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Para el acuerdo de 2018, consulte la Declaración de Panmunjom .

Acuerdo de Armisticio de Corea
Korean War armistice agreement 1953.jpg
Delegados de ambas partes beligerantes que firman el Acuerdo de Armisticio de Corea en Panmunjom , que marca el comienzo del alto el fuego aún existente entre las dos Coreas.
TipoArmisticio
Firmado27 de julio de 1953
LocalizaciónPanmunjom , Corea
Signatarios/ William K. Harrison Nam Il Peng Dehuai
North Korea
China
Fiestas Comando de las Naciones Unidas Ejército Popular de Corea Ejército de Voluntarios del Pueblo Chino
North Korea
China
IdiomasInglés , coreano , chino

El Acuerdo de Armisticio de Corea (en coreano : 한국 정전 협정 / 조선 정전 협정 , en chino :韓國 停戰 協定 / 朝鮮 停戰 協定) es un armisticio que provocó el cese completo de las hostilidades de la Guerra de Corea . Fue firmado por el teniente general del ejército estadounidense William Harrison, Jr. en representación del Comando de las Naciones Unidas (UNC), el general norcoreano Nam Il en representación del Ejército Popular de Corea (KPA) y Peng Teh-huai en representación del Ejército Voluntario del Pueblo Chino (PVA). . [1]El armisticio se firmó el 27 de julio de 1953 y se diseñó para "garantizar el cese completo de las hostilidades y de todos los actos de la fuerza armada en Corea hasta que se logre un arreglo pacífico final". [2]

Durante la Conferencia de Ginebra de 1954 en Suiza, el primer ministro y ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de China , Chou En-lai, sugirió que se debería implementar un tratado de paz en la península de Corea. Sin embargo, el secretario de Estado de Estados Unidos, John Foster Dulles , no se acomodó a este intento de lograr tal tratado. Nunca se ha logrado un arreglo de paz definitivo. [3] El armisticio firmado estableció la Zona Desmilitarizada de Corea (DMZ), la nueva frontera de facto entre las dos naciones, puso en vigor un alto el fuego y finalizó la repatriación de prisioneros de guerra . La DMZ corre cerca del paralelo 38 y ha separado al norte yCorea del Sur desde que se firmó el Acuerdo de Armisticio de Corea en 1953.

Corea del Sur nunca firmó el Acuerdo de Armisticio debido a la negativa del presidente Syngman Rhee a aceptar que no logró unificar Corea por la fuerza. [4] [5] China normalizó las relaciones y firmó un tratado de paz con Corea del Sur en 1992. En 1994, China se retiró de la Comisión de Armisticio Militar , dejando esencialmente a Corea del Norte y al Comando de la ONU como los únicos participantes en el acuerdo de armisticio. [6] [7] En 2011, Corea del Sur declaró que Corea del Norte había violado el armisticio 221 veces. [8]

Antecedentes [ editar ]

A mediados de diciembre de 1950, Estados Unidos estaba discutiendo los términos de un acuerdo para poner fin a la Guerra de Corea. [9] El acuerdo deseado pondría fin a los combates, proporcionaría garantías contra su reanudación y protegería la seguridad futura de las fuerzas de la UNC. [10] Estados Unidos solicitó una comisión de armisticio militar de membresía mixta que supervisara todos los acuerdos. [9] Ambas partes tendrían que acordar "cesar la introducción en Corea de cualquier unidad o personal aéreo, terrestre o naval de refuerzo ... y abstenerse de aumentar el nivel de equipo y material de guerra existente en Corea". [9] Estados Unidos deseaba crear una zona desmilitarizada que tendría aproximadamente 20 millas (32 km) de ancho. [9]El acuerdo propuesto también abordaría la cuestión de los prisioneros de guerra que, según Estados Unidos, deberían intercambiarse uno por uno. [9]

