation of the section. Section 2(b) provides guidance about how the results test is to be applied.[77] There is a statutory framework to determine whether a jurisdiction's election law violates the general prohibition from Section 2 in its amended form:[78]
Section 2 prohibits voting practices that “result[] in a denial or abridgment of the right * * * to vote on account of race or color [or language-minority status],” and it states that such a result “is established” if a jurisdiction’s “political processes * * * are not equally open” to members of such a group “in that [they] have less opportunity * * * to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. 10301. [...] Subsection (b) states in relevant part: A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.[79][80]
The Office of the Arizona Attorney general stated with respect to the framework to determine whether a jurisdiction's election law violates the general prohibition from Section 2 in its amended form and the reason for the adoption of Section 2 in its amended form:
To establish a violation of amended Section 2, the plaintiff must prove,“based on the totality of circumstances,” that the State’s “political processes” are “not equally open to participation by members” of a protected class, “in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” § 10301(b). That is the “result” that amended Section 2 prohibits: “less opportunity than other members of the electorate,” viewing the State’s “political processes” as a whole. The new language was crafted as a compromise designed to eliminate the need for direct evidence of discriminatory intent, which is often difficult to obtain, but without embracing an unqualified “disparate impact” test that would invalidate many legitimate voting procedures. S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 28-29, 31-32, 99 (1982)[81][80]
When determining whether a jurisdiction's election law violates the general prohibition from Section 2 of the VRA, courts have relied on factors enumerated in the Senate Judiciary Committee report associated with the 1982 amendments ("Senate Factors"), including:[75]
- The history of official discrimination in the jurisdiction that affects the right to vote;
- The degree to which voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized;
- The extent of the jurisdiction's use of majority vote requirements, unusually large electoral districts, prohibitions on bullet voting, and other devices that tend to enhance the opportunity for voting discrimination;
- Whether minority candidates are denied access to the jurisdiction's candidate slating processes, if any;
- The extent to which the jurisdiction's minorities are discriminated against in socioeconomic areas, such as education, employment, and health;
- Whether overt or subtle racial appeals in campaigns exist;
- The extent to which minority candidates have won elections;
- The degree that elected officials are unresponsive to the concerns of the minority group; and
- Whether the policy justification for the challenged law is tenuous.
The report indicates not all or a majority of these factors need to exist for an electoral device to result in discrimination, and it also indicates that this list is not exhaustive, allowing courts to consider additional evidence at their discretion.[69][74]:344[82]:28–29
Section 2 prohibits two types of discrimination: "vote denial", in which a person is denied the opportunity to cast a ballot or to have their vote properly counted, and "vote dilution",[83][84]:2–6 in which the strength or effectiveness of a person's vote is diminished.[85]:691–692 Most Section 2 litigation has concerned vote dilution, especially claims that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan or use of at-large/multimember elections prevents minority voters from casting sufficient votes to elect their preferred candidates.[85]:708–709 An at-large election can dilute the votes cast by minority voters by allowing a cohesive majority group to win every legislative seat in the jurisdiction.[86]:221 Redistricting plans can be gerrymandered to dilute votes cast by minorities by "packing" high numbers of minority voters into a small number of districts or "cracking" minority groups by placing small numbers of minority voters into a large number of districts.[87]
In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court used the term "vote dilution through submergence" to describe claims that a jurisdiction's use of an at-large/multimember election system or gerrymandered redistricting plan diluted minority votes, and it established a legal framework for assessing such claims under Section 2.[a] Under the Gingles test, plaintiffs must show the existence of three preconditions:
- The racial or language minority group "is sufficiently numerous and compact to form a majority in a single-member district";
- The minority group is "politically cohesive" (meaning its members tend to vote similarly); and
- The "majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."[89]:50–51
The first precondition is known as the "compactness" requirement and concerns whether a majority-minority district can be created. The second and third preconditions are collectively known as the "racially polarized voting" or "racial bloc voting" requirement, and they concern whether the voting patterns of the different racial groups are different from each other. If a plaintiff proves these preconditions exist, then the plaintiff must additionally show, using the remaining Senate Factors and other evidence, that under the "totality of the circumstances", the jurisdiction's redistricting plan or use of at-large or multimember elections diminishes the ability of the minority group to elect candidates of its choice.[74]:344–345
Subsequent litigation further defined the contours of these "vote dilution through submergence" claims. In Bartlett v. Strickland (2009),[90] the Supreme Court held that the first Gingles precondition can be satisfied only if a district can be drawn in which the minority group comprises a majority of voting-age citizens. This means that plaintiffs cannot succeed on a submergence claim in jurisdictions where the size of the minority group, despite not being large enough to comprise a majority in a district, is large enough for its members to elect their preferred candidates with the help of "crossover" votes from some members of the majority group.[91][92]:A2 In contrast, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether different protected minority groups can be aggregated to satisfy the Gingles preconditions as a coalition, and lower courts have split on the issue.[b]
The Supreme Court provided additional guidance on the "totality of the circumstances" test in Johnson v. De Grandy (1994).[88] The court emphasized that the existence of the three Gingles preconditions may be insufficient to prove liability for vote dilution through submergence if other factors weigh against such a determination, especially in lawsuits challenging redistricting plans. In particular, the court held that even where the three Gingles preconditions are satisfied, a jurisdiction is unlikely to be liable for vote dilution if its redistricting plan contains a number of majority-minority districts that is proportional to the minority group's population size. The decision thus clarified that Section 2 does not require jurisdictions to maximize the number of majority-minority districts.[98] The opinion also distinguished the proportionality of majority-minority districts, which allows minorities to have a proportional opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, from the proportionality of election results, which Section 2 explicitly does not guarantee to minorities.[88]:1013–1014
