Estados Unidos detonó dos armas nucleares sobre las ciudades japonesas de Hiroshima y Nagasaki el 6 y 9 de agosto de 1945, respectivamente. Los dos bombardeos mataron entre 129.000 y 226.000 personas, la mayoría de las cuales eran civiles, y siguen siendo el único uso de armas nucleares en los conflictos armados.
| Bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parte de la Guerra del Pacífico de la Segunda Guerra Mundial | |||||||
 Nubes en forma de hongo de la bomba atómica sobre Hiroshima (izquierda) y Nagasaki (derecha) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Beligerantes | |||||||
 Japón | |||||||
| Comandantes y líderes | |||||||
 Shunroku Hata | |||||||
| Unidades involucradas | |||||||
| Segundo Ejército General :
| ||||||
| Bajas y perdidas | |||||||
| 1 prisioneros de guerra británicos, 7 holandeses y 12 estadounidenses muertos | Hiroshima:
Nagasaki:
Total muertos:
| ||||||
En el último año de la Segunda Guerra Mundial , los aliados se prepararon para una costosa invasión del continente japonés . Esta empresa fue precedida por una campaña convencional y de bombas incendiarias que devastó 67 ciudades japonesas. La guerra en Europa concluyó cuando Alemania se rindió el 8 de mayo de 1945 y los aliados volvieron toda su atención a la Guerra del Pacífico . En julio de 1945, el Proyecto Manhattan de los Aliados había producido dos tipos de bombas atómicas: " Fat Man ", un arma nuclear de implosión de plutonio ; y " Little Boy ", un arma de fisión tipo pistola de uranio enriquecido . El Grupo Compuesto 509 de las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército de los Estados Unidos fue entrenado y equipado con la versión Silverplate especializada del Boeing B-29 Superfortress , y desplegado en Tinian en las Islas Marianas . Los aliados pidieron la rendición incondicional de las fuerzas armadas imperiales japonesas en la Declaración de Potsdam el 26 de julio de 1945, siendo la alternativa la "destrucción rápida y total". Japón ignoró el ultimátum.
Se obtuvo el consentimiento del Reino Unido para el bombardeo, como requería el Acuerdo de Quebec , y el 25 de julio se emitieron órdenes para que se utilizaran bombas atómicas contra Hiroshima, Kokura , Niigata y Nagasaki. Estos objetivos fueron elegidos porque eran grandes áreas urbanas que también tenían instalaciones importantes desde el punto de vista militar. El 6 de agosto, un niño pequeño fue arrojado a Hiroshima; tres días después, un Fat Man cayó sobre Nagasaki. Durante los siguientes dos a cuatro meses, los efectos de los bombardeos atómicos mataron entre 90.000 y 146.000 personas en Hiroshima y entre 39.000 y 80.000 personas en Nagasaki; aproximadamente la mitad ocurrió el primer día. Durante meses después, un gran número de personas siguió muriendo por los efectos de las quemaduras, la enfermedad por radiación y las lesiones, agravadas por las enfermedades y la desnutrición. La mayoría de los muertos eran civiles, aunque Hiroshima tenía una guarnición militar considerable.
Japón se rindió a los aliados el 15 de agosto, seis días después de la declaración de guerra de la Unión Soviética y el bombardeo de Nagasaki. El gobierno japonés firmó el instrumento de rendición el 2 de septiembre, poniendo fin efectivamente a la guerra . Los académicos han estudiado extensamente los efectos de los bombardeos sobre el carácter social y político de la historia mundial y la cultura popular posteriores , y todavía hay mucho debate sobre la justificación ética y legal de los bombardeos. Los partidarios creen que los bombardeos atómicos fueron necesarios para poner fin rápidamente a la guerra con un mínimo de bajas, mientras que los críticos argumentan que el gobierno japonés podría haberse rendido por otros medios, al tiempo que destacan las implicaciones morales y éticas de las armas nucleares y las muertes causado a los civiles.
Fondo
Guerra pacífica
Blanco y verde: las áreas aún controladas por Japón incluyen Corea, Taiwán, Indochina y gran parte de China , incluidas la mayoría de las principales ciudades y las Indias Orientales Holandesas.
Rojo: áreas controladas por los aliados
Gris: Unión Soviética neutral
En 1945, la Guerra del Pacífico entre el Imperio de Japón y los Aliados entró en su cuarto año. La mayoría de las unidades militares japonesas lucharon ferozmente, asegurando que la victoria aliada tuviera un costo enorme. Las 1,25 millones de bajas en batalla sufridas en total por Estados Unidos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial incluyeron tanto al personal militar muerto en acción como herido en acción . Casi un millón de las bajas ocurrieron durante el último año de la guerra, de junio de 1944 a junio de 1945. En diciembre de 1944, las bajas de batalla estadounidenses alcanzaron un máximo histórico de 88.000 como resultado de la ofensiva alemana de las Ardenas . Las reservas de mano de obra de Estados Unidos se estaban agotando. Se hicieron más estrictos los aplazamientos para grupos como los trabajadores agrícolas y se consideró la posibilidad de reclutar mujeres. Al mismo tiempo, el público se estaba cansando de la guerra y exigía que se enviara a casa a los militares que habían servido durante mucho tiempo. [1]
En el Pacífico, los aliados regresaron a Filipinas , [2] recapturaron Birmania , [3] e invadieron Borneo . [4] Se llevaron a cabo ofensivas para reducir las fuerzas japonesas que quedaban en Bougainville , Nueva Guinea y Filipinas. [5] En abril de 1945, las fuerzas estadounidenses desembarcaron en Okinawa , donde continuaron los intensos combates hasta junio. En el camino, la proporción de víctimas japonesas con respecto a estadounidenses se redujo de cinco a uno en Filipinas a dos a uno en Okinawa. [1] Aunque algunos soldados japoneses fueron hechos prisioneros , la mayoría luchó hasta que murieron o se suicidaron . Casi el 99 por ciento de los 21.000 defensores de Iwo Jima fueron asesinados. De las 117.000 tropas de Okinawa y Japón que defendieron Okinawa entre abril y junio de 1945, el 94 por ciento murieron; [6] Se rindieron 7.401 soldados japoneses, un número sin precedentes. [7]
A medida que los aliados avanzaban hacia Japón, las condiciones empeoraban cada vez más para el pueblo japonés. La flota mercante de Japón disminuyó de 5.250.000 toneladas brutas en 1941 a 1.560.000 toneladas en marzo de 1945 y 557.000 toneladas en agosto de 1945. La falta de materias primas obligó a la economía de guerra japonesa a un fuerte declive después de mediados de 1944. La economía civil, que había ido lentamente se deterioró a lo largo de la guerra, alcanzó niveles desastrosos a mediados de 1945. La pérdida del transporte marítimo también afectó a la flota pesquera, y la captura de 1945 fue sólo el 22 por ciento de la de 1941. La cosecha de arroz de 1945 fue la peor desde 1909, y el hambre y la desnutrición se generalizó. La producción industrial de Estados Unidos fue abrumadoramente superior a la de Japón. En 1943, Estados Unidos produjo casi 100.000 aviones al año, en comparación con la producción japonesa de 70.000 durante toda la guerra. En febrero de 1945, el príncipe Fumimaro Konoe advirtió al emperador Hirohito que la derrota era inevitable y lo instó a abdicar. [8]
Preparativos para invadir Japón
Incluso antes de la rendición de la Alemania nazi el 8 de mayo de 1945, estaban en marcha planes para la mayor operación de la Guerra del Pacífico, la Operación Caída , la invasión aliada de Japón. [9] La operación tenía dos partes: Operación Olímpica y Operación Coronet . Programado para comenzar en octubre de 1945, Olympic involucró una serie de desembarcos del Sexto Ejército de los Estados Unidos con la intención de capturar el tercio sur de la isla principal más meridional de Japón, Kyūshū . [10] La Operación Olímpica iba a ser seguida en marzo de 1946 por la Operación Coronet, la captura de la llanura de Kantō , cerca de Tokio en la principal isla japonesa de Honshū por el Primer , Octavo y Décimo Ejércitos de EE. UU. , Así como un Cuerpo de la Commonwealth formado de las divisiones de Australia, Gran Bretaña y Canadá. La fecha prevista se eligió para permitir que Olympic completara sus objetivos, que las tropas fueran redistribuidas desde Europa y que pasara el invierno japonés . [11]
La geografía de Japón hizo que este plan de invasión fuera obvio para los japoneses; pudieron predecir los planes de invasión aliados con precisión y así ajustar su plan defensivo, la Operación Ketsugō , en consecuencia. Los japoneses planearon una defensa total de Kyūshū, dejando poco en reserva para cualquier operación de defensa posterior. [12] Cuatro divisiones veteranas fueron retiradas del Ejército de Kwantung en Manchuria en marzo de 1945 para fortalecer las fuerzas en Japón, [13] y se activaron 45 nuevas divisiones entre febrero y mayo de 1945. La mayoría eran formaciones inmóviles para la defensa costera, pero 16 fueron Divisiones móviles de alta calidad. [14] En total, había 2,3 millones de tropas del ejército japonés preparadas para defender las islas de origen, respaldadas por una milicia civil de 28 millones de hombres y mujeres. Las predicciones de víctimas variaron ampliamente, pero fueron extremadamente altas. El vicejefe del Estado Mayor de la Armada Imperial Japonesa , el vicealmirante Takijirō Ōnishi , predijo hasta 20 millones de muertes japonesas. [15]
El 15 de junio de 1945, un estudio del Comité de Planes de Guerra Conjuntos, [16] que proporcionó información de planificación al Estado Mayor Conjunto , estimó que Olympic resultaría en 130.000 a 220.000 bajas estadounidenses, con muertos estadounidenses en el rango de 25.000 a 46.000 . Entregado el 15 de junio de 1945, después de la información obtenida de la Batalla de Okinawa, el estudio señaló las inadecuadas defensas de Japón debido al bloqueo marítimo muy efectivo y la campaña estadounidense de bombardeos incendiarios. El Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército de los Estados Unidos , General del Ejército George Marshall , y el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército en el Pacífico, General del Ejército Douglas MacArthur , firmaron documentos de acuerdo con la estimación del Comité de Planes de Guerra Conjuntos. [17]
Los estadounidenses estaban alarmados por la acumulación japonesa, que fue rastreada con precisión a través de la inteligencia Ultra . [18] El secretario de Guerra Henry L. Stimson estaba lo suficientemente preocupado por las altas estimaciones estadounidenses de bajas probables como para encargar su propio estudio a Quincy Wright y William Shockley . Wright y Shockley hablaron con los coroneles James McCormack y Dean Rusk , y examinaron los pronósticos de víctimas de Michael E. DeBakey y Gilbert Beebe. Wright y Shockley estimaron que los aliados invasores sufrirían entre 1,7 y 4 millones de bajas en tal escenario, de las cuales entre 400.000 y 800.000 estarían muertas, mientras que las muertes japonesas habrían sido de alrededor de 5 a 10 millones. [19] [20]
Marshall comenzó a contemplar el uso de un arma que estaba "fácilmente disponible y que seguramente puede reducir el costo de vidas estadounidenses": [21] gas venenoso . Las cantidades de fosgeno , gas mostaza , gas lacrimógeno y el cloruro de cianógeno fueron trasladados a Luzón de las reservas en Australia y Nueva Guinea, en preparación para la operación olímpica, y se aseguraron de que MacArthur Guerra Química Servicio unidades fueron entrenados en su uso. [21] También se consideró el uso de armas biológicas contra Japón. [22]
Ataques aéreos en Japón
Si bien Estados Unidos había desarrollado planes para una campaña aérea contra Japón antes de la Guerra del Pacífico, la captura de las bases aliadas en el Pacífico occidental en las primeras semanas del conflicto significó que esta ofensiva no comenzó hasta mediados de 1944 cuando la larga El Boeing B-29 Superfortress a distancia quedó listo para su uso en combate. [23] La Operación Matterhorn involucró a B-29 con base en la India que atravesaron bases alrededor de Chengdu en China para realizar una serie de incursiones en objetivos estratégicos en Japón. [24] Este esfuerzo fracasó en lograr los objetivos estratégicos que sus planificadores habían planeado, en gran parte debido a problemas logísticos, las dificultades mecánicas del bombardero, la vulnerabilidad de las bases de operaciones chinas y el alcance extremo requerido para llegar a las principales ciudades japonesas. [25]
