Wahabismo
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El wahabismo ( árabe : الوهابية , romanizado : Al-Wahhābiyyah , literalmente 'wahabismo') es un movimiento y una doctrina de reactivación islámica que comenzó dentro del Islam sunita (principalmente Hanbali ) y está asociado con las enseñanzas de Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab . [a] [1] Se ha descrito de diversas formas como "ortodoxo", [2] "puritano (ical)"; [3] [4] y como un "movimiento de reforma" islámico para restaurar el " culto monoteísta puro " de los devotos.[5] [6]El término wahabí (sm) es usado principalmente por forasteros polémicamente y los adherentes rechazan su uso, prefiriendo ser llamados "salafistas" (un término usado también por seguidores de otros movimientos de reforma islámica), [4] [7] y se ven a sí mismos como 'Muwahhid' (que significa Monoteísta), [8] [9] [10] para enfatizar el principio de Tawhid [11] (la unidad de Dios ). [12] El término también se ha descrito como un insulto sunnifóbico . [13] [14] [15] [16] Se adhiere a la teología Athari .
El wahabismo lleva el nombre de un erudito , teólogo , predicador y activista islámico del siglo XVIII , Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). [5] [17] [18] [19] [20] Comenzó un movimiento de reforma en la región de Najd en Arabia Central , [5] [21] abogando por una purga de prácticas generalizadas como la veneración de los santos y las peregrinaciones a sus tumbas y santuarios que practicaba la gente de Najd, pero que él consideraba impurezas e innovaciones idólatras en el Islam ( bid'ah ). [5] [12] [22]Finalmente, formó un pacto con un líder local, Muhammad bin Saud , ofreciendo lealtad política y prometiendo que la protección y propagación del movimiento wahabí significaba "poder y gloria" y el gobierno de "tierras y hombres". [23]
La alianza entre los seguidores de ibn Abd al-Wahhab y los sucesores de Muhammad bin Saud (la Casa de Saud ) resultó ser duradera. La Casa de Saud continuó manteniendo su alianza político-religiosa con la secta wahabí a través del aumento y la disminución de su propia fortuna política durante los siguientes 150 años, hasta su eventual proclamación del Reino de Arabia Saudita en 1932, y luego, posteriormente, en los tiempos modernos. Hoy en día, las enseñanzas de Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab son la forma oficial del Islam patrocinada por el estado [24] [25] en Arabia Saudita. [26] Con la ayuda de la financiación de las exportaciones de petróleo de Arabia Saudita [27] (y otros factores [28]), el movimiento experimentó un "crecimiento explosivo" a partir de la década de 1970 y ahora tiene influencia mundial. [24] El Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Ha estimado que desde 1976 hasta 2016 entidades estatales y privadas en Riad han destinado al menos $ 10 mil millones (£ 6 mil millones) para seleccionar fundaciones caritativas hacia la subversión de la corriente principal del Islam sunita por el wahabismo. [29] Por otro lado, en 2018 el príncipe heredero saudí Muhammad Bin Salman , negó que alguien "pueda definir este wahabismo" o incluso que exista. [30] (A partir de 2017[update], los cambios en la política religiosa saudita por parte del príncipe heredero Muhammad bin Salman han llevado a algunos a sugerir que "los islamistas de todo el mundo tendrán que seguir su ejemplo o arriesgarse a terminar en el lado equivocado de la ortodoxia". [31]
Los "límites" del wahabismo han sido llamados "difíciles de precisar", [32] pero en el uso contemporáneo, los términos wahabí y salafí a menudo se usan indistintamente, y se consideran movimientos con diferentes raíces que se han fusionado desde la década de 1960. [33] [b] Sin embargo, el wahabismo también ha sido llamado "una orientación particular dentro del salafismo", [35] o como una rama conservadora del salafismo en el Golfo . [36] [37] El poeta nacional de Pakistán , Muhammad Iqbal, elogió el movimiento de reforma Najdi del siglo XVIII como "el primer latido de la vida en el Islam moderno" que se rebeló contra la rigidez de los ulemas . Al señalar su inspiración en los reformadores religiosos del siglo XIX, Iqbal afirmó que "a la inspiración de este movimiento se pueden rastrear, directa o indirectamente, casi todos los grandes movimientos modernos de Asia musulmana y África". [38] [39]
Definiciones y etimología
Definiciones
Algunas definiciones o usos del término Islam wahabí incluyen:
- "un corpus de doctrinas" y "un conjunto de actitudes y comportamientos, derivados de las enseñanzas de un reformista religioso particularmente severo que vivió en Arabia central a mediados del siglo XVIII" ( Gilles Kepel ) [40]
- "Islam puro" (David Commins, parafraseando la definición de los partidarios), [41] que no se desvía de la ley Sharia de ninguna manera y debería llamarse Islam y no wahabismo. (Rey Salman bin Abdul Aziz , rey de Arabia Saudita) [42]
- "un credo equivocado que fomenta la intolerancia, promueve la teología simplista y restringe la capacidad del Islam para adaptarse a circunstancias diversas y cambiantes" (David Commins, parafraseando la definición de los oponentes) [41]
- "un movimiento de reforma conservador ... el credo sobre el que se fundó el reino de Arabia Saudita, y [que] ha influido en los movimientos islámicos en todo el mundo" ( Enciclopedia del Islam y el mundo musulmán ) [43]
- "una secta dominante en Arabia Saudita y Qatar" con presencia en "India, África y otros lugares", con una "interpretación firmemente fundamentalista del Islam en la tradición de Ibn Hanbal" (Cyril Glasse) [11]
- un "movimiento reformista / revivalista del siglo XVIII para la reconstrucción sociomoral de la sociedad", "fundado por Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab" (Diccionario Oxford del Islam). [44]
- Un movimiento que buscaba "un retorno al mensaje prístino del Profeta" e intentó liberar al Islam de todas las "doctrinas superpuestas" y "supersticiones que han oscurecido su mensaje". Su significado espiritual de "luchar por una renovación interior de la sociedad musulmana", se corrompió cuando "su objetivo exterior - la consecución del poder social y político - se realizó" ( Muhammad Asad ) [45]
- "una tendencia política" dentro del Islam que "ha sido adoptada con el propósito de compartir el poder", pero no puede ser llamada una secta porque "no tiene prácticas especiales, ni ritos especiales, ni una interpretación especial de la religión que difiera del cuerpo principal de Islam sunita "(Abdallah Al Obeid, ex decano de la Universidad Islámica de Medina y miembro del Consejo Consultivo Saudita) [32]
- "el verdadero movimiento salafista". Comenzó como un movimiento de reforma teológica, tenía "el objetivo de llamar (da'wa) a la gente a restaurar el significado 'real' de tawhid (unidad de Dios o monoteísmo) y a ignorar y deconstruir las disciplinas y prácticas 'tradicionales' que evolucionaron ''. en la historia islámica como la teología y la jurisprudencia y las tradiciones de visitar tumbas y santuarios de personas veneradas ". (Ahmad Moussalli) [46]
- un término utilizado por los oponentes del salafismo con la esperanza de mancillar ese movimiento al sugerir una influencia extranjera y "evocar imágenes de Arabia Saudita". El término "se utiliza con mayor frecuencia en países donde los salafis son una pequeña minoría" de la comunidad musulmana, pero "han hecho avances recientes" en la "conversión" de la población local al salafismo. (Quintan Wiktorowicz) [9]
- un término general usado incorrectamente para referirse a "cualquier movimiento islámico que tenga una aparente tendencia hacia la misoginia, el militantismo, el extremismo o la interpretación estricta y literal del Corán y el hadiz" (Natana J. DeLong-Bas) [47]
- "Nadie puede definir el wahabismo. No hay wahabismo. No creemos que tengamos wahabismo". (Mohammed bin Salman, príncipe heredero de Arabia Saudita) [48]
Etimología
Según el escritor saudí Abdul Aziz Qassim y otros, fueron los otomanos los que "etiquetaron por primera vez a la escuela islámica de Abdul Wahhab en Arabia Saudita como wahabismo". Los británicos también lo adoptaron e influyeron en el uso del término en el Medio Oriente. [c] El término wahabí no debe confundirse con wahbi, que es el credo dominante dentro del ibadismo . [50]
El erudito argelino Muhammad El Hajjoui afirma que fueron los otomanos los primeros en colocar la etiqueta de "wahabismo" a los hanbalis sunitas de Najd, contratando "eruditos musulmanes de todos los países para componer, escribir y mentir sobre los hanbalis de Najd" con fines políticos. [51] [52]
Nombrar controversia y confusión
A los wahabíes no les gusta, o al menos no les gusta, el término. Ibn Abd-Al-Wahhab era reacio a la elevación de eruditos y otras personas, incluido el uso del nombre de una persona para etiquetar una escuela islámica. [9] [53] [54]
Según Robert Lacey, "a los wahabíes siempre les ha disgustado el nombre que se les da habitualmente" y prefirieron que los llamaran muwahhidun (unitarios). [55] Otro término preferido fue simplemente "musulmanes", ya que su credo es "Islam puro". [56] Sin embargo, los críticos se quejan de que estos términos implican que los no wahabíes no son monoteístas o no musulmanes. [56] [57] Además, los términos Muwahhidun y Unitarios están asociados con otras sectas, tanto existentes como extintas. [58]
Se ha dicho que otros términos que los wahabíes usan y / o prefieren incluyen ahl al-hadith ("pueblo de hadith"), Salafi Da'wa ("predicación salafista") o al-da'wa ila al-tawhid [59] (" predicación del monoteísmo "para la escuela más que para los adherentes) o Ahl ul-Sunna wal Jama'a (" gente de la tradición de Mahoma y el consenso de la Ummah "), [35] Ahl al-Sunnah (" Gente de la Sunna "), [60] o" la reforma o movimiento salafista del jeque "(el jeque es ibn Abdul-Wahhab). [d] La autodesignación como "Gente de la Sunna" fue importante para la autenticidad del wahabismo,porque durante el período otomano sólo el sunnismo era la doctrina legítima. [62]
Muchos, como el escritor Quinton Wiktorowicz, instan al uso del término salafista, sosteniendo que "sería difícil encontrar individuos que se refieran a sí mismos como wahabíes u organizaciones que usen 'wahabí' en su título, o que se refieran a su ideología en este de manera (a menos que estén hablando con una audiencia occidental que no esté familiarizada con la terminología islámica, e incluso entonces el uso es limitado y a menudo aparece como 'salafista / wahabí') ". [9] Un periodista del New York Times escribe que los saudíes "aborrecen" el término wahabismo, "sintiendo que los diferencia y contradice la noción de que el Islam es una fe monolítica". [63] Rey de Arabia Saudita Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saudpor ejemplo, ha atacado el término como "una doctrina que no existe aquí (Arabia Saudita)" y ha desafiado a los usuarios del término a localizar cualquier "desviación de la forma del Islam practicado en Arabia Saudita de las enseñanzas del Corán y los hadices proféticos ". [64] [65] Ingrid Mattson sostiene que "el 'wahbismo' no es una secta. Es un movimiento social que comenzó hace 200 años para librar al Islam de prácticas culturales rígidas que habían (sido) adquiridas a lo largo de los siglos". [66]
Por otro lado, según los autores de Global Security y Library of Congress, el término es ahora común y utilizado incluso por eruditos wahabíes en el Najd, [22] [67] una región a menudo llamada el "corazón" del wahabismo. [68] La periodista Karen House llama "salafista" "un término políticamente más correcto" para "wahabí". [69]
En cualquier caso, según Lacey, ninguno de los otros términos ha tenido éxito, por lo que, al igual que los cuáqueros cristianos , los wahabíes "han seguido siendo conocidos por el nombre que les asignaron en primer lugar sus detractores". [55] Sin embargo, la confusión se agrava aún más debido a la práctica común de varios gobiernos autoritarios que utilizan ampliamente la etiqueta "extremistas wahabíes" para toda oposición, legítima e ilegítima, y justifican represiones masivas contra cualquier disidente. [70]
(Otro movimiento, cuyos adherentes se les llama también "wahabí", pero los que se encontraban Ibaadi Jariyitas , ha causado cierta confusión en el norte y el África subsahariana, donde el líder del movimiento - Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Abd al-Rahman - vivió y predicó en el Siglo VIII d. C. Muhammad al-Shuwair estaba de visita en Mauritania en 1408 d. C. / 1987 d. C., cuando se reunió con líderes musulmanes que le dijeron que les agradaban los saudíes pero que deseaban abandonar la escuela "wahabí" que divide a los musulmanes. La fuente de sus puntos de vista fue que se refirieron a las sentencias dadas por eruditos del norte de África, como al-Wanshireesi, que vivió mucho antes que Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab. Al-Shuwair tuvo que explicarles que esos "wahabíes" no tenían nada que ver con Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.) [71]
Wahabíes y Salafis
El salafismo (de salaf , que significa "antepasados" o "predecesores") es un movimiento dentro del Islam sunita que aboga por el regreso del Islam "puro" como lo practicó el Profeta y la primera generación de eruditos musulmanes. Como dijo ibn Baz :
El llamado salafista es el llamado a lo que Dios ha enviado por su profeta Mahoma, que la paz y las bendiciones sean con él, es el llamado a adherirse al Corán y la Sunnah, este llamado al salafismo es el llamado a seguir las prácticas que el Messenger solía seguirlo en La Meca, luego en Medina. Desde enseñar dawa a los musulmanes, hasta dirigir a las personas a hacer el bien, enseñarles lo que Dios envió por Su Profeta sobre la unidad de Dios (monoteísmo), la lealtad hacia él y la fe en Su Mensajero Muhammad, que la paz y las bendiciones sean con él. [72]
Muchos estudiosos y críticos distinguen entre wahabíes y salafistas. Según el erudito estadounidense Christopher M. Blanchard, el wahabismo se refiere a "un credo islámico conservador centrado y que emana de Arabia Saudita", mientras que Salafiyya es "un movimiento islámico puritano más general que se ha desarrollado de forma independiente en varias épocas y en varios lugares del Islam". mundo". [73]
Sin embargo, muchos ven al wahabismo como el salafismo nativo de Arabia . [74] El wahabismo es la versión árabe del salafismo, según Mark Durie, quien afirma que los líderes sauditas "son activos y diligentes" en el uso de sus considerables recursos financieros "para financiar y promover el salafismo en todo el mundo". [75] Ahmad Moussalli tiende a estar de acuerdo en que el wahabismo es un subconjunto del salafismo y dice que "por regla general, todos los wahabíes son salafistas, pero no todos los salafistas son wahabíes". [46] Quintan Wiktorowicz afirma que los salafistas modernos consideran que el erudito del siglo XVIII Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab y muchos de sus estudiantes fueron salafis. [76]
Historia
La misión wahabí comenzó como un movimiento renovador y reformista en la remota y árida región de Najd . [2] [5] [21] Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab abogó por la purga de prácticas generalizadas como la veneración de piedras, árboles y cuevas; rezando a los santos ; y peregrinaciones a sus tumbas y santuarios que practicaba la gente de Najd, pero que él consideraba impurezas e innovaciones idólatras en el Islam ( bid'ah ). [5] [12] [22] El movimiento enfatizó la adherencia al Qur'an y Hadith , y abogó por el uso de Ijtihad . [2]Finalmente, formó un pacto con un líder local, Muhammad bin Saud , ofreciendo obediencia política y prometiendo que la protección y propagación del movimiento wahabí significaba "poder y gloria" y el gobierno de "tierras y hombres". [23] Con el colapso del Imperio Otomano después de la Primera Guerra Mundial, la dinastía Al Saud , y con él el wahabismo, se extendió a las ciudades santas de La Meca y Medina . Después del descubrimiento de petróleo cerca del Golfo Pérsicoen 1939, tuvo acceso a los ingresos por exportaciones de petróleo, ingresos que crecieron a miles de millones de dólares. Este dinero - gastado en libros, medios de comunicación, escuelas, universidades, mezquitas, becas, becas, trabajos lucrativos para periodistas, académicos y eruditos islámicos - le dio al wahabismo una "posición de fuerza preeminente" en el Islam en todo el mundo. [77]
En el país de la fundación del wahabismo, y con mucho el país más grande y poderoso donde es la religión del estado, los wahabíes ulama obtuvieron el control sobre la educación, la ley, la moral pública y las instituciones religiosas en el siglo XX, al tiempo que permitían como una "compensación "acciones doctrinalmente objetables, como la importación de tecnología y comunicaciones modernas, y el trato con los no musulmanes, en aras de la consolidación del poder de su guardián político, la dinastía Al Saud. [78]
Sin embargo, en las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX, varias crisis trabajaron para erosionar la "credibilidad" wahabí en Arabia Saudita y el resto del mundo musulmán: la toma de la Gran Mezquita en noviembre de 1979 por militantes; el despliegue de tropas estadounidenses en Arabia Saudita durante la Guerra del Golfo de 1991 contra Irak; y los ataques de al-Qaeda del 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Nueva York y Washington. [79]
En cada caso, se pidió al ulema wahabí que apoyara los esfuerzos de la dinastía para reprimir la disidencia religiosa, y en cada caso lo hizo [79] , exponiendo su dependencia de la dinastía saudí y sus políticas a menudo impopulares. [80] [81]
En Occidente, el fin de la Guerra Fría y la alianza anticomunista con la conservadora y religiosa Arabia Saudita y los ataques del 11 de septiembre crearon una enorme desconfianza hacia el reino y especialmente su religión oficial. [82]
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab
El fundador del wahabismo, Mohammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, nació alrededor de 1702-03 en la pequeña ciudad oasis de 'Uyayna en la región de Najd, en lo que ahora es el centro de Arabia Saudita. [83] Estudió en Basora , [84] en lo que ahora es Irak, y posiblemente La Meca y Medina mientras estaba allí para realizar el Hayy , antes de regresar a su ciudad natal de 'Uyayna en 1740. Allí trabajó para difundir la llamada ( da' wa ) por lo que él creía que era una restauración de la verdadera adoración monoteísta ( Tawhid ). [85] También creía que cualquier acto o declaración que involucre adorar a un ser que no sea Dios y asociar a otra criatura con el poder de Dios es equivalente a idolatría (eludir ). El núcleo de la controversia entre él y sus adversarios fue el alcance de estos actos. Aquellos que hicieron actos de devoción como buscar ayuda ( istigatha ) de objetos, tumbas de santos muertos, etc. eran herejes culpables de Shirk (politeísmo). [86]
Tales herejes no serían asesinados directamente, primero, se les daría la oportunidad de arrepentirse. Si se arrepiente, se acepta su arrepentimiento. Si no se arrepiente después de la aclaración de las pruebas, es ejecutado como apóstata. [87] Con el apoyo del gobernante de la ciudad, Uthman ibn Mu'ammar, llevó a cabo algunas de sus reformas religiosas en 'Uyayna, incluida la demolición de la tumba de Zayd ibn al-Khattab , uno de los Sahaba (compañeros ) del profeta Mahoma , y la muerte por lapidación de una mujer adúltera. Sin embargo, un jefe más poderoso (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr) presionó a Uthman ibn Mu'ammar para que lo expulsara de 'Uyayna. [88]
Cuando Mahoma comenzó a predicar su da'wa en el Hejaz controlado por los otomanos, donde prevaleció la veneración de los santos y las supersticiones , inicialmente fue rechazado y llamado "desviado". Más tarde, sin embargo, su llamado a la dawah se hizo extremadamente popular. [89]
Alianza con la Casa de Saud