An issue regarding the third Gingles precondition remains unresolved. In Gingles, the Supreme Court split as to whether plaintiffs must prove that the majority racial group votes as a bloc specifically because its members are motivated to vote based on racial considerations and not other considerations that may overlap with race, such as party affiliation. A plurality of justices said that requiring such proof would violate Congress's intent to make Section 2 a "results" test, but Justice White maintained that the proof was necessary to show that an electoral scheme results in racial discrimination.[99]:555–557 Since Gingles, lower courts have split on the issue.[c]
—Chief Justice Earl Warren on the right to vote as the foundation of democracy in Reynolds v. Sims (1964).[103]
Although most Section 2 litigation has involved claims of vote dilution through submergence,[85]:708–709 courts also have addressed other types of vote dilution under this provision. In Holder v. Hall (1994),[104] the Supreme Court held that claims that minority votes are diluted by the small size of a governing body, such as a one-person county commission, may not be brought under Section 2. A plurality of the court reasoned that no uniform, non-dilutive "benchmark" size for a governing body exists, making relief under Section 2 impossible.[105] Another type of vote dilution may result from a jurisdiction's requirement that a candidate be elected by a majority vote. A majority-vote requirement may cause a minority group's candidate of choice, who would have won the election with a simple plurality of votes, to lose after a majority of voters unite behind another candidate in a runoff election. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether such claims may be brought under Section 2, and lower courts have reached different conclusions on the issue.[d]
In addition to claims of vote dilution, courts have considered vote denial claims brought under Section 2. The Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974),[108] held that felony disenfranchisement laws cannot violate Section 2 because, among other reasons, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits such laws.[23]:756–757 A federal district court in Mississippi held that a "dual registration" system that requires a person to register to vote separately for state elections and local elections may violate Section 2 if the system has a racially disparate impact in light of the Senate Factors.[23]:754[109] Starting in 2013, lower federal courts began to consider various challenges to voter ID laws brought under Section 2.[110]
Specific prohibitions
The act contains several specific prohibitions on conduct that may interfere with a person's ability to cast an effective vote. One of these prohibitions is prescribed in Section 201, which prohibits any jurisdiction from requiring a person to comply with any "test or device" to register to vote or cast a ballot. The term "test or device" is defined as literacy tests, educational or knowledge requirements, proof of good moral character, and requirements that a person be vouched for when voting.[111] Before the Act's enactment, these devices were the primary tools used by jurisdictions to prevent racial minorities from voting.[112] Originally, the Act suspended tests or devices temporarily in jurisdictions covered by the Section 4(b) coverage formula, but Congress subsequently expanded the prohibition to the entire country and made it permanent.[40]:6–9 Relatedly, Section 202 prohibits jurisdictions from imposing any "durational residency requirement" that requires persons to have lived in the jurisdiction for more than 30 days before being eligible to vote in a presidential election.[113]:353
Several further protections for voters are contained in Section 11. Section 11(a) prohibits any person acting under color of law from refusing or failing to allow a qualified person to vote or to count a qualified voter's ballot. Similarly, Section 11(b) prohibits any person from intimidating, harassing, or coercing another person for voting or attempting to vote.[54] Two provisions in Section 11 address voter fraud: Section 11(c) prohibits people from knowingly submitting a false voter registration application to vote in a federal election, and Section 11(e) prohibits voting twice in a federal election.[114][115]:360
Finally, under Section 208, a jurisdiction may not prevent anyone who is English-illiterate or has a disability from being accompanied into the ballot box by an assistant of the person's choice. The only exceptions are that the assistant may not be an agent of the person's employer or union.[53]:221
Bail-in
Section 3(c) contains a "bail-in" or "pocket trigger" process by which jurisdictions that fall outside the coverage formula of Section 4(b) may become subject to preclearance. Under this provision, if a jurisdiction has racially discriminated against voters in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, a court may order the jurisdiction to have future changes to its election laws preapproved by the federal government.[43]:2006–2007 Because courts have interpreted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to prohibit only intentional discrimination, a court may bail in a jurisdiction only if the plaintiff proves that the jurisdiction enacted or operated a voting practice to purposely discriminate.[43]:2009
Section 3(c) contains its own preclearance language and differs from Section 5 preclearance in several ways. Unlike Section 5 preclearance, which applies to a covered jurisdiction until such time as the jurisdiction may bail out of coverage under Section 4(a), bailed-in jurisdictions remain subject to preclearance for as long as the court orders. Moreover, the court may require the jurisdiction to preclear only particular types of voting changes. For example, the bail-in of New Mexico in 1984 applied for 10 years and required preclearance of only redistricting plans. This differs from Section 5 preclearance, which requires a covered jurisdiction to preclear all of its voting changes.[43]:2009–2010[116]
During the Act's early history, Section 3(c) was little used; no jurisdictions were bailed in until 1975. Between 1975 and 2013, 18 jurisdictions were bailed in, including 16 local governments and the states of Arkansas and New Mexico.[117]:1a-2a Although the Supreme Court held the Section 4(b) coverage formula unconstitutional in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), it did not hold Section 3(c) unconstitutional. Therefore, jurisdictions may continue to be bailed-in and subjected to Section 3(c) preclearance.[12][118] In the months following Shelby County, courts began to consider requests by the attorney general and other plaintiffs to bail in the states of Texas and North Carolina,[119] and in January 2014 a federal court bailed in Evergreen, Alabama.[120]
A more narrow bail-in process pertaining to federal observer certification is prescribed in Section 3(a). Under this provision, a federal court may certify a non-covered jurisdiction to receive federal observers if the court determines that the jurisdiction violated the voting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Jurisdictions certified to receive federal observers under Section 3(a) are not subject to preclearance.[121]:236–237
Special provisions
Coverage formula
Section 4(b) contains a "coverage formula" that determines which states and local governments may be subjected to the Act's other special provisions (except for the Section 203(c) bilingual election requirements, which fall under a different formula). Congress intended for the coverage formula to encompass the most pervasively discriminatory jurisdictions. A jurisdiction is covered by the formula if:
- As of November 1, 1964, 1968, or 1972, the jurisdiction used a "test or device" to restrict the opportunity to register and vote; and
- Less than half of the jurisdiction's eligible citizens were registered to vote on November 1, 1964, 1968, or 1972; or less than half of eligible citizens voted in the presidential election of November 1964, 1968, or 1972.