El general de brigada Haywood S. Hansell determinó que Guam , Tinian y Saipan en las Islas Marianas servirían mejor como bases B-29, pero estaban en manos japonesas. [26] Las estrategias se cambiaron para adaptarse a la guerra aérea, [27] y las islas fueron capturadas entre junio y agosto de 1944. Se desarrollaron bases aéreas, [28] y las operaciones B-29 comenzaron en las Marianas en octubre de 1944. [29] Estas bases fueron reabastecidas fácilmente por buques de carga. [30] El XXI Comando de Bombarderos comenzó misiones contra Japón el 18 de noviembre de 1944. [31] Los primeros intentos de bombardear Japón desde las Marianas resultaron tan ineficaces como lo habían sido los B-29 con base en China. Hansell continuó la práctica de realizar los llamados bombardeos de precisión a gran altitud , destinados a industrias clave y redes de transporte, incluso después de que estas tácticas no hubieran producido resultados aceptables. [32] Estos esfuerzos resultaron infructuosos debido a las dificultades logísticas con la ubicación remota, los problemas técnicos con los aviones nuevos y avanzados, las condiciones climáticas desfavorables y la acción del enemigo. [33] [34]
El sucesor de Hansell, el general de división Curtis LeMay , asumió el mando en enero de 1945 e inicialmente continuó utilizando las mismas tácticas de bombardeo de precisión, con resultados igualmente insatisfactorios. Los ataques inicialmente tuvieron como objetivo instalaciones industriales clave, pero gran parte del proceso de fabricación japonés se llevó a cabo en pequeños talleres y hogares privados. [38] Bajo la presión del cuartel general de las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército de los Estados Unidos (USAAF) en Washington, LeMay cambió de táctica y decidió que las incursiones incendiarias de bajo nivel contra ciudades japonesas eran la única forma de destruir sus capacidades de producción, pasando del bombardeo de precisión al bombardeo de área con incendiarios. [39] Como la mayoría de los bombardeos estratégicos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial , el objetivo de la ofensiva aérea contra Japón era destruir las industrias bélicas del enemigo, matar o inhabilitar a los empleados civiles de estas industrias y socavar la moral civil . [40] [41]
Durante los siguientes seis meses, el XXI Comando de Bombarderos bajo LeMay bombardeó 67 ciudades japonesas. El bombardeo incendiario de Tokio , cuyo nombre en código es Operation Meetinghouse , del 9 al 10 de marzo mató a unas 100.000 personas y destruyó 16 millas cuadradas (41 km 2 ) de la ciudad y 267.000 edificios en una sola noche. Fue el bombardeo más mortífero de la guerra, con un costo de 20 B-29 derribados por antiaéreos y cazas. [42] En mayo, el 75 por ciento de las bombas lanzadas eran bombas incendiarias diseñadas para incendiar las "ciudades de papel" de Japón. A mediados de junio, las seis ciudades más grandes de Japón habían sido devastadas. [43] El final de los combates en Okinawa ese mes proporcionó aeródromos aún más cercanos al continente japonés, lo que permitió que la campaña de bombardeos se intensificara aún más. Los aviones que volaban desde portaaviones aliados y las islas Ryukyu también atacaron regularmente objetivos en Japón durante 1945 en preparación para la Operación Caída. [44] Los bombardeos incendiarios se trasladaron a ciudades más pequeñas, con poblaciones que oscilan entre 60.000 y 350.000. Según Yuki Tanaka , Estados Unidos bombardeó más de cien pueblos y ciudades japoneses. [45] Estas redadas fueron devastadoras. [46]
El ejército japonés no pudo detener los ataques aliados y los preparativos de defensa civil del país resultaron inadecuados. Los cazas y cañones antiaéreos japoneses tenían dificultades para atacar a los bombarderos que volaban a gran altura. [47] A partir de abril de 1945, los interceptores japoneses también tuvieron que enfrentarse a las escoltas de caza estadounidenses basadas en Iwo Jima y Okinawa. [48] Ese mes, el Servicio Aéreo del Ejército Imperial Japonés y el Servicio Aéreo de la Armada Imperial Japonesa dejaron de intentar interceptar los ataques aéreos para preservar los aviones de combate y contrarrestar la invasión esperada. [49] A mediados de 1945, los japoneses solo ocasionalmente codificaban aviones para interceptar B-29 individuales que realizaban salidas de reconocimiento sobre el país, para conservar el suministro de combustible. [50] En julio de 1945, los japoneses tenían 1.156.000 barriles estadounidenses (137.800.000 l) de gas avgas almacenados para la invasión de Japón. Aproximadamente 604.000 barriles estadounidenses (72.000.000 l) se habían consumido en el área de las islas de origen en abril, mayo y junio de 1945. [51] Si bien el ejército japonés decidió reanudar los ataques contra los bombarderos aliados a finales de junio, en ese momento había muy pocos operativos. combatientes disponibles para este cambio de táctica para obstaculizar los ataques aéreos aliados. [52]
Desarrollo de la bomba atómica
El descubrimiento de la fisión nuclear por los químicos alemanes Otto Hahn y Fritz Strassmann en 1938, y su explicación teórica por Lise Meitner y Otto Frisch , hicieron del desarrollo de una bomba atómica una posibilidad teórica. [53] En la carta de Einstein-Szilard se expresaron temores de que un proyecto de bomba atómica alemana desarrollaría primero armas atómicas, especialmente entre los científicos que eran refugiados de la Alemania nazi y otros países fascistas . Esto provocó una investigación preliminar en los Estados Unidos a fines de 1939. [54] El progreso fue lento hasta la llegada del informe del Comité MAUD británico a fines de 1941, que indicaba que solo se necesitaban de 5 a 10 kilogramos de uranio 235 enriquecido isotópicamente para una bomba. en lugar de toneladas de uranio natural y un moderador de neutrones como el agua pesada . [55]
El Acuerdo de Quebec de 1943 fusionó los proyectos de armas nucleares del Reino Unido y Canadá, Tube Alloys y el Laboratorio de Montreal , con el Proyecto Manhattan , [56] [57] bajo la dirección del General de División Leslie R. Groves, Jr. , del Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ejército de EE. UU . [58] Groves nombró a J. Robert Oppenheimer para organizar y dirigir el Laboratorio de Los Alamos del proyecto en Nuevo México, donde se llevó a cabo el trabajo de diseño de bombas. [59] Finalmente se desarrollaron dos tipos de bombas, ambas nombradas por Robert Serber . Little Boy era un arma de fisión tipo pistola que usaba uranio-235 , un isótopo raro de uranio separado en Clinton Engineer Works en Oak Ridge, Tennessee . [60] El otro, conocido como dispositivo Fat Man , era un arma nuclear de tipo implosión más poderosa y eficiente, pero más complicada, que usaba plutonio creado en reactores nucleares en Hanford, Washington . [61]
Había un programa de armas nucleares japonés , pero carecía de los recursos humanos, minerales y financieros del Proyecto Manhattan, y nunca avanzó mucho hacia el desarrollo de una bomba atómica. [62]
Preparativos
Organización y formación
El Grupo Compuesto 509 se constituyó el 9 de diciembre de 1944 y se activó el 17 de diciembre de 1944 en el campo aéreo del ejército de Wendover , Utah, al mando del coronel Paul Tibbets . [63] Tibbets fue asignado para organizar y comandar un grupo de combate para desarrollar los medios de lanzar un arma atómica contra objetivos en Alemania y Japón. Debido a que los escuadrones voladores del grupo estaban compuestos por aviones bombarderos y de transporte, el grupo fue designado como una unidad "compuesta" en lugar de una unidad de "bombardeo". [64] Trabajando con el Proyecto Manhattan en Los Alamos, Tibbets seleccionó a Wendover para su base de entrenamiento en Great Bend, Kansas , y Mountain Home, Idaho , debido a su lejanía. [65] Cada bombardero completó al menos 50 gotas de práctica de bombas de calabaza explosivas inertes o convencionales y Tibbets declaró a su grupo listo para el combate. [66] El 5 de abril de 1945, se asignó el nombre en clave Operation Centerboard. El oficial responsable de su asignación en la División de Operaciones del Departamento de Guerra no fue autorizado a conocer ningún detalle al respecto. El primer bombardeo recibió más tarde el nombre en código Operation Centerboard I, y el segundo, Operation Centerboard II. [67]
El Grupo Compuesto 509 tenía una fuerza autorizada de 225 oficiales y 1.542 hombres alistados, casi todos los cuales finalmente se desplegaron en Tinian. Además de su fuerza autorizada, el 509º se había unido a él en Tinian 51 personal civil y militar del Proyecto Alberta , [68] conocido como el 1er Destacamento Técnico. [69] del Grupo Composite 509o 393 D Bombardeo Escuadrón estaba equipado con 15 Silverplate B-29. Estos aviones estaban especialmente adaptados para transportar armas nucleares y estaban equipados con motores de inyección de combustible , hélices de paso reversible Curtiss Electric , actuadores neumáticos para abrir y cerrar rápidamente las puertas de la bahía de bombas y otras mejoras. [70]
El escalón de apoyo en tierra del 509º Grupo Compuesto se trasladó por ferrocarril el 26 de abril de 1945 a su puerto de embarque en Seattle , Washington. El 6 de mayo, los elementos de apoyo zarparon en el SS Cape Victory para las Marianas, mientras que el material del grupo se embarcó en el SS Emile Berliner . El Cape Victory hizo breves escalas en los puertos de Honolulu y Eniwetok, pero a los pasajeros no se les permitió abandonar el área del muelle. Un grupo de avanzada del escalón aéreo, que constaba de 29 oficiales y 61 hombres alistados, voló en C-54 a North Field en Tinian, entre el 15 y el 22 de mayo. [71] También hubo dos representantes de Washington, DC, el general de brigada Thomas Farrell , el comandante adjunto del Proyecto Manhattan, y el contralmirante William R. Purnell del Comité de Política Militar, [72] que estuvieron presentes para decidir una política superior asuntos sobre el terreno. Junto con el Capitán William S. Parsons , el comandante del Proyecto Alberta, se les conoció como los "Jefes Conjuntos de Tinian". [73]
Elección de objetivos
En abril de 1945, Marshall le pidió a Groves que nominara objetivos específicos para el bombardeo para la aprobación final de él y Stimson. Groves formó un Comité de Objetivos, presidido por él mismo, que incluía a Farrell, el Mayor John A. Derry, el Coronel William P. Fisher, Joyce C. Stearns y David M. Dennison de la USAAF; y los científicos John von Neumann , Robert R. Wilson y William Penney del Proyecto Manhattan. El Comité de Objetivos se reunió en Washington el 27 de abril; en Los Alamos el 10 de mayo, donde pudo conversar con los científicos y técnicos del lugar; y finalmente en Washington el 28 de mayo, donde fue informado por Tibbets y el comandante Frederick Ashworth del Proyecto Alberta, y el asesor científico del Proyecto Manhattan, Richard C. Tolman . [74]
El Comité de Objetivos nombró cinco objetivos: Kokura (ahora Kitakyushu ), el sitio de una de las plantas de municiones más grandes de Japón; Hiroshima , un puerto de embarque y un centro industrial que fue el sitio de un importante cuartel general militar; Yokohama , un centro urbano para la fabricación de aviones, máquinas herramienta, muelles, equipos eléctricos y refinerías de petróleo; Niigata , un puerto con instalaciones industriales que incluyen plantas de acero y aluminio y una refinería de petróleo; y Kioto , un importante centro industrial. La selección de destino estuvo sujeta a los siguientes criterios:
- El objetivo tenía más de 4,8 km de diámetro y era un objetivo importante en una gran ciudad.