El gobernante de una ciudad cercana, Muhammad ibn Saud, invitó a ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab a unirse a él, y en 1744 se hizo un pacto entre los dos. [90] Ibn Saud protegería y propagaría las doctrinas de la misión wahabí, mientras que ibn Abdul Wahhab "apoyaría al gobernante, proporcionándole 'gloria y poder'". Quienquiera que defendiera su mensaje, prometió ibn Abdul Wahhab, "gobernará, por medio de él, las tierras y los hombres". [23] Ibn Saud abandonaría los impuestos no Sharia sobre las cosechas locales y, a cambio, Dios podría compensarlo con el botín de la conquista y los impuestos de conformidad con la sharia que excederían lo que renunció. [91] La alianza entre la misión wahabí y la familia Al Saud ha "perdurado durante más de dos siglos y medio", sobreviviendo a la derrota y al colapso.[90][92] Las dos familias se han casado varias veces a lo largo de los años y, en la Arabia Saudita de hoy, el ministro de religión es siempre un miembro de lafamilia Al ash-Sheikh , es decir, un descendiente de Ibn Abdul Wahhab. [93]
Según Natana DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab se contuvo al instar a luchar con supuestos incrédulos, prefiriendo predicar y persuadir en lugar de atacar. [e] Ibn Abdul Wahhab siguió una política de no interferencia en el proyecto de consolidación del estado de Ibn Saud. Mientras Ibn Saud estaba a cargo de los asuntos políticos y militares, prometió defender las enseñanzas religiosas de Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Sin embargo, las campañas militares de Ibn Saud no fueron necesariamente aprobadas por Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Delineando los roles específicos de Amir (líder político) e Imam (líder religioso), ibn Abdul Wahhab estipuló que solo el imán (líder religioso) podría declarar la campaña militar como Jihad.después de cumplir con las estipulaciones religiosas legales. [95] Ibn Abdul Wahhab solo autorizó el Jihad cuando la comunidad wahabí fue atacada primero, como medida defensiva. [f] Sin embargo, después de la muerte de Muhammad bin Saud en 1765, el hijo y sucesor de Muhammad bin Saud, Abdulaziz bin Muhammad , utilizó un enfoque de "convertir o morir" para expandir su dominio. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab renunció a su puesto de imán y se retiró de la vida política y financiera activa en 1773. Abd al-Aziz continuó con su visión expansionista más allá de los confines de Najd. [97]
La conquista se expandió por la Península Arábiga hasta que conquistó La Meca y Medina a principios del siglo XIX. [98] [99] Fue en este momento que los wahabíes abrazaron las ideas de Ibn Taymiyya, que declaró a los musulmanes autoproclamados que no siguen la ley islámica como no musulmanes, para justificar su guerra y conquista de los Sharifs musulmanes de Hijaz. [100]
Uno de sus ataques más notables y controvertidos fue contra la ciudad de Karbala, de mayoría chiíta, en 1802. Según el cronista wahabí 'Uthman b. 'Abdullah b. Bishr, los ejércitos saudíes mataron a muchos de sus habitantes, saquearon sus riquezas y las distribuyeron entre la población. [101]
En 1805, los ejércitos saudíes habían tomado el control de La Meca y Medina . [102] El emir saudí Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud denunció al sultán otomano y cuestionó la validez de su afirmación de ser califa y guardián de los santuarios del Hejaz . [103] El Imperio Otomano, que sospechaba del ambicioso Muhammad Ali de Egipto , le ordenó luchar contra los wahabíes, ya que la derrota de cualquiera de ellos sería beneficioso para ellos. [104] Las tensiones entre Muhammad Ali y sus tropas también lo llevaron a enviarlos a Arabia y luchar contra los saudíes, donde muchos fueron masacrados. Esto llevó a laGuerra otomana-saudí . [105] El Egipto otomano, liderado por Ibrahim Pasha , finalmente logró derrotar a los saudíes en una campaña que comenzó en 1811. [106] En 1818 derrotaron a Al Saud, arrasaron la capital Diriyah , masacraron a sus habitantes y ejecutaron al emir de Al-Saud. y exiliando a los líderes políticos y religiosos del emirato, [92] [107] e intentó sin éxito acabar no solo con la Casa de Saud, sino también con la misión wahabí. [108] El imperio británico dio la bienvenida a la Destrucción de Diriya de Ibrahim Pasha .con el objetivo de promover los intereses comerciales de la región. El capitán George Forster Sadleir, un oficial del ejército británico en la India fue enviado desde Bombay para consultar con Ibrahim Pasha en Dariyya. [109]
Un segundo estado saudita más pequeño ( Emirato de Nejd ) duró desde 1819 hasta 1891. Al estar sus fronteras dentro de Najd, el wahabismo estuvo protegido de futuras campañas otomanas o egipcias por el aislamiento del Najd, la falta de recursos valiosos y la limitada comunicación y transporte de esa época. [110]
En la década de 1880, al menos entre los habitantes de la ciudad, si no los beduinos, la doctrina monoteísta ortodoxa de Salafiyya se había convertido en la cultura religiosa nativa del Najd. [111]
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud
En 1901, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud , un descendiente de quinta generación de Muhammad ibn Saud, [112] inició una campaña militar que condujo a la conquista de gran parte de la península arábiga y la fundación de la actual Arabia Saudita, tras el colapso de los otomanos. Imperio. [113] Bajo el reinado de Abdulaziz, "las consideraciones políticas triunfaron sobre el idealismo religioso" favorecido por los piadosos wahabíes. Su éxito político y militar dio a los wahabíes ulama control sobre las instituciones religiosas con jurisdicción sobre un territorio considerable y, en años posteriores, las ideas wahabíes formaron la base de las reglas y leyes relativas a los asuntos sociales y dieron forma a las políticas judiciales y educativas del reino. [114]Pero las protestas de los wahabíes ulama fueron anuladas cuando se trataba de consolidar el poder en Hijaz y al-Hasa, mantener una relación positiva con el gobierno británico , adoptar tecnología moderna, establecer un marco administrativo gubernamental simple o firmar una concesión petrolera con los EE . UU. [115 ] El ulama wahabí también emitió una fatwa afirmando que "solo el gobernante podía declarar una jihad" (una violación de la enseñanza de Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, según DeLong-Bas). [95] [116]
A medida que el reino del wahabismo se expandió bajo Ibn Saud hacia áreas chiítas ( al-Hasa , conquistada en 1913) y Hejaz (conquistada en 1924–25), facciones radicales entre los wahabíes como los Ikhwan presionaron por la conversión forzada de los chiítas y la erradicación de ( lo que vieron como) idolatría. Ibn Saud buscó "un enfoque más relajado". [117] En al-Hasa, los esfuerzos para detener la observancia de las fiestas religiosas chiítas y reemplazar los deberes de enseñanza y predicación de los clérigos chiítas por wahabíes duraron solo un año. [118]En La Meca y Jeddah (en Hejaz) la prohibición del tabaco, el alcohol, jugar a las cartas y escuchar música en el fonógrafo era más flexible que en Najd. A pesar de las objeciones de los wahabíes ulama, Ibn Saud permitió tanto la conducción de automóviles como la asistencia de chiítas al hajj. [119]
La aplicación del derecho imperante y la prohibición del mal, como la observancia de la oración, las pautas islámicas de segregación sexual , etc., ocuparon un lugar destacado durante el Tercer emirato saudí, y en 1926 se fundó en La Meca un comité formal para su aplicación. [11] [120] [121]
Mientras los guerreros wahabíes juraron lealtad a los monarcas de Al Saud, hubo una gran rebelión. El rey Abdulaziz reprimió a los rebeldes Ikhwan , miembros de tribus nómadas convertidos en guerreros wahabíes que se opusieron a "introducir innovaciones como teléfonos, automóviles y el telégrafo" y "enviar a su hijo a un país de incrédulos (Egipto)". [122] Gran Bretaña había advertido a Abdulaziz cuando el Ikhwan atacó los protectorados británicos de Transjordania , Irak y Kuwait , como una continuación de la jihad para expandir el reino wahabista. [123] Los Ikhwan eran en su mayoría miembros de tribus beduinas que creían que tenían derecho a la Yihad independiente, las incursiones, etc. sin el permiso delAmir y tuvieron conflictos tanto con los gobernantes wahabíes ulemas como con los saudíes. También se opusieron a los impuestos saudíes sobre las tribus nómadas. Después de sus incursiones contra los habitantes de Arabia Saudita, Ibn Saud se enfrentó a un enfrentamiento final contra los Ikhwan con el respaldo de los Wahhabi ulema en 1929. El Ikhwan fue derrotado de manera decisiva y buscó el respaldo de los gobernantes extranjeros de Kuwait y el Imperio Británico. En enero de 1930, el cuerpo principal de Ikhwan se rindió a los británicos cerca de la frontera entre Arabia Saudita y Kuwait. El movimiento wahabí fue percibido como un movimiento de poblaciones asentadas de la Península Arábiga contra la dominación nómada de las rutas comerciales, los impuestos y su jahiliyya.costumbres. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab había criticado a las tribus nómadas y los cronistas wahabíes elogiaron a los gobernantes saudíes por domesticar a los beduinos. [124]
Conexión con el mundo exterior
Antes de Abdulaziz, durante la mayor parte de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, había una fuerte aversión a mezclarse con "idólatras" (incluida la mayoría de los habitantes del mundo musulmán ) en tierras wahabíes. Como mínimo, los clérigos wahabíes consideraban pecaminoso el contacto voluntario, y si uno disfrutaba de la compañía de los idólatras y "aprobaba su religión", se consideraba un acto de incredulidad . [125] Viajar fuera del ámbito de Najd a las tierras otomanas "estaba estrictamente controlado, si no prohibido por completo". [126]
A lo largo de su historia, sin embargo, el wahabismo se ha vuelto más complaciente con el mundo exterior. [126] A finales del siglo XIX, los wahabíes encontraron musulmanes con creencias al menos similares, primero con Ahl-i Hadith en India, [127] y más tarde con revivalistas islámicos en los estados árabes (uno de ellos fue Mahmud Sahiri al-Alusi en Bagdad). [128] Los avivadores y wahabíes compartían un interés común en el pensamiento de Ibn Taymiyya , la permisibilidad del ijtihad y la necesidad de purificar las prácticas innovadoras de adoración. [129] En la década de 1920, Rashid Rida , un salafista pionero cuyo periódico al-Manarfue ampliamente leído en el mundo musulmán, publicó una "antología de tratados wahabíes" y una obra que alababa a Ibn Saud como "el salvador de los Haramayn [las dos ciudades santas] y un practicante del auténtico gobierno islámico". [130] [131]
En un intento por "unirse a la corriente principal musulmana y borrar la reputación de sectarismo extremo asociado con el Ikhwan", en 1926 Ibn Saud convocó un congreso musulmán de representantes de gobiernos musulmanes y asociaciones populares. [132] A principios de la década de 1950, las "presiones" sobre Ibn Saud de controlar las regiones de Hejaz y al-Hasa - "fuera del corazón wahabí" - y de "navegar por las corrientes de la política regional" "perforaron el sello" entre los El corazón wahabí y la "tierra de la idolatría" en el exterior. [133] [134]
Una corriente importante en la política regional en ese momento era el nacionalismo secular , que, con Gamal Abdul Nasser , estaba barriendo el mundo árabe. Para combatirlo, el alcance misionero wahabí trabajó en estrecha colaboración con las iniciativas de política exterior saudí. En mayo de 1962, una conferencia en La Meca organizada por saudíes discutió formas de combatir el laicismo y el socialismo. A su paso, se estableció la Liga Musulmana Mundial . [135] Para propagar el Islam y "repeler tendencias y dogmas hostiles", la Liga abrió sucursales en todo el mundo. [136] Desarrolló una asociación más estrecha entre los wahabíes y los principales salafis, e hizo una causa común con la Hermandad Musulmana de avivamiento islámico , Ahl-i Hadith.y el Jamaat-i Islami , combatiendo el sufismo y las prácticas religiosas populares "innovadoras" [135] y rechazando las "formas occidentales y occidentales que eran tan perjudiciales para la piedad y los valores musulmanes". [137] Se enviaron misioneros a África Occidental, donde la Liga financió escuelas, distribuyó literatura religiosa y otorgó becas para asistir a universidades religiosas sauditas. Un resultado fue la Sociedad Izala, que luchó contra el sufismo en Nigeria, Chad, Níger y Camerún. [138]
Un evento que tuvo un gran efecto en el wahabismo en Arabia Saudita [139] fue la "infiltración del movimiento de reactivación transnacionalista" en la forma de miles de refugiados piadosos, islámicos árabes musulmanes de la Hermandad Musulmana de Egipto después de la represión de Nasser contra la Hermandad [140] ( y también de represiones nacionalistas similares en Irak [141] y Siria [142] ), para ayudar al personal del nuevo sistema escolar del Reino (en gran parte analfabeto). [143]
La ideología islamista de la Hermandad difería del wahabismo más conservador que predicaba la obediencia leal al rey . La Hermandad trató lo que un autor (Robert Lacey) llamó "conceptos que promueven el cambio" como la justicia social y el anticolonialismo, y dio "un giro religioso radical, pero aparentemente seguro" a los valores wahabíes que los estudiantes sauditas "habían absorbido en la infancia". . Con el "Islam radical y práctico" de la Hermandad, la jihad se convirtió en una "posibilidad práctica hoy", no solo en parte de la historia. [144]
El clero y el gobierno sauditas ordenaron a los Hermanos que no intentaran hacer proselitismo o involucrarse en asuntos doctrinales religiosos dentro del Reino, pero no obstante, "tomaron el control de la vida intelectual de Arabia Saudita" mediante la publicación de libros y la participación en círculos de discusión y salones organizados por príncipes. [145] Con el tiempo, asumieron roles de liderazgo en ministerios gubernamentales clave, [146] y tuvieron influencia en el plan de estudios de educación. [147] Una universidad islámica en Medina creada en 1961 para capacitar a proselitistas, en su mayoría no sauditas, en el wahabismo. [148] se convirtió en "un refugio" para los refugiados de los Hermanos Musulmanes de Egipto. [149]Las ideas de los Hermanos finalmente se extendieron por todo el reino y tuvieron un gran efecto en el wahabismo, aunque los observadores difieren en cuanto a si esto fue "socavando" [139] [150] o "mezclándose" con él. [151] [152]
Crecimiento
En las décadas de 1950 y 1960 en Arabia Saudita, los ulama wahabíes mantuvieron su control sobre los tribunales religiosos y presidieron la creación de universidades islámicas y un sistema de escuelas públicas que les dio a los estudiantes "una fuerte dosis de instrucción religiosa". [153] Fuera de Arabia Saudita, el ulama wahabí se volvió "menos combativo" hacia el resto del mundo musulmán. Al enfrentar el desafío de Occidente, la doctrina wahabí "sirvió bien" para muchos musulmanes como "plataforma" y "ganó adeptos más allá de la península". [153] [154]
Se han dado varias razones para este éxito: el crecimiento en popularidad y fuerza del nacionalismo árabe (aunque los wahabíes se oponían a cualquier forma de nacionalismo como ideología, los saudíes eran árabes y su enemigo, el califato otomano, era étnicamente turco), [28 ] y reforma islámica (específicamente reformar siguiendo el ejemplo de esas tres primeras generaciones de musulmanes conocidos como salaf ); [28] la destrucción del Imperio Otomano que patrocinó a sus críticos más efectivos; [155] la destrucción de otro rival, el Khilafa en Hejaz, en 1925. [28]
No menos importante fue el dinero que Arabia Saudita ganó por la exportación de petróleo. [77]
Era de las exportaciones de petróleo
El bombeo y exportación de petróleo de Arabia Saudita comenzó durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y sus ganancias ayudaron a financiar actividades religiosas en las décadas de 1950 y 1960. Pero fue la crisis del petróleo de 1973 y la cuadriplicación del precio del petróleo lo que aumentó astronómicamente la riqueza del reino y aumentó su prestigio al demostrar su poder internacional como líder de la OPEP. En 1980, Arabia Saudita ganaba cada tres días los ingresos del petróleo que le había costado un año obtener antes del embargo. [156]Decenas de miles de millones de dólares estadounidenses de este dinero se gastaron en libros, medios de comunicación, escuelas, becas para estudiantes (desde primaria hasta posgrados), becas y subsidios para recompensar a periodistas, académicos y eruditos islámicos, la construcción de cientos de centros islámicos y universidades, y más de mil escuelas y mil mezquitas. [157] [158] [159] Durante este tiempo, el wahabismo alcanzó lo que Gilles Kepel llamó una "posición preeminente de fuerza en la expresión global del Islam". [77]
Jihad de Afganistán
La "cúspide de la cooperación" entre los wahabíes y los grupos revivalistas musulmanes fue la jihad afgana. [160]
En diciembre de 1979, la Unión Soviética invadió Afganistán . Poco después, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam , un clérigo de los Hermanos Musulmanes vinculado a instituciones religiosas sauditas, [g] emitió una fatwa [h] declarando la yihad defensiva en Afganistán contra la Unión Soviética atea, " fard ayn", una obligación personal (o individual) para todos los musulmanes. El edicto fue apoyado por el Gran Mufti de Arabia Saudita (el más alto erudito religioso), Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz , entre otros. [161] [162]
Entre 1982 y 1992, se estima que 35.000 voluntarios musulmanes individuales fueron a Afganistán para luchar contra los soviéticos y su régimen afgano. Miles más asistieron a escuelas fronterizas repletas de ex y futuros combatientes. En algún lugar entre 12.000 y 25.000 de estos voluntarios procedían de Arabia Saudita. [163] Arabia Saudita y las otras monarquías conservadoras del Golfo también proporcionaron un apoyo financiero considerable a la yihad: 600 millones de dólares al año en 1982. [164]
En 1989, las tropas soviéticas se habían retirado y en pocos años el régimen prosoviético de Kabul se había derrumbado. [ cita requerida ]
Este triunfo religioso saudí / wahabí se destacó aún más en el mundo musulmán porque muchos estados de mayoría musulmana (y la OLP ) estaban aliados con la Unión Soviética y no apoyaban la jihad afgana. [165] Pero muchos voluntarios de la jihad (el más famoso Osama bin Laden ) que regresaban a Arabia Saudita y en otros lugares a menudo eran radicalizados por militantes islámicos que eran "mucho más extremos que sus patrocinadores saudíes". [165]
"Erosión" del wahabismo
Revolución islámica en Irán
La Revolución Islámica de febrero de 1979 en Irán desafió al wahabismo saudí de varias maneras en varios frentes. Fue una revolución chií, no sunita, y el wahabismo sostenía que los chiítas no eran verdaderamente musulmanes. No obstante, su enorme popularidad en Irán y su derrocamiento de una monarquía secular pro estadounidense generó un enorme entusiasmo entre los piadosos sunitas, no solo entre los musulmanes chiítas de todo el mundo. [166] Su líder ( Ruhollah Khomeini) predicó que la monarquía estaba en contra del Islam y que Estados Unidos era el enemigo del Islam, y pidió el derrocamiento de la familia al-Saud. (En 1987, el discurso público de Jomeini declaró que "estos wahabíes viles e impíos son como dagas que siempre han traspasado el corazón de los musulmanes por la espalda", y anunció que La Meca estaba en manos de "una banda de herejes ". [167] ) [168] Todo esto estimuló a Arabia Saudita, un reino aliado con Estados Unidos, a "redoblar sus esfuerzos para contrarrestar a Irán y difundir el wahabismo en todo el mundo", y revirtió cualquier movimiento de los líderes sauditas para distanciarse del wahabismo o "suavizar" su ideología. . [169]
Incautación de la Gran Mezquita
En 1979, entre 400 y 500 insurgentes islamistas, utilizando armas y suministros de contrabando, se apoderaron de la Gran Mezquita de La Meca, pidieron el derrocamiento de la monarquía, denunciaron a los ulama wahabíes como marionetas reales y anunciaron la llegada del Mahdi del " fin de los tiempos". ". Los insurgentes se desviaron de la doctrina wahabí en detalles significativos, [170] pero también fueron asociados con líderes wahabíes ulama (Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz conocía al líder insurgente, Juhayman al-Otaybi ). [171]Su toma del lugar más sagrado del Islam, la toma de rehenes de cientos de peregrinos del Hajj y la muerte de cientos de militantes, fuerzas de seguridad y rehenes atrapados en el fuego cruzado durante la reconquista de la mezquita, que duró dos semanas, conmocionó al mundo islámico [172 ] y no realzó el prestigio de Al Saud como "custodios" de la mezquita.