As originally enacted, the coverage formula contained only November 1964 triggering dates; subsequent revisions to the law supplemented it with the additional triggering dates of November 1968 and November 1972, which brought more jurisdictions into coverage.[51] For purposes of the coverage formula, the term "test or device" includes the same four devices prohibited nationally by Section 201—literacy tests, educational or knowledge requirements, proof of good moral character, and requirements that a person be vouched for when voting—and one further device defined in Section 4(f)(3): in jurisdictions where more than five percent of the citizen voting age population are members of a single language minority group, any practice or requirement by which registration or election materials are provided only in English. The types of jurisdictions that the coverage formula applies to include states and "political subdivisions" of states.[53]:207–208 Section 14(c)(2) defines "political subdivision" to mean any county, parish, or "other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting."[122]
As Congress added new triggering dates to the coverage formula, new jurisdictions were brought into coverage. The 1965 coverage formula included the whole of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia; and some subdivisions (mostly counties) in Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Carolina.[51] The 1968 coverage resulted in the partial coverage of Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Wyoming. Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wyoming filed successful "bailout" lawsuits, as also provided by section 4.[51] The 1972 coverage covered the whole of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, and parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.[51]
The special provisions of the Act were initially due to expire in 1970, and Congress renewed them for another five years. In 1975, the Act's special provisions were extended for another seven years. In 1982, the coverage formula was extended again, this time for 25 years, but no changes were made to the coverage formula, and in 2006, the coverage formula was again extended for 25 years.[51]
Throughout its history, the coverage formula remained controversial because it singled out certain jurisdictions for scrutiny, most of which were in the Deep South. In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court declared the coverage formula unconstitutional because the criteria used were outdated and thus violated principles of equal state sovereignty and federalism.[12][123][124] The other special provisions that are dependent on the coverage formula, such as the Section 5 preclearance requirement, remain valid law. However, without a valid coverage formula, these provisions are unenforceable.[13][125]
Preclearance requirement
Section 5[126] requires that covered jurisdictions receive federal approval, known as "preclearance", before implementing changes to their election laws. A covered jurisdiction has the burden of proving that the change does not have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race or language minority status; if the jurisdiction fails to meet this burden, the federal government will deny preclearance and the jurisdiction's change will not go into effect. The Supreme Court broadly interpreted Section 5's scope in Allen v. State Board of Election (1969),[127] holding that any change in a jurisdiction's voting practices, even if minor, must be submitted for preclearance.[128] The court also held that if a jurisdiction fails to have its voting change precleared, private plaintiffs may sue the jurisdiction in the plaintiff's local district court before a three-judge panel.[e] In these Section 5 "enforcement actions", a court considers whether the jurisdiction made a covered voting change, and if so, whether the change had been precleared. If the jurisdiction improperly failed to obtain preclearance, the court will order the jurisdiction to obtain preclearance before implementing the change. However, the court may not consider the merits of whether the change should be approved.[11][66]:128–129[127]:556[130]:23
Jurisdictions may seek preclearance through either an "administrative preclearance" process or a "judicial preclearance" process. If a jurisdiction seeks administrative preclearance, the attorney general will consider whether the proposed change has a discriminatory purpose or effect. After the jurisdiction submits the proposed change, the attorney general has 60 days to interpose an objection to it. The 60-day period may be extended an additional 60 days if the jurisdiction later submits additional information. If the attorney general interposes an objection, then the change is not precleared and may not be implemented.[131]:90–92 The attorney general's decision is not subject to judicial review,[132] but if the attorney general interposes an objection, the jurisdiction may independently seek judicial preclearance, and the court may disregard the attorney general's objection at its discretion.[23]:559 If a jurisdiction seeks judicial preclearance, it must file a declaratory judgment action against the attorney general in the U.S. District Court for D.C. A three-judge panel will consider whether the voting change has a discriminatory purpose or effect, and the losing party may appeal directly to the Supreme Court.[133] Private parties may intervene in judicial preclearance lawsuits.[56]:476–477[131]:90
In several cases, the Supreme Court has addressed the meaning of "discriminatory effect" and "discriminatory purpose" for Section 5 purposes. In Beer v. United States (1976),[134] the court held that for a voting change to have a prohibited discriminatory effect, it must result in "retrogression" (backsliding). Under this standard, a voting change that causes discrimination, but does not result in more discrimination than before the change was made, cannot be denied preclearance for having a discriminatory effect.[135]:283–284 For example, replacing a poll tax with an equally expensive voter registration fee is not a "retrogressive" change because it causes equal discrimination, not more.[136]:695 Relying on the Senate report for the Act, the court reasoned that the retrogression standard was the correct interpretation of the term "discriminatory effect" because Section 5's purpose is " 'to insure that [the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation] shall not be destroyed through new [discriminatory] procedures' ".[134]:140–141 The retrogression standard applies irrespective of whether the voting change allegedly causes vote denial or vote dilution.[135]:311
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in Georgia v. Ashcroft[56] that courts should not determine that a new redistricting plan has a retrogressive effect solely because the plan decreases the number of minority-majority districts. The court emphasized that judges should analyze various other factors under the "totality of the circumstances", such as whether the redistricting plan increases the number of "influence districts" in which a minority group is large enough to influence (but not decide) election outcomes. In 2006, Congress overturned this decision by amending Section 5 to explicitly state that "diminishing the ability [of a protected minority] to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of" Section 5.[137] Uncertainty remains as to what this language precisely means and how courts may interpret it.[23]:551–552, 916