- La explosión crearía un daño efectivo.
- Era poco probable que el objetivo fuera atacado en agosto de 1945. [75]
Estas ciudades quedaron prácticamente intactas durante los bombardeos nocturnos, y las Fuerzas Aéreas del Ejército acordaron dejarlas fuera de la lista de objetivos para poder realizar una evaluación precisa de los daños causados por las bombas atómicas. Se describió a Hiroshima como "un importante depósito del ejército y puerto de embarque en medio de una zona industrial urbana. Es un buen objetivo de radar y tiene un tamaño tal que una gran parte de la ciudad podría sufrir graves daños. Hay colinas adyacentes que es probable que produzcan un efecto de enfoque que aumentaría considerablemente el daño de la explosión. Debido a los ríos, no es un buen objetivo incendiario ". [75]
El Comité de Destinatarios declaró que "se acordó que los factores psicológicos en la selección de blancos eran de gran importancia. Dos aspectos de esto son (1) obtener el mayor efecto psicológico contra Japón y (2) hacer que el uso inicial sea lo suficientemente espectacular para la importancia de el arma será reconocida internacionalmente cuando se publique publicidad sobre ella ... Kioto tiene la ventaja de que la gente es más inteligente y, por lo tanto, más capaz de apreciar la importancia del arma. Hiroshima tiene la ventaja de ser de tal tamaño y con posible enfocar desde las montañas cercanas que una gran fracción de la ciudad puede ser destruida. El palacio del Emperador en Tokio tiene una fama mayor que cualquier otro objetivo, pero es de menor valor estratégico ". [75]
Se dijo incorrectamente que Edwin O. Reischauer , un experto en Japón del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército de los Estados Unidos , había evitado el bombardeo de Kioto. [75] En su autobiografía, Reischauer refutó específicamente esta afirmación:
... la única persona que merece crédito por salvar a Kioto de la destrucción es Henry L. Stimson, el Secretario de Guerra en ese momento, que había conocido y admirado a Kioto desde su luna de miel allí varias décadas antes. [76] [77]
El 30 de mayo, Stimson le pidió a Groves que eliminara a Kioto de la lista de objetivos debido a su importancia histórica, religiosa y cultural, pero Groves señaló su importancia militar e industrial. [78] Stimson luego se acercó al presidente Harry S. Truman sobre el asunto. Truman estuvo de acuerdo con Stimson y Kyoto fue temporalmente eliminado de la lista de objetivos. [79] Groves intentó restaurar Kioto a la lista de objetivos en julio, pero Stimson se mantuvo firme. [80] [81] El 25 de julio, Nagasaki fue incluida en la lista de objetivos en lugar de Kioto. Era un importante puerto militar, uno de los centros de reparación y construcción naval más grandes de Japón y un importante productor de artillería naval. [81]
Demostración propuesta
A principios de mayo de 1945, Stimson creó el Comité Interino a instancias de los líderes del Proyecto Manhattan y con la aprobación de Truman para asesorar sobre asuntos relacionados con la energía nuclear . [82] Durante las reuniones del 31 de mayo y el 1 de junio, el científico Ernest Lawrence sugirió darles a los japoneses una demostración sin combate. [83] Arthur Compton recordó más tarde que:
Era evidente que todo el mundo sospecharía de un engaño. Si una bomba explotara en Japón con aviso previo, el poder aéreo japonés todavía era adecuado para causar una interferencia seria. Una bomba atómica era un dispositivo intrincado, todavía en la etapa de desarrollo. Su funcionamiento estaría lejos de ser rutinario. Si durante los ajustes finales de la bomba los defensores japoneses atacaran, un movimiento defectuoso podría fácilmente resultar en algún tipo de falla. Ese fin de una demostración de poder anunciada sería mucho peor que si no se hubiera hecho el intento. Ahora era evidente que cuando llegara el momento de utilizar las bombas, sólo deberíamos tener disponible una de ellas, seguida de otras a intervalos demasiado largos. No podíamos permitirnos la posibilidad de que uno de ellos fuera un fiasco. Si la prueba se hiciera en algún territorio neutral, sería difícil creer que los militares decididos y fanáticos de Japón quedarían impresionados. Si se hiciera primero una prueba tan abierta y no lograra rendirse, la posibilidad de dar el impacto de sorpresa que resultó ser tan efectivo desaparecería. Por el contrario, prepararía a los japoneses para interferir con un ataque atómico si pudieran. Aunque la posibilidad de una demostración que no destruyera vidas humanas era atractiva, nadie podía sugerir una forma en la que pudiera ser tan convincente que pudiera detener la guerra. [84]
La posibilidad de una demostración se planteó nuevamente en el Informe Franck emitido por el físico James Franck el 11 de junio y el Panel Asesor Científico rechazó su informe el 16 de junio, diciendo que "no podemos proponer ninguna demostración técnica que pueda poner fin a la guerra; no vemos ninguna alternativa aceptable al uso militar directo ". Luego, Franck llevó el informe a Washington, DC, donde el Comité Interino se reunió el 21 de junio para reexaminar sus conclusiones anteriores; pero reafirmó que no había alternativa al uso de la bomba en un objetivo militar. [85]
Al igual que Compton, muchos funcionarios y científicos estadounidenses argumentaron que una demostración sacrificaría el valor de impacto del ataque atómico, y los japoneses podrían negar que la bomba atómica era letal, lo que hacía menos probable que la misión produjera una rendición. Los prisioneros de guerra aliados podrían ser trasladados al lugar de la demostración y morir a causa de la bomba. También les preocupaba que la bomba pudiera ser un fracaso ya que la prueba Trinity era de un dispositivo estacionario, no una bomba lanzada desde el aire. Además, aunque se estaban produciendo más bombas, solo dos estarían disponibles a principios de agosto y costarían miles de millones de dólares, por lo que usar una para una demostración sería costoso. [86] [87]
Folletos
Durante varios meses, Estados Unidos advirtió a los civiles sobre posibles ataques aéreos lanzando más de 63 millones de folletos en todo Japón. Muchas ciudades japonesas sufrieron daños terribles a causa de los bombardeos aéreos; algunos fueron destruidos hasta en un 97 por ciento. LeMay pensó que los folletos aumentarían el impacto psicológico de los bombardeos y reducirían el estigma internacional de las ciudades bombardeadas por zonas. Incluso con las advertencias, la oposición japonesa a la guerra siguió siendo ineficaz. En general, los japoneses consideraron los mensajes de los folletos como veraces, y muchos japoneses optaron por abandonar las principales ciudades. Los folletos causaron tal preocupación que el gobierno ordenó el arresto de cualquier persona sorprendida en posesión de un folleto. [88] [89] Los textos de los folletos fueron preparados por prisioneros de guerra japoneses recientes porque se pensaba que eran la mejor opción "para atraer a sus compatriotas". [90]
En preparación para lanzar una bomba atómica sobre Hiroshima, el Panel Científico del Comité Interino dirigido por Oppenheimer decidió no utilizar una bomba de demostración y no enviar una advertencia especial en un folleto. Esas decisiones se implementaron debido a la incertidumbre de una detonación exitosa y también por el deseo de maximizar el impacto en el liderazgo . [91] No se le dio ninguna advertencia a Hiroshima de que se iba a lanzar una bomba nueva y mucho más destructiva. [92] Varias fuentes dieron información contradictoria sobre cuándo se lanzaron los últimos folletos sobre Hiroshima antes de la bomba atómica. Robert Jay Lifton escribió que era el 27 de julio [92] y Theodore H. McNelly escribió que era el 30 de julio. [91] La historia de la USAAF señaló que once ciudades fueron atacadas con panfletos el 27 de julio, pero Hiroshima no fue una de ellas, y no hubo salidas de panfletos el 30 de julio. [89] Se llevaron a cabo salidas de folletos los días 1 y 4 de agosto. Es posible que Hiroshima haya sido distribuido a finales de julio o principios de agosto, ya que los relatos de los supervivientes hablan de la entrega de folletos unos días antes de que se lanzara la bomba atómica. [92] Se imprimieron tres versiones de un folleto que enumeraba 11 o 12 ciudades elegidas para bombardeos incendiarios; un total de 33 ciudades enumeradas. Con el texto de este folleto en japonés "... no podemos prometer que solo estas ciudades estarán entre las atacadas ..." [88] Hiroshima no figuraba en la lista. [93] [94]
Consulta con Gran Bretaña y Canadá
En 1943, Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido firmaron el Acuerdo de Quebec , que estipulaba que no se utilizarían armas nucleares contra otro país sin el consentimiento mutuo. Por tanto, Stimson tuvo que obtener el permiso británico. Una reunión del Comité de Política Combinada , que incluyó a un representante canadiense, se celebró en el Pentágono el 4 de julio de 1945. [95] El mariscal de campo Sir Henry Maitland Wilson anunció que el gobierno británico estaba de acuerdo con el uso de armas nucleares contra Japón, lo que ser registrado oficialmente como una decisión del Comité de Política Combinada. [95] [96] [97] Como la divulgación de información a terceros también estaba controlada por el Acuerdo de Quebec, la discusión se centró en los detalles científicos que se revelarían en el anuncio de prensa del atentado. La reunión también consideró lo que Truman podría revelar a Joseph Stalin , el líder de la Unión Soviética , en la próxima Conferencia de Potsdam , ya que esto también requería la concurrencia británica. [95]
Las órdenes para el ataque se emitieron al general Carl Spaatz el 25 de julio bajo la firma del general Thomas T. Handy , el Jefe de Estado Mayor en funciones, ya que Marshall estaba en la Conferencia de Potsdam con Truman. [98] Decía:
- El 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force lanzará su primera bomba especial tan pronto como el clima permita el bombardeo visual después del 3 de agosto de 1945 sobre uno de los objetivos: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata y Nagasaki. Para llevar personal científico militar y civil del Departamento de Guerra para observar y registrar los efectos de la explosión de la bomba, aviones adicionales acompañarán al avión que transporta la bomba. Los aviones de observación permanecerán a varias millas de distancia del punto de impacto de la bomba.