Mientras se hablaba de un posible acuerdo de armisticio, a finales de mayo y principios de junio de 1951, el presidente de la República de Corea (República de Corea, Corea del Sur), Syngman Rhee, se opuso a las conversaciones de paz. Creía que la República de Corea debería continuar expandiendo su ejército para poder marchar hasta el río Yalu y unificar completamente a la nación. [5] La UNC no apoyó la posición de Rhee. [5] Incluso sin el apoyo de la UNC, Rhee y el gobierno de Corea del Sur intentaron movilizar al público para que se resistiera a cualquier interrupción de los combates cerca del río Yalu. [11] Otros funcionarios de la República de Corea apoyaron las ambiciones de Rhee y la Asamblea Nacional de Corea del Sur.aprobó por unanimidad una resolución que respalda una lucha continua por un "país independiente y unificado". [11] A finales de junio, sin embargo, la Asamblea decidió apoyar las conversaciones de armisticio, [11] aunque el presidente Rhee siguió oponiéndose a ellas. [12]

Al igual que Syngman Rhee, el líder norcoreano Kim Il-sung también buscó la unificación completa. La parte norcoreana tardó en apoyar las conversaciones de armisticio y solo el 27 de junio de 1951, diecisiete días después de que comenzaran las conversaciones de armisticio, cambió su lema de "arrojar al enemigo al mar" por "llevar al enemigo al paralelo 38". [13] Corea del Norte fue presionada para que apoyara las conversaciones de armisticio por parte de sus aliados, la República Popular China y la Unión Soviética, cuyo apoyo fue vital para permitir que Corea del Norte siguiera luchando.

Discusiones del armisticio [ editar ]

El sitio de las negociaciones en 1951

Las conversaciones sobre un armisticio comenzaron el 10 de julio de 1951, [14] en Kaesong , una ciudad de Corea del Norte en la provincia de Hwanghae del Norte, cerca de la frontera con Corea del Sur. [15] Los dos negociadores principales fueron el Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército, General Nam Il, un viceprimer ministro norcoreano, y el Vicealmirante de los Estados Unidos Charles Turner Joy . [16] Después de un período de dos semanas, el 26 de junio de 1951, se acordó una agenda de cinco partes [17] y esta guió las conversaciones hasta la firma del armisticio el 27 de julio de 1953. Los temas a discutir fueron:

  1. Aprobación de una agenda.
  2. Fijar una línea de demarcación militar entre las dos partes para establecer una zona desmilitarizada como condición básica para el cese de hostilidades en Corea.
  3. Arreglos concretos para la realización de un alto el fuego y armisticio en Corea, incluida la composición, autoridad y funciones de una organización supervisora ​​para llevar a cabo los términos de una tregua y armisticio.
  4. Disposiciones relativas a los prisioneros de guerra.
  5. Recomendaciones a los gobiernos de los países interesados ​​en ambos lados. [17]
Acuerdo de Armisticio de Corea en inglés; Registros del Estado Mayor Conjunto de Estados Unidos, Grupo de Registros 218; Archivos Nacionales en College Park, College Park, MD [disponible a través del Catálogo de Archivos Nacionales (NAID: 6852876)


Una vez que se decidió la agenda, las conversaciones se desarrollaron lentamente. Hubo largos intervalos entre reuniones. La brecha más larga entre las discusiones comenzó el 23 de agosto de 1951, [17] cuando Corea del Norte y sus aliados afirmaron que el lugar de la conferencia en Kaesong había sido bombardeado. Corea del Norte solicitó a la UNC que llevara a cabo una investigación inmediata, que concluyó que había evidencia de que un avión de la UNC había atacado el lugar de la conferencia. Sin embargo, las pruebas parecían fabricadas. Posteriormente, los comunistas se negaron a permitir una investigación durante las horas del día. [18] Las conversaciones de armisticio no se reanudaron hasta el 25 de octubre de 1951. [14] Estados Unidos no permitiría que se llevaran a cabo más discusiones en Kaesong. [19] Panmunjom , un pueblo cercano enLa provincia de Kyonggi , cercana tanto a Corea del Norte como a Corea del Sur, fue elegida como el nuevo lugar para las deliberaciones. Esto estaba condicionado a que la responsabilidad de proteger la aldea fuera compartida por ambos poderes. [20] [21]