Before 2000, the "discriminatory purpose" prong of Section 5 was understood to mean any discriminatory purpose, which is the same standard used to determine whether discrimination is unconstitutional. In Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish II) (2000),[55] the Supreme Court extended the retrogression standard, holding that for a voting change to have a "discriminatory purpose" under Section 5, the change must have been implemented for a retrogressive purpose. Therefore, a voting change intended to discriminate against a protected minority was permissible under Section 5 so long as the change was not intended to increase existing discrimination.[135]:277–278 This change significantly reduced the number of instances in which preclearance was denied based on discriminatory purpose. In 2006, Congress overturned Bossier Parish II by amending Section 5 to explicitly define "purpose" to mean "any discriminatory purpose."[57]:199–200, 207[138]
Federal examiners and observers
—Justice Hugo Black on the right to vote as the foundation of democracy in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964).[139]
Until the 2006 amendments to the Act,[54]:50 Section 6 allowed the appointment of "federal examiners" to oversee certain jurisdictions' voter registration functions. Federal examiners could be assigned to a covered jurisdiction if the attorney general certified that
- The Department of Justice received 20 or more meritorious complaints that the covered jurisdiction denied its residents the right to vote based on race or language minority status; or
- The assignment of federal examiners was otherwise necessary to enforce the voting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.[121]:235–236
Federal examiners had the authority to register voters, examine voter registration applications, and maintain voter rolls.[121]:237 The goal of the federal examiner provision was to prevent jurisdictions from denying protected minorities the right to vote by engaging in discriminatory behavior in the voter registration process, such as refusing to register qualified applicants, purging qualified voters from the voter rolls, and limiting the hours during which persons could register. Federal examiners were used extensively in the years following the Act's enactment, but their importance waned over time; 1983 was the last year that a federal examiner registered a person to vote. In 2006, Congress repealed the provision.[121]:238–239
Under the Act's original framework, in any jurisdiction certified for federal examiners, the attorney general could additionally require the appointment of "federal observers". By 2006, the federal examiner provision was used solely as a means to appoint federal observers.[121]:239 When Congress repealed the federal examiner provision in 2006, Congress amended Section 8 to allow for the assignment of federal observers to jurisdictions that satisfied the same certification criteria that had been used to appoint federal examiners.[54]:50
Federal observers are tasked with observing poll worker and voter conduct at polling places during an election and observing election officials tabulate the ballots.[121]:248 The goal of the federal observer provision is to facilitate minority voter participation by deterring and documenting instances of discriminatory conduct in the election process, such as election officials denying qualified minority persons the right to cast a ballot, intimidation or harassment of voters on election day, or improper vote counting.[121]:231–235 Discriminatory conduct that federal observers document may also serve as evidence in subsequent enforcement lawsuits.[121]:233 Between 1965 and the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder to strike down the coverage formula, the attorney general certified 153 local governments across 11 states.[140] Because of time and resource constraints, federal observers are not assigned to every certified jurisdiction for every election.[121]:230 Separate provisions allow for a certified jurisdiction to "bail out" of its certification.[140]
Bailout
Under Section 4(a), a covered jurisdiction may seek exemption from coverage through a process called "bailout."[51] To achieve an exemption, a covered jurisdiction must obtain a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the District Court for D.C. that the jurisdiction is eligible to bail out.[11][51] As originally enacted, a covered jurisdiction was eligible to bail out if it had not used a test or device with a discriminatory purpose or effect during the 5 years preceding its bailout request.[40]:22, 33–34 Therefore, a jurisdiction that requested to bail out in 1967 would have needed to prove that it had not misused a test or device since at least 1962. Until 1970, this effectively required a covered jurisdiction to prove that it had not misused a test or device since before the Act was enacted five years earlier in 1965,[40]:6 making it impossible for many covered jurisdictions to bail out.[40]:27 However, Section 4(a) also prohibited covered jurisdictions from using tests or devices in any manner, discriminatory or otherwise; hence, under the original act, a covered jurisdiction would become eligible for bailout in 1970 by simply complying with this requirement. But in the course of amending the Act in 1970 and 1975 to extend the special provisions, Congress also extended the period of time that a covered jurisdiction must not have misused a test or device to 10 years and then to 17 years, respectively.[40]:7, 9 These extensions continued the effect of requiring jurisdictions to prove that they had not misused a test or device since before the Act's enactment in 1965.
In 1982, Congress amended Section 4(a) to make bailout easier to achieve in two ways. First, Congress provided that if a state is covered, local governments in that state may bail out even if the state is ineligible to bail out.[51] Second, Congress liberalized the eligibility criteria by replacing the 17-year requirement with a new standard, allowing a covered jurisdiction to bail out by proving that in the 10 years preceding its bailout request:
- The jurisdiction did not use a test or device with a discriminatory purpose or effect;
- No court determined that the jurisdiction denied or abridged the right to vote based on racial or language minority status;
- The jurisdiction complied with the preclearance requirement;
- The federal government did not assign federal examiners to the jurisdiction;
- The jurisdiction abolished discriminatory election practices; and
- The jurisdiction took affirmative steps to eliminate voter intimidation and expand voting opportunities for protected minorities.