- Se lanzarán bombas adicionales sobre los objetivos anteriores tan pronto como el personal del proyecto las prepare. Se emitirán más instrucciones con respecto a objetivos distintos de los enumerados anteriormente. [99]
Ese día, Truman anotó en su diario que:
Esta arma se utilizará contra Japón desde ahora hasta el 10 de agosto. Le he dicho al Sec. of War, Sr. Stimson, para usarlo de manera que los objetivos militares y los soldados y marineros sean el objetivo y no las mujeres y los niños. Incluso si los japoneses son salvajes, despiadados, despiadados y fanáticos, nosotros, como líderes del mundo por el bienestar común, no podemos lanzar esa terrible bomba sobre la antigua capital [Kioto] o la nueva [Tokio]. Él y yo estamos de acuerdo. El objetivo será puramente militar. [100]
Declaración de Potsdam
El éxito del 16 de julio de la prueba Trinity en el desierto de Nuevo México superó las expectativas. [101] El 26 de julio, los líderes aliados emitieron la Declaración de Potsdam , que describía los términos de la rendición de Japón. La declaración fue presentada como un ultimátum y afirmó que sin una rendición, los Aliados atacarían Japón, resultando en "la inevitable y completa destrucción de las fuerzas armadas japonesas e igualmente inevitablemente la total devastación de la patria japonesa". La bomba atómica no fue mencionada en el comunicado. [102]
El 28 de julio, los periódicos japoneses informaron que el gobierno japonés había rechazado la declaración. Esa tarde, el primer ministro Suzuki Kantarō declaró en una conferencia de prensa que la Declaración de Potsdam no era más que un refrito ( yakinaoshi ) de la Declaración de El Cairo y que el gobierno tenía la intención de ignorarla ( mokusatsu , "matar en silencio"). [103] La declaración fue tomada por periódicos japoneses y extranjeros como un claro rechazo de la declaración. El emperador Hirohito, que estaba esperando una respuesta soviética a los no comprometidos sondeos de paz japoneses, no hizo ningún movimiento para cambiar la posición del gobierno. [104] La voluntad de Japón de rendirse seguía estando condicionada a la preservación de la kokutai (institución imperial y política nacional ), la asunción por parte de la Sede Imperial de la responsabilidad del desarme y la desmovilización, la no ocupación de las islas de origen japonés , Corea o Formosa , y la delegación de el castigo de los criminales de guerra al gobierno japonés. [105]
En Potsdam, Truman aceptó una solicitud de Winston Churchill de que Gran Bretaña estuviera representada cuando se lanzara la bomba atómica. William Penney y el capitán del grupo Leonard Cheshire fueron enviados a Tinian, pero descubrieron que LeMay no les permitiría acompañar la misión. Todo lo que pudieron hacer fue enviar una señal enérgica a Wilson. [106]
Bombas
La bomba Little Boy, a excepción de la carga útil de uranio, estaba lista a principios de mayo de 1945. [107] Había dos componentes de uranio-235, un proyectil cilíndrico hueco y un inserto de objetivo cilíndrico. El proyectil se completó el 15 de junio y el objetivo se insertó el 24 de julio. [108] El proyectil y ocho premontajes de bomba (bombas parcialmente ensambladas sin la carga de pólvora y componentes fisibles) salieron del Astillero Naval de Hunters Point , California, el 16 de julio a bordo del crucero USS Indianapolis , y llegaron a Tinian el 26 de julio. [109] El objetivo se inserta seguido por aire el 30 de julio, acompañado por el comandante Francis Birch del Proyecto Alberta. [108] Respondiendo a las preocupaciones expresadas por el 509º Grupo Compuesto sobre la posibilidad de que un B-29 se estrellara en el despegue, Birch había modificado el diseño de Little Boy para incorporar un tapón de cierre extraíble que permitiría armar la bomba en vuelo. [107]
El primer núcleo de plutonio , junto con su iniciador de erizo de polonio y berilio , fue transportado bajo la custodia del mensajero del Proyecto Alberta, Raemer Schreiber, en un maletín de transporte de campo de magnesio diseñado para tal fin por Philip Morrison . Se eligió magnesio porque no actúa como un sabotaje . [110] El núcleo partió del Campo Aéreo del Ejército de Kirtland en un avión de transporte C-54 del 320º Escuadrón de Transporte de Tropas del 509º Grupo Compuesto el 26 de julio, y llegó al Campo Norte el 28 de julio. Tres premontajes de alto explosivo Fat Man, designados F31, F32 y F33, fueron recogidos en Kirtland el 28 de julio por tres B-29, dos del 393 ° Escuadrón de Bombardeo más uno de la 216 ° Unidad Base de la Fuerza Aérea del Ejército, y transportado a North Field, llegando el 2 de agosto. [111]
Hiroshima
Hiroshima during World War II
At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of industrial and military significance. A number of military units were located nearby, the most important of which was the headquarters of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's Second General Army, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan,[112] and was located in Hiroshima Castle. Hata's command consisted of some 400,000 men, most of whom were on Kyushu where an Allied invasion was correctly anticipated.[113] Also present in Hiroshima were the headquarters of the 59th Army, the 5th Division and the 224th Division, a recently formed mobile unit.[114] The city was defended by five batteries of 70 mm and 80 mm (2.8 and 3.1 inch) anti-aircraft guns of the 3rd Anti-Aircraft Division, including units from the 121st and 122nd Anti-Aircraft Regiments and the 22nd and 45th Separate Anti-Aircraft Battalions. In total, an estimated 40,000 Japanese military personnel were stationed in the city.[115]
Hiroshima was a supply and logistics base for the Japanese military.[116] The city was a communications center, a key port for shipping, and an assembly area for troops.[78] It supported a large war industry, manufacturing parts for planes and boats, for bombs, rifles, and handguns.[117] The center of the city contained several reinforced concrete buildings and lighter structures. Outside the center, the area was congested by a dense collection of small timber workshops set among Japanese houses. A few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the city. The houses were constructed of timber with tile roofs, and many of the industrial buildings were also built around timber frames. The city as a whole was highly susceptible to fire damage.[118] It was the second largest city in Japan after Kyoto that was still undamaged by air raids,[119] primarily because it lacked the aircraft manufacturing industry that was the XXI Bomber Command's priority target. On 3 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed it off limits to bombers, along with Kokura, Niigata and Kyoto.[120]
The population of Hiroshima had reached a peak of over 381,000 earlier in the war but prior to the atomic bombing, the population had steadily decreased because of a systematic evacuation ordered by the Japanese government. At the time of the attack, the population was approximately 340,000–350,000.[121] Residents wondered why Hiroshima had been spared destruction by firebombing.[122] Some speculated that the city was to be saved for U.S. occupation headquarters, others thought perhaps their relatives in Hawaii and California had petitioned the U.S. government to avoid bombing Hiroshima.[123] More realistic city officials had ordered buildings torn down to create long, straight firebreaks.[124] These continued to be expanded and extended up to the morning of 6 August 1945.[125]
Bombing of Hiroshima
Hiroshima was the primary target of the first atomic bombing mission on 6 August, with Kokura and Nagasaki as alternative targets. The 393d Bombardment Squadron B-29 Enola Gay, named after Tibbets's mother and piloted by Tibbets, took off from North Field, Tinian, about six hours' flight time from Japan. Enola Gay was accompanied by two other B-29s: The Great Artiste, commanded by Major Charles Sweeney, which carried instrumentation, and a then-nameless aircraft later called Necessary Evil, commanded by Captain George Marquardt. Necessary Evil was the photography aircraft.[126]
| Aircraft | Pilot | Call sign | Mission role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Straight Flush | Major Claude R. Eatherly | Dimples 85 | Weather reconnaissance (Hiroshima) |
| Jabit III | Major John A. Wilson | Dimples 71 | Weather reconnaissance (Kokura) |
| Full House | Major Ralph R. Taylor | Dimples 83 | Weather reconnaissance (Nagasaki) |
| Enola Gay | Colonel Paul W. Tibbets | Dimples 82 | Weapon delivery |
| The Great Artiste | Major Charles W. Sweeney | Dimples 89 | Blast measurement instrumentation |
| Necessary Evil | Captain George W. Marquardt | Dimples 91 | Strike observation and photography |
| Top Secret | Captain Charles F. McKnight | Dimples 72 | Strike spare – did not complete mission |
After leaving Tinian, the aircraft made their way separately to Iwo Jima to rendezvous with Sweeney and Marquardt at 05:55 at 9,200 feet (2,800 m),[128] and set course for Japan. The aircraft arrived over the target in clear visibility at 31,060 feet (9,470 m).[129] Parsons, who was in command of the mission, armed the bomb in flight to minimize the risks during takeoff. He had witnessed four B-29s crash and burn at takeoff, and feared that a nuclear explosion would occur if a B-29 crashed with an armed Little Boy on board.[130] His assistant, Second Lieutenant Morris R. Jeppson, removed the safety devices 30 minutes before reaching the target area.[131]
During the night of 5–6 August, Japanese early warning radar detected the approach of numerous American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. Radar detected 65 bombers headed for Saga, 102 bound for Maebashi, 261 en route to Nishinomiya, 111 headed for Ube and 66 bound for Imabari. An alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. The all-clear was sounded in Hiroshima at 00:05.[133] About an hour before the bombing, the air raid alert was sounded again, as Straight Flush flew over the city. It broadcast a short message which was picked up by Enola Gay. It read: "Cloud cover less than 3/10th at all altitudes. Advice: bomb primary."[134] The all-clear was sounded over Hiroshima again at 07:09.[135]
At 08:09, Tibbets started his bomb run and handed control over to his bombardier, Major Thomas Ferebee.[136] The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) went as planned, and the Little Boy containing about 64 kg (141 lb) of uranium-235 took 44.4 seconds to fall from the aircraft flying at about 31,000 feet (9,400 m) to a detonation height of about 1,900 feet (580 m) above the city.[137][138] Enola Gay traveled 11.5 mi (18.5 km) before it felt the shock waves from the blast.[139]
Due to crosswind, the bomb missed the aiming point, the Aioi Bridge, by approximately 800 ft (240 m) and detonated directly over Shima Surgical Clinic.[140] It released the equivalent energy of 16 ± 2 kilotons of TNT (66.9 ± 8.4 TJ).[137] The weapon was considered very inefficient, with only 1.7 percent of its material fissioning.[141] The radius of total destruction was about 1 mile (1.6 km), with resulting fires across 4.4 square miles (11 km2).[142]
Enola Gay stayed over the target area for two minutes and was ten miles away when the bomb detonated. Only Tibbets, Parsons, and Ferebee knew of the nature of the weapon; the others on the bomber were only told to expect a blinding flash and given black goggles. "It was hard to believe what we saw", Tibbets told reporters, while Parsons said "the whole thing was tremendous and awe-inspiring ... the men aboard with me gasped 'My God'". He and Tibbets compared the shockwave to "a close burst of ack-ack fire".[143]
Events on the ground
People on the ground reported a pika (ピカ)—a brilliant flash of light—followed by a don (ドン)—a loud booming sound.[144] Some 70,000–80,000 people, around 30 percent of the population of Hiroshima at the time, were killed by the blast and resultant firestorm,[145][146] and another 70,000 were injured.[147] It is estimated that as many as 20,000 Japanese military personnel were killed.[148] U.S. surveys estimated that 4.7 square miles (12 km2) of the city were destroyed. Japanese officials determined that 69 percent of Hiroshima's buildings were destroyed and another 6 to 7 percent damaged.[149]
Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima had been very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the blast center. Since the bomb detonated in the air, the blast was directed more downward than sideways, which was largely responsible for the survival of the Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, now commonly known as the Genbaku (A-bomb) dome, which was only 150 m (490 ft) from ground zero (the hypocenter). The ruin was named Hiroshima Peace Memorial and was made a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996 over the objections of the United States and China, which expressed reservations on the grounds that other Asian nations were the ones who suffered the greatest loss of life and property, and a focus on Japan lacked historical perspective.[150] The bombing started intense fires that spread rapidly through timber and paper homes, burning everything in a radius of 2 kilometers (1.2 mi).[151] As in other Japanese cities, the firebreaks proved ineffective.[152]
Hiroshima in the aftermath of the bombing
Ruins of Hiroshima
Injured civilian casualties
The Hiroshima Genbaku Dome after the bombing
The clothes pattern, in the tight-fitting areas on this survivor, shown burnt into the skin.