El incidente también dañó el prestigio del establecimiento wahabí. El liderazgo saudí buscó y recibió wahabíes fatawa para aprobar la destitución militar de los insurgentes y luego ejecutarlos, [173] pero los clérigos wahabíes también fueron sospechosos de estar involucrados con los insurgentes. [174] En parte como consecuencia, los clérigos Sahwa influenciados por las ideas de los Hermanos recibieron rienda suelta. También se pensó que su ideología competiría con el reciente revolucionarismo islámico / tercermundismo de la revolución iraní. [174]
Aunque los insurgentes estaban motivados por el puritanismo religioso, el incidente no fue seguido por una ofensiva contra otros puristas religiosos, sino por dar mayor poder a los ulama y a los conservadores religiosos para hacer cumplir más estrictamente los códigos islámicos de innumerables formas [175] , desde la prohibición de imágenes de mujeres en los medios de comunicación para agregar aún más horas de estudios islámicos en la escuela y dar más poder y dinero a la policía religiosa para hacer cumplir las reglas de comportamiento conservadoras. [176] [177] [178]
Guerra del Golfo de 1990
En agosto de 1990, el Iraq invadió y anexó Kuwait. Preocupados de que Saddam Hussein pudiera avanzar hacia el sur y apoderarse de sus propios campos petroleros, los saudíes solicitaron el apoyo militar de Estados Unidos y permitieron que decenas de miles de soldados estadounidenses se asentaran en el Reino para luchar contra Irak. [179] Pero lo que "equivalía a buscar la ayuda de los infieles contra un poder musulmán" era difícil de justificar en términos de la doctrina wahabí. [180] [181]
Una vez más, las autoridades sauditas solicitaron y recibieron una fatwa de los líderes wahabíes ulama que apoyaban su acción. La fatwa no logró persuadir a muchos musulmanes conservadores y ulama que se oponían firmemente a la presencia de Estados Unidos, incluido el movimiento Sahwah "Despertar" apoyado por la Hermandad Musulmana que comenzó a presionar por un cambio político en el reino. [182] Fuera del reino, los grupos de reactivación islamista que habían recibido ayuda de Arabia Saudita durante mucho tiempo y tenían vínculos con los wahabíes (yihadistas árabes, islamistas paquistaníes y afganos) apoyaron a Irak, no a Arabia Saudita. [183]
Durante este tiempo y más tarde, muchos en el movimiento wahabí / salafista (como Osama bin Laden) no solo ya no miraban al monarca saudí como un emir del Islam, sino que apoyaban su derrocamiento, centrándose en la yihad contra los EE. UU. Y (lo que ellos creen son) otros enemigos del Islam. [184] [185] (Este movimiento a veces se denomina neo-wahabí o neo-salafí. [46] [186] )
Después del 11 de septiembre
Muchos, al menos fuera del reino, asumieron que atacar al aliado putativo de Arabia Saudita (matando a casi tres mil personas y causando al menos $ 10 mil millones en daños a la propiedad e infraestructura [187] ) era "una expresión del wahabismo", ya que el líder de al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden y la mayoría de los secuestradores eran ciudadanos saudíes. [188] Una reacción violenta en los EE.UU. antes hospitalarios contra el reino se centró en su religión oficial, que algunos llegaron a considerar "una doctrina de terrorismo y odio". [82]
Dentro del reino, el príncipe heredero Abdullah se dirigió a los líderes religiosos, tribales, empresariales y de los medios de comunicación del país tras los ataques en una serie de reuniones televisadas en las que pedían una estrategia para corregir lo que había salido mal. Según Robert Lacey , las reuniones y los artículos y respuestas posteriores de un clérigo superior, Abdullah Turki, y dos príncipes importantes de Al Saud, el príncipe Turki Al-Faisal y el príncipe Talal bin Abdul Aziz , sirvieron como una ocasión para determinar quién tenía la poder en el reino: no los ulama, sino la dinastía Al Saud. Declararon que los gobernantes musulmanes estaban destinados a ejercer el poder, mientras que los eruditos religiosos debían aconsejar. [189]
En 2003-2004, Arabia Saudita vio una ola de atentados suicidas con bomba relacionados con Al Qaeda, ataques contra extranjeros no musulmanes (aproximadamente el 80% de los empleados en el sector privado saudí son trabajadores extranjeros [190] y constituyen aproximadamente el 30% de los población del país), [191] y tiroteos entre las fuerzas de seguridad sauditas y militantes. Una reacción a los ataques fue una reducción del dominio de la religión y la sociedad por parte del establishment wahabí. Se llevaron a cabo "Diálogos Nacionales" que incluyeron "chiítas, sufíes, reformadores liberales y mujeres profesionales". [192] En 2009, como parte de lo que algunos llamaron un esfuerzo por "enfrentarse a los ulama y reformar el establecimiento clerical", el rey Abdullahemitió un decreto por el que sólo a los eruditos religiosos "oficialmente aprobados" se les permitiría emitir fatwas en Arabia Saudita. El rey también amplió el Consejo de Eruditos Mayores (que contiene eruditos religiosos aprobados oficialmente) para incluir a eruditos de las escuelas sunitas de jurisprudencia islámica distintas de las escuelas Hanbali madhab - Shafi'i , Hanafi y Maliki . [193]
Las relaciones con los Hermanos Musulmanes se han deteriorado constantemente. Después del 11 de septiembre, el entonces ministro del Interior, el príncipe Nayef, culpó a la Hermandad de extremismo en el reino, [194] y la declaró culpable de "traición a las promesas e ingratitud" y "la fuente de todos los problemas en el mundo islámico", después de fue elegido para el poder en Egipto. [195] En marzo de 2014, el gobierno saudí declaró a la Hermandad como una "organización terrorista". [179]
En abril de 2016, Arabia Saudita despojó a su policía religiosa, que aplica la ley islámica en la sociedad y es conocida como la Comisión para la Promoción de la Virtud y la Prevención del Vicio , de su poder de seguir, perseguir, detener, interrogar, verificar la identificación o arrestar a las personas sospechosas en el desempeño de sus funciones. Se les pidió que informaran sobre comportamientos sospechosos a la policía regular y a las unidades antidrogas, quienes decidirían si continuar con el asunto. [196] [197]
Muhammad bin Salman
Las acciones reformistas sobre la política religiosa tomadas por el príncipe heredero Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) en 2017 han llevado a algunos a cuestionar el futuro del conservadurismo wahabí. En una entrevista de octubre de 2017 con el periódico The Guardian , MbS declaró
Lo que pasó en los últimos 30 años no es Arabia Saudita. Lo que sucedió en la región en los últimos 30 años no es el Medio Oriente. Después de la revolución iraní de 1979, la gente quería copiar este modelo en diferentes países, uno de ellos es Arabia Saudita. No sabíamos cómo lidiar con eso. Y el problema se extendió por todo el mundo. Ahora es el momento de deshacerse de él. [198]
MBS se ha pronunciado a favor de permitir que las mujeres conduzcan y entren en estadios deportivos, y finalmente reabrieron los cines. Según Kamel Daoud, MBS está "sobre todo ... presionando al clero y anunciando la revisión y certificación de los grandes cánones de la ortodoxia musulmana, incluidos los hadices , la recopilación de los dichos del profeta Mahoma". [31]
La conferencia internacional de 2016 sobre el Islam sunita en Grozny (una conferencia sufí financiada por el gobierno de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos ) donde "200 eruditos musulmanes de Egipto, Rusia, Siria, Sudán, Jordania y Europa rechazan [ed] la doctrina de Arabia Saudita", [199] ha sido descrito por el Huffington Post como un "asalto frontal al wahabismo" (así como un asalto a otras "interpretaciones conservadoras del Islam, como el salafismo y el deobandismo "). [200] [201]
En una entrevista histórica en mayo de 2021 que explica la Visión 2030 , MBS defendió a Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab y señaló futuras reformas religiosas, declarando:
"Si el jeque Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab estuviera con nosotros hoy y nos encontrara comprometidos ciegamente con sus textos y cerrando nuestras mentes a la interpretación y la jurisprudencia mientras lo deificaba y santificaba, él sería el primero en oponerse a esto. No hay escuelas fijas de pensamiento y no hay una persona infalible. Debemos involucrarnos en la interpretación continua de los textos coránicos y lo mismo ocurre con la sunnah del Profeta ... " [202] [203] [204]
Al defender las políticas sauditas contra los grupos extremistas, MBS declaró que el pensamiento extremista es contrario a la religión y la cultura islámicas, y que no se puede avanzar en una cultura extremista. MBS definió la moderación como acatar "el Corán, la Sunnah y el sistema de gobierno básico" y su implementación en un sentido amplio que es tolerante con varias escuelas de pensamiento. Además, el Príncipe Heredero defendió la Ley Básica de Arabia Saudita , declarando:
"... la constitución saudita, que es el Corán, la Sunnah y nuestro sistema de gobierno básico ... seguirá siéndolo por siempre ... Así que, en última instancia, nuestra referencia es el Corán y la Sunnah del Profeta (la paz sea con él ) ... Nuestro papel es asegurarnos de que todas las leyes aprobadas en Arabia Saudita reflejen lo siguiente: Uno, que no violen el Corán y la Sunnah ... que preserven la seguridad y los intereses de los ciudadanos, y que ayuden a el desarrollo y la prosperidad del país ". [202] [203] [205]
Los pronunciamientos de MBS que rechazan a Arabia Saudita como un "estado wahabí", la promoción de Ijtihad y el fomento de la tolerancia hacia otras escuelas (al tiempo que reafirman la no existencia de una "escuela wahabí") fueron recibidos con elogios en los medios árabes y los columnistas liberales . También se hizo eco de los llamamientos del presidente egipcio 'Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi para una "revolución religiosa" en 2018. Sugiere una posible coordinación entre las dos naciones sobre reformas religiosas, pocos días después de la entrevista de MBS, Gran Imán de Al- Azhar , Ahmed el-Tayeb pidió una "renovación religiosa", declarando:
"La renovación constante asegura que el Islam siga siendo una religión vital y dinámica que difunde justicia e igualdad entre las personas. El llamado a santificar la herencia jurisprudencial y tratarla como igual a la sharia islámica [en sí] conduce al estancamiento ... debido a elementos que insisten en adherirse, de manera literal, a antiguas normas que se consideraron innovadoras en su día ”. [206]
Memorias del señor Hempher
Una descripción apócrifa ampliamente difundida pero desacreditada de la fundación del wahabismo [207] [208] conocida como Memorias del Sr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East (se han utilizado otros títulos) [209] alega que un agente británico llamado Hempher fue el responsable de la creación del wahabismo. [209] [210] El libro ha sido criticado como "una variación anglófoba de Los protocolos de los ancianos de Sión ". [208]
Relaciones con otros movimientos de reforma islámica
Ahl-i-Hadith
El movimiento wahabí fue parte de la corriente general de varias tendencias del renacimiento islámico en el siglo XVIII. Estaría influenciado y, a su vez, influiría en muchos otros movimientos de reactivación de la reforma islámica en todo el mundo. El movimiento Ahl-i-Hadith del subcontinente fue un movimiento revivalista sunita inspirado en los pensamientos de Shah Waliullah Dehlawi , Shawkani y Syed Ahmed Barelvi . Condenan totalmente el taqlid y abogan por el ijtihad basado en las escrituras. [211] Fundada a mediados del siglo XIX en Bhopal, pone gran énfasis en los estudios de hadices y condena la imitación de las escuelas de derecho canónicas. Se identifican con la primera escuela deAhl al-Hadith . A finales del siglo XIX, los eruditos wahabíes establecieron contactos con Ahl-i-Hadith y muchos estudiantes wahabíes estudiarían con los eruditos de Ahl-i-Hadith, muchos de los cuales más tarde fueron destacados eruditos salafistas en Arabia. [212] [213]
Tanto los wahabíes como Ahl-i-Hadith compartían un credo común, se oponían a las prácticas sufíes como visitar santuarios, buscar ayuda de los awliya muertos (istigatha), etc. Ambos movimientos revivieron las enseñanzas del teólogo y jurista sunita medieval, Ibn Taymiyya, a quien consideraban como " Shaykh al-Islam ". Con los recursos del principado musulmán de Bhopal a su disposición, Muhaddith Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan se convirtió en un firme defensor de la causa Ahl-i-Hadith en la India . A causa de las inestabilidades de la Arabia del siglo XIX, muchos ulemas wahabíes se dirigían a la India y estudiaban con Ahl-i-Hadith.mecenazgo. Destacados eruditos sauditas como Hamad Ibn Atiq mantendrían correspondencia con Siddiq Hasan Khan, solicitándole que enviara varias obras clásicas, debido a la escasez de tratados clásicos entre los eruditos najdi del siglo XIX. Enviaría a su hijo mayor, Sa'd ibn Atiq, a la India para estudiar con Siddiq Hasan Khan y con Sayyid Nazir Hussain durante más de nueve años. Sa'd Ibn Atiq se convertiría en una autoridad académica importante en el Tercer Estado Saudita designado por Ibn Saud como el cadí de Riyadh , así como el Imam de la Gran Mezquita de Riyad, lo que le da una gran influencia en la educación de los ulemas wahabíes. Entre sus estudiantes estaba Abd al Aziz Ibn Baz, quien fue muy influenciado por el indio Ahl-i-Hadith . Otro hijo de Sa'd Ibn Atiq, así como otros destacados eruditos Najdi de Aal Ash-Shaykh , estudiarían con el indio Ahl-i-Hadith durante el siglo XIX y principios del XX. [212] [214]
En 1931, un erudito indio Ahl-i-Hadith , Shaykh Ahmad ibn Muhammad Al Dehlawi, fundó el instituto Dar-ul-Hadith , que más tarde se adscribirá a la Universidad Islámica de Medina . Fomentaría el estudio de Hadith en todo Hejaz y también allanaría el camino para Albani y sus facciones Muhaddith en la década de 1960, con el apoyo de Ibn Baz, culminando con la consolidación del Salafi Manhaj contemporáneo . Ibn Baz, quien fue muy influenciado por Ahl-i-Hadith , compartió la pasión por el resurgimiento de las ciencias Hadith . Después del establecimiento del tercer estado saudí y el boom petrolero, los jeques sauditas pagarían sus deudas apoyando a Ahl-i-Hadith a través de las finanzas y las publicaciones masivas. Los maestros de Mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim también incluyeron estudiantes de eruditos Ahl-i-Hadith y él también hizo esfuerzos para apoyar la causa india Ahl-i-Hadith . Después de Mufti Muhammad, Ibn Baz como el Gran Mufti de Arabia Saudita apoyaría mucho el movimiento. Destacados eruditos de Ahl-i-Hadith como Shaykh Abdul Ghaffar Khan serían designados para enseñar en universidades sauditas. Sus estudiantes famosos incluyeron a Safar al Hawali y Muqbil bin Hadi al Wadi . Con patrocinio saudí, un vasto Ahl-i-Hadithse desarrolló la red. Los seminarios Ahl-i-Hadith experimentaron un aumento fenomenal de 134 en 1988 a 310 en 2000 (131 por ciento) y actualmente suman alrededor de 500. Según estimaciones paquistaníes, 34.000 estudiantes estudiaron bajo las madrazas Ahl-i-Hadith en 2006 en comparación con 18.800 en 1996 ( en comparación con 200.000 estudiantes Deobandi y 190.000 estudiantes Barelvi en 2006). Ahl-i-Hadith ha tenido un éxito notable en la conversión de musulmanes de otras escuelas de pensamiento. [215] [216]
Salafiyya otomana
A principios del siglo XIX, el erudito musulmán egipcio Abd al Rahman al Jabarti había defendido el movimiento wahabí. A partir del siglo XIX, los reformadores otomanos prominentes de Salafiyya mantendrían correspondencia con los wahabíes y los defenderían de los ataques sufíes. Estos incluían a Shihab al Din al Alusi , Abd al Hamid al Zahrawi, Abd al Qadir al Jabarti, Abd al Hakim al Afghani, Nu'man Khayr al-Din Al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri Al Alusi y su discípulo Muhammad Bahjat Al-Athari , Jamal al Din al Qasimi , Tahir al Jaza'iri , Muhibb al Din al Khatib , Muhammad Hamid al Fiqi y, sobre todo, Muhammad Rasheed Ridaquien fue considerado como el "líder de los salafis". Todos estos eruditos se corresponderían con eruditos árabes e indios de Ahl-i-Hadith y defenderían el pensamiento reformista. Compartían un interés común en oponerse a varias prácticas sufíes, denunciando el seguimiento ciego y reviviendo la teología correcta y las ciencias del hadiz. También abrieron la biblioteca Zahiriyya , la biblioteca Salafiyya , la biblioteca Al Manar , etc., propagando el pensamiento salafista y promoviendo a académicos como Ibn Taymiyya e Ibn Hazm. Rashid Rida tendría éxito en sus esfuerzos por rehabilitar a los wahabíes en el mundo islámico y conseguiría la amistad de muchos eruditos najdi. Con el apoyo del Tercer Estado Saudita en la década de 1920, un concepto de "Salafiyya"surgió a escala global reclamando herencia al pensamiento de los movimientos de reforma islámica del siglo XVIII y los piadosos predecesores ( Salaf ). Muchos de los discípulos de Rida serían asignados a varios puestos en Arabia Saudita y algunos de ellos permanecerían en Arabia Saudita. Otros difundirían la da'wa salafista a sus respectivos países. Entre estos discípulos se destacaron el sirio Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (1894-1976), el egipcio Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (1892-1959) y el marroquí Taqi al-Din al-Hilali (1894-1987). [217] [218] [219] [220]
El erudito sirio Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, ávido lector de Al-Manar y alumno de Muhammad Bahjat al Bitar (discípulo de Rida y Al-Qasimi) se adheriría plenamente a la metodología Salafiyya . Animado por su llamado a la reevaluación y la reactivación de los hadices, se dedicaría a los estudios de hadices y se convertiría en un muhaddith de renombre . Siguió los pasos de la antigua escuela Ahlul Hadith y aceptó la llamada de Ahl-i-Hadith . En la década de 1960, enseñaría en Arabia Saudita ejerciendo una profunda influencia allí. En la década de 1970, los pensamientos de Albani ganarían popularidad y se consolidó la noción de " Salafi Manhaj ". [221]
Practicas
Como movimiento de reactivación religiosa que trabaja para que los musulmanes vuelvan de lo que cree que son acumulaciones extranjeras que han corrompido el Islam, [222] y cree que el Islam es una forma de vida completa y, por lo tanto, tiene prescripciones para todos los aspectos de la vida, el wahabismo es bastante estricto. en lo que considera comportamiento islámico. Como resultado, se ha descrito como la "forma más estricta del Islam sunita". [223] Por otro lado, argumentan los críticos, el wahabismo no es estricto, sino una versión distorsionada del Islam y no se basa en la ley tradicional de la Sharia , ni su práctica es típica o está empantanada en las raíces del Islam. [224] [225] A diferencia de otras escuelas de sunnismo, los wahabíes advierten que deben basar los principios islámicos únicamente en el Corán yHadith , [226] rechazando gran parte del material derivado de la cultura islámica.
Sin embargo, esto no significa que todos los adherentes estén de acuerdo sobre lo que se requiere o está prohibido , o que las reglas no hayan variado por área o cambiado con el tiempo. En Arabia Saudita, la estricta atmósfera religiosa de la doctrina wahabí es visible en la conformidad en la vestimenta, el comportamiento público y la oración pública, [227] y hace sentir su presencia en la amplia libertad de acción de la " policía religiosa ", los clérigos en las mezquitas, maestros en las escuelas y jueces (que son eruditos legales religiosos) en los tribunales sauditas. [228]
Los "límites" del wahabismo han sido llamados "difíciles de precisar", [32] pero en el uso contemporáneo, los términos wahabí y salafí a menudo se usan indistintamente, y se consideran movimientos con diferentes raíces que se han fusionado desde la década de 1960. [33] [229] [b] Sin embargo, el wahabismo también ha sido llamado "una orientación particular dentro del salafismo", [35] o una marca saudita ultraconservadora de salafismo. [36] [37] Las estimaciones del número de adherentes al wahabismo varían, con una fuente ( Mehrdad Izady ) dando una cifra de menos de cinco millones de wahabíes en la región del Golfo Pérsico (en comparación con 28,5 millones de sunitas y 89 millones de chiítas). [26] [i]
Ordenando bien y prohibiendo mal
El wahabismo se destaca por su política de "obligar a sus propios seguidores y otros musulmanes a observar estrictamente los deberes religiosos del Islam, como las cinco oraciones", y por "hacer cumplir la moral pública en un grado que no se encuentra en ningún otro lugar". [233] Debido al interés principal en la purificación del Islam, la enseñanza se vuelve muy represiva para los seguidores. [234]
Mientras que otros musulmanes podrían instar a abstenerse del alcohol, vestimenta modesta y oración salat , para los wahabíes la oración "que sea puntual, ritualmente correcta y realizada en comunidad no solo se insta a los hombres sino que se les exige públicamente". No sólo está prohibido el vino, sino también "todas las bebidas embriagantes y otros estimulantes, incluido el tabaco". No solo se prescribe una vestimenta modesta, sino que se especifica el tipo de ropa que deben usar, especialmente las mujeres (una abaya negra , que cubra todo menos los ojos y las manos). [67]
Siguiendo la predicación y práctica de ibn Abd al-Wahhab de que la coacción debe usarse para hacer cumplir el seguimiento de la sharia, se ha autorizado a un comité oficial para "Dirigir el bien y prohibir el mal" (la llamada "policía religiosa") [233 ] [235] en Arabia Saudita, el único país fundado con la ayuda de guerreros wahabíes y cuyos eruditos y ciudadanos piadosos dominan muchos aspectos de la vida del Reino. Los "oficiales de campo" del comité hacen cumplir el cierre estricto de las tiendas durante el tiempo de oración, la segregación de sexos, la prohibición de la venta y el consumo de alcohol, la conducción de vehículos motorizados por mujeres y otras restricciones sociales. [236]
Se ha informado de un gran número de prácticas prohibidas por funcionarios, predicadores o policías religiosos sauditas wahabíes. Las prácticas que han sido prohibidas como Bid'a (innovación) o shirk (politeísmo) y, a veces, "castigadas con azotes" durante la historia wahabí incluyen tocar o escuchar música, bailar, adivinación, amuletos, programas de televisión (a menos que sean religiosos), fumar, jugar backgammon, ajedrez o cartas, dibujar figuras humanas o animales, actuar en una obra de teatro o escribir ficción (ambos se consideran formas de mentir), diseccionar cadáveres (incluso en investigaciones criminales y con fines de investigación médica), música grabada reproducida teléfonos en espera o envío de flores a amigos o familiares que se encuentren en el hospital. [237] [238] [239] [240][241] [242] Las prácticas musulmanas comunes que los wahabíes creen que son contrarias al Islam incluyen escuchar música en alabanza a Mahoma, rezar a Dios mientras se visitan tumbas (incluida la tumba de Mahoma), celebrar mawlid (cumpleaños del Profeta), [243] el uso de ornamentación en mezquitas, todo lo cual se considera ortodoxo en el resto del mundo islámico. [244] La conducción de vehículos motorizados por mujeres está permitida en todos los países, excepto en Arabia Saudita, dominada por los wahabíes [245], y loswahabíes desaconsejan lainterpretación de los sueños, practicada por los talibanes , que sonfamosos por su rigor. [246]
El wahabismo enfatiza "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" o cultura islámica y la importancia de evitar las prácticas culturales no islámicas y la amistad no musulmana sin importar cuán inocentes puedan parecer, [247] [248] sobre la base de que la Sunna prohíbe imitar a los no musulmanes. [249] Las prácticas extranjeras a veces castigadas y a veces simplemente condenadas por los predicadores wahabíes como no islámicas, incluyen la celebración de días en el extranjero (como el Día de San Valentín [250] o el Día de la Madre [247] [249] ), afeitarse, cortarse o recortarse la barba, [251] regalar flores, [252] ponerse de pie en honor a alguien, celebrar cumpleaños (incluido el del Profeta), cuidar o acariciar perros.[241] Los eruditos wahabíes han advertido contra los no musulmanes como amigos, sonriéndoles o deseándoles lo mejor en sus vacaciones. [63]
Los wahabíes no están de acuerdo unánimemente sobre lo que está prohibido como pecado. Algunos predicadores o activistas wahabíes van más allá que el Consejo oficial de estudiosos de Arabia Saudita al prohibir (lo que creen que es) el pecado. Juhayman al Utaybi declaró prohibido el fútbol por una variedad de razones, entre ellas, es una práctica extranjera no musulmana, debido a los uniformes reveladores y debido al idioma extranjero no musulmán que se usa en los partidos. [253] [254] El Gran Mufti saudí , por su parte, rechazó tales fatwas y pidió a la policía religiosa que procesara a su autor. [255]
Los principales líderes wahabíes de Arabia Saudita han determinado que el Islam prohíbe a una mujer viajar o trabajar fuera del hogar sin el permiso de su marido, permiso que puede ser revocado en cualquier momento, con el argumento de que las diferentes estructuras fisiológicas y funciones biológicas de los dos sexos significa que a cada uno se le asigna un papel distintivo que desempeñar en la familia. [256] Como se mencionó anteriormente, el wahabismo también prohíbe que las mujeres conduzcan vehículos de motor. Las relaciones sexuales fuera del matrimonio pueden ser castigadas con la flagelación, [257] aunque las relaciones sexuales fuera del matrimonio estaban permitidas con una esclava hasta que se prohibió la práctica de la esclavitud en 1962 (el príncipe Bandar bin Sultan fue producto de "un breve encuentro" entre sus padre príncipeSultan bin Abdul Aziz - el ministro de Defensa saudí durante muchos años - y "su esclava, una sirvienta negra"). [258] [259]
A pesar de este rigor, los eruditos wahabíes del Islam en el reino saudí han hecho excepciones al pronunciarse sobre lo que es haram. Las tropas extranjeras no musulmanas están prohibidas en Arabia, excepto cuando el rey las necesitó para enfrentarse a Saddam Hussein en 1990; La mezcla de género de hombres y mujeres está prohibida y se desaconseja la confraternización con no musulmanes, pero no en la Universidad de Ciencia y Tecnología King Abdullah (KAUST). Los cines y las mujeres que conducen están prohibidos, excepto en el complejo de ARAMCO en el este de Arabia Saudita, poblado por trabajadores de la empresa que proporciona casi todos los ingresos del gobierno. Las excepciones hechas en KAUST también están vigentes en ARAMCO. [260]
Las reglas más generales de lo que es permisible han cambiado con el tiempo. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud impuso las doctrinas y prácticas wahabíes "en una forma progresivamente más suave" a medida que sus conquistas de principios del siglo XX expandieron su estado a áreas urbanas, especialmente el Hejab. [261] Después de un vigoroso debate, las autoridades religiosas wahabíes de Arabia Saudita permitieron el uso de papel moneda (en 1951), la abolición de la esclavitud (en 1962), la educación de las mujeres (1964) y el uso de la televisión (1965). [259] La música, cuyo sonido alguna vez pudo haber llevado a una ejecución sumaria , ahora se escucha comúnmente en las radios sauditas. [261] Ahora se permiten los minaretes para mezquitas y el uso de marcadores funerarios, que antes estaban prohibidos. La asistencia a la oración, que alguna vez se impuso mediante la flagelación, ya no lo es.[262]
Apariencia
La uniformidad de vestimenta entre hombres y mujeres en Arabia Saudita (en comparación con otros países musulmanes en el Medio Oriente) se ha calificado de "un ejemplo sorprendente de la influencia externa del wahabismo en la sociedad saudí", y un ejemplo de la creencia wahabí de que "las apariencias externas y las expresiones están directamente conectadas con el estado interior de uno ". [244]
Una "insignia" de un salafista o wahabí particularmente piadoso es una túnica demasiado corta para cubrir el tobillo, una barba sin recortar [263] y sin cordón ( Agal ) para sujetar el pañuelo en su lugar. [264] Los guerreros de la milicia religiosa Ikhwan Wahhabi usaban un turbante blanco en lugar de un agal . [265]
Misión Wahhabiyya
Wahhabi mission, or Dawah Wahhabiyya, is the idea of spreading Wahhabism throughout the world.[266] Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government and charities on mosques, schools, education materials, scholarships, throughout the world to promote Islam and the Wahhabi interpretation of it. Tens of thousands of volunteers[163] and several billion dollars also went in support of the jihad against the atheist communist regime governing Afghanistan.[164]
Regions
Wahhabism originated in the Najd region, and its conservative practices have stronger support there than in regions in the kingdom to the east or west of it.[j][271][272] Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabi doctrines and practices on the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate".[261]
The only other country "whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to the Wahhabi creed", is the small gulf monarchy of Qatar,[k][273] whose version of Wahhabism is notably less strict. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar made significant changes in the 1990s. Women are now allowed to drive and travel independently; non-Muslims are permitted to consume alcohol and pork. The country sponsors a film festival, has "world-class art museums", hosts Al Jazeera news service, will hold the 2022 football World Cup, and has no religious force that polices public morality. Qataris attribute its different interpretation of Islam to the absence of an indigenous clerical class and autonomous bureaucracy (religious affairs authority, endowments, Grand Mufti), the fact that Qatari rulers do not derive their legitimacy from such a class.[273][274]
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Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify as Sunni Muslims.[275] The primary Wahhabi doctrine is affirmation of the uniqueness and unity of God (Tawhid),[12][276] and opposition to shirk (violation of tawhid – "the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab).[277] They call for adherence to the beliefs and practices of the salaf (exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to be heterodox doctrines, particularly those held by the Sufi and Shiite Muslims,[278] and practices such as the veneration of Prophets and saints in the Islamic tradition. They emphasize reliance on the literal meaning of the Quran and hadith, rejecting rationalistic theology (kalam). Wahhabism has been associated with the practice of takfir (labeling Muslims who disagree with their doctrines as apostates). Adherents of Wahhabism are favourable to derivation of new legal rulings (ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnah and understanding of the salaf, and they do not regard this as bid'ah (innovation).[279]
Theology
In theology Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (literal) school, which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbali school of law.[280][281] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on the zahir (apparent or literal) meaning of the Quran and hadith, and opposition to the rational argumentation in matters of belief favored by Ash'ari and Maturidi theology.[282][283] However, Wahhabism diverges in some points of theology from other Athari movements.[284] These include a zealous tendency toward takfir (denouncing alleged apostates), which bears a resemblance to the Kharijites.[284][285] Another distinctive feature is a strong opposition to mysticism.[284] Although it is typically attributed to the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah, Jeffry Halverson argues that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself a member of the Qadiriyyah Sufi order.[284] DeLong-Bas writes that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not denounce Sufism or Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as inconsistent with the Quran and hadith.[286]
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of the Shia to violate the doctrine of monotheism.[287] DeLong-Bas maintains that when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab denounced the Rafidah, he was not using a derogatory name for Shia but denouncing "an extremist sect" of Shia called Rafidah. He criticized them for assigning greater authority to their current leaders than to Muhammad in interpreting the Quran and sharia, and for denying the validity of the consensus of the early Muslim community.[287] In his treatise "Risalah fi al-radd ala al-Rafidah" (Treatise/Letter on the Denial/Rejection Pertaining to the Rafidah), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab addressed thirty-two topics on points of both theology and law refuting the Raafida. In doing so, Ibn Abdul Wahhab spoke as a scholar who had studied Shi'i scholarly works, outlining a broad and systematic perspective of the Shi'i worldview and theology. He also believed that the Shia doctrine of infallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God.[288] However, at no point did Ibn Abdul Wahhab "suggest that violence of any sort should be used against the Rafidah or Shi'is". Instead, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab ordered his followers to peacefully clarify their own legal teachings. He instructed that this procedure of education and debate should be carried out with the support of truthful ulama, hadith transmitters, and righteous people employing logic, rhetoric, examination of the primary texts and scholarly debates.[289]
David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of most Muslims through history who believed that the "shahada" profession of faith ("There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") made one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever."[290]
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al-Tawhid, he states that worship in Islam is limited to conventional acts of worship such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for Ramadan (Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Ist'ana (seeking help), and Istigatha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Worship beyond this – making du'a or tawassul – are acts of shirk and in violation of the tenets of tawhid (monotheism).[291][292]
The essence of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's justification for fighting his opponents in Arabia can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans the Prophet Muhammad fought "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that "they sacrificed animals to other beings; they sought the help of other beings; they swore vows by other beings." Someone who does such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary is not a Muslim but an unbeliever (as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed). Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit.[293][294]
This disagreement between Salafis and other Sunnis over the definition of worship (Ibadah) and monotheism (Tawhid) has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins.