Additionally, Congress required jurisdictions seeking bailout to produce evidence of minority registration and voting rates, including how these rates have changed over time and in comparison to the registration and voting rates of the majority. If the court determines that the covered jurisdiction is eligible for bailout, it will enter a declaratory judgment in the jurisdiction's favor. The court will retain jurisdiction for the following 10 years and may order the jurisdiction back into coverage if the jurisdiction subsequently engages in voting discrimination.[40][51][54]:22–23[141]
The 1982 amendment to the bailout eligibility standard went into effect on August 5, 1984.[51] Between that date and 2013, 196 jurisdictions bailed out of coverage through 38 bailout actions; in each instance, the attorney general consented to the bailout request.[117]:54 Between that date and 2009, all jurisdictions that bailed out were located in Virginia.[51] In 2009, a municipal utility jurisdiction in Texas bailed out after the Supreme Court's opinion in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder (2009),[142] which held that local governments that do not register voters have the ability to bail out.[143] After this ruling, jurisdictions succeeded in at least 20 bailout actions before the Supreme Court held in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) that the coverage formula was unconstitutional.[117]:54
Separate provisions allow a covered jurisdiction that has been certified to receive federal observers to bail out of its certification alone. Under Section 13, the attorney general may terminate the certification of a jurisdiction if 1) more than 50 percent of the jurisdiction's minority voting age population is registered to vote, and 2) there is no longer reasonable cause to believe that residents may experience voting discrimination. Alternatively, the District Court for D.C. may order the certification terminated.[121]:237, 239[140]
Bilingual election requirements
Two provisions require certain jurisdictions to provide election materials to voters in multiple languages: Section 4(f)(4) and Section 203(c). A jurisdiction covered by either provision must provide all materials related to an election—such as voter registration materials, ballots, notices, and instructions—in the language of any applicable language minority group residing in the jurisdiction.[53]:209 Language minority groups protected by these provisions include Asian Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Native Alaskans.[144] Congress enacted the provisions to break down language barriers and combat pervasive language discrimination against the protected groups.[53]:200, 209
Section 4(f)(4) applies to any jurisdiction encompassed by the Section 4(b) coverage formula where more than five percent of the citizen voting age population are members of a single language minority group. Section 203(c) contains a formula that is separate from the Section 4(b) coverage formula, and therefore jurisdictions covered solely by 203(c) are not subject to the Act's other special provisions, such as preclearance. The Section 203(c) formula encompasses jurisdictions where the following conditions exist:
- A single language minority is present that has an English-illiteracy rate higher than the national average; and
- Either:
- The number of "limited-English proficient" members of the language minority group is at least 10,000 voting-age citizens or large enough to comprise at least five percent of the jurisdiction's voting-age citizen population; or
- The jurisdiction is a political subdivision that contains an Indian reservation, and more than five percent of the jurisdiction's American Indian or Alaska Native voting-age citizens are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient.[53]:223–224
Section 203(b) defines "limited-English proficient" as being "unable to speak or understand English adequately enough to participate in the electoral process".[53]:223 Determinations as to which jurisdictions satisfy the Section 203(c) criteria occur once a decade following completion of the decennial census; at these times, new jurisdictions may come into coverage while others may have their coverage terminated. Additionally, under Section 203(d), a jurisdiction may "bail out" of Section 203(c) coverage by proving in federal court that no language minority group within the jurisdiction has an English illiteracy rate that is higher than the national illiteracy rate.[53]:226 After the 2010 census, 150 jurisdictions across 25 states were covered under Section 203(c), including statewide coverage of California, Texas, and Florida.[145]
Impacto
After its enactment in 1965, the law immediately decreased racial discrimination in voting. The suspension of literacy tests and the assignments of federal examiners and observers allowed for high numbers of racial minorities to register to vote.[85]:702 Nearly 250,000 African Americans registered in 1965, one-third of whom were registered by federal examiners.[146] In covered jurisdictions, less than one-third (29.3 percent) of the African American population was registered in 1965; by 1967, this number increased to more than half (52.1 percent),[85]:702 and a majority of African American residents became registered to vote in 9 of the 13 Southern states.[146] Similar increases were seen in the number of African Americans elected to office: between 1965 and 1985, African Americans elected as state legislators in the 11 former Confederate states increased from 3 to 176.[147]:112 Nationwide, the number of African American elected officials increased from 1,469 in 1970 to 4,912 in 1980.[112]:919 By 2011, the number was approximately 10,500.[148] Similarly, registration rates for language minority groups increased after Congress enacted the bilingual election requirements in 1975 and amended them in 1992. In 1973, the percent of Hispanics registered to vote was 34.9 percent; by 2006, that amount nearly doubled. The number of Asian Americans registered to vote in 1996 increased 58 percent by 2006.[53]:233–235
After the Act's initial success in combating tactics designed to deny minorities access to the polls, the Act became predominately used as a tool to challenge racial vote dilution.[85]:691 Starting in the 1970s, the attorney general commonly raised Section 5 objections to voting changes that decreased the effectiveness of racial minorities' votes, including discriminatory annexations, redistricting plans, and election methods such as at-large election systems, runoff election requirements, and prohibitions on bullet voting.[131]:105–106 In total, 81 percent (2,541) of preclearance objections made between 1965 and 2006 were based on vote dilution.[131]:102 Claims brought under Section 2 have also predominately concerned vote dilution.[85]:708–709 Between the 1982 creation of the Section 2 results test and 2006, at least 331 Section 2 lawsuits resulted in published judicial opinions. In the 1980s, 60 percent of Section 2 lawsuits challenged at-large election systems; in the 1990s, 37.2 percent challenged at-large election systems and 38.5 percent challenged redistricting plans. Overall, plaintiffs succeeded in 37.2 percent of the 331 lawsuits, and they were more likely to succeed in lawsuits brought against covered jurisdictions.[149]:654–656