Direct, thermal flash burns
22-year old victim Toyoko Kugata being treated at the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital (6 October 1945)
A photograph of the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima
Memorial at Andersonville NHS for the American airmen who died in the blast.
The air raid warning had been cleared at 07:31, and many people were outside, going about their activities.[153] Eizō Nomura was the closest known survivor, being in the basement of a reinforced concrete building (it remained as the Rest House after the war) only 170 meters (560 ft) from ground zero at the time of the attack.[154][155] He died in 1982, aged 84.[156] Akiko Takakura was among the closest survivors to the hypocenter of the blast. She was in the solidly-built Bank of Hiroshima only 300 meters (980 ft) from ground-zero at the time of the attack.[157]
Over 90 percent of the doctors and 93 percent of the nurses in Hiroshima were killed or injured—most had been in the downtown area which received the greatest damage.[161] The hospitals were destroyed or heavily damaged. Only one doctor, Terufumi Sasaki, remained on duty at the Red Cross Hospital.[152] Nonetheless, by early afternoon the police and volunteers had established evacuation centres at hospitals, schools and tram stations, and a morgue was established in the Asano library.[162]
Most elements of the Japanese Second General Army headquarters were undergoing physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle, barely 900 yards (820 m) from the hypocenter. The attack killed 3,243 troops on the parade ground.[163] The communications room of Chugoku Military District Headquarters that was responsible for issuing and lifting air raid warnings was located in a semi-basement in the castle. Yoshie Oka, a Hijiyama Girls High School student who had been mobilized to serve as a communications officer, had just sent a message that the alarm had been issued for Hiroshima and neighboring Yamaguchi, when the bomb exploded. She used a special phone to inform Fukuyama Headquarters (some 100 kilometers (62 mi) away) that "Hiroshima has been attacked by a new type of bomb. The city is in a state of near-total destruction."[164]
Since Mayor Senkichi Awaya had been killed while eating breakfast with his son and granddaughter at the mayoral residence, Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, who was only slightly wounded, took over the administration of the city, and coordinated relief efforts. Many of his staff had been killed or fatally wounded, including a Korean Prince as a member of the imperial family of Korea, Yi U, who was serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Japanese Army.[165][166] Hata's senior surviving staff officer was the wounded Colonel Kumao Imoto, who acted as his chief of staff. Soldiers from the undamaged Hiroshima Ujina Harbor used Shinyo-class suicide motorboats, intended to repel the American invasion, to collect the wounded and take them down the rivers to the military hospital at Ujina.[165] Trucks and trains brought in relief supplies and evacuated survivors from the city.[167]
Twelve American airmen were imprisoned at the Chugoku Military Police Headquarters, about 1,300 feet (400 m) from the hypocenter of the blast.[168] Most died instantly, although two were reported to have been executed by their captors, and two prisoners badly injured by the bombing were left next to the Aioi Bridge by the Kempei Tai, where they were stoned to death.[169][170] Eight U.S. prisoners of war killed as part of the medical experiments program at Kyushu University were falsely reported by Japanese authorities as having been killed in the atomic blast as part of an attempted cover up.[171]
Japanese realization of the bombing
The Tokyo control operator of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but it too had failed.[172] About 20 minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within 16 km (10 mi) of the city came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff.[173]
Military bases repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the General Staff; they knew that no large enemy raid had occurred and that no sizable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time. A young officer was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was felt that nothing serious had taken place and that the explosion was just a rumor.[173]
The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 160 km (100 mi) from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the firestorm created by the bomb. After circling the city to survey the damage they landed south of the city, where the staff officer, after reporting to Tokyo, began to organize relief measures. Tokyo's first indication that the city had been destroyed by a new type of bomb came from President Truman's announcement of the strike, sixteen hours later.[173]
Acontecimientos del 7 al 9 de agosto
After the Hiroshima bombing, Truman issued a statement announcing the use of the new weapon. He stated, "We may be grateful to Providence" that the German atomic bomb project had failed, and that the United States and its allies had "spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history—and won". Truman then warned Japan: "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware."[174] This was a widely broadcast speech picked up by Japanese news agencies.[175]
The 50,000-watt standard wave station on Saipan, the OWI radio station, broadcast a similar message to Japan every 15 minutes about Hiroshima, stating that more Japanese cities would face a similar fate in the absence of immediate acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and emphatically urged civilians to evacuate major cities. Radio Japan, which continued to extoll victory for Japan by never surrendering,[88] had informed the Japanese of the destruction of Hiroshima by a single bomb.[178] Prime Minister Suzuki felt compelled to meet the Japanese press, to whom he reiterated his government's commitment to ignore the Allies' demands and fight on.[179]
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April.[180] At two minutes past midnight on 9 August, Tokyo time, Soviet infantry, armor, and air forces had launched the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation.[181] Four hours later, word reached Tokyo of the Soviet Union's official declaration of war. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army began preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Korechika Anami, to stop anyone attempting to make peace.[182]
On 7 August, a day after Hiroshima was destroyed, Dr. Yoshio Nishina and other atomic physicists arrived at the city, and carefully examined the damage. They then went back to Tokyo and told the cabinet that Hiroshima was indeed destroyed by a nuclear weapon. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, estimated that no more than one or two additional bombs could be readied, so they decided to endure the remaining attacks, acknowledging "there would be more destruction but the war would go on".[183] American Magic codebreakers intercepted the cabinet's messages.[184]
Purnell, Parsons, Tibbets, Spaatz, and LeMay met on Guam that same day to discuss what should be done next.[185] Since there was no indication of Japan surrendering,[184] they decided to proceed with dropping another bomb. Parsons said that Project Alberta would have it ready by 11 August, but Tibbets pointed to weather reports indicating poor flying conditions on that day due to a storm, and asked if the bomb could be readied by 9 August. Parsons agreed to try to do so.[186][185]
Nagasaki
Nagasaki during World War II
The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest seaports in southern Japan, and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. The four largest companies in the city were Mitsubishi Shipyards, Electrical Shipyards, Arms Plant, and Steel and Arms Works, which employed about 90 percent of the city's labor force, and accounted for 90 percent of the city's industry.[187] Although an important industrial city, Nagasaki had been spared from firebombing because its geography made it difficult to locate at night with AN/APQ-13 radar.[120]
Unlike the other target cities, Nagasaki had not been placed off limits to bombers by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 3 July directive,[120][188] and was bombed on a small scale five times. During one of these raids on 1 August, a number of conventional high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few hit the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city, and several hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works.[187] By early August, the city was defended by the 134th Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the 4th Anti-Aircraft Division with four batteries of 7 cm (2.8 in) anti-aircraft guns and two searchlight batteries.[115]
In contrast to Hiroshima, almost all of the buildings were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of timber or timber-framed buildings with timber walls (with or without plaster) and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also situated in buildings of timber or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley. On the day of the bombing, an estimated 263,000 people were in Nagasaki, including 240,000 Japanese residents, 10,000 Korean residents, 2,500 conscripted Korean workers, 9,000 Japanese soldiers, 600 conscripted Chinese workers, and 400 Allied prisoners of war in a camp to the north of Nagasaki.[189]
Bombing of Nagasaki
Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Tibbets. Scheduled for 11 August against Kokura, the raid was moved earlier by two days to avoid a five-day period of bad weather forecast to begin on 10 August.[190] Three bomb pre-assemblies had been transported to Tinian, labeled F-31, F-32, and F-33 on their exteriors. On 8 August, a dress rehearsal was conducted off Tinian by Sweeney using Bockscar as the drop airplane. Assembly F-33 was expended testing the components and F-31 was designated for the 9 August mission.[191]
| Aircraft | Pilot | Call sign | Mission role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enola Gay | Captain George W. Marquardt | Dimples 82 | Weather reconnaissance (Kokura) |
| Laggin' Dragon | Captain Charles F. McKnight | Dimples 95 | Weather reconnaissance (Nagasaki) |
| Bockscar | Major Charles W. Sweeney | Dimples 77 | Weapon delivery |
| The Great Artiste | Captain Frederick C. Bock | Dimples 89 | Blast measurement instrumentation |
| Big Stink | Major James I. Hopkins, Jr. | Dimples 90 | Strike observation and photography |
| Full House | Major Ralph R. Taylor | Dimples 83 | Strike spare – did not complete mission |
At 03:47 Tinian time (GMT+10), 02:47 Japanese time [193] on the morning of 9 August 1945, Bockscar, flown by Sweeney's crew, lifted off from Tinian island with Fat Man, with Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29s flying an hour ahead as weather scouts and two additional B-29s in Sweeney's flight for instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged.[194]
During pre-flight inspection of Bockscar, the flight engineer notified Sweeney that an inoperative fuel transfer pump made it impossible to use 640 US gallons (2,400 l; 530 imp gal) of fuel carried in a reserve tank. This fuel would still have to be carried all the way to Japan and back, consuming still more fuel. Replacing the pump would take hours; moving the Fat Man to another aircraft might take just as long and was dangerous as well, as the bomb was live. Tibbets and Sweeney therefore elected to have Bockscar continue the mission.[195][196]
This time Penney and Cheshire were allowed to accompany the mission, flying as observers on the third plane, Big Stink, flown by the group's operations officer, Major James I. Hopkins, Jr. Observers aboard the weather planes reported both targets clear. When Sweeney's aircraft arrived at the assembly point for his flight off the coast of Japan, Big Stink failed to make the rendezvous.[194] According to Cheshire, Hopkins was at varying heights including 9,000 feet (2,700 m) higher than he should have been, and was not flying tight circles over Yakushima as previously agreed with Sweeney and Captain Frederick C. Bock, who was piloting the support B-29 The Great Artiste. Instead, Hopkins was flying 40-mile (64 km) dogleg patterns.[197] Though ordered not to circle longer than fifteen minutes, Sweeney continued to wait for Big Stink for forty minutes. Before leaving the rendezvous point, Sweeney consulted Ashworth, who was in charge of the bomb. As commander of the aircraft, Sweeney made the decision to proceed to the primary, the city of Kokura.[198]
After exceeding the original departure time limit by nearly a half-hour, Bockscar, accompanied by The Great Artiste, proceeded to Kokura, thirty minutes away. The delay at the rendezvous had resulted in clouds and drifting smoke over Kokura from fires started by a major firebombing raid by 224 B-29s on nearby Yahata the previous day.[199] Additionally, the Yahata Steel Works intentionally burned coal tar, to produce black smoke.[200] The clouds and smoke resulted in 70 percent of the area over Kokura being covered, obscuring the aiming point. Three bomb runs were made over the next 50 minutes, burning fuel and exposing the aircraft repeatedly to the heavy defenses around Kokura, but the bombardier was unable to drop visually. By the time of the third bomb run, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was getting close, and Second Lieutenant Jacob Beser, who was monitoring Japanese communications, reported activity on the Japanese fighter direction radio bands.[201]
With fuel running low because of the failed fuel pump, Bockscar and The Great Artiste headed for their secondary target, Nagasaki.[194] Fuel consumption calculations made en route indicated that Bockscar had insufficient fuel to reach Iwo Jima and would be forced to divert to Okinawa, which had become entirely Allied-occupied territory only six weeks earlier. After initially deciding that if Nagasaki were obscured on their arrival the crew would carry the bomb to Okinawa and dispose of it in the ocean if necessary, Ashworth agreed with Sweeney's suggestion that a radar approach would be used if the target was obscured.[202][203] At about 07:50 Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53 Japanese Time (GMT+9), the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given.[204]