Discusiones a nivel de coronel entre los ejércitos de Estados Unidos y Corea del Norte el 11 de octubre de 1951

Un punto de negociación importante y problemático fue la repatriación de prisioneros de guerra (POW). [22] Los comunistas tenían 10.000 prisioneros de guerra y la UNC tenía 150.000 prisioneros de guerra. [9] El PVA, el KPA y la UNC no pudieron ponerse de acuerdo sobre un sistema de repatriación porque muchos soldados del PVA y del KPA se negaron a ser repatriados al norte, [23] lo cual era inaceptable para los chinos y los norcoreanos. [24] En el acuerdo de armisticio final, firmado el 27 de julio de 1953 , se creó una Comisión de Repatriación de Naciones Neutrales, presidida por el general indio KS Thimayya , para manejar el asunto. [25]

En 1952, Estados Unidos eligió un nuevo presidente, Dwight D. Eisenhower , y el 29 de noviembre de 1952 el presidente electo fue a Corea para investigar qué podría poner fin a la Guerra de Corea. [26] Con la aceptación de las Naciones Unidas del armisticio propuesto por la India para la Guerra de Corea, [27] el KPA, el PVA y la UNC cesaron el fuego con la línea de batalla aproximadamente en la línea de Kansas, una línea de posiciones de la ONU al norte del paralelo 38 que se había establecido en la Operación Rugged . [28] Al aceptar el armisticio, los beligerantes establecieron la Zona Desmilitarizada de Corea.(DMZ), que desde entonces ha sido patrullada por el KPA, ROKA, Estados Unidos y las fuerzas conjuntas de la UNC. Las discusiones continuaron lentamente debido a las dificultades con respecto a la demarcación de la frontera entre Corea del Norte y Corea del Sur. China y Corea del Norte esperaban que la línea se mantuviera en el paralelo 38. Sin embargo, en cuestión de semanas, ambas naciones aceptaron la Kansas Line. [14] En marzo de 1953, la muerte de Joseph Stalin ayudó a impulsar las negociaciones. Si bien el líder chino Mao Zedong no estaba dispuesto a comprometerse en ese momento, el nuevo liderazgo soviético emitió una declaración dos semanas después de la muerte de Stalin, pidiendo un rápido fin a las hostilidades. [29]

El edificio donde se firmó el armisticio, que ahora alberga el Museo de la Paz de Corea del Norte

El 19 de julio de 1953 los delegados llegaron a un acuerdo que cubría todos los temas de la agenda. [30] El 27 de julio de 1953 a las 10:00 am, Nam Il, delegado del KPA y PVA, y William K. Harrison Jr. , delegado de la UNC firmaron el Armisticio . [2] Doce horas después de la firma del documento, comenzaron todos los reglamentos aprobados en el armisticio. [31] El acuerdo preveía el seguimiento por parte de una comisión internacional. La Comisión de Supervisión de Naciones Neutrales (NNSC) se estableció para evitar que se trajeran refuerzos a Corea, ya sea personal militar adicional o armas nuevas, y los equipos de inspección de miembros de NNSC de Checoslovaquia, Polonia, Suecia y Suiza operaron en toda Corea. [13]

Efectos [ editar ]

La Zona Desmilitarizada en comparación con la anterior 38a frontera paralela de facto

El Armisticio firmado estableció un "cese completo de todas las hostilidades en Corea por parte de todas las fuerzas armadas" [2] que debía ser aplicado por los comandantes de ambos lados. Sin embargo, el armisticio es solo un alto el fuego entre fuerzas militares, más que un acuerdo entre gobiernos para normalizar las relaciones. [32] No se firmó ningún tratado de paz formal y no se restablecieron las relaciones normalizadas. El armisticio estableció la Línea de Demarcación Militar (MDL) y la DMZ. La DMZ se acordó como una zona de amortiguación fortificada de 2,5 millas de ancho (4,0 km) entre las dos naciones coreanas. [14]La DMZ sigue la Línea de Kansas, donde las dos partes realmente se enfrentaron en el momento de la firma del Armisticio. La DMZ es actualmente la frontera nacional más defendida del mundo a partir de 2018 . [ cita requerida ]