By enfranchising racial minorities, the Act facilitated a political realignment of the Democratic and Republican parties. Between 1890 and 1965, minority disenfranchisement allowed conservative Southern Democrats to dominate Southern politics. After Johnson signed the Act into law, newly enfranchised racial minorities began to vote for liberal Democratic candidates throughout the South, and Southern white conservatives began to switch their party registration from Democrat to Republican en masse.[150]:290 These dual trends caused the two parties to ideologically polarize, with the Democratic Party becoming more liberal and the Republican Party becoming more conservative.[150]:290 The trends also created competition between the two parties,[150]:290 which Republicans capitalized on by implementing the Southern strategy.[151] Over the subsequent decades, the creation of majority-minority districts to remedy racial vote dilution claims also contributed to these developments. By packing liberal-leaning racial minorities into small numbers of majority-minority districts, large numbers of surrounding districts became more solidly white, conservative, and Republican. While this increased the elected representation of racial minorities as intended, it also decreased white Democratic representation and increased the representation of Republicans overall.[150]:292 By the mid-1990s, these trends culminated in a political realignment: the Democratic Party and the Republican Party became more ideologically polarized and defined as liberal and conservative parties, respectively; and both parties came to compete for electoral success in the South,[150]:294 with the Republican Party controlling most of Southern politics.[20]:203
Research shows that the Act successfully and massively increased voter turnout and voter registration, in particular among blacks.[15][16] The act has also been linked to concrete outcomes, such as greater public goods provision (such as public education) for areas with higher black population shares and more members of Congress who vote for civil rights-related legislation.[17][18] A 2016 study in the American Journal of Political Science found "that members of Congress who represented jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement were substantially more supportive of civil rights-related legislation than legislators who did not represent covered jurisdictions."[17] A 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics study found that the Act boosted voter turnout and increases in public goods transfers from state governments to localities with higher black population.[18] A 2018 study in The Journal of Politics found that Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act "increased black voter registration by 14–19 percentage points, white registration by 10–13 percentage points, and overall voter turnout by 10–19 percentage points. Additional results for Democratic vote share suggest that some of this overall increase in turnout may have come from reactionary whites."[15] A 2019 study in the American Economic Journal found that preclearance substantially increased turnout among minorities, even as far as to 2012 (the year prior to the Supreme Court ruling ending preclearance).[16] The study estimates that preclearance led to an increase in minority turnout of 17 percentage points.[16] A 2020 study found that the jurisdictions which had previously been covered by preclearance massively increased the rate of voter registration purges after the 2013 United States Supreme Court Shelby County v. Holder decision in which the “coverage formula” in Section 4b of the VRA that determined which jurisdictions had to presubmit changes in their election policies for federal approval was struck down.[14]
Constitucionalidad
Voter eligibility provisions
Early in the Act's enforcement history, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of several provisions relating to voter qualifications and prerequisites to voting. In Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the court upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(e). This section prohibits jurisdictions from administering literacy tests to citizens who attain a sixth-grade education in an American school in which the predominant language was Spanish, such as schools in Puerto Rico.[152] Although the court had earlier held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1959) that literacy tests did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,[153] in Morgan the court held that Congress could enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights—such as the right to vote—by prohibiting conduct it deemed to interfere with such rights, even if that conduct may not be independently unconstitutional.[154]:405–406[155]:652–656 After Congress created a nationwide ban on all literacy tests and similar devices in 1970 by enacting Section 201, the court upheld the ban as constitutional in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970).[113][156]
Also in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of various other provisions relating to voter qualifications and prerequisites to voting. The court upheld Section 202, which prohibits every state and local government from requiring people to live in their borders for longer than 30 days before allowing them to vote in a presidential election. Additionally, the court upheld the provision lowering the minimum voting age to 18 in federal elections, but it held that Congress exceeded its power by lowering the voting age to 18 in state elections; this precipitated the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment the following year, which lowered the voting age in all elections to 18. The court was deeply divided in Oregon v. Mitchell, and a majority of justices did not agree on a rationale for the holding.[113]:353[156]:118–121
Section 2 results test
The constitutionality of Section 2, which contains a general prohibition on discriminatory voting laws, has not been definitively explained by the Supreme Court. As amended in 1982, Section 2 prohibits any voting practice that has a discriminatory effect, irrespective of whether the practice was enacted or is administered for the purpose of discriminating. This "results test" contrasts with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, both of which directly prohibit only purposeful discrimination. Given this disparity, whether the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of Section 2 as appropriate legislation passed to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and under what rationale, remains unclear.[23]:758–759
In Mississippi Republican Executive Opinion v. Brooks (1984),[157] the Supreme Court summarily affirmed, without a written opinion, a lower court's decision that 1982 amendment to Section 2 is constitutional.[158] Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented from the opinion. They reasoned that the case presented complex constitutional issues that warranted a full hearing. When making later decisions, the Supreme Court is more likely to disregard a previous judgment if it lacks a written opinion, but for lower courts the Supreme Court's unwritten summary affirmances are as binding as are Supreme Court judgments with written opinions. Partially due to Brooks, the constitutionality of the Section 2 results test has since been unanimously upheld by lower courts.[23]:759–760
The pending case Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021) is expected to evaluate the applicability of Section 2 in the wake of the decision of Shelby. The case involves a challenge to a set of Arizona election laws and policies that the Democratic National Party asserted were discriminatory towards Hispanics and Native Americans under VRA's Section 2. While lower courts upheld the election laws, an en banc Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and found these laws to be in violation of Section 2. The question of Section 2's applicability is the crux of the case at the Supreme Court.[159]
During oral arguments on March 2, 2021, Michael Garvin, an attorney representing the Arizona Republican party, was asked by justice Amy Coney Barrett what interest the party had in invalidating the Arizona voting restrictions, to which Garvin replied, "Because it puts us at a competitive disadvantage relative to Democrats."[160][161][162]
Coverage formula and preclearance