A few minutes later at 11:00 Japanese Time, The Great Artiste dropped instruments attached to three parachutes. These instruments also contained an unsigned letter to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a physicist at the University of Tokyo who studied with three of the scientists responsible for the atomic bomb at the University of California, Berkeley, urging him to tell the public about the danger involved with these weapons of mass destruction. The messages were found by military authorities but not turned over to Sagane until a month later.[205] In 1949, one of the authors of the letter, Luis Alvarez, met with Sagane and signed the letter.[206]
At 11:01 Japanese Time, a last-minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed Bockscar's bombardier, Captain Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The Fat Man weapon, containing a core of about 5 kg (11 lb) of plutonium, was dropped over the city's industrial valley. It exploded 47 seconds later at 11:02 Japanese Time[193] at 1,650 ± 33 ft (503 ± 10 m), above a tennis court,[207] halfway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Nagasaki Arsenal in the north. This was nearly 3 km (1.9 mi) northwest of the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the Urakami Valley and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills.[208] The resulting explosion released the equivalent energy of 21 ± 2 kt (87.9 ± 8.4 TJ).[137] Big Stink spotted the explosion from a hundred miles away, and flew over to observe.[209]
Bockscar flew on to Okinawa, arriving with only sufficient fuel for a single approach. Sweeney tried repeatedly to contact the control tower for landing clearance, but received no answer. He could see heavy air traffic landing and taking off from Yontan Airfield. Firing off every flare on board to alert the field to his emergency landing, the Bockscar came in fast, landing at 140 miles per hour (230 km/h) instead of the normal 120 miles per hour (190 km/h). The number two engine died from fuel starvation as he began the final approach. Touching down on only three engines midway down the landing strip, Bockscar bounced up into the air again for about 25 feet (7.6 m) before slamming back down hard. The heavy B-29 slewed left and towards a row of parked B-24 bombers before the pilots managed to regain control. Its reversible propellers were insufficient to slow the aircraft adequately, and with both pilots standing on the brakes, Bockscar made a swerving 90-degree turn at the end of the runway to avoid running off it. A second engine died from fuel exhaustion before the plane came to a stop.[210]
Following the mission, there was confusion over the identification of the plane. The first eyewitness account by war correspondent William L. Laurence of The New York Times, who accompanied the mission aboard the aircraft piloted by Bock, reported that Sweeney was leading the mission in The Great Artiste. He also noted its "Victor" number as 77, which was that of Bockscar.[211] Laurence had interviewed Sweeney and his crew, and was aware that they referred to their airplane as The Great Artiste. Except for Enola Gay, none of the 393d's B-29s had yet had names painted on the noses, a fact which Laurence himself noted in his account. Unaware of the switch in aircraft, Laurence assumed Victor 77 was The Great Artiste,[212] which was in fact, Victor 89.[213]
Events on the ground
Although the bomb was more powerful than the one used on Hiroshima, its effects were confined by hillsides to the narrow Urakami Valley.[215] Of 7,500 Japanese employees who worked inside the Mitsubishi Munitions plant, including "mobilized" students and regular workers, 6,200 were killed. Some 17,000–22,000 others who worked in other war plants and factories in the city died as well.[216] Casualty estimates for immediate deaths vary widely, ranging from 22,000 to 75,000.[216] At least 35,000–40,000 people were killed and 60,000 others injured.[217][218] In the days and months following the explosion, more people died from their injuries. Because of the presence of undocumented foreign workers, and a number of military personnel in transit, there are great discrepancies in the estimates of total deaths by the end of 1945; a range of 39,000 to 80,000 can be found in various studies.[121]
Unlike Hiroshima's military death toll, only 150 Japanese soldiers were killed instantly, including 36 from the 134th AAA Regiment of the 4th AAA Division.[115] At least eight Allied prisoners of war (POWs) died from the bombing, and as many as thirteen may have died. The eight confirmed deaths included a British POW, Royal Air Force Corporal Ronald Shaw,[219] and seven Dutch POWs.[220] One American POW, Joe Kieyoomia, was in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing but survived, reportedly having been shielded from the effects of the bomb by the concrete walls of his cell.[221] There were 24 Australian POWs in Nagasaki, all of whom survived.[222]
The radius of total destruction was about 1 mi (1.6 km), followed by fires across the northern portion of the city to 2 mi (3.2 km) south of the bomb.[142][225] About 58 percent of the Mitsubishi Arms Plant was damaged, and about 78 percent of the Mitsubishi Steel Works. The Mitsubishi Electric Works suffered only 10 percent structural damage as it was on the border of the main destruction zone. The Nagasaki Arsenal was destroyed in the blast.[226] Although many fires likewise burnt following the bombing, in contrast to Hiroshima where sufficient fuel density was available, no firestorm developed in Nagasaki as the damaged areas did not furnish enough fuel to generate the phenomenon. Instead, the ambient wind at the time pushed the fire spread along the valley.[227]
As in Hiroshima, the bombing badly dislocated the city's medical facilities. A makeshift hospital was established at the Shinkozen Primary School, which served as the main medical centre. The trains were still running, and evacuated many victims to hospitals in nearby towns. A medical team from a naval hospital reached the city in the evening, and fire-fighting brigades from the neighboring towns assisted in fighting the fires.[228] Takashi Nagai was a doctor working in the radiology department of Nagasaki Medical College Hospital. He received a serious injury that severed his right temporal artery, but joined the rest of the surviving medical staff in treating bombing victims.[229]
Planes para más ataques atómicos en Japón
Groves expected to have another "Fat Man" atomic bomb ready for use on 19 August, with three more in September and a further three in October;[87] a second Little Boy bomb (using U-235) would not be available until December 1945.[230][231] On 10 August, he sent a memorandum to Marshall in which he wrote that "the next bomb ... should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August." Marshall endorsed the memo with the hand-written comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President",[87] something Truman had requested that day. This modified the previous order that the target cities were to be attacked with atomic bombs "as made ready".[232] There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs then in production for Operation Downfall, and Marshall suggested to Stimson that the remaining cities on the target list be spared attack with atomic bombs.[233]
Two more Fat Man assemblies were readied, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on 11 and 14 August,[234] and Tibbets was ordered by LeMay to return to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to collect them.[235] At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core.[236] Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until 16 August.[237] Therefore, it could have been ready for use on 19 August. Unable to reach Marshall, Groves ordered on his own authority on 13 August that the core should not be shipped.[232]
Rendición de Japón y posterior ocupación
Until 9 August, Japan's war council still insisted on its four conditions for surrender. The full cabinet met at 14:30 on 9 August, and spent most of the day debating surrender. Anami conceded that victory was unlikely, but argued in favour of continuing the war nonetheless. The meeting ended at 17:30, with no decision having been reached. Suzuki went to the palace to report on the outcome of the meeting, where he met with Kōichi Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan. Kido informed him that the emperor had agreed to hold an imperial conference, and gave a strong indication that the emperor would consent to surrender on condition that kokutai be preserved. A second cabinet meeting was held at 18:00. Only four ministers supported Anami's position of adhering to the four conditions, but since cabinet decisions had to be unanimous, no decision was reached before it ended at 22:00.[238]
Calling an imperial conference required the signatures of the prime minister and the two service chiefs, but the Chief Cabinet Secretary Hisatsune Sakomizu had already obtained signatures from Toyoda and General Yoshijirō Umezu in advance, and he reneged on his promise to inform them if a meeting was to be held. The meeting commenced at 23:50. No consensus had emerged by 02:00 on 10 August, but the emperor gave his "sacred decision",[239] authorizing the Foreign Minister, Shigenori Tōgō, to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one condition, that the declaration "does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler."[240]
On 12 August, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied, "Of course."[241] As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of the Throne, Hirohito recorded on 14 August his capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the next day despite a short rebellion by militarists opposed to the surrender.[242]
In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings and did not explicitly mention the Soviets as a factor for surrender:
Despite the best that has been done by every one—the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the power to destroy many innocent lives and do incalculable damage. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.[243]
In his "Rescript to the Soldiers and Sailors" delivered on 17 August, however, he stressed the impact of the Soviet invasion on his decision to surrender.[244]
Reportaje
On 10 August 1945, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, Yōsuke Yamahata, correspondent Higashi, and artist Yamada arrived in the city with orders to record the destruction for maximum propaganda purposes, Yamahata took scores of photographs, and on 21 August, they appeared in Mainichi Shimbun, a popular Japanese newspaper.[245] Leslie Nakashima filed the first personal account of the scene to appear in American newspapers. A version of his 27 August UPI article appeared in The New York Times on 31 August.[246]
Wilfred Burchett was the first western journalist to visit Hiroshima after the bombing, arriving alone by train from Tokyo on 2 September. His Morse code dispatch, "The Atomic Plague", was printed by the Daily Express newspaper in London on 5 September 1945. Nakashima's and Burchett's reports were the first public reports to mention the effects of radiation and nuclear fallout—radiation burns and radiation poisoning.[247][248] Burchett's reporting was unpopular with the U.S. military, who accused Burchett of being under the sway of Japanese propaganda, and suppressed a supporting story submitted by George Weller of the Chicago Daily News. William Laurence dismissed the reports on radiation sickness as Japanese efforts to undermine American morale, ignoring his own account published one week earlier.[249]
A member of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Lieutenant Daniel McGovern, used a film crew to document the effects of the bombings in early 1946. The film crew shot 90,000 ft (27,000 m) of film, resulting in a three-hour documentary titled The Effects of the Atomic Bombs Against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The documentary included images from hospitals showing the human effects of the bomb; it showed burned-out buildings and cars, and rows of skulls and bones on the ground. It was classified "secret" for the next 22 years.[250][251] Motion picture company Nippon Eigasha started sending cameramen to Nagasaki and Hiroshima in September 1945. On 24 October 1945, a U.S. military policeman stopped a Nippon Eigasha cameraman from continuing to film in Nagasaki. All Nippon Eigasha's reels were confiscated by the American authorities, but they were requested by the Japanese government, and declassified.[251] The public release of film footage of the city post-attack, and some research about the effects of the attack, was restricted during the occupation of Japan,[252] but the Hiroshima-based magazine, Chugoku Bunka, in its first issue published on 10 March 1946, devoted itself to detailing the damage from the bombing.[253]
The book Hiroshima, written by Pulitzer Prize winner John Hersey, which was originally published in article form in the popular magazine The New Yorker,[254] on 31 August 1946, is reported to have reached Tokyo in English by January 1947, and the translated version was released in Japan in 1949.[255][256][257] It narrated the stories of the lives of six bomb survivors from immediately prior to, and months after, the dropping of the Little Boy bomb.[254] Beginning in 1974, a compilation of drawings and artwork made by the survivors of the bombings began to be compiled, with completion in 1977, and under both book and exhibition format, it was titled The Unforgettable Fire.[258]
The bombing amazed Otto Hahn and other German atomic scientists, whom the British held at Farm Hall in Operation Epsilon. Hahn stated that he had not believed an atomic weapon "would be possible for another twenty years"; Werner Heisenberg did not believe the news at first. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker said "I think it's dreadful of the Americans to have done it. I think it is madness on their part", but Heisenberg replied, "One could equally well say 'That's the quickest way of ending the war'". Hahn was grateful that the German project had not succeeded in developing "such an inhumane weapon"; Karl Wirtz observed that even if it had, "we would have obliterated London but would still not have conquered the world, and then they would have dropped them on us".[259]