"Most Muslims throughout history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada] makes one a Muslim. One might or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals ... but ... any shortcomings would render one a sinner, not an unbeliever.
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God. ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature ... the main points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740]."
[290]
According to another source, defining aspects of Wahhabism include a very literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah and a tendency to reinforce local practices of the Najd.[295]
Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.[296][297]
On Taqlid and Ijtihad
The Wahhabi ulema upheld the right of qualified scholars to perform Ijtihad on legal questions and condemned Taqleed of Mujtahids. This stance pitted them against the Ottoman Sufi clergy who shunned Ijtihad and obligated Taqleed. Ottoman Salafiyya reformers of 19th and 20th centuries would defend the Wahhabis on the Ijtihad issue as well as join forces with Wahhabis to condemn various Sufi practices and orders(tariqats) which they considered to be reprehensible Bid'ah(innovation). Prominent amongst those Salafi-Ottoman scholars who backed Wahhabism included Khayr al-Din al-Alusi, Tahir al-Jaza'iri, Rashid Rida, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, etc.[298]
The Wahhabi scholars also advocated for a principle in Islamic legal theory often referred to as "the rule against Ijtihad reversal". This principle allows overturning a scholar's fatwa(legal judgement) when he bases it on personal Ijtihad(personal legal reasoning), rather than a clear textual source from Qur'an and Hadith. In effect, this allowed the Wahhabi qadis to remain autonomous. Opponents of Wahhabi movement harshly rebuked them for advocating Ijtihad and not recognising the finality of mad'habs(law schools).[299]
Jurisprudence (fiqh)
Of the four major sources in Sunni fiqh – the Quran, the Sunna, consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas) – Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings emphasized the Quran and Sunna. He used ijma only "in conjunction with its corroboration of the Quran and hadith"[300] (and giving preference to the ijma of Muhammad's companions rather than the ijma of legal specialists after his time), and qiyas only in cases of extreme necessity.[301] He rejected deference to past juridical opinion (taqlid) in favor of independent reasoning (ijtihad), and opposed using local customs.[302] He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" of Islam in order "to determine how the Quran and Muhammad dealt with specific situations" without considering interpretations of previous Islamic scholarship,[303] when using ijtihad. According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past judicial opinion in the face of clear contradictory evidence from hadith or Qur'anic text that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab condemned.[304] Natana DeLong-Bas writes that the Wahhabi tendency to consider failure to abide by Islamic law as equivalent to apostasy was based on the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's preaching and emerged after the latter's death.[305]
According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions".[306] Scholar David Cummings also states that early disputes with other Muslims did not center on fiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".[307]
Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith".[308] Cyril Glasse's New Encyclopedia of Islam states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school",[309] and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.[304][310]According to DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any law school to be binding". In the absence of a hadith, he encouraged following the examples of Prophet's companions rather than following a law school.[311] He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of analogical reasoning, and taking public interest and justice into consideration.[312]
Loyalty and disassociation
According to various sources – scholars,[313][314][315][316][317][318]former Saudi students,[319] Arabic-speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books,[320]and journalists[321]– Ibn `Abd al Wahhab preached and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam. According to a doctrine known as al-wala` wa al-bara` (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".[322][323]Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation,[320] although, according to one source (Hamid Algar) Wahhabis have "discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims outside Saudi Arabia "over the years".[315][324]
In reply, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including that "their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."[325]
Social Reforms
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab concerned himself with the social reformation of his people. In line with his methodology, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab denounced the practice of instant triple talaq, counting it as only a single talaq(regardless of the number of pronouncements). The outlawing of triple talaq has been considered to be one of the most significant reforms in the Islamic World in the 20th and 21st centuries. As an 18th-century reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab advocated for Ijtihad of qualified scholars in accordance with the teachings of Qur'an and Hadeeth. His thoughts reflected the major trends apparent in the 18th-century Islamic reform movements. Numerous significant socio-economic reforms would be advocated by the Imam during his lifetime. After his death, his followers continued his legacy. However, the destruction of the First Saudi State after Wahhabi Wars of 1818 and subsequent persecution of Salafis would result in a halt to the social reforms implemented by the Salafi ulema and suspicions towards the outside world would linger throughout the 19th century.[326]
Starting from the late 19th century and emergence of sweeping reform currents of Salafiyya across the world, the Salafis of Najd too would undergo a resurgence. After the establishment of The Third Saudi State and Unification of Saudi Arabia, a Salafiyya Global movement would crystallise with the backing of a state. Ibn Saud's reforms would get criticism from zealots amongst the Wahhabi clerics reminiscent of the 19th-century harshness. However, other ulema would allow them, eventually paving way for gradual reforms in KSA. Thus new education policy would be approved that would teach foreign languages, sciences, geography, etc. Over the objections of Ikhwan, the Wahhabi ulema would permit the introduction of telegraph and other wireless communication systems. Soon after, oil industries would be developed with the discovery of petroleum. Influential clerics such as Mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal ash-Shaykh would endorse female education.[327]
Politics
According to ibn Abdal-Wahhab there are three objectives for Islamic government and society: "to believe in Allah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid wrongdoing". This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature, sermons, fatwa rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by Wahhabis since the death of ibn Abdal-Wahhab.[67] Ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw a role for the imam, "responsible for religious matters", and the amir, "in charge of political and military issues".[328] (In Saudi history the imam has not been a religious preacher or scholar, but Muhammad ibn Saud and subsequent Saudi rulers.[59][329][330])
He also taught that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his people so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God. A Muslim must present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death.[67][331] Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders or ulama should be private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations, etc.[332][333] (This strict obedience can become problematic if a dynastic dispute arises and someone rebelling against the ruler succeeds and becomes the ruler, as happened in the late 19th century at the end of the second al-Saud state.[334] Is the successful rebel a ruler to be obeyed, or a usurper?[335])
While this gives the king wide power, respecting shari'a does impose limits, such as giving qadi (Islamic judges) independence. This means not interfering in their deliberations, but also not codifying laws, following precedents or establishing a uniform system of law courts – both of which violate the qadi's independence.[336]
Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" has developed among those who believe Al Saud has abandoned the laws of God.[184][185] According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is another "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu’aybi' school".[337]
Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance of dawah (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with concepts such as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.[338] Ibn Abdul Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'."[23]
Notable leaders
There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash-Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.
- Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.[339][340]
- Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1752–1826) was the head of Wahhabism after his father retired from public life in 1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.[339]
- Sulayman ibn Abd Allah (1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and author of an influential treatise that restricted travel to and residing in land of idolaters.[339]
- Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the second Saudi emirate.[339]
- Abd al-Latif ibn Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.[339]
- Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Latif Al ash-Sheikh (1848–1921) was the head of religious estate during period of Rashidi rule and the early years of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud.[339]
- Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash-Sheikh (1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaled religious authority".[341]
- Ghaliyya al-Wahhabiyya was a female military leader who defended Mecca against recapture by Ottoman forces.
In more recent times, two Wahhabi clerics have risen to prominence with no relation to ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
- Abdul Aziz bin Baz (1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.[342]
- Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since their deaths.[342]
International influence and propagation
Explanation for influence
Khaled Abou El Fadl attributed the appeal of Wahhabism to some Muslims as stemming from
- Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman Empire
- Reformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ);
- Destruction of the Hejaz Khilafa in 1925;
- Control of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking;
- Oil, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oil export revenue.[343]
Scholar Gilles Kepel, agrees that the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the Islamic World.
... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than that of Khomeini's Iran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring ... it reorganized the religious landscape by promoting those associations and ulamas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantial amounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many more converts. Above all, the Saudis raised a new standard – the virtuous Islamic civilization – as foil for the corrupting influence of the West.[77]
Funding factor
Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100 billion";[344] $2–3 billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1 billion/year);[345] and "at least $87 billion" from 1987 to 2007.[346]
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[347] It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship.[348] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[157] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[158] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".[345][349]
This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew,[347] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[350]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.[351][352]
Militant and political Islam
According to counter-terrorism scholar Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni extremists perpetrated about 700 terror attacks killing roughly 7,000 people from 1981 to 2006.[353] What connection, if any, there is between Wahhabism and the Salafi jihadists such as al-Qaeda who carried out these attacks, is disputed. 22 months after the September 11 attacks, when the FBI considered al-Qaeda as "the number one terrorist threat to the United States", journalist Stephen Schwartz and U.S. Senator Jon Kyle have explicitly stated during a hearing that occurred in June 2003 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the U.S. Senate that "Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world":[354]
Nearly 22 months have passed since the atrocity of September 11th. Since then, many questions have been asked about the role in that day's terrible events and in other challenges we face in the war against terror of Saudi Arabia and its official sect, a separatist, exclusionary and violent form of Islam known as Wahhabism. It is widely recognized that all of the 19 suicide pilots were Wahhabi followers. In addition, 15 of the 19 were Saudi subjects. Journalists and experts, as well as spokespeople of the world, have said that Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world, from Morocco to Indonesia, via Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya. In addition, Saudi media sources have identified Wahhabi agents from Saudi Arabia as being responsible for terrorist attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. The Washington Post has confirmed Wahhabi involvement in attacks against U.S. forces in Fallujah. To examine the role of Wahhabism and terrorism is not to label all Muslims as extremists. Indeed, I want to make this point very, very clear. It is the exact opposite. Analyzing Wahhabism means identifying the extreme element that, although enjoying immense political and financial resources, thanks to support by a sector of the Saudi state, seeks to globally hijack Islam [...] The problem we are looking at today is the State-sponsored doctrine and funding of an extremist ideology that provides the recruiting grounds, support infrastructure and monetary life blood of today's international terrorists. The extremist ideology is Wahhabism, a major force behind terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, a group that, according to the FBI, and I am quoting, is the "number one terrorist threat to the U.S. today".[354]
American scholar Natana J. DeLong-Bas, senior research assistant at the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, argues:
The militant Islam of Osama bin Laden did not have its origins in the teachings of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and was not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in contemporary Saudi Arabia, yet for the media it came to define Wahhabi Islam during the later years of bin Laden's lifetime. However "unrepresentative" bin Laden's global jihad was of Islam in general and Wahhabi Islam in particular, its prominence in headline news took Wahhabi Islam across the spectrum from revival and reform to global jihad.[355]
American academic and author Noah Feldman distinguishes between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis and what he calls the "followers of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s", such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chapters and other hard-line Islamists" during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance to Muslim governments and assassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, not the individual believer".[356]
In 2005, British author and religion academic Karen Armstrong declared that "Bin Laden was not inspired by Wahhabism but by the writings of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who was executed by President Nasser in 1966. Almost every fundamentalist movement in Sunni Islam has been strongly influenced by Qutb, so there is a good case for calling the violence that some of his followers commit "Qutbian terrorism"."[357] However, in 2014, regarding the ideology of ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh, Armstrong remarked that "IS is certainly an Islamic movement [...] because its roots are in Wahhabism, a form of Islam practised in Saudi Arabia that developed only in the 18th century".[358]
More recently, the self-declared "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been described as both more violent than al-Qaeda and more closely aligned with Wahhabism,[358][359][360] alongside Salafism and Salafi jihadism.[361][362]
For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.[363]
According to the American historian of Islam Bernard Haykel, "for Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end in itself." Wahhabism is the Islamic State's "closest religious cognate". ISIL borrowed two elements of Qutbism and 20th-century Islamism into its Wahhabi tradition. While Wahhabism shuns violent rebellion against earthly rulers, ISIL embraces political call to revolutions. While historically Wahhabis were not champions of a caliphate, ISIL borrowed the idea of restoration of a global caliphate.[363]
According to the American scholar Cole Bunzel, Arabist and historian specialized in Near Eastern studies, "The religious character of the Islamic State is, without doubt, overwhelmingly Wahhabi, but the group does depart from Wahhabi tradition in four critical respects: dynastic alliance, the caliphate, violence, and apocalyptic fervor".[364] However, ISIL's apocalyptic dimension lacks a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.[364]
ISIL did not follow the pattern of the first three Saudi-Wahhabi states in allying the religious mission of Wahhabism with the House of Saud, rather they consider them apostates. The call for a global caliphate is another departure from Wahhabism. The caliphate, understood in Islamic law as the ideal Islamic polity uniting all Muslim territories, does not figure much in traditional Wahhabi writings. Ironically, Wahhabism emerged as an anti-caliphate movement.[364]
Although religious violence was not absent in the Emirate of Diriyah, the first Saudi state, ISIL's gut-wrenching displays of beheading, immolation, and other forms of extreme violence aimed at inspiring fear are no throwback to Wahhabi practices. They were introduced by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda member and former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who took inspiration from the writings of Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, an Islamic theologian identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence.[365][366][367] It is the latter's legal manual on violence, popularly known as Fiqh al-Dima (The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood),[364][365][366][367][368] that is ISIL's standard reference for justifying its extraordinary acts of violence.[364][365][366][367] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[367] His theological and legal justifications influenced ISIL,[365][366][367] al-Qaeda,[365] and Boko Haram,[366] as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups.[365]
Criticism and support
Criticism by other Muslims
Among the criticism, or comments made by critics, of the Wahhabi movement are:
- That it is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant,[369] going beyond the bounds of Islam in its restricted definition of tawhid (monotheism), and much too willing to commit takfir (declare non-Muslim and subject to execution) Muslims it found in violation of the doctrines of Wahhabism[370] (in the second Wahhabi-Saudi jihad/conquest of the Arabian peninsula, an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to some estimates);[237][371][372][373]
- That Muhammad bin Saud's agreement to wage jihad to spread Ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings had more to do with traditional Najd practice of raiding – "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre" – than with religion;[374]
- That its rejection of the "orthodox" belief in saints, a belief which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islam very early on,[375][376][377] represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part of Islam ... for over a millennium."[378][379] In this connection, mainstream Sunni scholars also critique the Wahhabi citing of Ibn Taymiyyah as an authority when Ibn Taymiyyah himself adhered to the belief in the existence of saints;[380]
- That its use of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn al-Qayyim, and even Ibn Taymiyyah's name to support its stance is inappropriate, as it is historically known that all three of these men revered many aspects of Sufism, save that the latter two critiqued certain practices among the Sufis of their time. Those who criticize this aspect of Wahhabism often refer to the group's use of Ibn Hanbal's name to be a particularly egregious error, arguing that the jurist's love for the relics of Muhammad, for the intercession of the Prophet, and for the Sufis of his time is well established in Islamic tradition.[379]
Initial opposition
It has been reported that Ibn Abdul Wahhab's father, was critical of his son. The dispute arose when Ibn Abdul Wahhab began his public dawa activities in Huraymila. However, none of the sources state the exact nature of this disagreement. Salafi scholar Ibn Uthaymin notes that it probably was not concerning an issue of aqeedah (beliefs) as Abdul Wahhab, "did not lend any support to the saint-cults and other false practices". It is speculated that they disputed over payment of judges in solving disputes and in the manner of giving dawa, spreading Islamic teachings. Until his father's death in 1153 A.H Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was not overly active and public in his dawah efforts.[381]
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's brother wrote a book in refutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab", also known as: "Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").[382] It has been reported that his brother repented and eventually returned to his call.[383][384]
In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[382] Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communications between Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).