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Section 5 preclearance requirement in three cases. The first case was South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966),[163] which was decided about five months after the Act's enactment. The court held that Section 5 constituted a valid use of Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, reasoning that "exceptional circumstances" of pervasive racial discrimination, combined with the inadequacy of case-by-case litigation in ending that discrimination, justified the preclearance requirement.[163]:334–335[164]:76 The court also upheld the constitutionality of the 1965 coverage formula, saying that it was "rational in both practice and theory" and that the bailout provision provided adequate relief for jurisdictions that may not deserve coverage.[163]:330[164]:76–77
The Supreme Court again upheld the preclearance requirement in City of Rome v. United States (1980).[165] The court held that because Congress had explicit constitutional power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments "by appropriate legislation", the Act did not violate principles of federalism. The court also explicitly upheld the "discriminatory effect" prong of Section 5, stating that even though the Fifteenth Amendment directly prohibited only intentional discrimination, Congress could constitutionally prohibit unintentional discrimination to mitigate the risk that jurisdictions may engage in intentional discrimination. Finally, the court upheld the 1975 extension of Section 5 because of the record of discrimination that continued to persist in the covered jurisdictions. The court further suggested that the temporary nature of the special provisions was relevant to Section 5's constitutionality.[164]:77–78
The final case in which the Supreme Court upheld Section 5 was Lopez v. Monterey County (Lopez II) (1999).[166] In Lopez II, the court reiterated its reasoning in Katzenbach and Rome, and it upheld as constitutional the requirement that covered local governments obtain preclearance before implementing voting changes that their parent state required them to implement, even if the parent state was not itself a covered jurisdiction.[164]:78[167]:447
The 2006 extension of Section 5 was challenged before the Supreme Court in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder (2009).[142] The lawsuit was brought by a municipal water district in Texas that elected members to a water board. The District wished to move a voting location from a private home to a public school, but that change was subject to preclearance because Texas was a covered jurisdiction. The District did not register voters, and thus it did not appear to qualify as a "political subdivision" eligible to bail out of coverage. Although the court indicated in dicta (a non-binding part of the court's opinion) that Section 5 presented difficult constitutional questions, it did not declare Section 5 unconstitutional; instead, it interpreted the law to allow any covered local government, including one that does not register voters, to obtain an exemption from preclearance if it meets the bailout requirements.[168][169]
In a 5–4 decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013),[170] the Supreme Court struck down Section 4(b) as unconstitutional.[12][125] The court reasoned that the coverage formula violates the constitutional principles of "equal sovereignty of the states" and federalism because its disparate treatment of the states is "based on 40 year-old facts having no logical relationship to the present day", which makes the formula unresponsive to current needs.[12][124] The court did not strike down Section 5, but without Section 4(b), no jurisdiction may be subject to Section 5 preclearance unless Congress enacts a new coverage formula.[13] After the decision, several states that were fully or partially covered—including Texas, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina—implemented laws that were previously denied preclearance. This prompted new legal challenges to these laws under other provisions unaffected by the court's decision, such as Section 2.[171]:189–200 Research has shown that the coverage formula and the requirement of preclearance substantially increased turnout among racial minorities, even as far as the year before Shelby County.[16] Some jurisdictions that had previously been covered by the coverage formula increased the rate of voter registration purges after Shelby County.[172]
Racial gerrymandering
While Section 2 and Section 5 prohibit jurisdictions from drawing electoral districts that dilute the votes of protected minorities, the Supreme Court has held that in some instances, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents jurisdictions from drawing district lines to favor protected minorities. The court first recognized the justiciability of affirmative "racial gerrymandering" claims in Shaw v. Reno (1993).[173] In Miller v. Johnson (1995),[174] the court explained that a redistricting plan is constitutionally suspect if the jurisdiction used race as the "predominant factor" in determining how to draw district lines. For race to "predominate", the jurisdiction must prioritize racial considerations over traditional redistricting principles, which include "compactness, contiguity, [and] respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests."[174]:916[175]:621 If a court concludes that racial considerations predominated, then the redistricting plan is considered "racially gerrymandered" and must be subjected to strict scrutiny, meaning that the redistricting plan will be upheld as constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. In Bush v. Vera (1996),[176]:983 a plurality of the Supreme Court assumed that complying with Section 2 or Section 5 constituted compelling interests, and lower courts have allowed only these two interests to justify racial gerrymandering.[23]:877
Ver también
- Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
- National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)
- Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)
- Voter suppression in the United States
- Women's suffrage in the United States
Notas
- ^ In Gingles, the Supreme Court held that the Gingles test applies to claims that an at-large election scheme results in vote dilution. The court later held, in Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993), that the Gingles test also applies to claims that a redistricting plan results in vote dilution through the arrangement of single-member districts.[88]:1006
- ^ The Courts of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit,[93] Eleventh Circuit,[94] and Ninth Circuit[95] have either explicitly held that coalition suits are allowed under Section 2 or assumed that such suits are permissible, while those in the Sixth Circuit[96] and Seventh Circuit[97] have rejected such suits.[23]:703
- ^ Courts of Appeals in the Second Circuit[100] and Fourth Circuit[101] have held that such proof is not an absolute requirement for liability but is a relevant additional factor under the "totality of the circumstances" test. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that such proof is a required component of the third precondition.[23]:711–712[102]
- ^ The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that challenges to majority-vote requirements under Section 2 are not cognizable,[106] while the Eastern District of Arkansas held the opposite.[23]:752–753[107]
- ^ The Supreme Court subsequently held that plaintiffs may alternatively bring Section 5 enforcement actions in state courts.[23]:534[129]
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- ^ Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5(b); (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b))
- ^ Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5(c); (formerly 42 U.S.C. 1973c(c))
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- ^ Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a); (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F))
- ^ a b Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)
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- ^ Eilperin, Juliet (August 22, 2013). "What's Changed for African Americans Since 1963, By the Numbers". The Washington Post. Retrieved January 5, 2014.