Hahn told the others, "Once I wanted to suggest that all uranium should be sunk to the bottom of the ocean".[259] The Vatican agreed; L'Osservatore Romano expressed regret that the bomb's inventors did not destroy the weapon for the benefit of humanity.[260] Rev. Cuthbert Thicknesse, the Dean of St Albans, prohibited using St Albans Abbey for a thanksgiving service for the war's end, calling the use of atomic weapons "an act of wholesale, indiscriminate massacre".[261] Nonetheless, news of the atomic bombing was greeted enthusiastically in the U.S.; a poll in Fortune magazine in late 1945 showed a significant minority of Americans (23 percent) wishing that more atomic bombs could have been dropped on Japan.[262][263] The initial positive response was supported by the imagery presented to the public (mainly the powerful images of the mushroom cloud).[262] During this time in America, it was a common practice for editors to keep graphic images of death out of films, magazines, and newspapers.[264]
Víctimas posteriores al ataque
An estimated 90,000 to 140,000 people in Hiroshima (up to 39 percent of the population) and 60,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki (up to 32 percent of the population) died in 1945,[121] though the number which died immediately as a result of exposure to the blast, heat, or due to radiation, is unknown. One Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission report discusses 6,882 people examined in Hiroshima, and 6,621 people examined in Nagasaki, who were largely within 2,000 meters (6,600 ft) from the hypocenter, who suffered injuries from the blast and heat but died from complications frequently compounded by acute radiation syndrome (ARS), all within about 20 to 30 days.[265][266] The most well known of these was Midori Naka, some 650 meters (2,130 ft) from the hypocenter at Hiroshima, who would travel to Tokyo and then with her death on 24 August 1945 was to be the first death officially certified as a result of radiation poisoning, or as it was referred to by many, "atomic bomb disease". It was unappreciated at the time but the average radiation dose that will kill approximately 50 percent of adults, the LD50, was approximately halved, that is, smaller doses were made more lethal, when the individual experienced concurrent blast or burn polytraumatic injuries.[267] Conventional skin injuries that cover a large area frequently result in bacterial infection; the risk of sepsis and death is increased when a usually non-lethal radiation dose moderately suppresses the white blood cell count.[268]
In the spring of 1948, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was established in accordance with a presidential directive from Truman to the National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council to conduct investigations of the late effects of radiation among the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[269] In 1956, the ABCC published The Effect of Exposure to the Atomic Bombs on Pregnancy Termination in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[270] The ABCC became the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), on 1 April 1975. A binational organization run by both the United States and Japan, the RERF is still in operation today.[271]
Cancer increases
Cancers do not immediately emerge after exposure to radiation; instead, radiation-induced cancer has a minimum latency period of some five years and above, and leukemia some two years and above, peaking around six to eight years later.[272] Dr Jarrett Foley published the first major reports on the significant increased incidence of the latter among survivors. Almost all cases of leukemia over the following 50 years were in people exposed to more than 1Gy.[273] In a strictly dependent manner dependent on their distance from the hypocenter, in the 1987 Life Span Study, conducted by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, a statistical excess of 507 cancers, of undefined lethality, were observed in 79,972 hibakusha who had still been living between 1958–1987 and who took part in the study.[274] As the epidemiology study continues with time, the RERF estimates that, from 1950 to 2000, 46 percent of leukemia deaths which may include Sadako Sasaki and 11 percent of solid cancers of unspecified lethality were likely due to radiation from the bombs or some other post-attack city effects, with the statistical excess being 200 leukemia deaths and 1,700 solid cancers of undeclared lethality. Both of these statistics being derived from the observation of approximately half of the total survivors, strictly those who took part in the study.[275]
Birth defect investigations
While during the preimplantation period, that is one to ten days following conception, intrauterine radiation exposure of "at least 0.2 Gy" can cause complications of implantation and death of the human embryo.[276] The number of miscarriages caused by the radiation from the bombings, during this radiosensitive period, is not known.
One of the early studies conducted by the ABCC was on the outcome of pregnancies occurring in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a control city, Kure, located 18 mi (29 km) south of Hiroshima, to discern the conditions and outcomes related to radiation exposure.[277] James V. Neel led the study which found that the overall number of birth defects was not significantly higher among the children of survivors who were pregnant at the time of the bombings.[278] He also studied the longevity of the children who survived the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, reporting that between 90 and 95 percent were still living 50 years later.[279]
While The National Academy of Sciences raised the possibility that Neel's procedure did not filter the Kure population for possible radiation exposure which could bias the results.[280] Overall, a statistically insignificant increase in birth defects occurred directly after the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima when the cities were taken as wholes, in terms of distance from the hypocenters however, Neel and others noted that in approximately 50 humans who were of an early gestational age at the time of the bombing and who were all within about 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) from the hypocenter, an increase in microencephaly and anencephaly was observed upon birth, with the incidence of these two particular malformations being nearly 3 times what was to be expected when compared to the control group in Kure, were approximately 20 cases were observed in a similar sample size.[281]
In 1985, Johns Hopkins University geneticist James F. Crow examined Neel's research and confirmed that the number of birth defects was not significantly higher in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[282] Many members of the ABCC and its successor Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) were still looking for possible birth defects among the survivors decades later, but found no evidence that they were significantly common among the survivors, or inherited in the children of survivors.[279][283]
Investigations into brain development
Despite the small sample size of 1,600 to 1,800 persons who came forth as prenatally exposed at the time of the bombings, that were both within a close proximity to the two hypocenters, to survive the in utero absorption of a substantial dose of radiation and then the malnourished post-attack environment, data from this cohort does support the increased risk of severe mental retardation (SMR), that was observed in some 30 individuals, with SMR being a common outcome of the aforementioned microencephaly. While a lack of statistical data, with just 30 individuals out of 1,800, prevents a definitive determination of a threshold point, the data collected suggests a threshold intrauterine or fetal dose for SMR, at the most radiosensitive period of cognitive development, when there is the largest number of undifferentiated neural cells (8 to 15 weeks post-conception) to begin at a threshold dose of approximately "0.09" to "0.15" Gy, with the risk then linearly increasing to a 43-percent rate of SMR when exposed to a fetal dose of 1 Gy at any point during these weeks of rapid neurogenesis.[284][285]
However either side of this radiosensitive age, none of the prenatally exposed to the bombings at an age less than 8 weeks, that is prior to synaptogenesis or at a gestational age more than 26 weeks "were observed to be mentally retarded", with the condition therefore being isolated to those solely of 8–26 weeks of age and who absorbed more than approximately "0.09" to "0.15" Gy of prompt radiation energy.[284][286]
Examination of the prenatally exposed in terms of IQ performance and school records, determined the beginning of a statistically significant reduction in both, when exposed to greater than 0.1 to 0.5 gray, during the same gestational period of 8–25 weeks. However outside this period, at less than 8 weeks and greater than 26 after conception, "there is no evidence of a radiation-related effect on scholastic performance."[284]
The reporting of doses in terms of absorbed energy in units of grays and rads, rather than the use of the biologically significant, biologically weighted sievert in both the SMR and cognitive performance data, is typical.[286] The reported threshold dose variance between the two cities, is suggested to be a manifestation of the difference between X-ray and neutron absorption, with Little Boy emitting substantially more neutron flux, whereas the Baratol that surrounded the core of Fat Man, filtered or shifted the absorbed neutron-radiation profile, so that the dose of radiation energy received in Nagasaki, is mostly that from exposure to x-rays/gamma rays, in contrast to the environment within 1500 meters of the hypocenter at Hiroshima, were instead the in-utero dose more depended on the absorption of neutrons, which have a higher biological effect per unit of energy absorbed.[287] From the radiation dose reconstruction work, which were also informed by the 1962 BREN Tower Japanese city analog, the estimated dosimetry at Hiroshima still has the largest uncertainty as the Little Boy bomb design was never tested before deployment or afterward, therefore the estimated radiation profile absorbed by individuals at Hiroshima had required greater reliance on calculations than the Japanese soil, concrete and roof-tile measurements which began to reach accurate levels and thereby inform researchers, in the 1990s.[288][289][290]
Many other investigations into cognitive outcomes, such as schizophrenia as a result of prenatal exposure, have been conducted with "no statistically significant linear relationship seen", there is a suggestion that in the most extremely exposed, those who survived within a kilometer or so of the hypocenters, a trend emerges akin to that seen in SMR, though the sample size is too small to determine with any significance.[291]
Hibakusha
The survivors of the bombings are called hibakusha (被爆者, Japanese pronunciation: [çibakɯ̥ɕa]), a Japanese word that literally translates to "explosion-affected people". The Japanese government has recognized about 650,000 people as hibakusha. As of 31 March 2020[update], 136,682 were still alive, mostly in Japan (an annual decrease of around 9,200).[292][293] The government of Japan recognizes about one percent of these as having illnesses[ambiguous] caused by radiation.[294][better source needed] The memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contain lists of the names of the hibakusha who are known to have died since the bombings. Updated annually on the anniversaries of the bombings, as of August 2020[update], the memorials record the names of more than 510,000 hibakusha; 324,129 in Hiroshima and 185,982 in Nagasaki, up by 4,943[295] and 3,406[296] respectively from the previous year's figures of 319,186[297] and 182,601.[298]
If they discuss their background, Hibakusha and their children were (and still are) victims of fear based discrimination and exclusion when it comes to prospects of marriage or work[299] due to public ignorance about the consequences of radiation sickness or that the low doses that the majority received were less than a routine diagnostic x-ray, much of the public however persist with the belief that the Hibakusha carry some hereditary or even contagious disease.[300] This is despite the fact that no statistically demonstrable increase of birth defects/congenital malformations was found among the later conceived children born to survivors of the nuclear weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or indeed has been found in the later conceived children of cancer survivors who had previously received radiotherapy.[301][302][303] The surviving women of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that could conceive, who were exposed to substantial amounts of radiation, went on and had children with no higher incidence of abnormalities/birth defects than the rate which is observed in the Japanese average.[304][305][306] A study of the long-term psychological effects of the bombings on the survivors found that even 17–20 years after the bombings had occurred survivors showed a higher prevalence of anxiety and somatization symptoms.[307]
Double survivors
Perhaps as many as 200 people from Hiroshima sought refuge in Nagasaki. The 2006 documentary Twice Survived: The Doubly Atomic Bombed of Hiroshima and Nagasaki documented 165 nijū hibakusha (lit. double explosion-affected people), nine of whom claimed to be in the blast zone in both cities.[308] On 24 March 2009, the Japanese government officially recognized Tsutomu Yamaguchi as a double hibakusha. He was confirmed to be 3 km (1.9 mi) from ground zero in Hiroshima on a business trip when the bomb was detonated. He was seriously burnt on his left side and spent the night in Hiroshima. He arrived at his home city of Nagasaki on 8 August, the day before the bombing, and he was exposed to residual radiation while searching for his relatives. He was the first officially recognized survivor of both bombings.[309] He died on 4 January 2010, at the age of 93, after a battle with stomach cancer.[310]
Korean survivors