Sunni opposition
Wahhabism has been vehemently criticized by many mainstream Sunni Muslims and continues to be condemned by prominent traditional Sunni scholars in the strongest terms as a "new faction,a vile sect" .[385]
Regarding Wahhabism, the Azharite Sunni scholar and intellectual Muhammad Abu Zahra said:
"The Wahhabis exaggerated [and bowdlerized] Ibn Taymiyya's positions ... The Wahhabis did not restrain themselves to proselytism only, but resorted to warmongering against whoever disagreed with them on the grounds that they were fighting innovation (bid`a), and innovations are an evil that must be fought ... Whenever they were able to seize a town or city they would come to the tombs and turn them into ruins and destruction ... and they would destroy whatever mosques were with the tombs also ... Their brutality did not stop there but they also came to whatever graves were visible and destroyed them also. And when the ruler of the Hijaz regions caved in to them they destroyed all the graves of the Companions and razed them to the ground ... In fact, it has been noticed that the Ulama of the Wahhabis consider their own opinions correct and not possibly wrong, while they consider the opinions of others wrong and not possibly correct. More than that, they consider what others than themselves do in the way of erecting tombs and circumambulating them, as near to idolatry ... In this respect they are near the Khawarij who used to declare those who dissented with them apostate and fight them as we already mentioned."[386]
The Sunni conventional scholars for centuries rejected Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas however Wahhabism has made this controversial scholar its central figure.[387]
In the 18th century, the Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to be a modern-day manifestation of the Kharijites.[388][389] Another important early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni Sufi jurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to whomever "declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca" for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. These arguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time.[390]
Morocco
The Sunni jurist and son of the Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Ghumari, Abu'l-Fayd Ahmad, staunchly condemned Wahhabism and attacked it for straying away from classical tradition, stating: "And nothing has emerged ... to bring about earthquakes and discord in the religion like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was astray and led others astray. Hence he was the Devil's Horn foretold by the Messenger (upon him be blessings and peace), and he abstained from offering prayer for Najd because of him, and because of the dissensions which would flow from his demonic preaching."[391]
Kuwait
The Kuwaiti Sunni Sufi Shafi'i jurist Yusuf ibn al-Sayyid Hashim al-Rifa`i (1932–1999) remained a severe critic of Wahhabism throughout his scholarly life, and penned a famous fifty-seven-point critique of the movement, titled Advice to the Scholars of Najd. He criticized the followers of the movement for allegedly labeling all other Sunnis "pagans", "innovators" and "deviants".[392]
Turkey
The leader of the Gulen movement movement Fethullah Gülen accuses Arabs of conspiring against the Ottoman state as well as reducing Islam strictly to Wahhabism and Arab norms.[393]
Malaysia
Malaysia's largest Islamic body, the National Fatwa Council, has described Wahhabism as being against Sunni teachings, Dr Abdul Shukor Husin, chairman of the National Fatwa Council, was quoted as saying that Wahhabis "view every practice that was not performed by Prophet Muhammad as bid’ah, a departure from Islam, not in accordance with the sunnah." However, the fatwa by the National Fatwa Council has been criticised by the permanent chairman of the ulama wing of PAS, Dr Hamdan Muhammad, who was quoted as saying that the state authority was hasty in issuing its decree.[394]
South Asia
Opposition against wahabbism started in South Asia in 19th century which was led by prominent Islamic scholers of the time most notable of them was Maulana Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi. By the late 19th century it was led by Maulana Ahmed Raza Khan, whose extensive written refutation of wahabbism along with active opposition of wahabbism by his disciples and other sunni ulama (Islamic scholars) became a movement. The movement was letter known as Barelvi movement. South Asia's Barelvi movement rejects Wahhabi beliefs.[395] According to Barelvi scholars, Wahhabis preach violence as opposed to Barelvis who promote peace. In 2016 Barelvis banned Wahhabis from their mosques nationwide.[396] The founder of the movement Ahmed Raza Khan said Wahhabis are not Muslims, and any Muslim who has difficulty understanding this, has also left Islam.[397]
Somalia
The Somalia based paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a actively battles Salafi-Jihadi militants to prevent imposition of Wahhabi ideology.[398]
Lebanon
The transnational Lebanon Al-Ahbash movement uses takfir against Wahhabi and Salafi leaders.[399][400] The head of Al-Ahbash, Abdullah al-Harari says Wahhabis offer anthropomorphic descriptions of God thereby imitate polytheists.[401]
United States
The Sufi Islamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani classify Wahhabism as being extremist and heretical based on Wahhabism's role as a terrorist ideology and labelling of other Muslims, especially Sufis as polytheists, a practice known as takfir.[402][403][404][405]
2016 joint fatwa in Chechnya
In late 2016, at a conference of over a hundred Sunni scholars in Chechnya, Al-Azhar's current dean, Ahmed el-Tayeb was said to have taken an uncompromising stand against Wahhabism by defining orthodox Sunnism as "the Ash'arites and Muturidis (adherents of the theological systems of Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and Imam Abul Hasan al-Ash'ari) ... followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki or Hanbali) and ... also the followers of the Sufism of Imam Junaid al-Baghdadi in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification."[406] Having said that, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayeb allegedly excluded the "Salafists" from the term of Ahluls Sunna (Sunnis) stating that Salafists – also known as Wahhabis – are not from among the Sunnis.[407]
Non-religious motivations
According to at least one critic, the 1744–1745 alliance between Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud to wage jihad on neighboring allegedly ignorant Muslims, was a "consecration" by Ibn Abdul Wahhab of bin Saud tribe's long-standing raids on neighboring oases by "renaming those raids jihad". Part of the Najd's "Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a case of substituting fath, "the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre".[374]
Support
Pakistani poet Muhammad Iqbal praised the movement, while observing that
The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the Prophet.[408]
Islamic scholar Bilal Philips stated that the label "Wahhabi" is the most commonly used epithet to describe those who dare to deny the infallibility of all the four mad'habs as innovators and apostates.[409] He also supported the Najdi movement, noting that:
"It is interesting to note that separate places of prayer for each of the Madh-habs remained around the Ka’bah until the first quarter of the twentieth century when ‘Abdul-‘Azeez ibn Sa’oud and his army conquered Makkah (October 1924) and united all worshippers behind a single Imaam regardless of his or their Madh-habs"[410]
See also
- Aqidah
- Decline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire
- Destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Saudi Arabia
- Fitnat al-Wahhabiyya
- International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
- Islamic extremism
- Islamic fundamentalism
- Islamic schools and branches
- Kharijites
- Memoirs of Mr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East
- Muslim World League
- Ottoman–Saudi War
- Petro-Islam
- Quran
- Schools of Islamic theology
- Shia–Sunni relations
- Sufi–Salafi relations
- Takfirism
- Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
- Wahhabi War
References
Notes
- ^
- MOHAMMADIYYA, a term used to denote (a) the doctrine and (b) the followers of Krishna. cAbd al-Wahhab. Brill Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
- mohammadīyah An eighteenth-century religious revival (tajdīd) and reform (islāh) movement founded in Nejd in Saudi Arabia by the scholar and jurist Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhb (1702/3–1791/2). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World
- MOHAMMADIYAH An Islamic renewal group established by Muhammad ibn EAlllll abhi.. l-Wahhab (d. AH 1206/1792 CE), the Mohammadıyah continues to the present in the Arabian Peninsula. The term Wahabı was originally used by opponents of the movement, who charged that it was a new form of Islam, but the name eventually gained wide acceptance. Encyclopedia of Religion 2nd ed (Macmillan)
- Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–92) Founder of a revivalist and reformist religious movement centered in Najd in central Arabia and commonly referred to as the Wahhabiyya or Wahhabis, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought
- Wahhabis Eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society. (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam)
- MUWAHHIDUN The movement was started by a religious scholar from Najd (Saudi Arabia), Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), schooled by ulama (Islamic clergy) in what is now Iraq, Iran, and the Hijaz (western Arabia). The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa (2nd edition) (Macmillan)
- The Wahhabiyya is a conservative reform movement launched in eighteenth-century Arabia by Muhammad b.Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (Macmillan)
- Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyya) Named after its founder, Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), Wahhabism is the most important form of militant Islamic reformism to arise in the Arabian Peninsula. ... It refers to a set of doctrines and practices and to a sectarian movement comprised of those who embrace them. Encyclopedia of Islam, InfoBase
- Wahhabism. Wahhabism refers to a conservative interpretation of Islam founded as a revival and reform movement in eighteenth-century Arabia (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World)
- Wahabism An Islamic movement which developed during the eighteenth century in central Arabia, providing a rigorous, puritanical interpretation of Sunni teaching. (A Dictionary of Contemporary World History (3rd ed.), Oxford)
- Wahhābī Islamic Movement Wahhābī, also spelled Wahābī, any member of the Muslim reform movement founded by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in the 18th century in Najd, central Arabia, and adopted in 1744 by the Saʿūdī family. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
- Wahhābīya An ultra-conservative, puritanical Muslim movement adhering to the Ḥanbalite law, although it regards itself as ghair muqallidīn, non-adherent to parties, but defending truth. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford)
- ^ a b Salafism has been termed a hybridation between the teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and others which have taken place since the 1960s.[34]
- ^ According to Life magazine, the term "Wahhabi" was used in the US during the 1950s to refer to "puritan Muslims".[49][failed verification]
- ^ According to author Abdul Aziz Qassim.[61]
- ^ At various times Ibn Abd al-Wahhab either waged not jihad but only qital (fighting) against unbelievers ...[94]
- ^ DeLong-Bas also maintains that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab waged jihad only in defense against aggressive opponents.[96]
- ^ Azzam was a lecturer at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah and active in the Muslim World League
- ^ Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Faith
- ^ Other sources give far lower numbers of Shia though they do not estimate the number of Wahhabi. 15% of KSA is Shia.[230][231][232]
- ^ at least one scholar (David Commins), sometimes refers to Wahhabism as the "Najdi reform movement",[267]"Najdi movement",[268]"Najdi doctrine",[269] and "Najdi mission"[270]
- ^ About two million, compared to Saudi Arabia's thirty million.
Citations
- ^ Commins 2006, p. vi. "What is the Wahhabi Mission? ... A neutral observer could define the Wahhabi mission as the religious reform movement associated with the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792)"
- ^ a b c Mark Juergensmeyer; Wade Clark Roof, eds. (2011). "Wahhabis". Encyclopedia of Global Religion. Sage Publications. p. 1369. ISBN 978-1452266565.
- ^ Kampeas, Ron. "Fundamentalist Wahhabism Comes to U.S." Belief.net, Associate Press. Retrieved 27 February 2014.
- ^ a b "Wahhabi". Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Retrieved 12 December 2010.
- ^ a b c d e f Haykel 2013, p. 231.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. vi. "wahhabism"
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 123–24. "Wahhabism has become [...] a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith."
- ^ Al-Tahānawī (1745). Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm. Retrieved 14 April 2021.
- ^ a b c d Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 235 footnote.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. ix. "Thus, the mission's devotees contend that 'Wahhabism' is a misnomer for their efforts to revive correct Islamic belief and practice. Instead of the Wahhabi label, they prefer either Salafi, one who follows the ways of the first Muslim ancestors (salaf), or 'Muwahhid', one who professes God's oneness."
- ^ a b c see also: Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–72
- ^ a b c d Esposito 2003, p. 333
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. vi, 137, 192. "A neutral observer could define the Wahhabi mission as the religious reform movement associated with the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). He and his followers believe that they have a religious obligation to spread the call (in Arabic, da’wa) for a restoration of pure monotheistic worship. Thus, the mission's devotees contend that 'Wahhabism' is a misnomer for their efforts to revive correct Islamic belief and practice. Instead of the Wahhabi label, they prefer either salafi, one who follows the ways of the first Muslim ancestors (salaf), or muwahhid, one who professes God's unity. ... In political terms, Alusi toed a fine line when we recall that he wrote his work before the demise of the Ottoman Empire was on the horizon. We find no such restraint to embrace Saudi Arabia as a political cause in the post-Ottoman writings of his colleague in the religious reform movement, Rashid Rida. This Syrian-born figure is much better known than Alusi and had far-reaching influence on the Muslim world through his monthly periodical, al-Manar ('The Lighthouse'), which came out in 1898 and continued until Rida's death in 1935. He had left his native Syria (in present-day Lebanon) in 1897 and moved to Egypt in order to join the circle of the celebrated Egyptian reformer-scholar Muhammad Abduh. They collaborated on the first Muslim periodical to achieve a pan-Islamic reach, with readers in Indonesia and the Muslim communities in the Americas. Rida's political involvements in the Arab East are far too complex for a thorough treatment here, but several incidents in his career illustrate the tendency for Ottoman religious reformers to re-evaluate Wahhabism. For one thing, conservative ulama put him in the same category as others seeking to eliminate popular religious practices and beliefs and tarred him with the Wahhabi label. These ulama opposed the Ottoman constitutional movement and accused the constitutionalists like Rida of being Wahhabis. When Rida visited Damascus a few months after the July 1908 constitutional restoration, two conservative sheikhs interrupted his public lecture at the city's ancient Umayyad mosque and 'Wahhabi-baited' him. The authorities made matters worse by arresting one of the rabble-rousing sheikhs, whose allies then drummed up protesting crowds at other mosques. The rowdy mob frightened Rida into fleeing Damascus the next day and with the Wahhabi tag attached to his local comrades in religious reform, they retreated to their homes for several weeks before venturing out. ... In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an 'Islamic threat' posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.' The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles. An even more egregious instance of Wahhabi-phobia is the warning from a government minister in Kyrgyzstan about Wahhabi agitators from Shiite Iran.The Russian media circulates stories about 'Wahhabi' villages in rebellious regions of Daghestan, where the inhabitants reportedly abide by a Taliban-style regime with a ban on television and compulsory veiling of women. When a journalist visited this village, he discovered religious pluralism: some women did veil while others did not; some men wore beards as a sign of piety while others were clean shaven; he even found some television viewers."
- ^ Daly Metcalf, Barbara (1982). Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900. Princeton University Press. pp. 271–72, 279. JSTOR j.ctt7zvmm2.
Given the animosity between the pro-Wahhabi Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandists, it is ironic that an early twentieth-century treatise by an Indian Muslim attacking the Deobandists labelled them Wahhabis
- ^ H. Cordesman, Anthony (31 December 2002). "Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century: IV. Opposition and Islamic Extremism Final Review". Center for Strategic and International Studies. pp. 8–9. Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 December 2020.
- ^ Reem, Abu (1 April 2007). "The Wahhabi Myth: Debunking the Bogeyman". Muslim Matters. Archived from the original on 29 November 2020.
- ^ Brown 2009, p. 245.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Laoust, H. (2012) [1993]. "Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb". In Bearman, P. J.; Bianquis, Th.; Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E. J.; Heinrichs, W. P. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.). Leiden: Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3033. ISBN 978-9004161214.
- ^ Michael Sells (22 December 2016). "Wahhabist Ideology: What It Is And Why It's A Problem". The Huffington Post. New York. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
- ^ a b Commins 2006, p. 7. "The Wahhabi religious reform movement arose in Najd, the vast, thinly populated heart of Central Arabia."
- ^ a b c "Wahhabi". GlobalSecurity.org. 27 April 2005. Archived from the original on 7 May 2005. Retrieved 10 May 2008.
- ^ a b c d Lacey 2009, p. 10–11. "the two ... concluded a pact. Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the stern doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, which made the Koran the basis of government. In return, Abdul Wahhab would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power'. Whoever championed his message, he promised, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'."
- ^ a b "Analysis Wahhabism". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 13 May 2014.
For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's dominant creed. It is an austere form of Sunni Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran. Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies. Critics say that Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Wahhabism's explosive growth began in the 1970s when Saudi charities started funding Wahhabi schools (madrassas) and mosques from Islamabad to Culver City, California.
- ^ Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469.
A sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, at the beginning of the 19th century it gained footholds in India, Africa, and elsewhere.
- ^ a b Izady, Mehrdad (2014) [1999]. "Demography of Religion in the Gulf". Mehrdad Izady.
- ^ Kepel 2002, p. 61. "... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia [that] had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."
- ^ a b c d Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005), The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, pp. 70–72.
- ^ "What is Wahhabism? The reactionary branch of Islam said to be 'the main source of global terrorism'". The Telegraph. Retrieved 16 December 2016.
- ^ Goldberg, Jeffrey (2 April 2018). "Saudi Crown Prince: Iran's Supreme Leader 'Makes Hitler Look Good'". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 18 January 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2021.
Goldberg: Isn't it true, though, that after 1979, but before 1979 as well, the more conservative factions in Saudi Arabia were taking oil money and using it to export a more intolerant, extremist version of Islam, Wahhabist ideology, which could be understood as a kind of companion ideology to Muslim Brotherhood thinking?
MbS: First of all, this Wahhabism – please define it for us. We're not familiar with it. We don't know about it.
Goldberg: What do you mean you don't know about it?
MbS: What is Wahhabism?
Goldberg: You're the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. You know what Wahhabism is.
MbS: No one can define this Wahhabism.
Goldberg: It's a movement founded by Ibn abd al-Wahhab in the 1700s, very fundamentalist in nature, an austere Salafist-style interpretation –
MbS: No one can define Wahhabism. There is no Wahhabism. We don't believe we have Wahhabism. We believe we have, in Saudi Arabia, Sunni and Shiite. We believe we have within Sunni Islam four schools of thought, and we have the ulema [the religious authorities] and the Board of Fatwas [which issues religious rulings]. Yes, in Saudi Arabia it's clear that our laws are coming from Islam and the Quran, but we have the four schools – Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki – and they argue about interpretation.
The first Saudi state, why was it established? After the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs, the people of the Arabian Peninsula went back to fighting each other like they did for thousands of years. But our family, 600 years ago, established a town from scratch called Diriyah, and with this town came the first Saudi state. It became the most powerful economic part of the peninsula. They helped change reality. Most other towns, they fought over trade, hijacked trade, but our family said to two other tribes, "Instead of attacking the trade routes, why don't we hire you as guards for this area?" So trade grew, and the town grew. This was the method. Three hundred years later, this is still the way. The thought was always that you need all the great brains of the Arabian Peninsula – the generals, the tribal leaders, the scholars – working with you. One of them was Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab.
But our project is based on the people, on economic interests, and not on expansionist ideological interests. Of course we have things in common. All of us are Muslim, all of us speak Arabic, we all have the same culture and the same interest. When people speak of Wahhabism, they don't know exactly what they are talking about. Abd al-Wahhab's family, the al-Sheikh family, is today very well known, but there are tens of thousands of important families in Saudi Arabia today. And you will find a Shiite in the cabinet, you will find Shiites in government, the most important university in Saudi Arabia is headed by a Shiite. So we believe that we are a mix of Muslim schools and sects. - ^ a b Daoud, Kamel (16 November 2017). "If Saudi Arabia Reforms, What Happens to Islamists Elsewhere?". The New York Times. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
- ^ a b c Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 August 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2014.
- ^ a b Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 2 April 2014.
Hamid Algar ... emphasizes the strong influence of the Saudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political situation of the Arab world at the time as a contributing factor that led to the co-opting of Salafism ... Khaled Abou El Fadl ... expresses the opinion that Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world ... it would have to be spread under the banner of Salafism. This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more 'credible paradigm in Islam'; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism ... The co-opting of Salafism by Wahhabism was not completed until the 1970s when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co-opted the symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable.
- ^ Lacroix, Stephane (Spring 2008). "Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith". ISIM Review. Leiden University. 21 (1): 6–7. hdl:1887/17210.
- ^ a b c GlobalSecurity.org Salafi Islam
- ^ a b "For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". The Washington Post. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ a b Esposito 2011, p. 54.
- ^ Iqbal, Muhammad (2013). The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 978-0804781466.
But the spirit of Ibn Taimlyyah's teaching found a fuller expression in a movement of immense potentialities which arose in the eighteenth century, from the sands of Nejd, described by Macdonald as the "cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam". It is really the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the inspiration of this movement are traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modem movements of Muslim Asia and Africa, e.g. the Sanusl movement, the Pan-Islamic movement, and the Babi movement, which is only a Persian reflex of Arabian Protestantism. The great puritan reformer, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in 1700,studied in Medina, travelled in Persia, and finally succeeded in spreading the fire of his restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam. He was similar in spirit to Ghazali's disciple, Muhammad Ibn Tumart – the Berber puritan reformer of Islam who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim Spain, and gave her a fresh inspiration.
- ^ Ahmad Sherwani, Latif (1995). Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal (PDF). Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan. pp. 231, 229.
(i) Mullaism – The ulema have always been a source of great strength to Islam. But during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad, they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of Ijtihad i.e. the forming of independent judgment in matters of law. The Wahabi movement which was a source of inspiration to the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers was really a revolt against this rigidity of the Ulema. Thus the first objective of the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and a freedom to reinterpret the law in the light of advancing experience. ... During the nineteenth century were born Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani in Afghanistan and Mufti Alam Jan in Russia. These men were probably inspired by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab who was born in Nejd in 1700, the founder of the so-called Wahabi movement which may fitly be described as the first throb of life in modern Islam.
- ^ Kepel 2004, p. 157.
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. viv. "While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances."
- ^ Mahdi, Wael (18 March 2010). "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
- ^ Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Macmillan Reference. 2004. p. 727.
- ^ Esposito 2003, p. 123, "Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab"
- ^ Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca, ISBN 978-0930452797 pp. 160–61
- ^ a b c Moussalli, Ahmad (January 2009). "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?" (PDF). Conflicts Forum Monograph. Retrieved 8 June 2014.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 123–24
- ^ Goldberg, Jeffrey (2 April 2018). "Saudi Crown Prince: Iran's Supreme Leader 'Makes Hitler Look Good'". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 18 January 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2021.
MbS: What is Wahhabism?
Goldberg: You're the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. You know what Wahhabism is.
MbS: No one can define this Wahhabism.
Goldberg: It's a movement founded by Ibn abd al-Wahhab in the 1700s, very fundamentalist in nature, an austere Salafist-style interpretation –
MbS: No one can define Wahhabism. There is no Wahhabism. We don't believe we have Wahhabism. - ^ "The King of Arabia". Life. 31 May 1943. p. 72. ISSN 0024-3019. Retrieved 22 June 2013.
- ^ Hoffman, Valerie (2012). The Essentials of Ibadi Islam. p. 19.
- ^ al Torifi, Talal (30 July 2020). "Ottomans in Arab World: Nothing but a name, a few stones, and a long legacy of crimes". Al Arabiya.
Regarding the movement of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the deceitful lies spread by the Ottomans about it, El Hajjoui says, "It is a political issue, not a religious one. In reality, religious people are in agreement that the Ottomans are responsible for this shameful propaganda against the House of Saud, which freed the Two Holy Mosques from them a hundred years ago. They are the ones who sought the help of Egypt's ruler, Muhammad Ali Pasha, to expel Wahhabism from the Two Holy Mosques and imprison the House of Saud. Indeed, the Turks are the ones who gave the name "Wahhabism" to the Hanbalis of Najd and spread false accusations and lies about them. They paid scholars from all over the world to make up lies about the Hanbalis of Najd. They are the ones who wrote a book attacking Wahhabism and claimed it was written by Sheikh Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, brother of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. They took bin Saud captive to Istanbul where they broke the promise of safety they had made to him and assassinated him. I believe that the West had a hand in this war that was waged by Ottomans on bin Saud. They were dismayed by the notion of bin Saud's rule over Hejaz, and deplored the idea of him spreading security and justice and ruling by what God has commanded. Under the Turks' rule, Hejaz was a breeding ground for chaos and banditry until Wahhabism came and made it a place of peace and justice." (Mohamed El Hajjoui, Wahhabis are Sunnis Hanbalis, Al Serat Newspaper, Year 1. Issue 5, 26 Jumada al-Thani, 1352 AH/16 October 1933 AD).
- ^ Al Torifi, Talal (23 July 2020). "Turks defrauding history with Ottoman monuments narrative". Arab News.
We can mention here what the Algerian scholar Mohammed Al-Hajwi said about the Ottoman promotion of the term Wahhabism and how it was unfairly attacked. Al-Hajwi talks about the teachings of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab and the lies the Ottomans spread about them. He said: "The issue is political, not religious, and the people of religion are, in fact, in agreement and the Ottoman Turks raised this evil and spread this false propaganda against Abdullah bin Saud and kicked them (the Saudis) out of the Two Holy Mosques. They (the Ottoman Turks) were the ones who sought the help of the governor of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha, and this helped them to expel the Wahhabis from the Two Holy Mosques and capture Abdullah bin Saud.