- ^ Katz, Ellen; Aisenbrey, Margaret; Baldwin, Anna; Cheuse, Emma; Weisbrodt, Anna (2006). "Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act". University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. 39. SSRN 1029386.
- ^ a b c d e Pildes, Richard H. (April 2011). "Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America". California Law Review. 99. SSRN 1646989.
- ^ Boyd, James (May 17, 1970). "Nixon's Southern Strategy: 'It's All in the Charts'" (PDF). The New York Times. Retrieved August 2, 2008.
- ^ Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e); (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e))
- ^ Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
- ^ Buss, William G. (January 1998). "Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act". Iowa Law Review. 83. Retrieved January 7, 2014. (Subscription required.)
- ^ Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
- ^ a b Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
- ^ Mississippi Republican Executive Opinion v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984)
- ^ Kamen, Al (November 14, 1984). "Court Backs Voting Plan". The Washington Post. Retrieved June 30, 2017.
- ^ Chung, Andrew (February 24, 2021). "U.S. Supreme Court set to weigh Republican-backed voting restrictions". Reuters. Archived from the original on February 27, 2021. Retrieved February 28, 2021.
- ^ "In Supreme Court, GOP attorney defends voting restrictions by saying they help Republicans win". NBC News.
- ^ "Lawyer says eliminating voting restrictions would put Republicans at a 'competitive disadvantage'". www.washingtonpost.com.
- ^ Weinberg, Abigail. "A GOP lawyer says the quiet part loud in SCOTUS voting rights case".
- ^ a b c South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
- ^ a b c d Posner, Mark A. (2006). "Time is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation's History of Discrimination in Voting" (PDF). New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy. 10. Retrieved December 14, 2013.
- ^ City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)
- ^ Lopez v. Monterey County (Lopez II), 525 U.S. 266 (1999)
- ^ Harper, Charlotte Marx (2000). "Lopez v. Monterey County: A Remedy Gone Too Far?". Baylor Law Review. 52. Retrieved May 24, 2014.
- ^ Liptak, Adam (June 22, 2009). "Justices Retain Oversight by U.S. on Voting". The New York Times. Retrieved January 21, 2014.
- ^ Bravin, Jess (June 23, 2009). "Supreme Court Avoids Voting-Rights Act Fight". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on March 7, 2014. Retrieved May 19, 2017.
- ^ Sean Sullivan (February 27, 2013). "Everything You Need to Know about the Supreme Court Voting Rights Act Case". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on February 28, 2012. Retrieved February 27, 2013.
- ^ Wilson, McKenzie (2015). "Piercing the Umbrella: The Dangerous Paradox of Shelby County v. Holder". Seton Hall Legislative Journal. 39. Retrieved April 13, 2019.
- ^ Feder, Catalina; Miller, Michael G. (2020). "Voter Purges After Shelby". American Politics Research. 48 (6): 687–692. doi:10.1177/1532673x20916426. ISSN 1532-673X. S2CID 221131969.
- ^ Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
- ^ a b Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)
- ^ Ebaugh, Nelson (1997). "Refining the Racial Gerrymandering Claim: Bush v. Vera". Tulsa Law Journal. 33 (2). Retrieved December 30, 2013.
- ^ Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)
One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a work in the public domain: "Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Effect of the Voting Rights Act". U.S. Department of Justice. June 19, 2009Otras lecturas
- Ansolabehere, Stephen; Persily, Nathaniel; Stewart, Charles III (2010). "Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act". Harvard Law Review. 123 (6): 1385–1436.
- Berman, Ari (2015). Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-3741-5827-9.
- Bullock, Charles S. III, Ronald Keith Gaddie, and Justin J. Wert, eds. (2016). The Rise and Fall of the Voting Rights Act by (University of Oklahoma Press; 240 pages) focus on period between the 2006 revision of the 1965 act and the invalidation of one of its key provisions in Shelby County v. Holder (2013).
- Davidson, Chandler (1984). Minority Vote Dilution. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. ISBN 978-0-88258-156-9.
- Davidson, Chandler (1994). Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-02108-9.
- Finley, Keith M. (2008). Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil Rights, 1938–1965. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-3345-3.
- Garrow, David J. (1978). Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-02498-2.
- Lawson, Steven F. (1976). Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-7391-0087-5.
- Smooth, Wendy (September 2006). "Intersectionality in electoral politics: a mess worth making". Politics & Gender. 2 (3): 400–414. doi:10.1017/S1743923X06261087. S2CID 145812097.
enlaces externos
- Text of original Act and 1970, 1975, and 1982 amendments (PDF)
- Voting Rights Enforcement and Reauthorization: An Examination of the Act's Section 5 Preclearance Provision, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
- Voting Rights Act: Past, Present, and Future, Justice Talking
- The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Background and Overview (PDF), Congressional Research Service
- "The Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March: Shaking the Conscience of the Nation", a National Park Service Teaching with Historic Places lesson plan
- Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, March 8, 2006, Vol. 1 Vol. 2 Vol. 3 Vol. 4
- The Great Society Congress