During the war, Japan brought as many as 670,000 Korean conscripts to Japan to work as forced labor.[311] About 5,000–8,000 Koreans were killed in Hiroshima and another 1,500–2,000 died in Nagasaki.[312] For many years, Korean survivors had a difficult time fighting for the same recognition as Hibakusha as afforded to all Japanese survivors, a situation which resulted in the denial of the free health benefits to them in Japan. Most issues were eventually addressed in 2008 through lawsuits.[313]
Memoriales
Hiroshima
Hiroshima was subsequently struck by Typhoon Ida on 17 September 1945. More than half the bridges were destroyed, and the roads and railroads were damaged, further devastating the city.[314] The population increased from 83,000 soon after the bombing to 146,000 in February 1946.[315] The city was rebuilt after the war, with help from the national government through the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law passed in 1949. It provided financial assistance for reconstruction, along with land donated that was previously owned by the national government and used for military purposes.[316] In 1949, a design was selected for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall, the closest surviving building to the location of the bomb's detonation, was designated the Hiroshima Peace Memorial. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum was opened in 1955 in the Peace Park.[317] Hiroshima also contains a Peace Pagoda, built in 1966 by Nipponzan-Myōhōji.[318]
Nagasaki
Nagasaki was also rebuilt after the war, but was dramatically changed in the process. The pace of reconstruction was initially slow, and the first simple emergency dwellings were not provided until 1946. The focus on redevelopment was the replacement of war industries with foreign trade, shipbuilding and fishing. This was formally declared when the Nagasaki International Culture City Reconstruction Law was passed in May 1949.[315] New temples were built, as well as new churches owing to an increase in the presence of Christianity. Some of the rubble was left as a memorial, such as a torii at Sannō Shrine, and an arch near ground zero. New structures were also raised as memorials, such as the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, which was opened in the mid-1990s.[319]
Debate sobre los bombardeos
The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender, and the ethical, legal, and military controversies surrounding the United States' justification for them have been the subject of scholarly and popular debate.[320] On one hand, it has been argued that the bombings caused the Japanese surrender, thereby preventing casualties that an invasion of Japan would have involved.[6][321] Stimson talked of saving one million casualties.[322] The naval blockade might have starved the Japanese into submission without an invasion, but this would also have resulted in many more Japanese deaths.[323]
Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argued that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan "played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation".[324] A view among critics of the bombings, that was popularized by American historian Gar Alperovitz in 1965, is the idea of atomic diplomacy: that the United States used nuclear weapons to intimidate the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War. Although not accepted by mainstream historians, this became the position in Japanese school history textbooks.[325]
Those who oppose the bombings give other reasons for their view, among them: a belief that atomic bombing is fundamentally immoral, that the bombings counted as war crimes, and that they constituted state terrorism.[326]
Legado
Like the way it began, the manner in which World War II ended cast a long shadow over international relations for decades to come. By 30 June 1946, there were components for nine atomic bombs in the US arsenal, all Fat Man devices identical to the one used in the bombing of Nagasaki.[327] The nuclear weapons were handmade devices, and a great deal of work remained to improve their ease of assembly, safety, reliability and storage before they were ready for production. There were also many improvements to their performance that had been suggested or recommended, but that had not been possible under the pressure of wartime development.[328] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy had decried the use of the atomic bombs as adopting "an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages",[329] but in October 1947, he reported a military requirement for 400 bombs.[330]
The American monopoly on nuclear weapons lasted four years before the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in September 1949.[330] The United States responded with the development of the hydrogen bomb, a nuclear weapon a thousand times as powerful as the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[331] Such ordinary fission bombs would henceforth be regarded as small tactical nuclear weapons. By 1986, the United States had 23,317 nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union had 40,159. In early 2019, more than 90% of the world's 13,865 nuclear weapons were owned by Russia and the United States.[332][333]
By 2020, nine nations had nuclear weapons,[334] but Japan was not one of them.[335] Japan reluctantly signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in February 1970,[336] but it is still sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella. American nuclear weapons were stored on Okinawa, and sometimes in Japan itself, albeit in contravention of agreements between the two nations.[337] Lacking the resources to fight the Soviet Union using conventional forces, the Western Alliance came to depend on the use of nuclear weapons to defend itself during the Cold War, a policy that became known in the 1950s as the New Look.[338] In the decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States would threaten to use its nuclear weapons many times.[339]
On 7 July 2017, more than 120 countries voted to adopt the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Elayne Whyte Gómez, President of the UN negotiations on the nuclear ban treaty, said "the world has been waiting for this legal norm for 70 years," since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.[340] As of 2020[update], Japan has not signed the treaty.[341][342]
Notas
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- Sweeney, Charles; Antonucci, James A.; Antonucci, Marion K. (1997). War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission. New York: Quill Publishing. ISBN 978-0-380-78874-3.
- Tanaka, Yuki; Young, Marilyn B. (2009). Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History. New York: New Press. ISBN 978-1-59558-547-9. OCLC 624416971.
- Thomas, Gordon; Morgan-Witts, Max (1977). Ruin from the Air. London: Hamilton. ISBN 978-0-241-89726-3. OCLC 252041787.
- Tibbets, Paul W. (1998). Return Of The Enola Gay. New Hope, Pennsylvania: Enola Gay Remembered. ISBN 978-0-9703666-0-3. OCLC 69423383.
- Toon, O. B.; Turco, R. P.; Robock, A.; Bardeen, C.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G. L. (2007). "Atmospheric Effects and Societal Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism" (PDF). Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics. 7 (8): 1973–2002. Bibcode:2007ACP.....7.1973T. doi:10.5194/acp-7-1973-2007. ISSN 1680-7316. Retrieved 4 December 2016.
- United States Department of State (1960). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945. Foreign Relations of the United States. 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. OCLC 22435734.
- Wainstock, Dennis D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-95475-8. OCLC 33243854.
- Walker, J. Samuel (January 1990). "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update". Diplomatic History. 14 (1): 97–114. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00078.x. ISSN 1467-7709.
- Walker, J. Samuel (April 2005). "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground". Diplomatic History. 29 (2): 311–334. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00476.x. ISSN 1467-7709. S2CID 154708989.
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (1996). Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. ISBN 978-1-56098-665-2. OCLC 32921746.
- White, Geoffrey. M. (July 1995). "Memory Wars: The Politics of Remembering the Asia-Pacific War" (PDF). Asia-Pacific Issues (21). ISSN 1522-0966. Retrieved 30 June 2013.
- Williams, M. H. (1960). Chronology, 1941–1945. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 1358166.
- Yamada, Michiko; Izumi, Shizue (2002). "Psychiatric Sequelae in Atomic Bomb Survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Two Decades After the Explosions". Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology. 37 (9): 409–415. doi:10.1007/s00127-002-0572-5. ISSN 0933-7954. PMID 12242616. S2CID 7257634.
- Zaloga, Steven J.; Noon, Steve (2010). Defense of Japan 1945. Fortress. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-687-3. OCLC 503042143.
Otras lecturas
- Allen, Thomas; Polmar, Norman (1995). Code-Name Downfall. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-684-80406-4.
- Alperovitz, Gar; Tree, Sanho (1996). The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. New York: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-679-76285-0.
- Barrett, David Dean (2020). 140 Days to Hiroshima: The Story of Japan's Last Chance to Avert Armageddon. Diversion Books. ISBN 978-1-63576-581-6.
- The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-02985-3.
- Delgado, James P. (2009). Nuclear Dawn: the Atomic Bomb, from the Manhattan Project to the Cold War. New York: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-396-4. OCLC 297147193.
- Gallichio, Marc (2020). Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gordin, Michael D. (2007). Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12818-4. OCLC 70630623.
- Gosling, Francis George (1994). The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Energy, History Division. OCLC 637052193.
- Krauss, Robert; Krauss, Amelia (2005). The 509th Remembered: A History of the 509th Composite Group as Told by the Veterans Themselves. Buchanan, Michigan: 509th Press. ISBN 978-0-923568-66-5. OCLC 59148135.
- Merton, Thomas (1962). Original Child Bomb: Points for Meditation to be Scratched on the Walls of a Cave. New York: New Directions. OCLC 4527778.
- Murakami, Chikayasu (2007). Hiroshima no shiroi sora (The White Sky in Hiroshima). Tokyo: Bungeisha. ISBN 978-4-286-03708-0.
- Ogura, Toyofumi (2001). Letters from the End of the World: A Firsthand Account of the Bombing of Hiroshima. Tokyo: Kodansha International. ISBN 978-4-7700-2776-4.
- Sekimori, Gaynor (1986). Hibakusha: Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company. ISBN 978-4-333-01204-6.
- Toll, Ian W. (2020). Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-08065-0.
- Ward, Wilson (Spring 2007). "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima". International Security. 31 (4): 162–179. doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.162. ISSN 1531-4804. S2CID 57563920.
- Warren, Stafford L. (1966). "Manhattan Project". In Ahnfeldt, Arnold Lorentz (ed.). Radiology in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army. pp. 831–922. OCLC 630225.
enlaces externos
- Media from Wikimedia Commons
- News from Wikinews
- Quotations from Wikiquote
Decision
- "Order from General Thomas Handy to General Carl Spaatz authorizing the dropping of the first atomic bomb". Wikisource. 2015.
- "Documents on the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb". Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "President Truman Defends Use of Atomic Bomb, 1945: Original Letters". Shapell Manuscript Foundation. Retrieved 8 February 2014.
- "Correspondence Regarding Decision to Drop the Bomb". Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
Effects
- "The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. 1946. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "Scientific Data of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Disaster". Atomic Bomb Disease Institute, Nagasaki University. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "Tale of Two Cities: The Story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". National Science Digital Library. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". Atomic Archive. 1946. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" (PDF). National Security Archive. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "Photo gallery of aftermath pictures". Time-Life. Archived from the original on 19 July 2012. Retrieved 8 February 2014.
- "Photo Essay: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 75th anniversary of atomic bombings". BBC News. Retrieved 9 August 2020.
- The short film Children of Hiroshima (Reel 1 of 2) (1952) is available for free download at the Internet Archive
- The short film Children of Hiroshima (Reel 2 of 2) (1952) is available for free download at the Internet Archive
- Video footage of the bombing of Nagasaki (silent) on YouTube
- Reconstruction video of the bombing of Hiroshima on YouTube
- Hiroshima – 1945 – Movietone Moment on YouTube
- The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima & Nagasaki public domain audiobook at LibriVox
The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima & Nagasaki public domain audiobook at LibriVoxArchives
- "Nagasaki Archive". Google Earth mapping of Nagasaki bombing archives. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
- "Hiroshima Archive". Google Earth mapping of Hiroshima bombing archives. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
Bibliographies
- "Annotated bibliography for atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues. Archived from the original on 5 March 2012. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
Commemoration
- Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall For The Atomic Bomb Victims
- Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Hall For The Atomic Bomb Victims
- Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum
- Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Look Back at the US Atomic Bombing 64 Years Later – video by Democracy Now!
- Hiroshima & Nagasaki Remembered 2005 website commemorating 60th anniversary