El Armisticio también estableció regulaciones sobre los prisioneros de guerra. El acuerdo establecía que:

Dentro de los sesenta (60) días siguientes a la entrada en vigor de este acuerdo, cada parte deberá, sin ofrecer impedimento alguno, repatriar directamente y entregar en grupos a todos aquellos prisioneros de guerra bajo su custodia que insistan en la repatriación al lado al que pertenecían en el momento de la capturar. [2]

Al final, más de 22.000 soldados del KPA o PVA rechazaron la repatriación. En el lado opuesto, 327 soldados surcoreanos, 21 soldados estadounidenses y 1 soldado británico también rechazaron la repatriación y permanecieron en Corea del Norte o en China. (Ver: Lista de desertores estadounidenses y británicos en la Guerra de Corea ).

Con la firma del Armisticio terminó la guerra. A pesar de la guerra de tres años, la frontera internacional se mantuvo en un lugar similar al de sus inicios.

Eventos posteriores [ editar ]

Fracaso de la Conferencia de Ginebra [ editar ]

Artículo principal: Conferencia de Ginebra de 1954

El artículo IV (párrafo 60) del Acuerdo de Armisticio exige que se celebre una conferencia política dentro de los 3 meses posteriores a la firma del acuerdo para "asegurar la solución pacífica de la cuestión de Corea". [2] Se celebró una conferencia en Ginebra, Suiza, en abril de 1954, y se perdió el plazo de 3 meses por 6 meses. La conferencia se centró en dos conflictos separados: el conflicto en Corea; y el conflicto de Indochina . Los participantes en las conversaciones sobre el conflicto en Corea fueron Estados Unidos, la URSS, Francia, China y Corea del Norte y del Sur. El acuerdo de paz en la península de Corea fue planteado oficialmente en la conferencia por el diplomático chino Zhou Enlai con el secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos, John Foster Dulles, pero no se logró ningún progreso. [3] The United States intentionally avoided discussing the “Peace Treaty on the Korean Peninsula,” in spite of criticism from the other representatives at the conference about the negative attitude of the United States.

United States abrogation of paragraph 13d[edit]

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Deployment of U.S. atomic weapons in Korea in 1958

Paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement mandated that neither side introduce new weapons into Korea, other than piece-for-piece replacement of equipment.[33] In September 1956 the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford indicated that the U.S. military intention was to introduce atomic weapons into Korea, which was agreed to by the U.S. National Security Council and President Eisenhower.[34] The U.S. unilaterally abrogated paragraph 13d, breaking the Armistice Agreement, despite concerns by United Nations allies.[35][36][37] At a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on 21 June 1957, the U.S. informed the North Korean representatives that the United Nations Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13d of the armistice.[38][39] In January 1958 nuclear armed Honest John missiles and 280mm atomic cannons were deployed to South Korea,[40] followed within a year by atomic demolition munitions[41] and nuclear armed Matador cruise missiles with the range to reach China and the Soviet Union.[36][42] North Korea believed the U.S. had introduced new weapons earlier, citing NNSC inspection team reports for August 1953 to April 1954.[34][43] The U.S. believed that North Korea had introduced new weapons contrary to 13d, but did not make specific allegations.[44]

Following the abrogation of paragraph 13d, the NNSC largely lost its function, and became primarily office based in the DMZ with a small staff. North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13d.[37] North Korea responded militarily by digging massive underground fortifications resistant to nuclear attack, and by the forward deployment of its conventional forces so that the use of nuclear weapons against it would endanger South Korean and U.S. forces as well. In 1963 North Korea asked the Soviet Union and China for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused.[36]

United Nations statements[edit]

In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolutions endorsing the desirability of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and dissolving the UNC.[45][46] This was followed by North Korean attempts to start peace discussions with the U.S. The U.S. however believed influencing China to restrict North Korean actions would be more effective.[47]

In October 1996, the U.N. Security Council, by a statement of the President of the Security Council, Honduras, urged that the Armistice Agreement should be fully observed until replaced by a new peace mechanism. Approving nations included the United States and the People’s Republic of China, two of the armistice's signatories, effectively refuting any suggestion that the armistice was no longer in force.[45]

North Korean announcements to withdraw from the agreement[edit]

Depiction of a banner during a 1989 student festival in Pyongyang, prior to calls from North Korea to leave the agreement.

