Design and capability of aircraft carriers during World War II


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Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea.[1][2][3] Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa.[4] Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union,[a] her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk.[5][6][7][8][9]

Without victories at sea in the Pacific theater, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Saipan, The Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft.[10] Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez canal, and through the Panama Canal. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian Admiral Herbert Richmond stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".[11]

Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles,[12] supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones. This article is part of a series that covers World War II from the vantage point of aircraft carrier operations and is focused upon carrier design and capability.


Design considerations

Aircraft carrier design involved trade-offs between offensive striking power and defensive survivability. The more carrier tonnage allocated to guns and armor for protection, the less was available for carrying and launching aircraft, the warship's principal weapon. Combatant nations of World War II placed varying emphasis on these factors depending upon conditions in their principal operating theater, their preferred operating tactics, and their industrial capability. Experts continue to debate whether increasing carrier survivatility through increased anti-aircraft armament and armored flight decks was optimal during World War II since adding the weight to do so necessitated reductions in the number of carrier aircraft available to inflict damage upon the enemy. For example, would designing the USS Yorktown so that it was more likely to survive the punishment it took at the Battle of Midway have been desirable if its carrying a smaller air group resulted in fewer Japanese carriers being sunk?[13]

Initial constraints on design

Aircraft carrier design prior to the outbreak of World War II had been constrained by limitations of international agreements among the major naval powers which were intended to avoid an arms race over capital ships. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited carrier displacement for the five signers to 27,000 tons ( long tons of 2,240 lbs/ton), except that each could convert two existing battleship hulls to carriers having displacements up to 33,000 tons. Armament for carriers was limited to a maximum of ten guns with a maximum caliber of 8 inches. Aircraft carriers were defined as having displacements of at least 10,000 tons and used exclusively for launching and landing aircraft. The overall tonnage limit for carriers was 135,000 tons for Britain and America, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 tons for Italy and France.[14]

"Experimental" Designs

Only four aircraft carriers were in service or under construction at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was agreed to. These four were considered "experimental" and not included as part of the treaty's overall tonnage limitations. They were relatively small in size and carried a relatively small number of aircraft. These were HMS Argus (a converted liner), USS Langley (a converted collier), IJN Hōshō (laid down as a carrier), and HMS Hermes (laid down as a carrier).

Evolving design emphasis by each combatant

Japanese aircraft carriers

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) emphasized offensive capability consistent with their strategic vision of orchestrating and winning a single, decisive battle. Limited by treaties to having fewer capital ships than the US and UK, Japan's planning emphasized ways to degrade enemy fleets before they arrived at battle by extending the capability of IJN weapon systems. Aircraft as well as torpedoes had longer ranges than American or British counterparts.

The following table shows some key performance parameters for Japanese aircraft carriers. It also shows what it took to sink them. Carriers are listed in order of commissioning date within each carrier type (fleet, light, escort).

Key Performance Parameters for Japanese Aircraft Carriers

Notes:

  • This table includes only ships that operated between July 1937 and August 1945 and that had flight decks for both launching and recovering aircraft at sea.
  • "Commission Date" is the date the ship was first commissioned as an aircraft carrier.
  • "Standard Displacement" is the weight in tons of the ship with full load of stores and ammunition, but with no fuel, lubricating oil, or reserve feed water. (See Stille, p. 61)
  • "Range" is the maximum distance in nautical miles possible on a load of fuel when traveling at optimal speed, which is typically much less than maximum speed.
  • "Operational Aircraft" is the number that could be launched for attacks or Combat Air Patrol. It excludes spares and cargo aircraft. (See Parshall and Tully, p. 478)
  • Various specifications changed over time. Values shown here are typically for the 1942 to 1944 time frame.