“It is true that the Turks are the ones who gave the Hanbalis of Najd the name of Wahhabis and they were the ones who spread the accusations and lies in the Islamic world about them and hired Muslim scholars in all countries to compose, write and lie about the Hanbalis of Najd. And they were the ones who wrote a book against Wahhabism and attributed it to Suleiman ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, the brother of Mohammed ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, and they are the ones who took Abdullah bin Saud as a prisoner to Istanbul, but they breached the covenant they made with him and murdered him brutally. I believe that foreigners played a part in this war that the Ottoman Turks started on Abdullah bin Saud because they were upset that he had seized the Hijaz and spread security, justice, and mercy in the area. - ^ Blanchard, Christopher M. (24 January 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. p. [page needed]. Retrieved 12 March 2014.
- ^ Bederka, Alan. "Wahhabism and Boko Haram" (PDF). Student Center for African Research and Resolutions. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 July 2014. Retrieved 4 August 2014.
Calling them Wahhabis implies that they learned ideas from a man – Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab – instead of the Qur'an and Sunnah the, two great sources of Islam.
- ^ a b Lacey 1981, p. 56.
- ^ a b Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 57. ISBN 978-0060563394.
... the Wahhabis used to label themselves al-Muslimun (the Muslims) or al-Muwahidun (the monotheists), intimating that those who did not accept their creed were neither Muslims nor monotheists
- ^ Algar 2002, pp. 1–2. "Wahhabis themselves prefer the titles al-Muwahhidun or Ahl al-Tauhid, 'the asserters of the divine unity'. But precisely this self-awarded title springs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tawhid that is a foundation of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk. There is no reason to acquiesce in this assumption of a monopoly, and because the movement in question was ultimately the work of one man, Muhammad b. abdal-Wahhab it is reasonable as well as conventional to speak of 'Wahhabism' and Wahhabis."
- ^ Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469.
Adherents ... prefer to call themselves Muhwahhidun (Unitarians). However, this name is not often used, as [it] is associated with other completely different sects extant and defunct.
- ^ a b Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom (First ed.). Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. p. 21.
- ^ Mark Durie (6 June 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum.
Salafis themselves do not like being called Wahhabis, because to them it smacks of idolatry to name their movement after a recent leader. Instead they prefer to call themselves Ahl al-Sunnah "People of the Sunna".
- ^ Mahdi, Wael (18 March 2010). "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
- ^ Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, Stéphane Lacroix Saudi Arabia in Transition Cambridge University Press 2015 ISBN 978-1107006294 p. 153
- ^ a b MacFarquhar, Neil (12 July 2002). "A Few Saudis Defy a Rigid Islam to Debate Their Own Intolerance". New York Times. Retrieved 4 May 2014.
Wahhabi-inspired xenophobia dominates religious discussion in a way not found elsewhere in the Islamic world.
Bookshops in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, for example, sell a 1,265-page souvenir tome that is a kind of "greatest hits" of fatwas on modern life. It is strewn with rulings on shunning non-Muslims: don't smile at them, don't wish them well on their holidays, don't address them as "friend".
A fatwa from Sheik Muhammad bin Othaimeen, whose funeral last year attracted hundreds of thousands of mourners, tackles whether good Muslims can live in infidel lands. The faithful who must live abroad should "harbor enmity and hatred for the infidels and refrain from taking them as friends", it reads in part. - ^ "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". 18 March 2010. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ "Saudi Prince Salman: The Term 'Wahhabi' Was Coined by Saudi Arabia's Enemies". Archived from the original on 4 August 2016. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ Mattson, Ingrid (18 October 2001). "Ingrid Mattson: What is Islam? CNN Interview". Retrieved 23 October 2015.
- ^ a b c d "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
- ^ Riedel, Bruce O. (2011). "Saudi Arabia, Elephant in the Living Room". The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press. p. 160. ISBN 978-0815722274.
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 150. ISBN 978-0307473288.
- ^ Esposito 2011, p. 55.
- ^ M. Zarabozo 2005, p. 217. "Another interesting but similarly devastating misunderstanding or lack of scholarly research occurred in North and sub-Saharan Africa. In the Second Hijri Century there was an Abaadhi Kharijite movement in North Africa. They were known as the "Wahhabis", after their leader Abdul-Wahhaab ibn Abdul-Rahmaan ibn Rustum. Muhammad al-Shuwair was visiting Mauritania in 1408 A.H., about fifteen years ago, and he met with Muslim leaders there who said they like the Saudis but they wish they would give up the "Wahhabi" school that divides the Muslims. Upon asking them what their source for their views was, they referred to rulings given by scholars of North Africa, such as al-Wanshireesi, who lived long before Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab. Al-Shuwair had to explain to them that those "Wahhabis" had nothing to do with the followers of ibn Abdul-Wahhaab"
- ^ Abd al-Aziz, Baz. "نبذة عن الدعوة السلفية وحياة الشيخ محمد بن عبدالوهاب". Bin Baz. Retrieved 8 April 2021.
- ^ Blanchard, Christopher M. (24 January 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. p. CRS-2. Retrieved 12 March 2014.
- ^ Murphy, Caryle (5 September 2006). "For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". The Washington Post.
- ^ Mark Durie (6 June 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum.
- ^ Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 216.
- ^ a b c d Kepel 2006, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 208. "Much of Wahhabism's 20th-century experience has been the story of trade-offs for the sake of consolidating the position of its political guardian. The ulama gained control over education, law, public morality and religious institutions. In return, they only mildly objected to the import of modern technology and communications and did not hamper Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud's dealings with the British, non-Saudi Arabs and Americans."
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. 156. "The gradual erosion of Wahhabi credibility has been punctuated by three major crises ... [November 1979 seizure of Grand Mosque; [2] Iraq invasion of Kuwait; [3] 9/11]"
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 156. "[Wahhabi clerics] dependence on the Saudi government disposed leading Wahhabi clerics to support its policies. As political discontent in the kingdom intensified, the Wahhabi establishment found itself in the awkward position of defending and unpopular dynasty."
- ^ Kepel 2004, p. 179. "the ulama occupy center stage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of this tradition, the religious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clerics but were rather sahwa militants"
- ^ a b Long, David E (2005). "Saudi Arabia [review of Wahhabi Islam by Natana DeLong-Bas]". Middle East Journal. 59 (2): 316–19. JSTOR 4330135.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2007, p. 17.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2007, p. 22.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. ix.
- ^ Commins 2009, pp. x, xix.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 24. "Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab ... insisted that invoking and making vows to holy men constituted major acts of idolatry and it was proper to deem anyone who failed to consider such practices idolatry an infidel ... He then stated that if one admits that these practices are major acts of idolatry, fighting immediately becomes a duty as part of the prophetic mission to destroy idols. Thus, the idolater who calls upon a saint for help must repent, If he does so, his repentance is accepted. If he does not repent, he must be killed. [source: Ibn Ghannam, Hussien, Tarikh najd. (Cairo 1961) p. 438] ... In the end, the debate ... was not settled by stronger arguments but by force majeure through Saudi conquest, carried out in the name of holy war, or jihad."
- ^ Asthana, N. C.; Nirmal, Anjali (2009). Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities. Pointer Publishers. ISBN 978-8171325986 – via Google Books.
- ^ Oliver, Haneef James (2002). The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden. Trafford Publishing. ISBN 978-1553953975.
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. 18. "In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab arrived in al-Dir'iyya ... This was the origin of the pact between religious mission and political power that has endured for more than two and half centuries, a pact that has survived traumatic defeats and episodes of complete collapse."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 18. "Muhammad ibn Saud declared his readiness to back the mission against unbelief and idolatry but insisted ... two conditions ... Second, that Sheikh Muhammad approve of Ibn Saud's taxation of al-Dir'iyya's harvests. The reformer ... replied that God might compensate the amir with booty and legitimate taxes greater than the taxes on harvests."
- ^ a b English, Jeanette M. (2011). "14". Infidel behind the paradoxical veil. 1 (1st ed.). AuthorHouse. p. 260. ISBN 978-1456728106. LCCN 2011900551. Retrieved 11 April 2012.
In the last years of the 18th century, Ibn Saud attempted to seize control of Arabia and its outer lying regions and his heirs spent the next 150 years in this pursuit. This was done at the expense of the overlords of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the house of Al Saud met with defeat at the hands of the Ottoman and Egyptian armies, resulting in the burning of Diriyah.
- ^ Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 August 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 4 September 2014. Retrieved 21 August 2014.
The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of the Al Sheikh family, descendants of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover, links between Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealed with multiple marriages.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 203.
- ^ a b DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 35. "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab promised not to interfere with Muhammad Ibn Saud's state consolidation, and Muhammad Ibn Saud promised to uphold Ibn Abd al Wahhab's religious teachings ... but there is a marked difference between noninterference in military activities and active support and religious legitimation for them ... Rather than actively supporting or promoting this conquest, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab merely 'acceded' to it, hoping that Ibn Saud would get his fill of conquest and then focus on more important matter – those pertaining to religious reform. In fact, as evidence of the lack of religious support this military conquest enjoyed, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab left Ibn Saud's company altogether during this campaign, devoting himself instead to spiritual matters and prayer."
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 38. "Opponents of the Wahhabi movement claimed religious justification for their military actions by accusing the Wahhabis of ignorance, sorcery and lies ... It was only at this point – when the Wahhabi community was threatened – that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab finally authorized a jihad as holy war to defend the Wahhabis. However, even this defensive jihad remained limited in scope, as fighting was permitted only against those who had either attacked or insulted his followers directly."
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 35, 38, 39.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a center for the study of religion under the guidance of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed religion throughout the peninsula, the gulf, and into Syria and Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backsliding Muslims of the peninsula. Under the banner of religion and preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, the Al Saud by 1803 had expanded their dominion across the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and the apparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even after the Ottoman sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in 1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar in the north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again in the next century.
- ^ Olivier Roy; Antoine Sfeir, eds. (2007). Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism. Columbia University Press. pp. 399–400.
The history of the Al Sa'ud dynasty is, therefore, one of political expansion based on the Wahhabi doctrine. After the conclusion of the pact of 1744, Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, who at the time ruled only the Najd village of Dir'iya, embarked on the conquest of neighboring settlements, destroying idols and obliging his new subjects to submit to Wahhabi Islam.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 247–50.
- ^ Khatab, Sayed (2011). Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Theological and Ideological Basis of Al-Qa'ida's Political Tactics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-9774164996. Retrieved 8 September 2016.
- ^ Bowen, Wayne H. (2008). The History of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p. 153. ISBN 978-0313340123. OCLC 166388162.
- ^ Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Salafies, "Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism". Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 2. (1989), pp. 123–32. (Text online at JSTOR)
- ^ Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot. A History of Egypt From the Islamic Conquest to the Present. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007.
- ^ Fahmy, K. (2012). Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1851685707.
- ^ Kamal S. Salibi (1998). The Modern History of Jordan. I.B. Tauris. p. 31. ISBN 978-1860643316. Retrieved 8 June 2016.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 38. "Ibrahim's ruthless prosecution of the war, al-Dir'iyya's leveling and the exile of the emirate's political and religious leadership gave the same impression to a sojourning European as it did to Arabian Bedouins and townsmen: The Saudi emirate and the Wahhabi mission had been crushed once and for all."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 41.
- ^ Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia : The Shape of a Client Feudalism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan. p. 153. ISBN 978-1349267286.
The British in India had welcomed Ibrahim Pasha's siege of Diriyah: if the 'predatory habits' of the Wahhabists could be extirpated from the Arabian peninsula, so much the better for British trade in the region. It was for this reason that Captain George Forster Sadleir, an officer of the British Army in India (HM 47th regiment), was sent from Bombay to consult Ibrahim Pasha in Diriyah.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 69. "Wahhabism retained hegemony over Najd's religious life because of the political shelter provided by Saudi power. In turn, the Saudi realm could maintain its independence vis-a-vis Istanbul because of physical and technological factors: Its geographical isolation, its lack of valuable resources, the limits of nineteenth-century communications, transportation and military technologies made conquest and pacification too costly for both Cairo and Istanbul. These outside powers decided to leave the Saudis alone so long as they did not revive the first amirate's impulse for expansion through jihad and refrained from attacking Hijaz, Iraq and Syria."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 69. "Outside of al-Qasim, the Rashidis left Wahhabi ulama in place a qadis throughout Najd, including the amirate's capital Ha'il. By the 1880s, generations of Najdi townsmen had lived in a Wahhabi milieu. The strict monotheistic doctrine had been naturalized as the native religious culture."
- ^ Lacey 1981, p. 525.
- ^ "Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Saud information resource". Archived from the original on 3 March 2012.
Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab sought the protection of Muhammad bin Saud, in Ad-Dariyah, the home of the House of Saud ... they had interests in common, pre-eminently a desire to see all the Arabs of the Peninsula brought back to Islam in its simplest and purest form. In 1744, they therefore took an oath that they would work together to achieve this end.
- ^ Blanchard, Christopher M. (24 January 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. pp. CRS-2–3. Retrieved 4 May 2014.
Since the foundation of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, there has been a close relationship between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religious establishment. Wahhabi-trained Bedouin warriors known as the Ikhwan were integral to the Al Saud family's military campaign to reconquer and unify the Arabian peninsula from 1912 until an Ikhwan rebellion was put down by force in 1930. Thereafter, Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom's religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom's judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically have denounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs, an issue that remains controversial within Saudi Arabia and among outside observers.
- ^ Commins 2009, pp. 102–03. "What we do know is that Ibn Saud hewed to the dynastic tradition of supporting Wahhabi ulama and giving them control over religious institutions. At the same time, he tempered Wahhabi zeal when he felt that it clashed with the demands of consolidating power in Hijaz and al-Hasa or the constraints of firmer international boundaries maintained by the era's dominant power in the region, Great Britain. Simply put, political considerations trumped religious idealism. The same principle governed Ibn Saud's approach to adopting modern technology, building a rudimentary administrative framework and signing the oil concession with the Americans."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 88.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 77. "The Ikhwan pressed for strict adherence to Wahhabi norms, but Ibn Saud was willing to take a more relaxed approach to matters like smoking tobacco and worship at shrines."
- ^ Commins 2009, pp. 76–77. "Wahhabi ulama ordered the demolition of several Shiite mosques and took over teaching and preaching duties at the remaining mosques in order to convert the population ... some Shiites emigrated to Bahrain and Iraq ... The intensive phase of Wahhabi coercion lasted about one year. When ibn Saud decided to curb the Ikhwan, he permitted the shiites to drive away Wahhabi preachers."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 78. "Ibn Saud designated local dignitaries in Mecca and Jeddah to enforce loosely the Wahhabi prohibition of tobacco, alcohol, playing cards and the phonograph. The outcome of this approach was the preservation of a more relaxed atmosphere in Hijaz than in Najd. Standards would stiffen when Ibn Saud arrived for the pilgrimage with a retinue of Wahhabi ulama and then slacken with his departure ... [Ibn Saud] even pioneered the use of automobiles to transport pilgrims from Jeddah to Mecca over the objections of Wahhabi ulama who considered them a prohibited innovation. In another sign of Ibn Saud's willingness to disregard Wahhabi sensibilities, he allowed Shiites to perform the pilgrimage."
- ^ Cook, Michael (2001). Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 95. "[the first] documented instance of a formal committee to enforces the duty dates to 1926, [when the official Saudi newspaper in Mecca published the news of its establishment]"
- ^ "The First Ikhwan Rebellion 1927–1928. Wars of the World". Globe University. Retrieved 29 April 2014.
They attacked Ibn Sa'ud for introducing such innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the telegraph and for sending his son to a country of unbelievers (Egypt). Despite Ibn Sa'ud's attempts to mollify the Ikhwan by submitting their accusations to the religious scholars ('ulama'), they provoked an international incident by destroying an Iraqi force that had violated a neutral zone established by Great Britain and Ibn Sa'ud between Iraq and Arabia (1927–28); the British bombed Najd in retaliation.
- ^ "University of Central Arkansas, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf Region".
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. 80-90, 151.
- ^ Commins 2009, pp. 47–49. "Ibn Atiq considered those who fall in the first category (those who willingly fall in with the idolaters) to be infidels ... Those who fall in the second category are considered sinners rather than infidels because they stay with idolaters for the sake of acquiring wealth or preserving family ties; ... it is a sin, however, to remain in their land even if in one's heart one hates the idolaters ... Those who fall in the third category are free of any blame. They openly practise religion or are compelled to reside among idolaters ... For the rest of the nineteenth century strict enforcement of this aversion to mixing with idolaters – and in Wahhabi terms, most Muslims fell into that category – would remain the norm in Wahhabi discourse."
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. 130.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 144. "Ahl-i Hadith scholars and Wahhabis agreed that Sufis and Shiites were not true believers. The movement also shared with the Wahhabis that desire to revive the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and a tendency to express intolerance toward other Muslims (Ahl-i Hadith preachers compared Delhi's Muslims to idolaters)."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 134. "Alusi began a campaign against ritual innovations in Sufi orders like music, dance and veneration of saints' tombs"
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 133.
- ^ Algar 2002, p. 46. "Rashid Rida (d. 1935) ... After a visit to the newly conquered Hijaz, he published a work praising the Saudi ruler as the savior of the Haramayn and a practitioner of authentic Islamic rule and, two years later, an anthology of Wahhabi treatises. [why?] ... the aftermath of World War One saw both the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate and the failure of Sharif Husay to gain either a pan-Arab kingdom or acceptance by Muslim as a candidate for a revived caliphate. It is, then perhaps, not surprising that persons of salafi tendency ... casting around in desperation for a hero, should have begun to view Ibn Sa'ud with favor and to express sympathy for Wahhabism."
- ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 92. ISBN 978-0060563394.
Rida's liberal ideas and writings were fundamentally inconsistent with Wahhabism, and this is why after Rida's death, the Wahhabis regularly condemned and maligned Rida. ... the Saudis banned the writings of Rida, successfully preventing the republication of his work even in Egypt, and generally speaking made his books very difficult to locate
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 138.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 103. "By the early 1950s, Saudi Arabia was by no means a modern state ... Nevertheless, the twin pressures of controlling regions outside the Wahhabi heartland and navigating the currents of regional politics led him to take steps that punctured the seal between the internal land of belief and the outside land of idolatry."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 155.
- ^ a b Commins 2009, pp. 151–52. "in the 1950s and 1960s, two dramatic shift in Arab regional and Saudi domestic politics brought Islam to the fore as an element in the kingdom's international relations ... [1] the polarization of Arab politics between revolutionary (republican, nationalist) regimes and conservative monarchies and, [2] in the domestic realm, the assimilation of political ideologies sweeping nearby Arab lands."
- ^ Algar 2002, p. 49. "It was in the bosom of this organization, intended to eclipse all other supranational Islamic organizations, that a closer association between leading Salafis and Wahhabis came into being. Its constituent council, which met for the first time in December 1962, was headed by the then chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, a lineal descendant of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, and the presidency remains to this day vested in the Saudi chief mufti. Included among its eight other members were important representatives of the Salafi tendency: Sa'id Ramadan, son-in-law of Hasan al-Banna ... Maulana Abu l-A'la Maududi ... Maulanda Abu 'l-Hasan Nadvi (d. 2000) of India. In accordance with statute, the head of the league's secretariat has always been a Saudi citizen, the first to occupy the post being Muhammad Surur al-Sabban."
- ^ Robinson, Francis (November 2006). "Review of The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia". Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. 16 (3): 320–22. doi:10.1017/s1356186306286474. JSTOR 25188657. S2CID 164054440.
Then, the book [The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia] widens its focus to embrace the world beyond Arabia and to demonstrate how the Wahhabis and Islamic revivalists in the world beyond, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Jamaat-i Island, found common cause in their rejection of the West and its ways which were so deleterious of Muslim piety and values.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 153. "The League also sent missionaries to West Africa, where it funded schools, distributed religious literature and gave scholarships to attend Saudi religious universities. These efforts bore fruit in Nigeria's Muslim northern region with the creation of a movement (the Izala Society) dedicated to wiping out ritual innovations. Essential texts for members of the Izala Society are Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's treatise of God's unity and commentaries by his grandsons."
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. 5. "The decision to offer asylum to Muslim Brothers fleeing persecution at the hands of secular Arab regimes was part of an effort to consolidate the bastion of Islam against atheist currents. No one could have foreseen that the Muslim Brothers would successfully spread their ideas in the kingdom and erode Wahhabism's hegemony."
- ^ "In Depth Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". Al Jazeera. 6 February 2011.
... targets of state repression. When Gamal Abdel Nasser took over Egypt in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood is said to have welcomed the coup, but this budding relationship did not last. An attempted assassination on Nasser in 1954, blamed by the authorities on elements of the Brotherhood, saw the movement face a crackdown that led to the imprisonment of Qutb and other members. In 1956, the organisation was repressed and banned and Qutb was executed in 1966. However, it continued to grow, albeit underground.
- ^ Godlas, Alan. "The Muslim Brotherhood in 'Iraq Until 1991". University of Georgia. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
- ^ Kepel 2004, p. 156. "In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – then allies of Moscow."
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 144.
In the 1960s, when Faisal became king, he championed the creation of public schools across the kingdom for boys – and also girls. The largely illiterate nation had few qualified teachers, so the government dispatched emissaries abroad, mostly to Egypt and Jordan, to recruit teachers with substantive skills who also were devout Muslims. A hallmark of King Faisal's reign was an effort to create an Islamic alliance in the Middle East to counter the Arab nationalism of Egypt's president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser, a nationalist strongman and sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia, turned on his country's conservative Muslim Brotherhood, King Faisal welcomed those religious conservatives into Saudi Arabia as scholars and teachers, reinforcing the fundamentalist hold on the young Ministry of Education, founded in 1954 under his predecessor and half-brother, King Saud.
- ^ Lacey 2009, pp. 56–57. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively deferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhood and giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as an instantly romantic concept – part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possibility today, and they could even make personal contact with jihad in the barrel-chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah and Mecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the surviving Qutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist-tinged thinking of their Middle Eastern neighborhood. But in the process, they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus – hands-on, radical Islam."
- ^ Kepel 2004, pp. 173–74. "Within the kingdom itself, the Muslim Brothers obeyed the prohibition on proselytizing to Saudi subjects [but] ... contributed to discussion circles and frequented the salons held by princes ... Methodically but without fanfare, the Brothers took control of Saudi Arabia's intellectual life, publishing books that extended their influence among educators and generally making themselves politically useful while obeying the orders that kept them away from the pulpits."
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 156.