North Korea has announced that it will no longer abide by the armistice at least six times, in 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013.[48][49][50]

On 28 April 1994, North Korea announced that it would cease participating in the Military Armistice Commission, but would continue contact at Panmunjom through liaison officers and maintain the general conditions of the armistice. North Korea stated it regarded the U.S. deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea as terminating the armistice.[51][52]

On 3 September 1994 China joined North Korea in withdrawing from and ceasing participation in the Military Armistice Commission.[7]

In January 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush, in his first State of the Union Address, labeled North Korea a part of an Axis of Evil.[53] In October 2006 North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test. There were two isolated violent incidents in 2010: the ROKS Cheonan sinking, which was attributed to North Korea, despite denials; and the North Korean Bombardment of Yeonpyeong. In 2010, the U.S. position regarding a peace treaty was that it could only be negotiated when North Korea “takes irreversible steps toward denuclearization.”[54]

In 2011, South Korea stated that North Korea had violated the armistice 221 times.[8]

In 2013 North Korea argued that the Armistice was meant to be a transitional measure and that North Korea had made a number of proposals for replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, but the U.S. had not responded in a serious way. It further argued that the Military Armistice Commission and the NNSC had long been effectively dismantled, paralysing the supervisory functions of the Armistice. North Korea believes the annual U.S. and South Korean exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle are provocative and threaten North Korea with nuclear weapons.[55] JoongAng Ilbo reported that U.S. vessels equipped with nuclear weapons were participating in the exercise,[56] and the Pentagon publicly announced that B-52 bombers flown over South Korea were reaffirming the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” for South Korea.[57]

In March 2013, North Korea announced that it was scrapping all non-aggression pacts with South Korea. It also closed the border and closed the direct phone line between the two Koreas.[58] North Korea further stated it had the right to make a preemptive nuclear attack.[58] A United Nations spokesman stated that the Armistice Agreement had been adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, and could not be unilaterally dissolved by either North Korea or South Korea.[59] On 28 March 2013, the U.S. sent two B-2 Spirit stealth bombers to South Korea to participate in ongoing military exercises in the region, including the dropping of inert munitions on a South Korean bomb range. This was the first B-2 non-stop, round-trip mission to Korea from the United States.[60] Following this mission, North Korean state media announced that it was readying rockets to be on standby to attack U.S. targets.[61] In May 2013, North Korea offered to enter into negotiations for a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement.[62]

In August 2016, North Korea installed anti-personnel mines to prevent the defection of its front-line border guards around the Bridge of No Return, situated in the Joint Security Area (JSA).[63] The UN Command protested this move as it violates the Armistice Agreement which specifically prohibits armed guards and anti-personnel mines.[63]

In 2016, when North Korea proposed formal peace talks, the U.S. adjusted its position from the pre-condition that North Korea should have already taken “irreversible steps toward denuclearization,” to a negotiating stance that includes North Korea halting its nuclear program. The discussions did not take place. A State Department spokesman said that “[North Korea] periodically raise[s] the idea and it never really gets far.”[64][65]

Panmunjom Declaration[edit]

On 27 April 2018 the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification on the Korean Peninsula was signed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un which commits the two countries to denuclearization and talks to bring a formal end to conflict.[66] The two leaders agreed to, later in the year, convert the Korean Armistice Agreement into a full peace treaty, formally ending the Korean War after 65 years.[67] The DPRK later called off talks with South Korea scheduled for 16 May, blaming U.S.–South Korean military exercises, and threw the planned 12 June summit into doubt, saying it might not attend if Washington continues to demand it unilaterally abandon its nuclear arsenal.[68][69] The 2018 North Korea–United States Summit was held in Singapore on 12 June 2018 at Capella Hotel despite previous tensions before the summit. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and United States President Donald Trump signed a joint declaration that declared the following:[70]