Sources:

  • Parshall, Jonathan and Anthony Tully; Shattered Sword (2005)
  • Stille, Mark; The Imperial Japanese Navy (2013)
  • Imperial Japanese Navy Page
  • Naval War In The Pacific, 1941-1945
  • World War II Database

American aircraft carriers

Americans perceived their principal operating theater would be the Pacific, where immense distances between refueling bases placed a premium on carrier speed and range. Threats were likely to come from other warships, either as enemy aircraft or ship's guns, rather than from land-based planes or batteries. Carrier-launched strikes would involve fewer aircraft and each would carry less of a payload, consisting of 250lb and 500lb bombs, compared to land-based aircraft. Also, war-games indicated the ability to strike first and decisively was important for success. Strong first strikes against enemy carriers were expected to reduce or eliminate their ability to counter-attack, reducing the need for strong defensive measures. As a result of these considerations, Americans placed greater emphasis on aircraft striking power than upon survivability when attacked. Accordingly, carriers were designed to carry more aircraft and aircraft components at the expense of more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor. To further increase the number of aircraft carried, large numbers of them were kept on the flight deck in addition to those kept below in hangars. In the Pacific, storms that could toss or wash deck-park aircraft overboard were uncommon and could theoretically be navigated around. Finally, within a year of the beginning of the Pacific War, America's industrial capacity enabled them to rapidly make good their carrier losses, enabling them to take greater risks with their carriers to achieve greater success.[13]

(to be continued)

British aircraft carriers

The British also operated in the Pacific but, for most of the war, their principal areas of carrier operation were the coastal Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. In these areas, there were no enemy carriers. The threat was from land-based, potentially multi-engine, heavy bombers in potentially overwhelming numbers that could deliver heavy payloads consisting of 1,000lb bombs or more and be protected by equally large numbers of fighter aircraft. Unlike with relatively few and small enemy attacking aircraft in the Pacific, it was almost assured that some attacking aircraft would penetrate a fighter and anti-aircraft screen. Further, attacks from land bases could be sustained after airfield repairs, unlike in the Pacific where the launch platform could be sunk or sufficiently damaged to require an immediate return to dry-dock facilities. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on surviving an attack such that a counter-attack could be launched. Survivability was enhanced with more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor at the expense of larger aircraft groups on-board. Additional anti-aircraft armament also made carriers more self-sufficient for defense and less reliant upon other warships for screening. Finally, heavy weather was more common and less avoidable in the Atlantic theater than in the Pacific. and deck-parking to increase aircraft group size was less common.[13]

(to be continued)

All carriers

The table below (incomplete, work-in-progress) shows the specifications and capabilities for aircraft carriers as they evolved over time.


SELECTED ESCORT CARRIERS

Long Island aircraft: 16 hangar + 46 flight deck Audacity: no hangar; aircraft stored on flight deck

Footnotes

  1. ^ Britain and America shipped war-sustaining goods to the Soviet Union via Arctic Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Pacific Ocean routes.

References

  1. ^ Mawdsley, Evan (2019). The War For The Seas- A Maritime History of World War II. London: Yale University Press. p. 478. ISBN 978-0-300-19019-9.
  2. ^ Overy, p. 61
  3. ^ Symonds, p. 641
  4. ^ Overy, Richard (1995). Why The Allies Won. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. p. 18. ISBN 0-393-03925-0.
  5. ^ Overy p. 19, 254, 321
  6. ^ Mawdsley, p.478
  7. ^ Baranov, Sergey (14 Mar 2018). "Lend-Lease: How American supplies aided the USSR in its darkest hour". Russia. Science & Tech. Retrieved 29 Aug 2019.
  8. ^ Hill, Alexander (July 2008). "Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans". History.net. Retrieved 28 Aug 2019.
  9. ^ Toland, John (1965). The Last 100 Days. New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. ISBN 0-553-34208-8.
  10. ^ Symonds, WWII at Sea, p. xi-xii
  11. ^ Mawdsley, page=xxxix, 477
  12. ^ Symonds, p. 268
  13. ^ a b c Pocklington, Alexander (aka "Drachinifel") (2 Jan 2019). "'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers: Survivaility vs. Strike Power". Five Minute Guide To Warships WWI & WWII (more or less). Retrieved 31 Mar 2019.
  14. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (29 Dec 2017). "Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922". NavWeaps- Naval Weapons, Naval Technology and Naval Reunions. Retrieved 31 Mar 2019.
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