Stephane Lacroix, a Saudi expert at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, sums up the battle over education in Saudi Arabia: 'The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change – if at all. Islamists see education as their base so they won't compromise on this.' [source: telephone interview by author Karen House]
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 201. "The content analysis reveals both Wahhabi doctrine and Muslim Brothers themes. In fact, the Muslim Brother imprint on this sample of Saudi schoolbooks is striking. Apparently members of the organization secured positions in the Ministry of Education, which they used to propagate their ideas."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 112. "A new Islamic university in Medina was created to train proselytizers and its regulations called for 75% of its students to come from abroad."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 164.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. 185. "David Commins, in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia ... believes that 'the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is not Wahhabi. It is instead a part of contemporary jihadist tendency that evolved from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb ... in other words; Al-Qaeda belongs to an offshoot of twenty-first-century Muslim revivalist ideology, not Wahhabism.' ... agrees with DeLong-Bas's conclusions that Al-Qaeda's ideology evolved with the introduction of Salafi ideas from Sayyid Qutb and other Muslim Brotherhood members."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 172. "the pronouncements and actions [of Juhayman, the leader of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure] indicated that a combustible mix of Wahhabi and modern Islamic revivalism was brewing in the niches of Saudi mosques. Exactly how and when these elements combined has not yet been established beyond the common knowledge that Saudi Arabia opened its doors to members of the Muslim Brothers fleeing repression by secular regimes in Egypt and Syrian in the later 1950s and 1960s They spread their ideas by occupying influential positions in educational institutions and circulating their literature."
- ^ Kepel 2004, p. 157. "In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – then allies of Moscow. This blend of traditionalists and modern Islamist militants served the kingdom's interests well at first, because it countered the threat of a 'progressive', pro-Soviet Islam – the brand preached at Al Azhar University in Egypt during the Nasser regime. But eventually this volatile mixture would explode in the Saudis' hands."
- ^ a b Commins 2009, pp. 155–156. "In the 1950s and 1960s ... within Saudi Arabia, official religious institutions under Wahhabi control multiplied at the same time that ulama maintained their hold on religious law courts, presided over the creation of Islamic universities and ensured that children in public schools received a heavy dose of religious instruction."
- ^ Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 80
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 154.
- ^ Lacey 1981, back cover.
- ^ a b Kepel 2002, p. 72.
- ^ a b Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 234.
A former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article [Ottaway, David The King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p. 185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent 'north of $75 billion' in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personal Web site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 had distributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 176.
- ^ Kepel 2002, pp. 145–47.
- ^ Aboul‐Enein, Youssef. "The Late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam's Books" (PDF). dtic.mil. Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved 5 June 2014.
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. 174.
- ^ a b Kepel 2002, p. 143.
- ^ a b Kepel 2002, p. 139. "The summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 1981, which had reached a consensus on the idea of launching a jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine, refused to do the same for Afghanistan. Instead, it confined itself to calling on all Islamic states to cooperate with the UN secretary general in bringing an end to a situation that was 'prejudicial to the Afghan people'.".
- ^ Kramer, Martin S. (June 1996), "Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power", Middle East Quarterly, pp. 37–49, archived from the original on 26 December 2010
- ^ Kramer, Martin S. (1996), "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca", Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 978-1560002727
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 171. "Tehran's efforts to export the revolution through leaflets, radio broadcasts and tape cassettes castigating Al Saud for corruption and hypocrisy found a receptive audience in the Eastern Province. On 28 November, Saudi Shia summoned the courage to break the taboo on public religious expression by holding processions to celebrate the Shia holy day of Ashura [...]
"on 1 February, the one-year anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, violent demonstrations again erupted. Crowds attacked banks and vehicles and hoisted placards with Khomeini's picture. The government responded to the February protests with a mix of coercion and co-optation. On the one hand, leading Shiite activists were arrested. On the other, a high official from the Interior Ministry met with Shiite representatives and acknowledged that Riyadh had neglected the region's development needs. [...] extend the electricity network [...] more schools and hospitals and improve sewage disposal." - ^ Shane, Scott (25 August 2016). "Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters'". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 24 June 2017.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 63. "It is important to emphasize, however, that the 1979 rebels were not literally a reincarnation of the Ikhwan and to underscore three distinct features of the former: They were millenarians, they rejected the monarchy and they condemned the wahhabi ulama."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 163.
- ^ Benjamin, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002) p. 90
- ^ Salame, Ghassan, "Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia", Arab Studies Quarterly, v.ix n. 3 (1987), p.321
- ^ a b Kepel 2004, p. 179. "in keeping with a pattern dating back to the alliance between the royal family and tribal clerics, in which the ulama occupy center stage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of this tradition, the religious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clerics but were rather sahwa militants whose belief system was a hybrid of Salafism and Qutbist thought and whose allegiances lay outside the Saudi kingdom."
- ^ Wright, Sacred Rage, (2001), p. 155
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 49–52.
- ^ Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–72
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 48. "'Those old men actually believed that the Mosque disaster was God's punishment to us because we were publishing women's photographs in the newspapers,' says a princess, one of Khaled's nieces. 'The worrying thing is that the king [Khaled] probably believed that as well.' Khaled had come to agree with the sheikhs. Foreign influences and bida'a were the problem. The solution to the religious upheaval was simple – more religion."
- ^ a b Lacroix, Stéphane. "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 176 "... Iraq's 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's annexation of the oil-rich amirate alarmed Riyadh and Washington, in large measure because his intentions were unclear: Did he intend to push south to seize the oil fields in Saudi Arabia's Eastern province."
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 269. "For the Muslim Saudi monarchy to invite non-Muslim American troops to fight against Muslim Iraqi soldiers was a serious violation of Islamic law. An alliance between Muslims and non-Muslims to fight Muslims was also specifically forbidden by the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab."
- ^ McCants, William (17 March 2014). "Islamist Outlaws". Foreign Affairs.
- ^ Kepel 2002, pp. 150, 218, 225–26.
- ^ a b Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left. Penguin Books. p. 246. ISBN 978-0141030432.
In contemporary Wahhabism there are two broad factions. One is publicly supportive of the House of Saud, and will endorse any policy decision reached by the Saudi government and provide scriptural justification for it. The second believe that the House of Saud should be forcibly removed and the Wahhabi clerics should take charge. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are from the second school.
- ^ a b Kepel 2002, p. 220. "According to the militants, there were, however, two kinds of salafist, as they defined them. The sheikists had replaced the adoration of Allah with the idolatry of the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head. Their theorist was Abdelaziz bin Baz ... the archetypal court ulama (ulama al-balat) ... They had to be striven against and eliminated. Confronted by the sheikist traitors, the jihadist-salafists had a similarly supercilious respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, but they combined it with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith. The dissident Saudi preachers Hawali and Auda were held in high esteem by this school."
- ^ Dillon, Michael R. "Wahhabism: Is it a factor in the spread of global terrorism?" (PDF). September 2009. Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 27–38. Retrieved 2 April 2014.
- ^ "How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?". 2004. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 172
- ^ Lacey 2009, pp. 234–36. "A few days later another article appeared delivering the same verdict. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz ... ranked high in the brotherly pecking order ... The sheikhs and ulama had very valuable advice to offer, wrote the prince, but it was no more than that – advice. They should not consider that they were among 'those who govern'. Dr. Turki's bid for a direct role in Saudi government was firmly slapped down, and the reverend doctor did not argue back."
- ^ Coy, Peter (16 July 2014). "Online Education Targets Saudi Arabia's Labor Problem, Starting With Women". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 26 September 2014.
Saudi citizens account for two-thirds of employment in the high-paying, comfortable public sector, but only one-fifth of employment in the more dynamic private sector, according to the International Monetary Fund (PDF).
- ^ "Census shows Kingdom's population at more than 27 million". Saudi Gazette. 24 November 2010. Archived from the original on 6 October 2014.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. 6. "In 2003–2004, Saudi cities were the scene of a wave of suicide bombings, killings of westerners and gun battles between Saudi security forces and militants ... members of Al Saud decided it might be time to trim Wahhabism's domination by holding a series of National Dialogues that included Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and professional women. At present, the indications are not good for true believers in Wahhabi doctrine. But as its history demonstrates, the doctrine has survived crises before."
- ^ Christopher Boucek (27 October 2010). "Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical Relationship". Carnegie Endowment.
- ^ Rubin, Elizabeth (7 March 2004). "The Jihadi Who Kept Asking Why". New York Times. Retrieved 22 July 2014.
When Saudi intellectuals began worrying aloud that Saudi mosques and schools were fostering hatred of non-Wahhabists among young men, the religious establishment – which ensures that the kingdom follows a strictly puritanical interpretation of Islamic law – reacted with righteous anger, as if its social authority were under threat. Prince Nayef defended the religious establishment and blamed instead a foreign import – the Muslim Brotherhood, the radical Islamic political organization founded in Egypt in the 1920s – for the kingdom's problems. For years, Saudi Arabia sheltered and embraced the Brotherhood activists, and now, Prince Nayef told the press, the Brotherhood had turned against the Saudis and were destroying the Arab world.
- ^ Mintz, John; Farah, Douglas (10 September 2004). "In Search of Friends Among The Foes U.S. Hopes to Work With Diverse Group". The Washington Post. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's religious police ordered to be 'gentle'". BBC. 13 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia strips religious police of arrest powers". CNN. CNN. 14 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
- ^ Chulov, Martin. "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince". The Guardian. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
- ^ Cervellera, Bernardo (9 June 2016). "Conference in Grozny: Wahhabism exclusion from the Sunni community provokes Riyadh's wrath". AsiaNews.it. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
- ^ Dorsey, James M. (28 October 2017). "Crown Prince Mohammed's Vow To Moderate Saudi Islam: Easier Said Than Done". HuffPost. Bloomberg. Retrieved 16 November 2017.
- ^ "The Sunni Conference in Grozny: A Muslim Intra-sectarian Struggle for Legitimacy". Arab Nyheter. 2 November 2016. Archived from the original on 17 November 2017.CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
- ^ a b "What is our identity? An interview with Mohammed bin Salman, the architect of the new Saudi Vision". The Rahnuma Daily. 4 May 2021. Archived from the original on 6 May 2021.
- ^ a b "MBS: 'Founder of Wahhabism would be first to object to our blind commitment to his texts, worshipping and sanctifying him'". The Rahnuma Daily. 6 May 2021. Archived from the original on 7 May 2021.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman explains Vision 2030 in landmark interview". The Rahnuma Daily. 4 May 2021. Archived from the original on 25 May 2021.
- ^ Aluwaisheg, Dr. Abdel Aziz (4 May 2021). "Managing Saudi-US relations after crown prince's interview". The Rahmuma Daily. Archived from the original on 17 May 2021.
- ^ Yehoshua, Y (4 May 2021). "Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's Far-Reaching Statements On Religion Herald Further Reforms In The Kingdom". MEMRI. Archived from the original on 6 May 2021.
- ^ Haykel, Bernard (27 May 2008). "Middle East Strategy at Harvard, Anti-Wahhabism: a footnote". John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ a b Packer, George (17 May 2004). "Caught in the Crossfire: Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy or Islamist radicalism?". The New Yorker.
- ^ a b Confessions of a British Spy and British Enmity Against Islam (PDF) (8th ed.). Waqf Ikhlas Publications. 2001. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 May 2015.
- ^ Daniel Pipes (January 1996). "The Saga of "Hempher", Purported British Spy". Daniel Pipes. Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ Esposito 2003, p. [page needed], "Ahl-i Hadith".
- ^ a b Lacroix 2013, pp. 60-62.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. 145.
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. 144–45.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. 147.
- ^ Meijer, Roel (2013). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74, 130–35. ISBN 978-0199333431.
- ^ Dean Commins, David (1990). Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195061039.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. [page needed].
- ^ Lauzière, Henri (2016). The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 70–80. ISBN 978-0231175500.
- ^ Meijer, Roel (2013). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199333431.
- ^ Lacroix 2013, pp. 63-70.
- ^ Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East, p. 333
- ^ "Ramadan in Saudi Arabia". The Economist. 11 June 2016. Retrieved 11 June 2016.
- ^ Paul Marshall Radical Islam's Rules: The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari'a Law Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005 ISBN 978-1461686903 p. 19
- ^ Paulo Casaca, Siegfried O. Wolf Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship Springer 2017 ISBN 978-3319556901 p. 159
- ^ Mark A. Caudill Twilight in the Kingdom: Understanding the Saudis Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006 ISBN 978-0275992521 p. 132
- ^ "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
Wahhabi influence in Saudi Arabia, however, remained tangible in the physical conformity in dress, in public deportment, and in public prayer. Most significantly, the Wahhabi Legacy was manifest in the social ethos that presumed government responsibility for the collective moral ordering of society, from the behavior of individuals, to institutions, to businesses, to the government itself.
- ^ Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 10. ISBN 978-1403964335.
... religious police, which is feared and reviled both because of its wide reach and because its members are drawn from the lower classes. Their resentment of the rich, combined with their freedom of action, results in a dangerous combination and adds to the hardline religious social atmosphere sanctioned by Wahhabi doctrine, which is spread by clerics in the mosques and teachers in the schools, and which guides the verdicts handed down by Wahhabi 'justice' in the courts.
- ^ Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith. ISIM Review, Spring 2008, No. 21.
- ^ Anees al-Qudaihi (24 March 2009). "Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights". BBC.
- ^ Lionel Beehner (16 June 2006). "Shiite Muslims in the Middle East". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 17 July 2006.
- ^ Vali Nasr (2006). Shia Revival. p. 236.
- ^ a b Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470.
Wahhabism is noted for its policy of compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers, under pain of flogging at one time, and for enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere.
- ^ Saudi schools promoting hatred and violence on non-believers BBC.co.uk
- ^ Kepel 2004, p. 158. "Ibn Taymiyya and Abdul Wahhab counseled the strictest possible application of sharia in the most minuscule aspects of daily life and the use of coercion on subjects who did not conform to dogma. As Wahhabism began to exert its influence, a religious militia, the mutawaa – bearded men armed with cudgels (and today, riding in shiny SUVs) – was organized in Saudi Arabia to close down shops and office at prayer times five times a day."
- ^ Saudi Arabia's religious police 'contains extremists' BBC, 4 February 2014
- ^ a b Van der Meulen, D. (2000). The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud. Routledge. pp. 62–113. ISBN 978-0710306760.
- ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 67. ISBN 978-0060563394.
Wahhabis regularly flogged the residents of territories under their control for listening to music, shaving their beards, wearing silk or gold (this applied to men only), smoking, playing backgammon, chess, or cards, or failing to observe strict rules of sex segregation; and they destroyed all the shrines and most of the Muslim historical monuments found in Arabia.
- ^ Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 152–59.
- ^ Kostiner, Joseph (1993). The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. Oxford University Press. p. 119. ISBN 978-0195074406.
- ^ a b Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 160.
- ^ Tripp, Harvey; Peter North (2003). Culture Shock! Saudi Arabia. Graphic Arts Center Publishing Company. p. 131.
- ^ Battram, Robert A. (2010). Canada in Crisis (2): An Agenda for Survival of the Nation. Trafford. pp. 415–16. ISBN 978-1426933936.
- ^ a b Sharp, Arthur G. "What's a Wahhabi?". net places. Archived from the original on 21 March 2014. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ Anderson, Shelly (2013). Falling Off the Edge of the World. Lulu. p. 137. ISBN 978-1304059833.
- ^ Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press. p. 239. ISBN 978-0231134996.
The Taliban, despite their similarity to Wahhabis, never destroyed the graves of pirs (holy men) and emphasised dreams as a means of revelation, which is not a Wahhabi trait.
- ^ a b Husain, The Islamist, 2007, p. 250
- ^ Afshin Shahi (2013). The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia. ISBN 978-1134653195.
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab condemned many traditions, practices and beliefs that were an integral part of the religious and cultural consciousness of the Muslim community.
- ^ a b "A special day for mothers: Difference of opinion". Saudi Gazette. Archived from the original on 12 March 2014.
[hadith] 'Whoever imitates or resembles a nation, he is considered among them.'
- ^ Diana Marwan Al-Jassemand Ala’a Al-Twarib. "Many celebrate Valentine's Day in secret". Saudi Gazette. Archived from the original on 12 March 2014.
- ^ A Saudi Woman Is Threatened After Tweeting About Beards|newyorker.com |19 February 2014 |Katherine Zoepf
- ^ Eltahawy, Mona (1 July 2004). "The Wahhabi war against 'infidels' and flowers". Islam Daily. Archived from the original on 26 July 2014. Retrieved 22 March 2014.
... a Saudi friend forwarded me a copy of a fatwa, or religious ruling, issued by senior clerics. The fatwa banned the giving of flowers when visiting the sick in the hospital. The ruling observed: "It is not the habit of Muslims to offer flowers to the sick in hospital. This is a custom imported from the land of the infidels by those whose faith is weak. Therefore it is not permitted to deal with flowers in this way, whether to sell them, buy them or offer them as gifts."
- ^ [Mansour al-Nogaidan, a young preacher in the Sahwah (awakening) movement] Lacey 2009, p. 122. "... he continued his crusade against what he saw as the hypocrisy of the Wahhabi establishment. A year later, in 1989, he issued a fatwa condemning the World Youth Soccer Cup, which was being held in Saudi Arabia. Soccer was haram (forbidden), in his view, like many sports ..."
- ^ [the leader of "The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong" (Juhayman Al-Otaybi)] Lacey 2009, p. 12. "Everywhere Juhayman looked he could detect bidaa – dangerous and regrettable innovations. The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong was originally intended to focus on moral improvement, not on political grievances or reform. But religion is politics and vice versa ... immoral of the government to permit soccer matches ..."
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 50.
... one Saudi sheikh issued a fatwa condemning soccer because the Koran, he insisted, forbids Muslim to imitate Christians or Jews. Therefore, using words like foul or penalty kick is forbidden. The country's grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al Ashaikh, rejected that fatwa and called on the religious police to track down and prosecute its author.
- ^ Brooks, Geraldine (1995). Nine Parts of Desire. Doubleday. p. 161.
[from the religious editor of the Saudi Gazette circa 1986–1995] There are legal and moral rights that become consequential on marriage. Because of their different physiological structures and biological functions, each sex is assigned a role to play in the family ... it is the husband who is supposed to provide for the family. If he cannot gain enough to support the family ... both ... may work for gain. However:
1. The husband has the right to terminate a wife's working whenever he deems it necessary;
2. He has the right to object to any job if he feels that it would expose his wife to any harm, seduction or humiliation;
3. The wife has the right to discontinue working whenever she pleases. - ^ Lacey 1981, chapter 48: "Death of a Princess".
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 75
- ^ a b Max Rodenbeck (21 October 2004). "Unloved in Arabia". New York Review of Books. 51 (16).
- ^ House, Karen Elliott, On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future, Knopf, 2012, p. 9
- ^ a b c Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470.
Wahhabi doctrines and practices were imposed by the conquests although in a progressively gentler form as more urban areas passed into Saudi control. This was particularly true of the Hejaz, with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate. Thus, although the sound of a trumpet calling reveille in Mecca when it was newly conquered was enough to cause riot among the Wahhabi soldiers – music was forbidden – such that only energetic intervention on the part of the young Prince Faysal, later King, prevented a massacre, today music flows freely over the radio and television.
- ^ Glassé, Cyril (2003). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira. p. 471. ISBN 978-0759101906.
The sign of changing times in Saudi Arabia is that the exigencies of the modern world and pragmatism have opened the door to accepting the legal precedents of the other schools. The Wahhabis consider, or previously considered, many of the practices of the generations which succeeded the Companions as bid‘ah ... these included the building of minarets (today accepted) and the use of funeral markers.
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 12. "Luxuriant beards were and are the most famous badge of Salafi conviction, based on a traditional belief, which some scholars dispute, that the Prophet never trimmed his beard ... The other badge is a shortened thobe, because the Prophet did not let his clothes brush the ground."
- ^ Ambah, Faiza Saleh (22 June 2007). "An Unprecedented Uproar Over Saudi Religious Police". Washington Post Foreign Service. Retrieved 26 September 2014.
- ^ Rutter, Eldon (1998). "The Holy Cities of Arabia". In Michael Wolfe (ed.). One Thousand Roads to Mecca: Ten Centuries of Travelers Writing about the ... Grove Press. p. 344. ISBN 978-0802135995.
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 56. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 41. "Official Egyptian correspondence expressed sectarian hostility to the Najdi reform movement"
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 141. "Nevertheless, significant differences separate the Najdi movement from the modern revivalist agenda because the former stemmed from Muhammad ibn Ad al-wahhab's distinctive views on doctrine, whereas the Muslim Brothers were a reaction against European domination and cultural invasion."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 152. "The Wahhabi leadership of the World Muslim League made it an instrument for exporting the Najdi doctrine."
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 204. "The present debate signifies that the Najdi mission has become part of a globalized Muslim discourse."
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235.
The Eastern Province (home to the oil reserves and to the perennially ill-used and unhappy Shiite minority) and the Hejaz (site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with their more open, international outlook) both resent the overwhelming dominance of religious conservatives from the Najd, home of the Al Saud, at all levels of national governance.
- ^ Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 58. ISBN 978-1403964335.
... Asir, and the tribal population in that region, like the liberals of the Hijaz and the Shiites of the Eastern Province, have always been reluctant partners in the Saudi state. As with the merchants of the Hijaz and al-Jouf, the tribes of Asir have never fully embraced Wahhabi doctrine. Periodic local rebellions, and a low-level struggle to keep alive a regional identity, are both testimony to that ...
- ^ a b Dorsey, James M. "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia". 2013-09-08. Middle East Online. Retrieved 28 April 2014.
Qatar, the only other country whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to the Wahhabi creed.
- ^ Cole, Juan (2009). Engaging the Muslim World. Macmillan. p. 110. ISBN 978-0230620575.
- ^ Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Extremism, by Zubair Qamar, condensed and edited by ASFA staff
- ^ "Allah". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 28 May 2008.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 62.
- ^ Kabir, Nahid Afrose (2013). Young American Muslims: Dynamics of Identity. Edinburgh University Press. p. 44. ISBN 978-0748669936.
Both Wahhabism and Salafism are very much opposed by the vast majority of Sunnis and also by Shiites
- ^ Halverson 2010, p. 71. "Abdul-Wahhab was a proponent of Ijtihad, as were the leading reformers of the Salafi movement in Egypt."
- ^ Halverson 2010, p. 49. "Wahhabism then is justifably characterized as a distinct sectarian movement with its own idiosyncrasies that diverge from other Athari movements. But it nevertheless remains thoroughly Athari in nature."