  1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
  2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
  3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
  4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

The joint statement also includes Trump’s commitment to providing security guarantees to North Korea and that there will be follow-up negotiations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and an undetermined high-level North Korean official thereafter.[71]

At the start of a three-day summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Pyongyang, the pair’s third meeting of 2018, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stated that his meeting with Trump “provided geopolitical stability and that he expects more progress in talks between his nation and Washington.”[72] Kim also credited Moon with making the “historic” U.S.–DPRK summit in Singapore possible.[73] The third day of the Moon–Kim summit yielded a joint statement from the two leaders announcing an agreement to pursue a co-host bid for the 2032 Olympic Games. Further, the joint statement announced that the two nations will now “participate jointly” at international competitions, including the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.[74]

Commemorations[edit]

Over the years, United States Presidents have made proclamations in support of the National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day. For instance, following the example of every U.S. president since Eisenhower, on 26 July 2017, President Donald Trump proclaimed 27 July as National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day.[75][76][77]

North Korea commemorates 27 July as a national holiday known as Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War.[78][79]

See also[edit]

  • Korean conflict
  • Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
  • Northern Limit Line
  • Korean reunification
  • North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
  • Hambak-do

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

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  2. ^ a b c d e "Korean War Armistice Agreement". FindLaw. Canada and United States: Thomson Reuters. 27 July 1953. Archived from the original on 5 March 2014. Retrieved 5 March 2014.
  3. ^ a b "North Korea: Why negotiations can't wait for denuclearisation". www.afr.com. 9 February 2018. Archived from the original on 15 February 2018. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
  4. ^ Kollontai, Ms Pauline; Kim, Professor Sebastian C. H.; Hoyland, Revd Greg (28 May 2013). Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 111. ISBN 978-1-4094-7798-3.
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  7. ^ a b "China, Backing North Korea, Quits Armistice Commission". The New York Times. 3 September 1995.
  8. ^ a b Herald, The Korea (5 January 2011). "N.K. commits 221 provocations since 1953". www.koreaherald.com. Retrieved 10 February 2020.
  9. ^ a b c d e f Stueck 1995, p. 212.
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  11. ^ a b c Stueck 1995, p. 215.
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  19. ^ Catchpole 2000, p. 320.
  20. ^ Stueck 1995, p. 237.
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  22. ^ Stokesbury 1990, pp. 187–99.
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  28. ^ "KOREA 1951–1953" (PDF). Center of Military History, Department of the Army. 1997 [1989]: 25. Cite journal requires |journal= (help) (Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 56–60005)
  29. ^ Agov 2013, p. 238.
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  31. ^ Catchpole 2000, p. 322.
  32. ^ "Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State (1953) July 27, 1953". U.S. Department of State. 2013. Archived from the original on 18 May 2015. Retrieved 27 July 2013.
  33. ^ Robert R. Bowie; Mansfield D. Sprague; F.W. Farrell (29 March 1957), "New Equipment for U.S. Forces in Korea", Memorandum to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, archived from the original on 22 May 2013, retrieved 21 March 2013
  34. ^ a b Cumings, Bruce (2005). Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York City: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0393347531. Archived from the original on 19 February 2014. Retrieved 7 November 2013.
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Sources[edit]

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  • Mount, Graeme S.; Laferriere, André (2004). The Diplomacy of War: The Case of Korea. Québec: Black Rose Books. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-1551642390.
  • Stokesbury, James L. (1988). A Short History of the Korean War (1st ed.). New York City: William Morrow and Company. pp. 144–153, 187–199, 240, 242–245. ISBN 978-0688063771.
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  • Selden, Mark; So, Alvin Y. (2004). War and state terrorism: the United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the long twentieth century. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 77–80. ISBN 978-0742523913.

Further reading[edit]

  • Watry, David M. (2014). Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 978-0807157183.

External links[edit]

  • Works related to Korean Armistice Agreement at Wikisource

Coordinates: 37°57′40″N 126°39′52″E / 37.9611°N 126.6645°E / 37.9611; 126.6645