- ^ Halverson 2010, p. 34. "The Atharis are often erroneously (but understandably) subsumed under the Hanbalite school of law (madhhab) [...] The Hanbalite madhhab [...] largely maintained the traditionalist or Athari position"
- ^ Halverson 2010, p. 36. "For the Atharis, the "clear" (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur'an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden."
- ^ Spevack, Aaron (2014). The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and Mysticism in the Synthesis of Al-Bajuri. State University of New York Press. p. 44.
Those who opted out of affiliation with the Ash'aris and Maturidis are often referred to as merely a group of Hanbalis [...] or Atharis, who relied on transmitted as opposed to rationally deduced sources. Their school is generally associated with an insistence on avoiding the use of rational argumentation in matters of belief, and a reliance solely on transmitted content (Qur'an and Hadith).
- ^ a b c d Halverson 2010, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Esposito, John L.; Emad El-Din Shahin, eds. (2013). "Islam and power in Saudi Arabia". The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412–13. ISBN 978-0195395891.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 84.
- ^ a b DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 84–87.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 84-87.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 90.
- ^ a b Commins 2009, p. x. "Most Muslims throughout history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada] makes one a Muslim. One might or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals ... but ... any shortcomings would render one a sinner, not an unbeliever.
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God. ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature ... the main points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740]." - ^ Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid[page needed]
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 69.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 25.
- ^ Ibn Ghannam, Hussien (2009). Tarikh najd. Cairo. pp. 467–71, 477.
- ^ "Wahhabi Theology". Saudi Arabia, Library of Congress Country Studies. Library of Congress. 1992.
The Wahhabi movement in Najd was unique in two respects: first, the ulama of Najd interpreted the Quran and sunna very literally and often with a view toward reinforcing parochial Najdi practices;
- ^ Commins 2009, pp. 142–43. "It is common for writers on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to assert that he sought a social renewal of Arabia, but that characterization is never given specific substance, unless one considers ritual correctness and moral purity to constitute such renewal. The problem with such generalizations is they encourage facile comparisons with modern revivalist movements, when in fact Najd's eighteenth-century reformer would have found key elements in Hasan al-Banna's writings utterly alien."
- ^ Esposito 2003, p. 123, "Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab". "plans for socio-religious reform of society were based on the key doctrine of tawhid"
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. 132–33.
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. 22–23, 115–16.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 97.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 96.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. 100.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 107–08.
- ^ a b Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 247–50.
- ^ Vogel, Frank E (2000). Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden. p. 76.
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening ... the Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions.
- ^ Commins 2006, p. 12. According to Commins, Kitab al-Tawhid "has nothing to say on Islamic law, which guides Muslims' everyday lives. This is a crucial point. One of the myths about Wahhabism is that its distinctive character stems from its affiliation with the supposedly 'conservative' or 'strict' Hanbali legal school. If that were the case, how could we explain the fact that the earliest opposition to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab came from other Hanbali scholars? Or that a tradition of anti-Wahhabi Hanbalism persisted into the nineteenth century? As an expert on law in Saudi Arabia notes, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening ... The Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh [jurisprudence] rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions."
- ^ Richard C. Martin, ed. (2004). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Macmillan Reference. p. 728.
Among the innovations condemned by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the centuries-long heritage of jurisprudence (fiqh) that coalesced into four Sunni schools of law and many schools of Shi'ism. The Wahhabiyya considered themselves the true Sunnis and acknowledged their affinity to the Hanbali legal tradition. Yet they rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith, even that of Ibn Hambal and his students.
- ^ Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. pp. 469, 470.
The Wahhabis are often said to 'belong' to the Hanbali School of Law (madhhab), but strictly speaking, like the Ahl al-Hadith ... they are ghayr muqallidun ('non-adherents'), and do not see themselves as belonging to any school, any more than the first Muslim generations did.
- ^ Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam Altamira, 2001, p. 407
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, p. [page needed]. "he did not consider the opinion of any law school to be binding... Where clarification was needed from ...nonscriptural source, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab encouraged his followers to turn to the example of Muhammad's Companions rather than the opinions of the law schools."
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 112–13.
- ^ Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470.
Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab branded all who disagreed with him as heretics and apostates, thereby justifying the use of force in imposing his doctrine, and political suzerainty with it, on neighboring tribes. It allowed him to declare holy war (jihad), otherwise legally impossible, against other Muslims. To this end, Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab also taught the use of firearms in place of the sword and the lance, the traditional weapons of the desert.
- ^ Moussalli, Ahmad (30 January 2009). Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy? (PDF). A Conflicts Forum Monograph. p. 3.
... the Wahhabis – who claim to be the champion of Sunni Islam – perceive the Sunnis as having been wrong for over ten centuries and have been living a state of pre-Islamic paganism (jahiliyya [literally, ignorance]) since they moved away from the way of al-salaf. They even accused the majority of orthodox Sunni Muslims who were living under the Ottoman caliphate and the caliphate itself of reprehensible innovation (bid‘ah) and unbelief (kufr) because they had been living under a political system that is unknown to al-salaf.
- ^ a b Algar 2002, p. 20. "In 1159/1746, the Wahhabi-Saudi state made a formal proclamation of jihad all who did not share their understanding of tauhid, for they counted as non-believers, guilty of shirk and apostasy. It is significant that whenever the term 'Muslims' occurs in Uthman b. Abdullah b Bishr's chronicle, `Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, it refers exclusively to the Wahhabis. But the Wahhabi dismissal of all Muslims other than themselves as non-believers is of more than historical significance. Discreetly concealed over the years because of a variety of factors – above all the desire of the Saudi regime to portray itself as a protector of Muslim interests, despite abundant evidence to the contrary – this attitude of monopolistic rejection continues to inform the attitudes to Muslims held by contemporary Wahhabis and those under their influence, even when not fully articulated."
- ^ Ruthven, Malise (1984). Islam in the World. Penguin. p. 282.
Ibn `Abd al Wahhab's fundamentalism ... led to an Khariji-style division of the world into 'us' against 'them', identifying all who failed to conform to Wahhabi tenets as 'infidels' liable to attack ...
- ^ Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahhabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). Naval Postgraduate School. p. 13. Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 April 2014.
The intertwining of Saudi political/military power and Wahhabi religious power strengthened this legitimacy, as Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyyah) claims to represent the only orthopraxy Islam.
- ^ Abu Khalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power, p. 50
- ^ "analyses wahhabism". PBS Frontline.
Wahhabi Muslims believe that their sect is the real true form of Islam, and that pretty much any other kind of way of practicing Islam is wrong." [according to Ahmed Ali, 'a Shi'a Muslim who grew up in Saudi Arabia']
- ^ a b Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left. Penguin. p. 250.
My Saudi students gave me some of their core texts from university classes. They complained that regardless of their subject of study, they were compelled to study 'Thaqafah Islamiyyah' (Islamic Culture) ... These books were published in 2003 (after a Saudi promise in a post-9/11 world to alter their textbooks) and were used in classrooms across the country in 2005. I read these texts very closely: entire pages were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation. There were prolonged denunciations of nationalism, communism, the West, free mixing of the sexes, observing birthdays, even Mother's Day
- ^ Khalid, Ahmad Ali (20 July 2011). "Petro-Islam' is a nightmare scenario". Wisdom Blow. Retrieved 1 April 2014.
Saudi textbooks are filled with references to hate; the Islamic Studies curriculum in the country is simply barbaric. I've experienced first-hand being taught by an Islamic Studies teacher in one of the most prominent private schools in Riyadh, about the dangers of having non-Muslims as friends and about the evil conspiracies hatched by Christians, Jews and Shias.
- ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. pp. 49, 50.
Significantly, Abd al-Wahhab also insisted that it was a sign of spiritual weakness for Muslims to care for or be interested in non-Muslim beliefs or practices. Pursuant to a doctrine known as al-wala` wa al-bara` (literally, the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal. For example, it was forbidden for a Muslim to be the first to greet a non-Muslim, and even if a Muslim returned a greeting, a Muslim should never wish a non-Muslim peace.
- ^ Bukay, David (Summer 2013). "Islam's Hatred of the Non-Muslim". Middle East Quarterly: 11–20. Retrieved 27 June 2015. (source conflates Wahhabism and Islam)
- ^ Curtin Winsor (22 October 2007). "Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism". Global Politician.
- ^ Blanchard, Christopher M. (24 January 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. p. CRS-5.
The Saudi Arabian government has strenuously denied the above allegations. Saudi officials continue to assert that Islam is tolerant and peaceful, and they have denied allegations that their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education. In response to allegations of teaching intolerance, the Saudi government has embarked on a campaign of educational reforms designed to remove divisive material from curricula and improve teacher performance, although the outcome of these reforms remains to be seen. Confrontation with religious figures over problematic remarks and activities poses political challenges for the Saudi government, because some key Wahhabi clerics support Saudi government efforts to de-legitimize terrorism inside the kingdom and have sponsored or participated in efforts to religiously re-educate former Saudi combatants.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 8, 109–110, 173.
- ^ Commins 2006, pp. 90–102, 111–13.
- ^ DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 34–35.
- ^ "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: History. Rulers of the first Saudi state". info.gov.sa. Government of Saudi Arabia. Archived from the original on 19 December 2012. Retrieved 20 August 2014. (note the first four Saudi monarchs have the title Imam)
- ^ Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 207
- ^ House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 27.
Not only is the Saudi monarch effectively the religious primate, but the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Islam that he represents instructs Muslims to be obedient and submissive to their ruler, however imperfect, in pursuit of a perfect life in paradise. Only if a ruler directly countermands the commandments of Allah should devout Muslims even consider disobeying. 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. [surah 4:59]'
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 180. "Ibn Baz submitted a memorandum to apologize for the Letter of Demands' tone and for publishing it at all rather than adhering to the customary Wahhabi principle that counsel to a ruler should be private."
- ^ Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis. London. pp. 191–94.
- ^ Struggle between designated heir Abdullah and his half brother Saud
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 62. "For the Wahhabi ulama, however, the succession struggle raises an unprecedented and knotty issue: namely, which candidate to support. Part of the problem lay in the ulama's tendency to accord allegiance to the ruler, regardless of how he came to power, as long as he declared support for Wahhabism. But some ulama insisted on a strict juridical view that branded a rebel against the legitimate ruler (imam) as a usurper"
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 115. "Since believers owe the ruler obedience, he is free to organize government as he sees fit as long as he does not cross that line. While this appears to grant unlimited powers to the ruler, the proviso for respecting shari'a limits is significant, since it includes, in Wahhabi doctrine, respect for the independence of qadis in matters within their jurisdiction. Hence, the ruler may not interfere in their deliberations. Building on this limitation on a ruler's power, the ulama have preserved their autonomy in the legal sphere by refusing to participate in the codification of law and the formation of a uniform system of law courts ... In matters before religious courts, Vogel found a striking degree of independence wielded by qadis because their mandate is not to follow precedent or implement a uniform code, but to discern the divine ruling in a particular incident."
- ^ "Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Fanaticism and Terror". Zubair Qamar.
- ^ Lacey 2009, p. 56. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and also of the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change-promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and the equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that was unthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House of Saud."
- ^ a b c d e f Commins 2009, p. 210.
- ^ Khaled Abou El Fadl (2002), The Place of Tolerance in Islam, p. 8. Beacon Press. ISBN 0807002291.
- ^ Commins 2009, p. 111.
- ^ a b Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 6 May 2014.
First, there is the void created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, two years later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since their passing, no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David Dean Commins, history professor at Dickinson College and author of "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia".
- ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, 2005, pp. 70–72.
- ^ documentary The Qur'an aired in the UK, The Qur'an review in The Independent
- ^ a b Yahya Birt, an academic who is director of The City Circle, a networking body of young British Muslim professionals, quoted in Wahhabism: A deadly scripture| Paul Vallely 1 November 2007
- ^ Curtin Winsor (22 October 2007). "Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism". Global Politician. Archived from the original on 10 June 2008.
- ^ a b Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, 19 May 2003
- ^ Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64
- ^ Coolsaet, Rik (2013). "Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism, Chapter 7". In Rik Coolsaet (ed.). Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. ISBN 978-1409476450.
The proliferation of brochures, free qurans and new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milat, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the growth of Internet sites: all of these elements have facilitated access to Wahhabi teachings and the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.
- ^ Kepel 2002, pp. 69–75.
- ^ "Radical Islam in Central Asia". Retrieved 13 November 2014.
- ^ Kuan Yew Lee; Ali Wyne (2012). Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and ... MIT Press. ISBN 978-0262019125.
But over the last 30-odd years, since the oil crisis and the petrodollars became a major factor in the Muslim world, the extremists have been proselytizing, building mosques, religious schools where they teach Wahhabism ... sending out preachers, and having conferences. Globalizing, networking. And slowly they have convinced the Southeast Asian Muslims, and indeed Muslims throughout the world, that the gold standard is Saudi Arabia, that that is the real good Muslim.
- ^ Lynch III, Thomas F. (29 December 2008). "Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism Differences that Matter" (PDF). gsmcneal.com. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. pp. 24–40. Retrieved 22 October 2014.
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'It is a kind of untamed Wahhabism,' said Bernard Haykel, a scholar at Princeton. 'Wahhabism is the closest religious cognate.' [...] The Islamic State's founder, Mr. Baghdadi, grafted two elements onto his Wahhabi foundations borrowed from the broader, 20th-century Islamist movements that began with the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately produced Al Qaeda. Where Wahhabi scholars preach obedience to earthly rulers, Mr. Baghdadi adopted the call to political action against foreign domination of the Arab world that has animated the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and other 20th-century Islamist movements. Mr. Baghdadi also borrowed the idea of a restored caliphate. Where Wahhabism first flourished alongside the Ottoman Caliphate, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded shortly after that caliphate's dissolution, in 1924 – an event seen across the world as a marker of Western ascent and Eastern decline. The movement's founders took up the call for a revived caliphate as a goal of its broader anti-Western project.
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• John Renard (2009). Tales of God Friends: Islamic Hagiography in Translation. Berkeley: University of California Press. - ^ Jonathan A.C. Brown, "Faithful Dissenters: Sunni Skepticism about the Miracles of Saints", Journal of Sufi Studies 1 (2012), p. 123
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- ^ M. Zarabozo 2005, pp. 29–30. "It was during this time that some words were exchanged or a dispute arose between Muhammad and his father.Unfortunately, none of the sources state the exact nature of this disagreement. Al-Uthaimeen notes that it probably was not concerning an issue of aqeedah (beliefs) as Abdul-Wahhaab, Muhammad's father, did not lend any support to the saint-cults and other false practices that existed.One explanation given is that it concerned the payment that some judges received for solving disputes. Although it is not known that Abdul-Wahhaab ever accepted such payments, it is clear that he did not consider it wrong for the other judges to accept payments of this nature. However, his son Muhammad considered this a type of bribe that is forbidden in Islam.Perhaps a stronger difference of opinion between them was concerned with the manner of making dawah and spreading the true teachings (and not the content of the teachings itself). In any case, what is certain is that while his father was still alive, Muhammad, out of deference to his father, was not overly active and public in his dawah (propagation) efforts as he was to become after his father's death in 1153 A.H"
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- ^ Memon, Naeem Osman (July 1994), "Chapter 9 The Kafir Controversy", Three in One, An Enemy – A Disbeliever – A Liar, Islam International Publications, archived from the original on 12 June 2002, retrieved 23 July 2018
- ^ Mohamed Mohamed (8 June 2009). "Somali rage at grave desecration". BBC News. BBC Somali Service. Retrieved 1 April 2010.
Most Somalis are Sufi Muslims, who do not share the strict Saudi Arabian-inspired Wahhabi interpretation of Islam with the hardline al-Shabab group. They embrace music, dancing and meditation and are appalled at the desecration of the graves ... The umbrella group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama (Sufi Sects in Somalia) has condemned the actions of what they call the ideology of modern Wahhabism and the desecrations of graves. They see Wahhabism as foreign and ultimately un-Islamic.
- ^ Rougier, Bernard (2015). The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from al-Qaeda to ISIS. Princeton University Press. p. 88. ISBN 978-1400873579. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
- ^ Policy Studies, Lebanese Center for (1994). "The Beirut Review: A Journal on Lebanon and the Middle East". The Beirut Review: A Journal on Lebanon and the Middle East (7): 124.
- ^ Kabha, Mustafa. Al-Ahbash and Wahhabiyya: Interpretations of Islam (PDF). Cambridge University Press. pp. 530–31.
- ^ Administrator. "Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation".
- ^ The Islamists Have it Wrong By Abdul Hadi Palazzi Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2001
- ^ "On Islam and 500 most influential Muslims" (PDF).
- ^ "The Naqshbandiyya Nazimiyya Sufi Order of America: Sufism and Spirituality".
- ^ Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi (9 September 2016). "Islamic conference in Chechnya: Why Sunnis are disassociating themselves from Salafists". Firstpost.
He stated: 'Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’ah are the Ash’arites or Muturidis (adherents of Abu Mansur al-Maturidi's systematic theology which is also identical to Imam Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari's school of logical thought). In matters of belief, they are followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shaf’ai, Maliki or Hanbali) and are also the followers of pure Sufism in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification.'
- ^ Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi (9 September 2016). "Islamic conference in Chechnya: Why Sunnis are disassociating themselves from Salafists". Firstpost.
- ^ Iqbal, Muhammad (2012). The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 978-080478686-7.
The great puritan reformer, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in 1700,studied in Medina, travelled in Persia, and finally succeeded in spreading the fire of his restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam. He was similar in spirit to Ghazall's disciple, Muhammad Ibn Tumart – the Berber puritan reformer of Islam who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim Spain, and gave her a fresh inspiration. We are, however, not concerned with the political career of this movement which was terminated by the armies of Muhammad 'All Pasha. The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the Prophet.
- ^ Bilal Philips, Abu Ameenah (1990). The Evolution of Fiqh(Islamic Law & The Madh-habs). Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House. p. 135.
As a corollary to these beliefs, it has been stated that anyone who dares openly to deny the infallibility of all four Madh-habs or the obligation to follow one to these Madh-habs is considered an accursed innovator and apostate.In the 20th century the most commonly used epithet for describing such an apostate has been the label Wahhabi (pronounced Wahhaabee).
- ^ Bilal Philips, Abu Ameenah (1990). The Evolution of Fiqh (Islamic Law & The Madh-habs). Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House. p. 114.
It is interesting to note that separate places of prayer for each of the Madh-habs remained around the Ka’bah until the first quarter of the twentieth century when ‘Abdul-‘Azeez ibn Sa’oud and his army conquered Makkah (October of 1924) and united all worshippers behind a single Imaam regardless of his or their Madh-habs
Bibliography
- Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. ISBN 188999913X.
- Brown, Daniel W. (2009). "The Wahhābī Movement". A New Introduction to Islam. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 245–47. ISBN 978-1405158077. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
- Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1845110802.
- Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris.
- DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195169913.
- DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2007). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1845113223.
- Esposito, John, ed. (2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acref/9780195125580.001.0001. ISBN 0195125584.
- Esposito, John L. (2011). What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam (2nd ed.). New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199794133.
- Haddad, Gibril F. (2004). Al-Albani and Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement. AQSA Publications.
- Halverson, Jeffry R. (2010). Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash'arism, and Political Sunnism. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0230106581.
- Haykel, Bernard (2013). "Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–92)". In Böwering, Gerhard; Crone, Patricia; Kadi, Wadad; Mirza, Mahan; Stewart, Devin J.; Zaman, Muhammad Qasim (eds.). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 231–32. ISBN 978-0691134840. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
- Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts (1st English ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674008774.
- Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674015753.
- Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts (New ed.). I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1845112578.
- Lacey, Robert (1981). The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Javonoich.
- Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. ISBN 978-0670021185.
- Lacroix, Stéphane (2013). "Chapter 2: Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism". In Meijer, Roel (ed.). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199333431. OCLC 5713616619.
- M. Zarabozo, Jamaal al-Din (2005). The Life, Teachings and Influence of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab. Riyadh: The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawah and Guidance The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. ISBN 9960295001.
- Valentine, Simon Ross (2015). Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond (First ed.). London: C. Hurst & Co. ISBN 978-1849044646.
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2006). "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 29 (3): 207–39. doi:10.1080/10576100500497004. S2CID 20873920.
Further reading
- Burckhardt, John Lewis, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830.
- Commins, David (2015). "From Wahhabi to Salafi". In Haykel, Bernard; Hegghammer, Thomas; Lacroix, Stéphane (eds.). Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151–66. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139047586.011. ISBN 978-1107006294. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
- De Gaury, Gerald and Stark, Freya, Arabia Phoenix, Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 978-0710306777
- Holden, David and Johns, Richard, The House of Saud, Pan, 1982, ISBN 0330268341
- Imran N. Hosein (1996). 'The Caliphate, the Hejaz and the Saudi-Wahhabi Nation-State'. New York: Masjid Darul Qur'an.
- Ismail, Raihan (2016). Saudi Clerics and Shia Islam. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190233310.
- Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0521644127
- Malik, S. K. (1986). The Quranic Concept of War (PDF). Himalayan Books. ISBN 8170020204.
- Moosa, Ebrahim (2015). What Is a Madrasa?. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-1469620138. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
- Oliver, Haneef James, The 'Wahhabi' Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden, T.R.O.I.D. Publications, 2004, ISBN 0968905854
- Phillips, Melanie (2006). Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within. Encounter books. ISBN 1594031444.
- Quist, B. Wayne and Drake, David F., Winning the War on Terror: A Triumph of American Values, iUniverse, 2005, ISBN 0595672728
- Saint-Prot, Charles (2008). Islam. L'avenir de la tradition entre révolution et occidentalisation [Islam. The Future of Tradition between Revolution and Westernization] (in French). Paris: Le Rocher.
- Swarup, Ram (1982). Understanding Islam through Hadis. Voice of Dharma. ISBN 068249948X.
- Trifkovic, Serge (2006). Defeating Jihad. Regina Orthodox Press, USA. ISBN 192865326X.
- Vernochet, Jean-Michel (2013). Les Egarés: Wahhabisme est-il un contre Islam ? (4th French ed.). Alfortville-F: Sigest. ISBN 978-2917329627.
- White, Jonathan R. (2017). "Militant Scholars and Strategists". Terrorism and Homeland Security (9th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning. pp. 252–53. ISBN 978-1305633773. LCCN 2015951183. Retrieved 1 June 2020.
External links
- Wheeler Thatcher, Griffithes (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica. 28 (11th ed.). p. 245.
- "Wahhabism"
- Islam for Today
- Spero News – Bosnia
- BBC Analysis
- Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology
- Booknotes interview with Stephen Schwartz
- Wahhabism
- Islamism
- Sunni Islamic branches
- Islamic fundamentalism
